

G. 11. 31

AN
IMPARTIAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
Nature of Sin.

In which are evidently Proved
Its **POSITIVE ENTITY** or **BEING**,
The true *Original* of its *Existence*;
The *Essentiall Parts* of its *Composition*,

By { Reason,
Authority, { *Divine*,
 { *Humane*, { *Antient*,
 { *Modern*, { *Romane*,
 { *Reformed*,

The Adversaries *Confessions* and *Contradictions*;

The Judgement of *Experience* and *Common sense*;

Partly Extorted by Mr. *Hickman's challenge*, partly by the *Influence*
which his *Errors* hath had on the *Lives* of many, (especially on the
Practise of our *last* and *worst Times*;) But chiefly intended as an *A-*
mulet to prevent the like *mischiefs* in time to come.

To which is added
An *Appendix*, in vindication of Doctor *HAMMOND*; with the *concurrent* of
Doctor *SANDERSON*; The *Oxford Visitors* impleaded; The *Supreme*
(*Authority* asserted; together with diverse other Subjects,
whose *Heads* are gathered in the *Contents*.)

After all
A *Postscript* concerning some *dealings* of Mr. *BAXTER*.

By *THOMAS PIERCE* Rector of *Brington*,

L O N D O N,

Printed by *R. N.* for *T. Garthwait*, at the little North-door of
Saint Paul's Church.

IMPARTIAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
NATURE OF SIN.



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To my Reverend Friend Mr. J.B.
at his lodging in Saint Paul's
Church-yard.

Sir,



He Face of Things in our British World, which the giddy Phaetons of the Times had lately confounded into a Chaos, doth not onely seem so strangely, but so miraculously alter'd, since the Book I now send you was first engaged in the Press; that had not the Stationer and the Printer put it wholly out of my power, (before your Letter of good news was so much as written) I had laid my Spunge upon several passages and expressions, which however they are of eternal verity, were yet much siffer when they were Penn'd, than now they are come into the Light. For then I took it to be a Time, wherein 'twas proper to engage in a Defensive war. But now I hope it is a season, wherein the Lamb shall lye down by the Wolf in peace, and the once-affrighted Kid commend the neighbourhood of the Leopard. Then I thought it was a Time, in which the enemies of God, and of his Anointed, (both King, and Church,) were to be conquer'd in obedience by dint of Argument and discourse.

11a, 11. 6

But now I hope the Time is coming, in which the enemies I speak of will face about, and turn Friends. Or if they are backward to reconciliation, and will not forgive us for having suffer'd, as fearing our Sufferings have been greater than they think we are able to forgive; I think our noblest way will be, to confute their fears with our moderation; and so to pull them in to us by cords of Love.

I know there are certain *Critiques*, who blow the Coals of Dissension with greatest Fierceness, when they see them most likely to be extinguish'd. They represent the suffering Party as men that breath nothing but vengeance, and therefore not to be trusted with old Injoyments; but still to continue the suffering Party; And so because they have been injur'd for some years past, to be Incapable of Justice for time to come. But if there are here and there a few, who lose the benefit of their sufferings by their Impatience, as I am not able to excuse them, and think them punished with their sin; so must I hold those other men (the envious Cole-Blowers I speak of) to be more incapable of excuse, in that they charge on so many thousands the indiscretion perhaps of Twenty or Thirty persons, who peradventure do only *SAT* that they are some of the Kings Party. For the Rule to measure His Party by, must be the Nature of their affections; which so far as they are differing from what they are known to be in Him, so far themselves must be known to be none of His. And His are Fatherly affections, as we may judge by his choice to lose the Benefit of his Right for so long a Time, rather than force his way to it by forreigne Help.

And truly (Sir,) I can say it as a very great Truth,
That

That as when our David was even hunted, and forc'd to fly into the * Wildernets, it seem'd a kind of Disloyalty for us to prosper, (at least so far, as to dwell at Home,) And all our comfort was even this, that we were not guilty of being safe, (at a time when it was difficult to be safe and Innocent, both at once; so now that we hope he is returning to his Jerusalem in peace, and his people with joy to their antient Loyalty and Allegiance, I am not able even to wish, much less to use my last endeavour, that our Enemies may suffer as heavy things as they Inflicted. I wish them deprived of nothing else, but what will kill them if they retain it. I wish them Health, and prosperity, and perfect Liberty of conscience, as well as of person, and of purse. But (more then these) I wish them Loyalty from this time forward; I wish them unanimity and uniformity in Religion; I wish them the Grace of Restitution to every person whom they wronged; I do not wish, with Saint * Paul they may be delivered up to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, but that their spirits may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. And so I hope I may boldly say, I wish them no worse than I wish my self. For I earnestly wish, and make it my prayer to God Almighty, that I never may prosper in any ill course, either by error of Judgement, or guilt of Practice. More than this (I thank God) I do not wish to my greatest enemies, and less I cannot wish to my dearest Friends. I wish our David may prove the Centre, for our Affections to meet and concentre in, from the most opposite points of the whole circumference. Whatever our Distances may have been, (and still may be as to some opinions,) I wish at last we may unite, and be

2 Sam. 15.
23, 28.

* 1 Cor. 5.5.

one in him ; And so Remember how we agree in Love and Loyalty to our Sovereign, as to forget how we differ in other things. All the Revenge that I desire, is that of Joseph towards his Brethren ; who ; though they had stripped him of his clothes, and cast him cruelly into the pit, and cheaply sold him to the Ishmaelites, (Gen. 37.) yet he requited them no worse then with food and raiment. Nay casting his Arms about their necks, he suffer'd his love to run out into tears and kisses. (Gen. 45.) If we look backward, I must profess, I have been many times engaged in such pen-combats as now I publish. But looking forward I suppose, that I shall run with the Foremost to Love and union.

Some may otherwise conjecture, by what is said in my Appendix, at such a Time. But 'tis for want of Consideration, that my whole performance was both extorted by the Adversary, and dispatched by my self, and also committed unto the Press, before I could hear of any Endeavours to reconcile the Pens of dissenting Brethren, or but to make a cessation of such like Arms. Sure I am, I am as ready as any one of my Brethren, to sacrifice any thing to Peace, excepting righteousness, and truth, the love of God, and his glory. I shall be willingly bound up from ever speaking, or writing, or injoying any place in the Church of God, (if my Superiours can but imagine how that may tend to the pullick good) rather than lay the least Block in the way of unity ; which now is attempting a return to such a Babel as ours hath been.

But (besides) my contention will be believed to have been such, as mine Adversary in time will applaud me for, when he shall find my Rudest twitches were but to snatch

*Match him from a Præcipice. As soon as Mr. Hickman shall be convinced, that though for a sinner to hate God, and to murder men, are as positive entities, as any actions to be imagin'd, yet they cannot but be reckon'd among the worst sorts of sins, and therefore cannot (without impiety) be said to be any of God's creatures, or God himself, (which yet Mr. Hickman hath often taught,) I say as soon as he shall discern, not onely how dangerous and sinfull, but how irrational and senseless his error is; he will as heartily thank me even for this very Book, as I would thank that man who should pluck a thorn out of my eye. Besides that my aime in what I have written, hath been the same with that of the most moderate Doctor Sanderison; For (to express it in * his words) I have not written against the moderate, but onely the Rigid-Scotized-thorow-paced Presbyterians. Of them Mr. Hickman can be but one. And even with him I am as ready to be upon just as good Termes, as with my neighbour Mr. Barlee I long have been. Let him onely forbear to wound me in the Apple of my eye, nay in the tenderest part of my very soul, by dishonouring God, and his Anointed, (long before whose restoration, (which is but hoped whilst I am writing,) I had sent my Vindication of his Supremacy to the Press, and which had certainly been as publick, as now it is, though the Republicans had prosper'd in their Carriere:) Let him, I say, but do that, and my work is done. If I shall ever again appear, in the behalf of any one of the five controverted points, it will be likehest to be in Latine (as being the Scholars Mother-tongue) and onely in order to reconciliation.*

Now that the God of peace and unity will make us at
unity

* See his Excellent long Preface before the second Edition of his 8th Sermons S. 24.

unity and peace within our selves, enlightning our heads
with that knowledge which is the mother of humility;
and inflaming our hearts with that zeal which is accord-
ing to such a knowledge, and thereby making up our
breaches as well of judgement as of charity, (or at
least of charity, if not of judgement,) that we may
all be held together by the bond of unity in the truth;
shall be as heartily the endeavour, as it is the frequent
and fervent prayer, of

Your meaneſt Brother and Servant


in our Lord and Maſter

Jeſus Chriſt.

Brighton. May 2. 1660.

THOMAS PIERCE,

A PAR-



A PARÆNETICAL PREFACE

Shewing the *purpose* of the *Author*, with the *Necessity* of the *Work* ; Representing its usefulness in *all* Times, but more especially in *these* ; with some Preparatory Advertisements, making the whole the more manageable to the less Intelligent of the people.

Christian Reader,

IF thou shalt ask in curiosity, why I happen to come (so late to this *Discharge* of my *Engagement*, (to which I stood by my *Promise* so long obliged;) Know that my several *Præengagements* with severall Books of Mr. *Baxter*, together with several *interventions* both of *sickness*, and *journies*, and other *Impediments* unavoidable, do conspire to give thee the *Reason* of it. For *these* did keep me from the *thought* of what I have brought to a *conclusion*, till somewhat *after* the beginning of this *last Winter*. Besides that at the *end* of my *Autocatacrisis*, (which I conceive more useful then all my *Controversies* besides, and upon which I bestowed the greatest labour, that it might put a full end to the *whole Dispute*;) I made a *promise* to my *Readers* of what I had purpos'd within my self, that if I return'd to any *Dispute* in any kind whatsoever, as it would fall out *Cross* to my *Inclinations*,

A Parænetical Preface

tions, so I resolv'd to do it onely at times of *Leisure*. That whilst my *homers* could be spent in my chief employment, I might not lose too many of them in my *least necessary* Defences. For though I remember I am a * *Shepherd*, and bound as well to defend, as to feed the Sheep; yet it cannot but be (to me) an unpleasant Game, to tyre my self in the hunting of *Wolves* and *Foxes*.

But after the Reason of my *lateness*, I am to render another Reason, why I betook my self at last to the present service. I saw the flock was indanger'd by several Vermin, and partly driven out of the Fold too; Nay the great *Master-shepherd* was himself assaulted by their Inventions, by whom he was scandalously reported to be the principal cause of their going astray. * Some I found teaching, (and that *not at all* in broadest Terms, That God is the Author of Injustice, the Author of Adultery, the Author of the evil of sin, not onely the Author of the sinful work it self, but of the evil intention too; (In a word) The Author of all those things, which we affirm to come to pass by his mere permission, (and not at all by his appointment.) † Others I caught in the Act of teaching, That God doth incite, or stir men up to wicked actions, that He seduceth, commandeth, doth make obdurate, draws, sends in deceipts, and effects those things which are grievous sins. Of which I now give an Instance from *Peter Martyr* in my Margin, because he was the most famous and learned Calvinist of Florence. In so much that Doctor *Whitaker* did most ingenuously confess (when he answer'd *Campion*) that * if Calvin, or *Peter Martyr*, or any other of that Party, affirms God to be the Author and cause of sin, they

* Ezek. 33.
7, 8. & ch. 34.
2, 10.

* See the pages and lines cited, from *Zuinglius*, *Calvin*, *Barthez*, and *D. Twisse*, with the Editions of their Books, in my first ed. of this Treatise, *Scd.* 2. p. 3-4.

† Deus homines ad suas pravas Actiones incitat, seducit, jubet, inducit, trahit, decepti-ones immittit, & quæ

peccata gravissima efficiunt. *Pet. Vermil. Mart. Florent.* (edit. Tigur. 1561.) in *Jud. c. 3. v. p. 10. & 11. fol. 56. pag. 1. lin. 7. &c.* * Si Calvinus, aut Martyr, aut quisquam nostrum affirmet. Deum, esse Authorem & Causam peccati, non repugno quin suum amos horrendæ Blasphemiae susterisque rei. *Whitak. in Respons. sua ad octavam Rationem Campiani*, (edit. Genev. 1610.) in *Tom. 1. operum suorum, pag. 33. col. lin. 34. &c.*

to the Reader.

are all of them guilty of the most horrid Blasphemy and wickedness. And yet when the *Florentine* I spake of had put the Question, (in the page preceeding his above cited words,) *An Deus causa sit peccati?* whether God be the cause of sin? he presently call'd it, *Quaestionem non dissimulandam*, and professedly held it in the affirmative! A third sort I found there were who taught, *That * God is the Author not of those actions alone, in and with which Sin is, but of the very pravity, Ataxia, Anomia, Irregularitas, and sinfulness it self which is in them; yea that God hath more hand in mens sinfulness, then they themselves.* These were publicly and in *Print*, the very words of Master Archer, a Presbyterian Minister of London in Lombard Street; who went over into Holland with Thomas Goodwin, (*Oliver Cromwell's* Ghostly Father, and the present usurper of the Presidentship in *Magdalen Colledge*), by which Goodwin he was commended for † as *previous a man as this earth bears any*. In Holland he was Pastor of the Church of *Arnhem*, as we are told by Mr. * *Edwards*, his loving Friend too. His book he was pleased to Intitle, [*Comfort for Believers in their Sins and Sufferings.*] for fear Believers should be afflicted with the *sinfulness* of their *sins*, which God himself is the *Author* of, and *more the Author* (in his opinion) than they can be. Yet his Book with this Doctrine was even printed by Authority, *cum Privilegio*, (when Presbyterianism was up) with the License and approbation of old Mr. *Drumham*, who was empowered to such things by the-world-knows-whom. It was the Doctrine of Mr. *Knox*, the great *Improducer* of Presbyterianism in Scotland) *That the wicked are not, onely left by Gods suffering, but † compelled to sin by his power.* p. 317. And again he saith, *we do not onely behold and know God to be the Principal cause of all things, but also the Author appointing all things.* p. 22. It is also taught in * another Treatise, (at first written in French, but after published in English) *That by vertue of Gods will, all things*

* Mr. Archer's
Comfort for
Believers. p.
36, 37.

† Mr. Thom.
Goodwin's A-
pologetical
Narration,
subscribed by
Phil. Nye,
Will. Bridge,
Jer. Burrows,
& Sidrach
Simpson. Li-
censed by
Charles Herle
(printed by
R. Dawlman.
1643.) p. 22.

* Mr. Ed-
wards his An-
tapologia (c.
dit. 1645. pag.
160.

† See him ci-
ted by Dr.
Heylin in his
Hist. Quin-
quart. part. 3.
ch. 16. p. 5.

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* A Brief Declaration of the Table of predestination, on p. 15.
 Ibid. p. 6.
 † Ibid. p. 6.

See the words in his Book of the 2. Edition (which Edition I use in all I cite from this Author.) p. 93. lin. penult. ult.

were made, yea even those things which are * evil and execrable p. 15. Another takes upon him to † prove, That all evil springeth out of God's Ordinance. And his Book is Intituled [Against a Privy Pa'st] as 'twere on purpose to betray the Protestant Name into Disgrace. But now at last Mr. Hickman outgoes them All, if they all are but capable to be outgon. For the most execrable and hainous of all the sins to be imagin'd, is the Devil's hating Almighty God. Which though Mr. Hickman doth confess to be the worst of all actions, and again essentially and incommunicably evil, (p. 94. lin. 2.) evil ex genere & obiecto, (Ibid. lin. 9.) and such as no kind of Circumstance can ever make lawful (ib. lin. 17.) yet he grossly calls it *The work of God*, as all other positive things are, (p. 96. lin. 8.) wilt thou know (good Reader) what may lead him to such a Blasphemy? Thou must know his principle is this Verbatim, [It belongs to the universality of the FIRST CAUSE to PRODUCE not only EVERY REAL BEING, but also the positive MODIFICATIONS of Beings. (95. l. ult. & p. 95. lin. 1.) And this he gives for the very Reason, why *The Author of hating God* (spoken of just now) is *the work of God*.

Now that this is a Principle (or a Doctrine) whose every consequence is a crime, I cannot better convince the Calvinists, than by the confession of Mr. Calvin. For when the very same Doctrine, which I suspect to have been brew'd by the Carpenters, was freshly broached by the Libertines, (breaking in, with Presbytery, to help disgrace our Reformation, just as the Quakers to the discredit of Christianity it self,) Master Calvin called it † *An Execrable Blasphemy*; not onely once, but again and again too. And what was that which he declaimed so much against in that stile? was it that God was said plainly to be the *Author of sin*? no such matter. It was onely for saying it in *equivallence*. It was for saying another thing, from whence God might be inferred to be the Author of sin. It was onely for saying, *God worketh all things*.

This

‡ Joh. Calvinii
 Tractatus
 Theologici
 Sec. (edit. Genev. 1612.) in
 Librarios. c.
 4. p. 436. col.
 3 lin. 50. & lib.
 p. 437. col. 1.
 lin. 14.

This was called by Mr. Calvin, *An Execrable Blasphemy*. And his Reason for it is very observable. For (saith he) * *from this Article, [God worketh all things] Three things do follow extremely frightfull. First that there will not be any Difference between God and the Devil; || Next, that God must deny himself; Thirdly, that God must be transformed into the Devil.*] A greater Authority than Calvin no man living can produce against his followers of the *Presbytery* (some few *Episcopal Anti-remonstrants* being unjustly called *Calvinists*,) there being a wide gulf fixt between them and Calvin,) And I have cited him so exactly (as few or no Writers are wont to do) that if an enemy will not believe me, he may consult Mr. Calvin with expedition, and make his own eyes bear witness for me.

* Ex hoc Articulo, [Deum sc. omnia operari] Trias admodum horrida consequitur, quorum primum hoc est. nullum inter Deum et Diabolum discrimen fore. ib. c. 13. p. 445. col. 1. lin. 53.

|| Ipsum à se col. 2. lin. 42.

abtegrari oportet, & in Diabolum transformari. Ibid. cap. 14. pag. 447.

Next considering with my self, how that a *lesser Blasphemy* than This, is called *Railing against the Lord*, (2. Chron. 32. 17.) and that a *Doctrine less diabolish*, is broadly said by the Apostle to be *the doctrine of Devils*, (1 Tim. 4. 1.) That it is God blessed for ever, against whom the children of transgression do open a wide mouth, and draw out the Tongue, (Isa. 57. 4.) the tongue which reacheth unto the heavens, (Psalm. 73. 9.) and whose talking is against the most high, (v. 8.) That our common enemies of Rome do object these things to the *Reformation*, as if (forsooth,) they were our *Protestant and common sins*; Nay that the *Lutherans* themselves will rather return unto the *Papists* from whom they rationally parted, than live in communion with the *Calvinians*, for this one Reason, because the *Calvinians* seem to worship another God, to wit, a God who is the Author and cause of sin; I say considering all this both with the causes and the effects, I confess my heart waxeth hot within me, and though for a Time I keep silence, yea even from good words, yet (as the Psalmist goes on,) it was pain and grief to me. I often call'd to mind

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that pertinent saying of Saint Peter; (1 Epist. c. 4. v. 14.) and then concluded within my self, If God on their part is evil spoken of, 'tis the fitter that on ours he should be glorified. If all his Works are commanded to speak well of him, in all places of his Dominion, (Psal. 103. 22.) I could not have answer'd it to my self, should I still have been guilty of keeping silence; much less to Him could I have had what to say, under whom I am entrusted, and that with faults. Since he describes a good Shepherd, by his readiness to lay down his life for the sheep, I durst not be such a Lascive, and unfaithful servant, as not to offer up my *oyle*, or shed a little of my *Ink*, where I should think my dearest blood were too cheap a sacrifice.

Finding therefore that *Dollrine*, which is so execrable and hainous as hath been shew'd, suck'd in greedily by the *Ranters* in these our dayes, breaking in upon the Church (which is Gods *Inclasure* as well as *Spouse*) even at that very gap, which some had purposely made to cast out *Bishops*, and *obedience*, and whatsoever was *Christian*, besides the name; I also considered who they were, who took upon them the *Tapslers office*; and drawing out the very *dreggs* of this deadly wine, boldly gave it instead of drink to the giddy people. Mr. Hickman seemed to be the boldest and the busiest officer of them all; and the more popular he was thought, I thought him the fitter to be encounter'd. For if his Favourers come to think, That God is the cause and the producer of every real being (not excepting the cursing or hating God) They have nothing to defend them from being *Libertines*. Or if they come to be persuaded that *sin* hath no real being (but is a non-entity, that is, a nothing) they must needs be *Carnadists*, for ought I am able to apprehend. And when they perfectly are either, (to wit *Carnadists* or *Libertines*.) I know not what can secure them from turning *Atheists*. It was observed by *Pencers* (in his *Epistle* before his *Chronicon*) that there are three *sins* especially which have a tendency to the changing of *States* and *Empires*; *doctrix*, *adulterix*, *doctrix*.

to the Reader,

idolaters. Impiety, Injustice, unbridled Lust. The Church is ruin'd by the first, the secular policy by the second, and private families by the third. Each of these must needs reign, when thought to have nothing of Reality, or (if it hath) to be God's own offspring. The late *Cromwellians* and the *Phanaticks* were clearly transported by the latter. For having † called their strength the Law of Justice, they constantly ascribed to God's decree, and appointment; and * *All working providence*, whatsoever vile practice they found they were able to bring about. Their *Declarations* and *Petitions*, their *Remonstrances* and *news Books*, their *Congratulations* and *Addresses*, both to the old and young Tyrant, did ever run in *Mr. Hickman's* and *Hobbs* his strain. *Regicide*, and *Sacrilege*, and all manner of *Usurpations*, (being not onely Real, but positive entities) were still ascribed to the working and will of God.

But *Mr. Hickman's* true opinion must not be judged of by his word; unless his opinion (like his words) doth often varie and shift it self to the two extreme parts of his contradictions. Whether 'tis really his opinion, that *that* is no sin, which is intrinsically a evil, because he saith it is good and the work of good; or else that *that* is a sin which is God's own work, because he saith it is an action; and hath a positive being; whether 'tis really his opinion, That for *Amnon* to ravish his sister *Tamar* could not possibly be a sin, because an action; or that a hatred of God himself cannot possibly be a sin, because a Quality; we can but guess by his plainest words, though the Searcher of hearts doth know his meaning. For one while he seeks to persuade his Readers, that sin is nothing, but a privation; And he doth it by producing such figurative expressions from certain Authors, as by which it is said, *that sin is no-thing*. (As 'twere on purpose to let us know what he means by a privation.) Another while he saith, that *all things positive are good and from God*; and yet that the *Revelation of hating God* is intrinsically evil; which notwithstanding he confesseth to be a positive thing. Another

† *Wild. 2. 11.*
* Reader,
Compare the
non sense with
the impiety of
the expression,
and mark
how little
they under-
stand, what
the word *pro-*
vidence doth
import.

a p. 93. & 94.
b p. 96.
c p. 93. 94.
d p. 96.
2 Sam. 13.

e p. 77.
f p. 96.

g p. 93. 94.
h p. 96.

while

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1 p. 103.

k p. 95.

while he saith, That the first ¹ sin of the Angels was a proud desire to be equal with God. Where sin is practica-
 ted in reſts of proud desire; which proud desire he will not
 deny to be a *Quality*, and so to have both a *Real* and a
positive Being. And yet another while he saith, That what-
 soever hath a *real* (he doth not say onely a *positive*) being,
 God himself doth kproduce, as the first cause of it. So that
 one of these two must needs be really his opinion, (but which
 of the two I leave him to say) either that sin is Gods work;
 and that God produced in the Angels their proud desire;
 Or else that sin hath no real being, but that conscience
 and sin are Ecclesiasticall words. By the first, he is a Li-
 berrine, by the second, a Carneadist. And whether he who
 is either will not laugh at the Psalmist (in his heart at least,
 or in his sleeve) for believing such a thing as a Reward for
 the Righteous, I shall leave it to be judged by the consider-
 ing Reader.

What should move him to assert the most contradictory
 things, as that sin is something, and nothing; an action, and
 no action; Not a quality, yet a quality; That the bating of
 God is a sin, and no sin; That God is the cause, and the Cre-
 ator, yet not the Author of every act, And yet the Author
 of every act which is but *positivus* or *real*; I am not able to
 imagine; unless he writes as he is moved by the present
 necessity of his affairs, or is carried away with the Jesuits
 Doctrine of probability, concerning which I shall speak in
 my consideration of Mr. Baxter.

Some prepa-
 rations, for
 the less Intel-
 ligent of the
 People.

Now to fit the plainest Reader for the perusal of my Book,
 and to make the *positivity* of the very worst sins become vi-
 sible to the blind, very easie to the unlearned, and to the
 obstinate, undeniable; I will supply him (in Antecessum)
 with severall Hints and *Admonitions* of severall forms and
 ways of arguing, upon which he may enlarge as occasion
 serves. 1. It is the property of *Qualities* (*Quarto modo*, and
 so of nothing but qualities) to denominate their subjects
 either like or unlike. And so those sins must needs be quali-
 ties, which will be granted to give such a denomination

II. The

to the Reader.

II. The *positive belief* (in sensu composito) *that there is no God*, must needs be granted (even by *all*) to be a *positive entity or being*; But 'tis so *wholly a sin*, as that 'tis *nothing but a sin*, to have a *positive belief that there is no God*; Therefore that which is so *a sin as to be nothing but a sin*, must needs be granted (even by *all*) to be a *positive entity or being*. III. *Sin properly so called is a transgression of the Law*. And so is the *act of the hating of God*, which yet is granted to have a *positive being*. IV. A *simple conversion* is to be made betwixt *sin*, and any *action* against a *negative precept*; for every such *action* must be a *sin*, and every such *sin* must be an *action*. V. If *something positive* may be a *sin*, then may a *sin* be *something positive*; but *something positive* may be a *sin*, witness *envy, pride, lust, malice*. VI. To hate God is an *Action*, and therefore *positively something*. But 'tis a *sin to hate God*. Ergo. VII. God forbid's in the Decalogue those *positive acts*, [*coveting, stealing, bearing false witness*;] and those are *sins* which God forbids in the Decalogue; therefore those *positive acts* are *sins*. VIII. In this true proposition, [*It is a sin to hate God*] *sin* is predicated directly of a *positive action*; therefore that *action* is a *species of sin*. IX. There is a *numerical identity* or *sameness* betwixt a *demonstrative* and a *determinate Individual*; as betwixt *this man*, and *Mr. Hickman*, when pointed out with a finger. Such an *Identity* there is betwixt *this sin*, and the *Devils hating of God*, when 'tis the thing so pointed out. Y. That very phrase, [*an act of sin*] implyeth *sin* to be a *compound*, which hath an *act*, as well as an *obliquity*. So that if *sin* is *sinfulness*, (which is the pleasure of *Mr. Hickman*,) then *sinfulness* is a *compound*, and hath an *act*. XI. The very word *peccare*, to *sin*, imports an *action*, so does *malefacere*, to do *wickedly*, as much as *benefacere*, to do *well*. And therefore this is the style of the holy Scriptures, * *They that have done evil, shall have a resurrection to damnation*, and † *God will render to every man according to his Deeds*. * *Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doth evil*. XII. 'Tis

* 1 John 5.

† Rom. 2. 6.

* Vulg.

A Parænetical Preface

false in extremity, and *nonsense* in the worst degree, because it implies a *contradiction*, to say the *sin* is the mere *repugnance* of the *act* to the *law*, without the *act* which is *repugnant*. Or that the *sin* of *hating God* is a *deflection* from the *Precept*, without that *hating* which is the *sin*. XIII. 'Tis so far from being *false*, to call it a *sin* to *blaspheme*, (which is a *positive entity*) that it is *blasphemy* to *deny* it. This is a proof from plain experience. XIV. A *part* of nothing can be the *thing*, of which it is but a *part*; for then the *part* would be the *whole*; which does imply a *contradiction*. And so the formal *part* of *sin* cannot possibly be the *sin*; but the *sin* must include the *material* also.

This doth prompt me (Gentle Reader) to prepare thee also for those *evasions*, with which the Adversaries of Truth will pretend to *answer* what thou shalt *urge*. 1. If therefore when thou provest a *sin* is *positive*, they shall only answer concerning *sin* *quatenus sin*; Remember to tell them of their Fallacie, *A Thesis ad Hypothesin*, or *à dictis simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*. 2. If again when thou sayst, *some sins are actions*, (such as those which God forbids us to put in being,) they shall answer that *sins* of *omission* are not; put them in mind of that other fallacie, *À dictis secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. 3. If when thou arguest by an *Induction* of such particulars, as in the Instance of *hating God*, they shall answer that *hating* is not *evil* in it self; and *good*, as fasten'd upon *sin*; Tell them straight of their Fallacies, *A rellè conjunctis ad modum divisa*, and *παράβασις ἐκ τῶ ἀλλο γένος*. For the Argument is of *hating*, as having *God* for its *object*; And so to answer of *hating*, without an *object*, is an Intolerable *impertinence*, dividing the *Act* from the *Object*, which were only considered in *conjunction*; much more is it *impertinent* to talk of *hating*, as 'tis objected upon *sin*, for *that* is a *transgression à genere ad genus*. God is not *sin*, nor is it a *sin* to *hate sin*; but the *sin* of *hating God*, is that to *which* they must *speak* in a compound sense. Hold them punctually to this, and they are undone. 4. If they take upon them to prove (adding the part of the opponent) that the *formal part* of

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sin is a mere privation, therefore the *sin* is a mere *privation*; tell them first of their fallacie, *παρελ τὸ ἐπὶ μανον*. For the *Antecedent* might be *true*, and yet the *sequel* extremely false. Tell them next there is a Fallacie of *Ignoratio Elenchi*; For the question is of *sin*, not of a *portion*, or *part* of *sin*. They are past all Remedy, who, when the Question is, *whether it rains*, do onely answer that the *stuff* does not stand in the corner. Tell them over an^d above, that the *formal part* of *some sins* (as of the *Devils* hating God) is a *positive Repugnance* to the *Law of God*; and so again there is the Fallacie *παρελ τὸ ἐν δεξιῇ λαμβάνειν*, barely to say, and not to prove the universality of the thing, can amount to no more then onely the *begging of the question*. Mr. Hickman must confess he is the *worst of Blasphemers*, if there is *but one sin* that is a *positive entity*; because he saith that *All such* must be either ** God's creatures*, or, *God himself*.

* p. 7. l. 9.
p. 79. lin. 5

This also prompts me to reflect upon the *Mischievous effects* of his sad *Dilemma*. For if God is said to be the *cause* of that *positive entity* or *action* [*Adam's eating forbidden fruit*,] And the *cause* of that *Law*, [*Thou shalt not eat it*,] he is said to be the *Author* or *cause* of that *sin*, which was his very *eating forbidden fruit*. I have therefore taken the greater pains in my following Treatise, both in ** vindicating* God from being the *Author* of such *effects*, and in *charging* them wholly upon the *Free-will* of *man*, ** shewing* how the *sinful agent* is alone the *cause* of the *sinful act*; to the end I might convince and convert my Adversary even in spite of his own *perverseness*, and disabuse his followers or *abettors* notwithstanding their *partiality* and *prepossession*. That when they exert any such *real* and *positive actions*, as the *hating of God*, the *ravishing of virgins*, the *killing of Kings*, the *committing of sacrilege*, the *coveting* and *seizing their neighbour's goods*, they may be forced to declare (with *Coppinger* and *Hacket* in the *Star-Chamber*) the works are *evil*, and from themselves, (unless they will take in the *Devil* too) not *good*, and from

* See my whole fourth chapter, and compare it with my citations from D. Good and D. Hammond. p. 109.
* See c. 5. p. 92. top. lin. 5

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* Ubi supra.
and also p. 82.

|| Exod. 20, 5.
Rom. 1. 30.

* Oseruyat.

|| Psal. 139 21.

* Ut eorum
implacabilis
adversus De-
um inimicitia
innoscat,
Sec. De animi
Medela. c. 17.
p. 283.

2 Act. 13. 18.
8. 14. 16.

2 Pet. 3. 20.

2 Pet. 3. 9.

* See Master
JENKINS
his Petition
to the Titular
Parliament
A. D. 1651.
and compare
it with the

Assembly-men's Confession of Faith, ch. 3. Artic. 1. which saith that God did unchange-
ably & eternally whatsoever comes to pass. From whence the Murder of the King was con-
cluded Gods Ordinance by them that wrought it. And Mr. Jenkins was heard to pray
at Black Fryers [O Lord we know that all things come to pass by thine APPOINTMENT.]
|| Jer 5, 27.

God, as * Mr. Hickman no less irrationally, than. blasphemously saith.

That there are *haters of God* who is *Love itself*, God hath told us by *Moses*, and by *Saint Paul*. And according to the importance of the original word, they are *hated by God* who are *haters of him*. How we ought to be affected towards them that *hate God*, the Psalmist tells us by his *example*. || *Do not I hate them O Lord that hate thee? yea I hate them with a perfect hatred*. Who they are that *hate God* (by way of eminence) our Learned Doctor *Stearn* hath taken the Liberty to say. I shall content my self at present to shew the place in my * Margin, and to observe, *Mr. Hickman* is therein intimately concern'd. I do not hate *Mr. Hickman*, but do love him so well, as to wish him better. Yet of the *Doctrine* which he delivers, and pleadeth for with so much vehemence, [That every positive thing is good, and either God, or his creature, I have industriously discovered my perfect hatred. For the Hellish murder of Gods Anointed (of ever Blessed and glorious Memory) was as positive a something as any action to be produced. And all the plea of those Deicides who sought to justify the Fall, was the use they made of this Fatal Doctrine. They ever imputed unto God, (irresistibly willing, or unconditionally decreeing, and effectually over-riding his peoples spirits) whatsoever unclean thing they were a suffer'd in. What was really but the patience, they call'd the pleasure of the Almighty. His passive permission, they stil'd * appointment. What he had every where forbidden, they gave him out to have predetermin'd. What was a sin not to be expiated, They call'd an expiatory sacrifice. They gave out God to be the Author of all that he suffer'd them to commit, the favourable approver, of whatsoever he condemn'd them to prosper in. In a word, they told the people, that God was delighted in those impie-

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tics, which with much *long suffering* he but *endur'd*. And then I think I was excusable for being *impatient* of such a *Doctrin*, as (to the Ruin of three Kingdomes) I saw *reduced into practice* for diverse years. Rom. 9.22.

How impartial I have been in the maintaining of the Truth, I shall evince in the following papers by my Reply to *Mr. BARLOW*, the Reverend Provost of *Queens Colledge* in *Oxford*, my very learned and loving Friend. To certain Reasonings of his in his *second Metaphysical Exercitation*, (which I am carefull to tell my Readers he printed *twenty years ago*, that by refuting those Errours which he asserted in his *youth*, when a *stranger* to me, I may not prejudice that *Friendship* which I desire may be *preserv'd* and improv'd betwixt us, nor take from the *honour* which is due to his *Riper years*,) I have replied so much the rather for these three Reasons: First because Master *Hickman* is very guiltily beholding to *Mr. Barlow's Book*, for the considerablest part of his *own collection*. He having stoln from that treasure whatsoever hath the Appearance of *strong*, or *handsome*; (I mean as much as concerns the *positivity of sin*.) Next that the Adversaries may grant, That if their *Cause* hath miscarried under the management and Defence of such a Person as Master *BARLOW*, it sure hath wanted nothing but *Truth*, and not *ability* to support it. Last of all *Mr. Barlow*, (so great was his *Candor*, and *love of Truth*,) was pleased to give me his *Free Assent*, that I should persecute *Error* where e're I found it. To differ in judgement, *Incolumi dicuit semper amicicia*; and therefore he is farr from falling out with *himself*, (much less with *me*,) if he very much differs at this Time of his *maturity* (like *Ms-lanchibow*, and Bishop *Andrews*, Doctor *Sanderson*, Master *Hales*, and almost *All the great Scholars* the world hath bred,) from what he was in his greener years.

And now (Good Reader) I am resolv'd, rather to part abruptly from thee, than to detain thee any longer

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with such *Preliminary Discourses*. I hope it will appear by the following Catalogue of Authors, (at least by as many as will be granted to be the *best*) both that I am far from being *singular* in what I *own* as the greatest *truth*, And that in case thou hast insensibly *taken up* a vulgar Error, thou needs not think it a discredit to *lay it down*.

A Note

A note of such as are used in the following papers, for the proving, or approving of *these three things*.

1. That the *most and worst sins* have a *positive Entity, or Being*. 2. That each of these is *complexum quid*, and to be taken *concretivè*, as consisting of a *material and formal part*. 3. That the *whole of sin* is the *production* (not of God, but) of *men and Devils*.

| A | A.D. | A.D. | D | A.D. | |
|------------------------|------|------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|
| Athenagoras. | 155 | Bona. | 1590 | Dionysius Areop. | 70 |
| Athanasius. | 325 | Bellarminus. | 1600 | Durandus. | 1305 |
| Apollinaris. | 364 | Bp. Bramhall. | | Bp. of Damascus | 1611 |
| S. Ambrosius. | 374 | Dr. Rob. Baronius. | | Claud. Devillius. | |
| Augustinus. | 914 | Burgerdiscius. | | Dioctetivius. | |
| Anselmus. | 1081 | Baxter. | | E | |
| Alexand. Alenfis. | 1240 | C | | Epiphanius. | 376 |
| Aquinas. | 1270 | Clement Alexand. | 204 | Episcopius. | 1618 |
| Anselmus. | 1303 | Cyprianus. | 250 | F | |
| Alvarez. | 1321 | Cyrillus Hierosol. | 365 | Fulgentius. | 500 |
| Armachanus. | 1378 | Chrysostomus. | 398 | Dr. Field. | |
| Amicus. | | Calvinus. | 1560 | G | |
| Ariaga. | | Cajetan. | 1600 | Gregor. Nazianz. | 364 |
| Apologisi for Pilemus. | | Cameracensis. | | Greg. Nyssen. | 374 |
| A Dola. | | Capreolus. | | Greg. de Valentia. | 1580 |
| Alfredius. | | Casamben. | | H. Gratius. | |
| B | | Chalcom. | | Dr. Good. | |
| S. Basilus. | 371 | Confessions of Advers. | | Jo. Gerhardus Jansenius. | |
| S. Bernardus. | 1112 | Balthaz. Gorderius. | | H | |
| Benaventure. | 1271 | Cumel. | | Hieronymus. | 375 |
| Mart. Burbans. | 1560 | Oicero. | | Hemmingius. | 1580 |
| Xybus Betnleius. | 1563 | Chemnitius. | | Dr. Hammond. | |
| | | | | Hajem | |

| | A.D. | | A.D. | S | A.D. |
|-----------------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|
| <i>Hesenterferus.</i> | 1600 | <i>Fran. de Mayran.</i> | 1310 | <i>S. Scripture.</i> | |
| I | | N | | <i>Salvian.</i> | 417 |
| <i>Irenaeus.</i> | 180 | <i>Nannius.</i> | | <i>Stephanus Episcopus Pa-</i> | |
| <i>Ignatius.</i> | 99 | O | | <i>risiens. D.D.</i> | 1270 |
| <i>Iustinus Martyr.</i> | 150 | <i>Origen.</i> | 224 | <i>Scotus.</i> | 1300 |
| <i>Fl. Illyricus.</i> | 1574 | <i>Ockam.</i> | 1320 | <i>Swaz.</i> | 1613 |
| <i>Fr. Junius.</i> | 1602 | <i>Bp. of Oseric.</i> | | <i>Sobnius</i> | |
| <i>Dr. Jackson.</i> | | P | | <i>A Sole.</i> | |
| K | | <i>Prosper.</i> | 433 | <i>Dr. Sanderfon.</i> | |
| <i>Keckermannus</i> | 1604 | <i>Parisienfis Magis.</i> | 1347 | <i>Dr. Stearn.</i> | |
| <i>Bp. of Kilmore.</i> | | <i>Petrus Vermilinus Mar-</i> | | T | |
| L | | <i>tyr.</i> | 1562 | <i>Theophilus Patriarcha.</i> | |
| <i>Lactantius.</i> | 317 | <i>Piscator.</i> | 1620 | <i>Antiochenus.</i> | 170 |
| <i>Lombardus.</i> | 1360 | <i>Dr. Prideaux.</i> | | <i>Tatianus Assyrius.</i> | 170 |
| <i>Lessius.</i> | | <i>The Protestant Divines</i> | | <i>Terullian.</i> | 203 |
| <i>Bp. Lesly.</i> | | <i>in their dispute a-</i> | | <i>Theophylact.</i> | 931 |
| <i>Cardinal de Lugo.</i> | | <i>gainst the Papists of</i> | | <i>Templaris.</i> | |
| <i>Polycarpus Lycerns.</i> | | <i>Original sin.</i> | | <i>Dr. Twisse.</i> | |
| M | | R | | <i>Trent Council.</i> | |
| <i>Macarius.</i> | 330 | <i>Ruffinus.</i> | 390 | V | |
| <i>S. Max. Martyr.</i> | 650 | <i>Joannes de Rada.</i> | | <i>C. Vorstin.</i> | 1611 |
| <i>Melanchthon.</i> | 1540 | <i>Remonstrants of the low</i> | | <i>Vasquez.</i> | |
| <i>Greg. Martinus.</i> | 1604 | <i>Countries.</i> | | <i>Ger. Vossius.</i> | |
| <i>Pt. Marnixius sanct.</i> | | <i>Guliel. de Rubione.</i> | | Z | |
| <i>Aldegongius.</i> | | <i>D. Reynolds.</i> | | <i>Huld. Zuinglius.</i> | 1510 |
| <i>Medina.</i> | | | | | |

Detestanda & abominanda opinio est, quæ Deum cujusquam malæ vo-
luntatis, aut malæ æstimationis credit Ausporem. Augustin, in Resp. ad
Artic. 10. falso sibi impostus, p. 808.

*** Quod Talis alius non solum præcisè ratione alicujus privationis;
sed etiam per se aliquo modo malus sit, est communis sententia Docto-
rum. LESSIUS de perfect. Divini. l. 13. c. 26. num. 176.

The general Contents of the several Chapters.

CHAP. I.

THe Introduction to an account of what hath passed from the beginning. The first occasion of the Dispute. The removal of a most wilful and groundless Slander. The continuation of the Account. Seventeen Arguments to prove the positive Entity of Sin. Mr. Hick's intercessing himself in an other mans Province. His laying the foundation of perfect Libertinism and Rantism: Occasioning 16 other Arguments for the positive Entity of sin. His Title page impertinent to his Book. A brief and general account of his whole Book. A Building made up of nothing, but one long Entry, and three back Doors. Mr. Hick, turns his back upon 14. Arguments at once. Nine more at once he passeth by without Answer. His promise of justifying the Schoolmen doth end in passing them over without regard. His widest back Door of all, at which he makes a most shameful and foul escape from the thing in question.

CHAP. II.

THe thing in Question from the beginning was Sin properly so called. How Mr. Hick, was frighted from it, in spite of S. Paul and Dr. Reynolds. Sin a Concrete: and so confessed by Mr. H. a little after he had deny'd it. The positive Act proved to be the sin of cursing God: Mr. H. (though challenged) not attempting to disprove it. No imaginable difference betwixt the positive Act of lying with *Bathsheba*, and the Adultery which was the sin; Sin confessed by Dr. Twisse to include a positive Act. The same is confessed by Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, and (in lucid intervals) by Mr. H. himself: who writes against his own knowledge: and as much against his own interest. 1. By the grossness of his own Falshood and Tergiversation. 2. by inferring that Vertue hath no positive Being. 3. by arming the Atheist against himself, in proving that God hath no positive Entity. 4. by putting it out of his power to deny he is a Brute, till he renounce his Transition & Thesis ad Hypothesin. The stone at which Mr. Hick, hath not stumbled only, but fallen, pass all setting by. The true state of Sin (Specified) as it differs from either part of Sin, and from Sinfulness it self. Mr. Hick, gets nothing though we should grant him his Reduplication, but rather looseth all he gapes at. Nay proves himself a *Carneadist* or *Libertine*. That Sin is *positive* and *concrete* may be concluded from *Bona Ventura*.

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CHAP.

of the several Chapters.

C H A P. IV.

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C H A P. V.

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The Contents of the Appendix.

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Touch-

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the whole cause, but does not know it. His opposition to the Assembly mens Confession of faith. Mr. H. proved to grant the whole cause at which he rails, and so to be a Calvinistical-Arminian. Confirmed by Du Moulin, Param, and Dr. Reynolds. Confirmed further by Dr. Twisse. And by the Synod of Dort. His scurrilous usage of Dr. Heylin shews the length of his own ears. His concluding Question childishly fallacious.

Touching the Remnant of his Book.

His Self condemnation, and Contradiction. The Calvinists draw their own consequences from their Tenet of Decrees. How Mr. H. is their Accuser, and how his own. How as an Hobbist, and an Arminian. How in striving to clear, he condemns himself; and confesseth his making God to be the Author of sin. His own thick darkness touching the darkness in the Creation. How he makes the most real things to be entia rationis. How he obtrudes a new Article of Faith. And makes it a point of omnipotence to be able to do evil. He proves his own sins to be positive entities, by ascribing his rage to his sobriety. His slanderous charge against Mr. Tho. Barlow of Queens C. in Oxford. His foul Defamation of Dr. Reynolds. His self contradiction, and blind zeal, as to Dr. Martin. The nullity of a Priesthood sinfully given by Presbyterians. The Recantations of some who were so Ordained. Mr. H's disappointment by Dr. Sandersons change of judgment. A vindication of Br. Hall, Br. Morton, Br. Brewarig from Mr. H's slanderous suggestion. The perfect Amitie, and Communion of all Episcopal Divines, for all their difference in judgment as to some controverted Doctrines.

Mr. H's confession of his Ignorance, an Incapacity to understand the points in controversy. His confessed insufficiency to maintain the chief Articles of the Creed. Yet his conceitedness of his parts is not the less. His way to make a Rope of sand whereby to pull in the Puritanes. His sinfull way of defending Robbery by adding a manifold aggravation. His slanderous insinuation against the two houses of Parliament, to save the credit of the visitors in sinning against their own commission. His disparagement of the visitors in his endeavours to assert them. The work he makes with Hypocendriacal conceits.

Touching

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Touching the supream authority of the Nation.

HE adds *Rayling* to his *Robbery*, and treasonably misplaceth the *Supreme power of the Nation*. The two *Houses* vindicated from his gross *Insinuation*, and the *supreme power* asserted by 19. Arguments. and by very many more, for which the Reader is entreated to use the works of *Judge Jenkins*.

Touching the Visitors of Oxford.

HOW Mr. H. became one of my *uncommissioned Receivers*. In what sense he may be called my *Receiver* and *Usurper*. How the *Assembly-Presbyterians* became *Abettors of Sacriledge*, and *Prævaricators* with the *Bible*. Mr H's confounding possession and right, and making no scruple of many *Robberies* at once. His wilfull *bitternesse* sadly reflecting upon the *Visitors*. And as much on the *Lords*, and *Commons*, work of all upon the *King*; in excluding whom he *bebeads the Parliament*. How he and his *Visitors* have acted against the two *Houses*, and withall against the *supreme power* of the Nation.

Touching Mr. H's no skill in Logick.

A Transition to the discovery of his *no skill in Logick*. His *Insultation* added to hide or bear up his *Ignorance*. Concerning the subject of an *Accident*. Of *Subjellum ultimum & ultimum*. Of an *Inseparable Accident*. Of the *substantiall Faculties* of the soul. By whom they are held to be its *essence*. Of his *granting* what he *denyes*, whilst he *denyes* it: and *giving up the whole cause*.

A Postscript touching some Dealings of Mr. Baxter.

THE *Synagogue* of the *Libertines* fitly applied to Mr. *Baxter*. His *Railing* on *K. James*, and *Bp. Bancroft*, on *Bp. Andrewes*, and *Dr. Sanderson*, for their *Justice* to the *Puritans*. His *confession* of his own *wickednesse* again confessed by himself; though but in part. His *prodigious falsifying* the *Common prayer*. His *denyal* of that confession which he confessed a little before. His *Perjury* and *Rebellion* proved out of his *own words*. His playing at *Fast & loose* with his

The Contents of the Postscript touching Mr. Baxter.

his integrity. His Time-serving and fawning upon his Sovereign Richard. His rejecting in our late miseries, &c. His charging upon God all the villainies of the times. His Flattering mentions of Old Oliver, as tenderly carefull of Christs cause. His being Accessory to the most Parricidal Act, the murder of Gods anointed. The seven wayes of partaking in other mens sins. His being an Incendiary in the war, and Incouraging many thousand to rebell, proved out of his confessions. His denying the Supremacy of the King which yet he allowed the two Cromwells. His confession that Rebellion is worse then Murder, Adultery, Drunkenness, and the like; and that he may be called a Perfidious Rebell by his consent, if the supremacy was in the King.

His denying the Supremacy of the King, which yet he allowed the two Cromwells. How he is proved by his concession to be a rebell. His being a Traitor to the two Houses which he had set up above the King, by setting Richard above them, when they disowned him. And by owning Cromwells Junto for a full and free Parliament. He is evinced out of his mouth to have been perjured over and over. His charge against the Lords and commons, and his setting aside the King, more then the houses ever did. His most Notable contradiction about the houses ruling without the King. His New Miscarriage against Grotius and the Episcopal Divines. He is proved to be a Jesuite by as good Logick as he useth. The Jesuites Doctrine of Probability. Papery common to Thomas Goodwin with some noted Presbyterians. Mr. Baxters Puritanism as well in Life, as Doctrin. His additional falsehood. The Originall of Puritanism among professors of Christianity. Our English Puritans characterized by Salmasius one of the learnedst of the beyond Sea Protestants. Mr. Baxter declared by Gods Anointed to be a fallow, and schismaticall person. His double injurie to Mr. Dance. His unparalleled bitterness against Episcopacy and our Church 7. wayes rebuked. The Conclusion giveth the reason of the whole procedure which Mr. Baxter.

CHAP. I.

THat the Christian Reader may discern, with his greatest ease and convenience in every kind, how the whole Case stands betwixt my Adversary, and me; and may be thereby enabled (without the trouble of diverting to many pages of severall Books, unless as his *patience* and *leisure* serves him,) to pass an *exact* and *speedy* Judgement, upon the matchless Adventures of this fresh Combatant; the *unsufficiency* of his Performances, when he *pretends* to Answer; and his grosse *Tergiversations*, when he declines it; How commonly he aims *beside* the mark, and *afflictedly* mistakes the Thing in *Question*; How he is fain to *sicke* himself, on purpose to get into a *laugh*; and how constantly his *laughing* doth prove to be in the *wrong Place*; How well he *justifies* me, and my whole proceeding, whilst he solemnly *contradicts* and *condemns* himself; How he happens to *glory* and *triumph* most, when his *overthrows* fortune to be the *greatest*; How he *calumniate*s the *Fathers*, in their *justification*, as some in the world have been *killed* in their own *Defence*; How without all Cause (but what his *Principles* and his *Displeasure* have shap'd out to him) his *payn'd* Arrows have been *shot* at my self, and *others*, which yet have lighted on his own head, and on the heads of his *Predecessors*, whom he hath *wished* in *zeal*, and exceedingly *disgraced* in meer *good will*; (confessing that to be *Blasphemy*, which the most eminent *Presbyterians* have taught *expressly*, and in *Print*, not onely by *consequence*, and in *privats*.) I say, that the Reader may be qualified to take up all at one *grasp*, at the least expence that is possible of *time* or *money*. I shall prepare him with an Account of what hath pass'd from the beginning; and I shall do it with as much *Brevity*, as I shall find will consist with *Truth* and *Clearness*. Nothing shall hinder me in my

*The Introduction
on is an Account
of what
hath pass'd
from the begin-
ning.*

Dispatch, but the Removal of a most *Desperate* and *Groundless* slander, with which our Actor made his entrance into the *Theatre*, that it might lye as a *block* in his Readers way. And to preserve the most *heedless* from *stumbling* at it, I think it my *duty* to give them *warning*.

The first occasion of the Dispute.

† Maleficium is the word.

* Chap. 3. p. 128. to pag. 126.

§. 2. I had endeavour'd in my *Notes* (which I was forc'd to make *Publick*) to prevent the *danger*, by demonstrating the *deadliness* of certain *Doctrines*, which the most *eminent* *Presbyterians* had *preached* to us from the *Press*; [to wit, *That All things come to pass by God's appointment and Decree. That men do sin by God's Impulse. That God commandeth to do † evil, and compelleth obedience to such Commands. That he makes men Transgressors. That Adultery or Murder is the work of God the Author, &c.*] These and multitudes of the like, (which I produced out of their writings in my * *Defence of the Divine Philanthropie*) were not the *issues* of my *Invention*, or onely *horrible Consequences* *unduly deduced* out of their *Doctrines*, (as M. *Hickman* hath dared to affirm, in despite of *God*, and his own *conscience*, and in a flat *contradiction* to all men's *eyes*,) but the words of M. *Calvin*, and of a man greater than he, *Huldéricus Zuinglius*, whose example in *Helvetia* M. *Calvin* imitated in *France*. And how their *Followers* go before them, in asserting *God* to be the *Author* of all the *wickedness* in the world, as I have plentifully shew'd in my *Autocataphris*, so shall I shew in a greater measure, if M. *Hickman* shall adventure to make it needfull. Even the *worst* of those expressions are very *publickly* *confessed*, by D. *Twisse*, and M. *Bayler*, (and divers others of their way) to have been written by those *Great ones*, on whom I charg'd them. And I speak it to the praise of their *ingenuity*; who rather chose to *excuse* (at least à *santo*) what was so grossly *derogatory* to the *glory* of *God*, then to *deny* what is so *visible* to all mens *eyes*.

The Removal of a most villainous and groundless slander.

But the *Rhapsodist* adventures beyond all possible expectation; and dares to tell us in effect, That when we read the printed works either of *Zuinglius*, or *Calvin*, of *Rorham*,

about, or D. Twisse, There is not any such thing, as we clearly see lying before us; That what we read, is not written; And that the things which I transcribed from some of the Authors whom he admires, were the meer chimeras of my Brain, though near an hundred years printed before I came into the world. Had I father'd mine own fancies upon one or more of his Predecessors, (as M. Hickman hath had the confidence to † tell the *Lecturers of Brackley*) I should not have thought my self fit to live. And by so much the more it becomes my Duty (as well as Interest) to clear the innocence of my dealing in this particular, although I know not how to do it without the ruine of my Accuser in point of fame. The shortest way to this end, will be by Noteing the very lines, as well as the words, and the pages, and the Editions of the Books, from whence the Reader may take a specimen, whereby to judge of the whole Heap. * *Numen ipsum AUTHOR est ejus quod nobis est INJUSTITIA.* — Cum Deus Angelum Transgressorem facit, & hominem, Ipse tamen Transgressor non constituitur, ut qui contra legem non veniat. (ib. lin. 41.) — b Quod Deus operatur per hominem, Homini visum vertitur, non etiam Deo. — c unum atque Idem Facinus, puta Adulterium aut Homicidium, in quantum Dei AUTHORE S, MOTORIS, ac Impulsoris OPUS est, crimen non est. — e Movet Deus Latronem ad occidendum innocentem, etiam ac imparatum ad mortem. — Impellit Deus ut occideret. (ib. l. 35.) permitto, Latronem coactum esse ad peccandum. (ib. l. 18.) Impulsore Deo trucidavit Latio. (ib. l. 21.) movet & impellit usque dum ille occisus est. (ib. lin. 25.)

f Satis aperte ostendi, Deum vocari eorum OMNIUM AUTHOREM, quæ isti Censores volunt otioso tantum ejus permisso contingere. Voluntas Dei rerum omnium causa — Reprobos in obsequium cogit, (ib. g. 2. fol. 69. p. 2. lin. 23. 26.) Idem Facinus Deo, Satana, homini assignari, absurdum non est. (ib. l. 2. c. 4. fol. 95. p. 2. lin. 20.)

g fusta de Præscientiâ his movetur, ubi constat

* Epist. Ded. pag. 2.

† Epist. Ded. pag. 4.

* Zeingli in Serm. de Prov. (edn. Tigur. Augst. 20. 1530) c. 5. fol. 364. p. 1. lin. 28 &c.

b Ib. cap. 6. fol. 365. p. 2. lin. 35.

* Ib. lin. 40.

* Ib. fol. 366. p. 1. lin. 11.

Dod. Twisse defendi the worth of this, vin. gra. l. 2. part 1. p. 37.

col. 1. lin. 17. 18. editi. Amst.

sterd. 1632.

f Calvin. Inst. (edn. Genev.

1637) lib. 1. c. 18. Sect. 3.

fol. 70. p. 1. l. 10. 8 Lib. 3.

cap. 23. Sect. 6. fol. 324. p. 2. lin. 8, 9.

from the box com.

Omnia ordinatione potius & Natu evenire. — Hic (i. e. peccator) justo Illius (i. e. Dei) impulsu agit quod sibi non licet. (l. 1. c. 18. §. 4. fol 71. p. 1. lin. 24.)

h Aliter malorum satan, quam Deus, sive de malo quod in culpa, sive de eo quod in pœnâ cernitur, loquamur, *AUTOR* judicatur esse.

i Fatemur Deum non modo ipsius operis peccaminosi, sed & Intentionis mala *AUTHOREM* esse &c.

I can and will (if required) produce a multitude of the like, not onely out of the *same*, but out of many other Writers, (as well *Papists* as *Presbyterian*) who are Enemies to *Us* of the *Church of England*. But *this* may suffice for my present purpose, and for hundreds of the same strain, I refer to my Papers already publish'd; wherein when all my citations were to *ex. D.* that even an *Enemy* accus'd no more than *on*, (of which I proved him also a *false Accuser*,) certainly nothing but *M. Hickman*, nor *M. Hickman himself*, without a conscience sear'd with an hot *† Iron*, could have reported them (even in *P. int*) as the mere *chimæra's* of my brain. Which being considered and compared both with the candid * *Acknowledgements* of *M. Barlee* (whom I must therefore prefer by many degrees, as well in *this*, as in other points,) and with what I exhibited to the eyes, of the most obstinate Antagonist who will but *† look*, concludes *M. Hickman* the worst of sinners, if *such* a sinner is the worst who is the *willfulst*. 'Twas from the naughtiness of the Heart, not from the windiness of the Spleen, that so unjustifi'd a Boldness must needs have risen. Had not the *D.ctrine* which I condemned been worse then those, which yet were *Dollrines* of * *Dravels* in the Apostle's language, or had they not been written as with a *Sun beam*, for clearness; and for duration, as with the point of a *Diamond*; where-with they were registered by their *Authors* in an *Indelible Record*) *M. Hickman* had been capable of some excuse, But to deny matters of fact after the manner that he hath done, is as if *Abalom* should have sworn that he never polluted his *Fathers* *Concubines*, after his having lain with them.

f *Marin. Ber.*
vham suggestus in Prophe-
cia Isaiæ oracula
he (sân Basil.
1551 in cap.
Esa. p. 259.
lin. 50.

i D Twiss vin.
Gra. l. 2. part.
2. p 36. col. 2.
l. 15.

† 1 Tim. 4. 2.

* Necess. Vin.
c. 3 p. 134: to
p. 136 cited
at large in my
discourse &c. c.
3. p. 180. &c.
† See self con-
demnation ex-
emplified, c. 3.
pag. 140, 141,
142. &c.
* 1 Tim. 4. 1.

them upon the top of the house, both in the sight of the Sun, and in the sight of all Israel. It were easy to write a volume (and indeed it is hard, to be so abstemious as not to write one,) in displaying the monstrous Nature of so incomparable a Slander, as that with which M. Hickman began his Book. Hoping to season, and to imbue his unwary Readers, with such a prejudice of me, and of all my writings, (in the first four pages of his Epistle) as might make them mine enemies at all adventure. But having held up this Lantern, whereby his weaker-eyed Brethren may see the dimensions of his threshold, which he had purposely erected to make them stumble into his house, I forbear to say more, till occasion serves. And hoping he will be warned by this Discovery, to betake himself to better courses, in whatsoever he shall publish from this time forwards, I immediately proceed to pursue the Tenor of my Account.

§ 3. M. Barlee, not denying, (such indeed was his ingenuity) but excusing those Doctrines which I had censur'd, (such was his favour to his own party) alleged that *Sin* had not a positive Entity, as having no efficient cause; so that though God is affirmed to have decreed, determin'd, and willed in, yet he is not concluded the Author of it.

§ 4. To this I returned a Confutation, in my Defence of the Divine Philanthropie chap. 3 § 8 p. 110. to p. 116. And again in the same Book, chap. 4 § 21. p. 20. 21 The former consisting of seventeen Arguments drawn out at length, I gave the Reader in Epitome, in the third chapter of my Autochthonis § 15 p. 145. to 147. The latter consisting of 7. particulars, I shall content my self, for the present, to refer my Reader thereunto.

§ 5. In stead of a reply, which I expected from Mr. B. I found him assisted by Mr. Hickman (whom he was fitter to assist) to hurt his cause with an assertion, that every positive thing is good. And that there is not any medium between God and his creature. And (so by consequence) that if sin is something positive, or a positive entity, it must be one of God's creatures, or God himself.

§ 6. Hence

2 Sam. 16. 22
which compare with
2 Sam. 11. 17,
12.

The continuation of the Account.
See his words and pages cited Philan. c. 3. § 28 and c. 4. § 21. pag. Seventeen Arguments to prove the positive Entity of sin.

M. Hickman's interesting himself in another man's province.
See the words and pages cited above, ch. 3. p. 150, 152, &c.

*His laying the
foundation of
perfect Liberi-
anism and
Rationalism.*

§ 6. Hence it was that I endeavoured to convince Mr. *Huckman* of his impiety; to shew him the *blasphemies* and *absurdities*, in which his friend and himself were at once involved; and to *amuse* his Readers, against the *venome* thus laid before them. My way to do it was by evincing, that *sin is positively something*; (which is the English of *positive entity*) whereby 'tis proved that there is *something*, which though *positive* and *real*, cannot be attributed to *God*, as the *maker* of it; because he cannot be possibly the *maker of sin*. And it was high time indeed, to make this matter apparent to him, when I had found a *publick Preacher* delivering this as the scope of the *first Article* of the *Creed*, That *God is the Maker of All Things Real*, p. 113. (cited and confuted in my *Aviso* p. 167.) Informing much that if *sin is something Real*, it is a part of his *Creed*, to believe that *God is the Maker of it*. And if it is *nothing* but a *word*, (in his opinion,) then will he say when he hath *sinned*, (with *Solomon's* * *Whore*,) That he hath *done just nothing*. And for *nothing*, it is impossible, that *God* should sentence his *Creatures* to *Fire* and *Brimstone*.

† Note M. H. ascribes every *real Being* to the *first cause* producing it, p. 95, 96.

* *Prov.* 30. 20.

Occasioning 16 other Arguments for the *positive entity of sin*. See the Arguments at large in *aviso* at c. 3. p. 148. to p. 165.

§ 7. Now to the Arguments aforesaid, which were not fewer than *seventeen*, I also added some *sixteen* more, whereby to *illustrate*, as well as *prove*, the *positive Entity* of *sin*. As first from the words of *S. James*, *Lust having conceived bringeth forth sin*, *James*. 1. 15. which having explained, I thence infer'd, That *Sin* is the *production* of *mans own will*, seduced by *lust*, and *consenting* to it, and *rendered evil* by so *consenting*. Secondly from the expressions of the eminentest Authors by him asserted, who teach that *God* doth *effice* *peccata*, and not onely *Will*, but *work Sin*, and that he hath a *hand* in *effecting sin*. Those very *Blasphemies* implying a *positive entity* of *sin*. 3. From *Cain's killing Abel*, and *David's lying with Bathsheba*, which being *actions*, are *positive entities*, and yet are *sins* too, as being a *murder* and an *adultery*. 4. From *experience* and the *confession* of the *Adversary*, that what

is privative of one thing, is also positive of another. 5. From the necessity of its being *complexum quid*, confessed also by M. Hickman. 6. From the meaning of *Bonum Metaphysicum*, as comprehending *res*, & *aliquid*; and as signifying no more, then *ens in ordine ad appetitum*; whereas it is onely the moral good, which is oppos'd to the thing in *Question*. 7. From the positive entity of a *Lye*, which is therefore *verum*, as much as *bonum Metaphysicum*, and yet hath no more of reall goodness, then of reall truth in it. 8. From the positive being of Satans pride, and of Petronius his *Inventions*, together with those of the *Presbyterians*. 9. From the difference or distinction betwixt a negative and positive *Atheism*. 10. From sins being divided into *actvall* and *habitvall*. 11. From the positive *filthiness* of flesh and spirit, of which a man is deprived, when God by his grace is plea'd to cleanse him. 12. From the Importance of the word *privative*, which may be predicated of *sinners*, as well as of *sins*. 13. To harden our own hearts, to consent unto Temptations, and to destroy our selves by such consent, are granted by all to be positive things. 14. Sin is spoken of as *such*, throughout the *Scriptures*. 15. It is confessed by M. Hickman, and by the men of his way, that sin is a compound which doth consist of a *materiall* and *formall* part, whereof the one being granted to be a positive entity, both together cannot be *less*. 16. Betwixt the *act* of *having* God, and the *sin* of *hating* God, which is the *act* of *hating* God, there cannot be the least difference, because *itself* cannot be different from *itself*: for that would imply the very grossest of Contradictions. But the *Act* of *hating* God is confessed by Master Hickman to be a positive entity. And so he yields the whole Cause, in spite of all his *endravours* to make *resistance*.

§. 8. But yet he endeavours a Resistance, as far as a *This-page* can doe it, which doth not really belong to any book in all the world, much less to that which he unhappily call'd his. For it pretends [a Justification of the Fathers and

Mr. Hick's This
the page is im-
pertinent to his
Book.

and Schoolmen from their being self condemned for denying the positivity of sin. And yet it pretends to be an Answer to so much of my *Antidote*, as doth relate to the foresaid opinion. Here are severall things, which prove him wilfull in his Impostures. For well he knew, I had not written against the Fathers or Schoolmen; much less against them as self-condemned; much less yet for denying the positivity of sin. I writ indeed against Himself and M. Hobbs; but they are hardly to much as sons, much less Fathers of the Church. And though I writ against others also, yet neither of them was a Schoolman, much less a Father. I writ against them as self-condemned, because I proved out of their writings that they asserted the very Doctrines, which * themselves had confessed to be blasphemous. So that unless our Justificator is thicker of sense and understanding then all men else, (which his perusal of M. *Astoric* forbids his Readers to believe) his pervarications must needs be wilfull.

* See *Intra*,
dell. p. 7. and
compare it with
c. 3. p. 140.
141, 142.

A brief and
general account
of M. Hick-
mans whole
book.

§ 9. After the promises of his *portal*, I find his building is nothing else, but a very long *Ent* y, and three *Back*-doors. As if the former were intended for the *Amusing* of his Readers, whilst the latter might serve for his own escape. His Entry hath such an *unseemly* length, that little less than a whole hour will serve his Readers to Travel through. And if their patience will but serve them, as far as the End of so long a passage, (in hope at last to meet with something whereby to disprove the positivity of sin,) they will be able to find nothing, besides the mentioned *Back* doors, at which the *Father* escapes from the Thing in *Question*. As if he were conscious to himself of having rashly undertaken to prove a dangerous falsehood, (to wit) that sin hath no positive being, he spends almost his whole book upon a multitude of subjects besides the purpose; rather *huddling up* a Volume from whatsoever he thought pretty, and durst *purloin* from some *English Authors*, then taking the courage to treat of that, to which his *Title-page* confesseth he stands obliged. Observe (good Reader)

Reader) the strangest *Answerer of Books*, that in all thy life thou hast read or heard of.

§. 10. His *Volume* consists of 175. pages. 65. of these are spent in an *Epistle*, and *Preface* to all that follows, wherein there is not *one syllable* so much as offering to disprove the *positivity* of *sin*. Then there begins a fresh reckoning up of *pages*. And though he takes upon him again, (as in his *Title-page* he had done) to prove that *sin* hath not a *positive Being*, yet he immediately *flies out* (for 48. pages together) talking of *Bishops* and *Presbyteries* and other subjects of *Evasion*, (I will not say in a *phrenetick*, but in a very *idle* manner,) before his misgiving heart serves him to make a *show* of some *proof* of the Thing in Question. And thus he hath made an *easy slice* to fill up two parts of three of his *Tedious Rhapsodie*, with more than an *hundred* such *fragments* and *ends* of *stuff*, as serve to prove nothing at all, besides his *fearfulness* to discourse of the *matter in hand*, and his *gift* of *impertinence* above the rest of mankind, and also the *lightness* of his *fingers* to supply the *heaviness* of his *invention*. For after 113 pages (65 being of that which he calls his *Preface*, and 48 of that which he calls his *Book*;) I find him using these words. [*Having removed the Rubbish, we may now come at the Question.*] Yet goes he not many steps farther, (in a pretended preparation to his design) when straight he digresseth to * *curse M. Bartlee*, to talk of the *Calvinists*, and *Arminians*, (by the old assistance of *M. Prin.*) and to speak for *Parisians* by such an admirable *Impertinence*, that he is fain at last to use these words—[*The Reader will pardon me (who can scarce pardon my self) for this excursion.*] yet no sooner doth he *confess* then he *commits* the same *trespass*, even by making a new *excursion* to my dispute with *Doctor Reynolds*, to a *Fable* of *Aesop*, and to a gross *falsification* of the *Learned* and *Reverend D. Hammond*, (which in due time and place I shall demonstrate to be *such* in a high Degree.) At last indeed he *speaks* something, *less* *impertinent*

A Building made up of nothing, but one long entry, and 3 Back doors.

* *Rephrew M. Bartlee*. p. 60.

Page 67.

impertinent then before, although *impertinent also*, as shall be shewed. Inasmuch as his Readers may well admire; how he could venture to call his Book by so *extravagant a Title*, as did least of all relate to the subject matter of his *Discourse*, unless he thought that his Readers would look no farther.

*M. H. turns his
back upon 14
Arguments at
once.*

§. 11. But having shew'd his *long Entry*, I conceive it high time that I discover his *Back-doors*, at which he maketh his *soul escapes* from the principall Duties Incumbent on him. First, when it lyes upon him to answer to my 17 *Arguments*; (of which he confesseth he took some notice, p. 100.) He talks a little to *three* of them, (for I cannot say truly, he answers *one*;) and having hastily done that, he escapes me thus. — [*As to the rest of his Arguments* (which were no fewer then 14.) *they are partly such as I have met with before, and partly such, as others upon whose expressions they are grounded, are more concerned in than my self.* p. 105.] This I call a *Back door*, at which he makes an *escape* which I say is *soul*; because he had boasted in his *Title-page*, his having *Answered so much*, as doth relate to the opinion of *sin's positive entity*. And yet he sneaks from those *Arguments*, by which that opinion was clearly proved; alledging no reasons for it, but what are pretended by every *sneaker*. He thought it a shame for him to say, [I have not any thing like an answer to the 14. *Arguments* remaining] And therefore worded the matter thus, [*they are partly such as before I met with, and they concern not me so much as others.*]

*Wine more at
once he passeth
by without an-
swer.*

§. 12. Next when it lyes upon him to answer the 16 *Arguments* besides, (of which I lately made mention § 7.) he does not so much as make a *shew* of giving answer to more than *seven*, (of which anon I shall take due notice,) but sneaks (without leave) from the other *Nine* inasmuch that his Readers might have believed there were *no more* then those *seven*, if they had not now met with my *Information*. This was therefore an *evasion* without a *Postern*.

§ 13. But how doe's he *justify the Schoolmen*, of which his *Title-page* made a boast? truly much after the rate of his other dealings. For he passeth them all by, with the common shift of a *Paralipsis*, [*I might strengthen my opinion from the Schoolmen*, p. 59.] without producing the words of so much as one. And is not this a *Back-door*, at which to make a most *shamefull* and *fool* escape? There is not a Boy in the Grammar-school, but may dispute at this rate, without the looking into such Authors, as *M. Morice* and *M. Prinn*, from whom I thought *Master Hickman* had learnt more wit, than to compile a whole Book in *Tergiversation* to his *Title*. And yet the *foolest* of his dealings is that which follows in my account. For

His promise in justifying the School men doth end in posing them over without regard.

§ 14. When at last he undertakes to handle the *Question under debate* (after his having been *impertinent* throughout one hundred and thirteen pages) he affirms the Question to be this, *Whether moral evil, as such, be a privation*, p. 48. Then (saith he) *we understand by the particle [as] sin considered abstractly from that either act, habit, or faculty, in which it is, and to which it gives denomination*, pag. 49.

His widest Back-door of all, at which he makes a most shamefull and fool escape from the thing in Question,

This is the widest *Back-door* of all, at which he studiously shifts from the thing in Question; in which because he makes use of as gross a *falsehood* as can be nam'd, I am sorry I cannot be less severe, than to prove him a *deliberate and willful sinner*. Had there been any such Question in all my Book, (to the least part of which he at least pretended to give an Answer, he would gladly have cited my words and pages. And so his fault had been sufficient, if he had onely not known that I had said any such Thing; But since I can prove that he knew the contrary, his crime is infinitely greater, and can argue no less than a *seared conscience*. Here then it is, that I must shew (in mine own Defence,) how much he hath written against his own *light*, and how much against his own *Interest*; as having put it in my power, (by an argument *ad hominem*) to prove *M. Hickman* an *arrant brute Beast*; rather a *Horse*

or a *Male*, then either a *Man* or a *Woman*. which I shall prove so convincingly meerly by using his own *Logick*, as he shall not be able to deny it, without renouncing his whole cause. Again he hath written against his Interest, as having granted implicitly, what he explicitly denyeth; and implicitly denying, what he had several times granted in plainest Terms: to wit, that the *Question* to be discussed, is, *Whether the thing which is called sin hath a positive Being, or no positive Being*. Not how, or by what means, or in respect of what, it hath such a Being. Not reduplicative, whether The sin of hating God, quatenus a sin, hath a positive Being; or whether quatenus an action; (for to hate God is confessed to be at once a sin, and an action too,) But whether the sin of hating God (which is an action as well as a sin) hath a positive being, yea, or no. To demonstrate that this is the Thing in *Question*, and ever was from the beginning of all our Difference, And then to demonstrate the *sad estate* which *Mr. Hickman* hath put himself into by his *Reduplication*, (his foisting in the word [*as*] against all dictates of sense and reason, and the whole procedure of our Debate) will so open his *Eyes*, as to stop his mouth too. And therefore this shall be the Theme of a second Chapter.

CHAP. II.

The thing in
Question from
the beginning,
was sin properly
so called.
See Div. Phil.
c. 3. p. 110.
Sec. and c. 4.
p. 42, 43.

§. 1. I Made it appear from the beginning of my Discourse on this subject, that though according to the propriety of Logick speech, a sin and a sinful act do sound as the *Abstract* and the *Concrete*, yet so far do they differ from other *Conjuncts*, as to admit of different *Predications*. For though we cannot say, a *whited wall* is *whiteness*.

ness, or that *whiteness* is a *whited wall*; yet we may say very truly, that a *sinful Act* may be a *sin*, and a *sin* may be a *sinful act*. For *Cain's killing Abel*, was a *sinful act*, and therefore a *sin*, because a *murder*. Whether we say it is a *sin*, or a *sinful act*, to hate God, it matters not amongst men; and all will say it comes to one, in the account of God, as well as in the stile of his *holy Pen-men*, with whom there is nothing more common, then for *sinful Acts* to be called *sins*. Hence I affirmed that *sin* it self is a *Concrete*, in respect of *sinfulness*, which is its *Abstract*. Of which opinion was D. Reynolds, when he intitled one of his Books, *The sinfulness of Sin*. And he had great reason for it, when he had found S. Paul speaking, of * *sins* being made exceeding *sinful*.

§. 2. But M. Hick, seeing clearly, that if any *sin* were granted to be a *concrete*, and the same with the *sinful act*, it must be also granted to have a *positive Entity or being*, (and prove him guilty of that *Blasphemy*, That it must needs be *God's creature*, or *God himself*;) was so scared out of his wits, or at least out of his Conscience, as to say that *sinfulness* is synonymous with *sin*, and that *sin* is so perfectly an *Abstract*, that if he conceive not of it as an *Abstract*, he cannot conceive of it as *sin*. p. 53, 54. without regard to S. Paul Rom. 7. 13. and then much less to D. Reynolds, whom he inferreth to have written touching the *sin of sin*, or the *sinfulness of sinfulness*, supposing both to be synonymous, and *sin* so perfectly an *abstract*, as hath been said. Nay without any regard to his blessed self, when he saith *that sin doth not signify abstractly*. p. 100.

§. 3. But though *sin* is an *Abstract* in respect of the former, (viz. *Abstractum physicum*) yet in respect of *sinfulness* (which is *abstractum metaphysicum*) all will confess it to be a *concrete*, (M. H. alone being excepted in his intemperate Fits, who yet in Times of sobriety will * confess what

seffeth, that the being of God is *Complexum Quid*. p. 95. that it hath a *materiall* or *formall part*. pag. 94. that it is an *Attributibid.*

* Note that D. Field calls *sin* of *commission*. on an evil *Act*, and also saith 'tis merely positive: as shall be shewed c. 3. Sect. 2.

* Rom 7. 13.

How M. Hick, was frighted from it, in spite of S. Paul and D. Reynolds.

Sin a *concrete*, and so confessed by Master Hickman a little after he had denied it.

* Note, he con-

I would have him,) and such I proved it to be, by proving an *Identity*, betwixt the *sin*, and the *sinfull Act*. For the *transgression of the Law* is confessedly an *Act*: and *sin* (by definition) is the *Transgression of the Law*. Nor will the Adversary deny, that the *Act of sinning* is a *sinfull Act*. For being a *Transgression*, it must needs be an *Act*, and being such an *act*, it must needs be *sinfull*. The *act of consenting* to a *Temptation*, which is *sin in its birth*, is *punctum indivisibile*, and hath not any *Dimensions* to make it capable of a *Division*; and so it must needs be the *sin of consenting* to the *Temptation*, as well as it is the *sinfull act*.

The positive act proved to be the sin of cursing God. Master Hickman (though challenged) not attempting to disprove it. See [marginalia] chap. 13. 11, 12.

§. 4. Farther yet, when in pursuit of the Controversie, it lay upon me to shew, how the determination of a mans will to the forbidden object, was equally a *sin*, and a *positive being*; and what an *Impiety* it would be to intitle God to so foul a thing; I made a challenge to M. Hickman (as well as others,) to give an instance in some particular, how the *act* and the *obliquity* might so be severed or distinguish'd, as he might say which is God's part, and which is Satan's. When a man doth curse God, (Lev. 24. 15.) which is the *Act* of that *sin*? and which is the *sin*, that is not the *Act*? or which is the *obliquity* of the *act*? that *sin*? M. Hickman did not attempt an Answer; and sure I am he was not able. For if the *cursing of God* is a whole *sin*, it is an *act* of *sin*, or an *obliquity* of an *Act*, or both together; and that either *separably*, or *inseparably*. 1. if onely an *Act*, where then is the *obliquity*? 2. if onely an *obliquity* of an *Act*, where is the *Act*? (for all the whole *sin* is the *cursing of God*, neither more, nor less, 3. if both together, and *separably*, let him make that *separation*. 4. if both are *inseparably* together, he must confess, that *sin* hath a *positive being*, and that himself hath made God to be the Author of *sin*.

No imaginable difference between the positive act of lying with Bathsheba, and the Adultery which was the sin.

§. 5. In a word, I made appear, what I meant by the

word *sin*, by the instances which I brought whereby to prove it the same with the *sinfull act*. There being no difference (no not so much as in imagination) between David's lying with Bathsheba, and his *Adultery*, or between his *Adultery*, and his *sin*. (**Arten*. p. 82.) His lying with Bathsheba was his *act*, which *act* was his *sin*, (p. 84.) And again, I discern no difference between the same *evil act*, and it self; as between Davids lying with Bathsheba, and his *Adultery*. (ibid.) Nor indeed was it possible that I should have spoken any otherwise, when the Thing spoken of was not half of sin, but the whole; not the formal part, (as they phrase it) but the very complexum, as M. H. himself calls it, (p. 95.) For *actual sin* of commission cannot otherwise be *sin*, than as it is an *act* of *sinning*; nor an *act* of *sinning* any otherwise, than as it is a *sinfull Act*.

§ 6. That this was meant in our Dispute, I have largely proved. And that we ought to mean this, I prove by the judgement of D. Twisse, who saith, that Fornication denoteth sin, not onely according to its Formality, as it is *sin*, but also according to its materiality, as it is an *Act*. His words in Latin are justly these. *Fornicatio notat peccatum, non tantum secundum Formale ejus quod peccatum est, sed & secundum materiale ejus, quod actus est*. Now because M. Hickman doth boast so much of D. Twisse, as one whom none durst undertake in the Arminian Controversies (p. 106.) I will farther insist upon his Authoritie, whereby to prove the true Importance, and together with that, the positive entity of *sin*; which that Doctor doth assert by unavoidable Implication, whilst he saith that [*All sin, being definitely considered, and according to its certain species, doth include two things, the natural act, and the turpitude of the Act, or its repugnance with the Law of God*. He gives

Sin confessed by D. Twisse to include both sine Act.
Vind. Gr. l. 2. c. 1. § 2. p. 155.

* *Omne peccatum definite consideratum & secundum certam speciem, duo com-*

plectitur, Actum Naturalem, — & Actus Turpitudinem, sive cum lege Dei Repugnantiam. E. G. Furtum Omne duo notat, viz. actum furandi rei alienae, & actus hujus deformitatem, quatenus lege divina nobis interdictum sit. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 37. 155.

his instance in the *sin of theft*, which he affirms to signify, as well the *Act of taking away what is anothers*, as the *deformity of the Act*, in as much as God hath said, *thou shalt not steal*. The like instances he gives in the sins of *Murder* and *Adultery*; which as it flatly contradicts what is said by *M. Hick*, of sins being a meer *abstract*, and the same with *sinfulness*, (pag. 53, 54.) so it proves the whole *sin* to have a *positive entity*, by ascribing no less to a part of *sin*. It being impossible for a part to have more of entity then the whole. And if *M. Hickman* shall dare to say, that a *Repugnance* to the *Law* may be *theft*, without *stealing*; or that *stealing* may be the *sin of theft*, without a *repugnance* to the *law* (so as one part of *sin* may be concluded to be a *sin*.) I forbear to say what will follow, that he may not accuse me of bitter Language.

The same is
confessed by *M.*
Whit. and *M.*
B. and (in lu-
cid intervals)
by *M. Hickm.*
himself.

§. 7. Noe, 'tis so absolutely *impossible*, (as implying a *contradiction*) that a man should be guilty of a *Repugnance* to any *Law*, without the *doing* of that *thing* which the *Law* forbids; And by consequence so impossible, that that alone should be the *sin*, which is affirmed by *D. Twisse* to be but the *formal part* of it; That as *M. Whitfield* and *M. Barlee* do acknowledge a *materiall*, and *formall part*, making up one and the same *sin*, so *M. Hickman* doth say as much, when the necessity of his affairs compels him to it (p. 94, 95.) how *contradictory* soever to what he had said a little before (p. 53, 54.) when brought to a distress of another *Nature*. And accordingly in his *Tenth* page, he held us in hand that he would prove, there cannot be any *positivity* of *sin*, (not of the *formall part* of *sin*.) Again at the end of his long *Preface*, when he *pretends* (at least) to come to the Thing in *Question*, he sets down his *Thesis* in these express words,

Who writes a-
gainst his own
knowledge. —
Look for-
wards on c. 6.
Sect. 14. & 15.

That *sin* hath not a *Positive Being*, pag. 1.
No mention hitherto of any *reduplications*, *sin as sin*, or *sin abstractly* considered from *act*, or *habit*. And indeed he knew it to be *impossible*, to consider the *sin of hating God*, *abstractly* from the *act* or *habit*, since the *Act of hating*
God,

God, is the *sin*, as well as the *Act*; and the *habit* well hated of God, is as well the *sin*, as the *habit*. He confesseth it an action to hate God, and an action so intrinsically and essentially evil, because evil antecedently to any positive Law, and evil *ex genere & objectis*; that no circumstance can make it lawful. p. 94. And as impossible as it is, to consider the same thing abstractly from its self, so impossible it must be, to consider the *sin* of hating God, abstractly from the *Act* of hating God. Thus M. Hickman hath written against his own light. But (which will grieve him most of all)

§. 8. He hath also written against his *Interest*. For first he confesseth (by the means of his prevarication) what he so stomachfully deny'd, and vainly pretended to refute too, to wit, That *sin* hath a positive being. I say he confesseth it in equivalence, and that much more to his disadvantage, then if he had said it in down-right Terms. For why should he shamefully fall away from his first Engagement, which was to prove that *sin* hath no positive being, (p. 1.) but that he was inwardly convinced, he had undertaken a thing impossible? If he did not *sin* for *sin*'s sake, nor think it a credit to be caught in the Act of Falshood, why should he publish so grosse a Forgery, as he knew would be detested by every Reader, who should but thorowly peruse either his book, or mine, but that he thought it would pain him less, to lye in the frying pan, then the Fire? If *sin* (in his opinion) hath no positive Being in any sense, or respect, (whether as a *Quality*, or as an *Action*, or as *complexum quid*, made up of a *materiall* and *formall* part,) why at last will he needs consider it, as merely abstracted from *Act*, or *habit*, and not without such abstraction? when yet it is impossible that the *hating* of God should be so considered? Let him shew how *that sin* can be abstracted from that *act* which is *that sin*, or how it can be consider'd as so abstracted; or else let him confess, he dares not dispute of the thing in *Question*, unless he may consider it, as it is impossible to be consider'd; which is not to dispute of the thing in *Question*, but by an unman-

And as much against his own interest.

1.

By the grossness of his falshood and Terrification.

like *Tergiversation* to acknowledge the prevalence of the Truth, at the very same time that he *reviles* it.

II.
By inferring
that *virtue*
hath no posi-
tive being.

§. 9. Again he hath open'd a wide Gate to the greatest absurdities in the world, in proving that *sin* hath no positive Being, because it hath none as abstractly considered from *act*, or *habit*. For according to this Logick, one may prove that *nothing* hath a positive Being. No *virtue* (we may be sure) as well as no *vice*. For (to clear it by an example) as the *act* or *habit* of *hating* God, hath no positive being, abstracted from the *act*, or *habit*; so the *act* or *habit* of *loving* God, hath no positive being, abstracted from the *act*, or *habit*. He confesseth it is an *action*, to *hate* God; and that the *hated* of God is a *quality*, he will not deny. Nor can he possibly say more for the positive being of *loving* God, or of the *love* which we have of God, which can have no being at all (neither positive nor privative) if abstracted from all either *act* or *habit*, that is, from it self.

III.
By arming the
Atheist against
himself, in pro-
ving that God
hath no positive
Entity.

§. 10. If M. Hickman's method were allowable, he would strengthen the hands, as of all evil doers, so of the Atheist in particular; who may prove to M. Hickman (though not to any man else) That God himself hath no positive entity (which is as much as to say, there is no God,) as abstractly considered from his Existence, or from all manner of substance, corporeal, and incorporeal. For the *sin* of *hating* God, without the *act* of *hating* God (which is the *sin*) is simply nothing in the world. And sure it cannot be a Question, whether simply nothing hath a positive being. Yet this is the best that can be made of M. Hickman's skill in *flouting* Questions.

IV.
By putting it
out of his po-
wer to deny he
is a *Brute*, till
he renounces his
transgression &
Thence ad Hypo-
thesis.

§. 11. Or admit a *sin* can be something, abstracted from all manner of *act* or *habit*: yet the Question still would be, whether such *sin* hath a positive being, *yes*, or *no*, in any respect whatsoever. Not whether it hath it *multiplacitudo*, as *sin*; that is so wretched a Transgression & *Thesis* as *Hypothesis*, as by which I will prove that *Master Hickman* is a *Brute*. Per sure the *Animal Ad. Hickman* cannot

cannot possibly be a *man*, reduplicative, *as an Animal*; (for then every *Animal* would be a *man* as well as he) I say he cannot be a *man*, as *abstractly consider'd* from the principle of reason; And being not a *man*, but yet an *Animal*, he must needs be a *Brute*, by all confessions. But M. Hickman will say, The Question is, whether he is a *man*, or no. Not, whether he is such, with the restrictive particle [*as*] joyned to *Animal*. And I say the very same touching the business we have in hand. The Question is, *Whether sin hath a positive being* (witness his own mouth, p. 1.) not with any restrictive [*as*] in conjunction with an abstraction from act or habit. If M. Hickman be granted to be a *man*, it will be a new Question, how he comes by his *manhood*, whether from his *material* or *formal* part, which yet (by the way) are both *essentials* of his *Being*. And *sin* being granted to have a *positive being*, it matters not how, or * *from whence* it hath it, whether from its *material* or *formal* part, (to use the words of D. Twisse) which are both *essentials* of its *Being* what it is, and no more can it exist without the one, than the other. But if the word [*as*] must needs be used, then *sin* as *synonymous with sinful act*, hath been ever the subject of my Discourse, as by all my Instances and proofs may very sufficiently appear. And whether *sin* hath a *positive being*, as *sin*, or as an *action*, or as a *quality*, (for 'tis confessed that to *hate God*, is a *sin*, and an *action*, as that the *hated of God*, is a *sin*, and a *quality*,) is a thing so easie to be determined, that 'tis not worthy of a Dispute. But if M. H. will needs dispute it, let him fairly confess, 'tis a *second Question*; in the doing of which, he must yield the first.

§. 12. From all this it follows, That when it is said by M. Hickman, (p. 49.) *my not distinguishing betwixt the sinful act, and the sin of the act, is the stone at which I have all along stumbled*; he does but dissemble the sense he hath of his *unhappyness*, and by playing the *Brave*, make the best of so bad a matter. For he knew very exactly, that I had proved an *Identity* betwixt the *sin of killing*

D a

Abel,

* Note, it cannot be here meant; whether it hath it from God or man, it being Blasphemy to say it can be from God, which is the crime in M. H. I now oppose.

The Bone at which M. H. hath not stumbled easily, but falls, just all recovery.

Abel, which was the *act* of *murder*, and the *act* of *killing him*, which was the *sin* of *murder*. That the *act* of *hating God* is the *sin* of *hating him*, and *converso*. And so I must thank M. Hickman for *whipping himself* thus upon *another mans back*. For this apparently is the *stone*, at which he hath *stumbled*, and *fallen headlong*, and *bruised himself* as shall be shew'd, his making a *distinction* without a *difference*. As, betwixt the *act* of *hating God*, which is granted to be the *sin*, and the *sin* of that *act*, which is granted to be that very *act* of *hating God*. For to *hate God* is *a sin*, *a whole sin*, and *nothing but a sin*: to which three clauses I challenge M. Hickman to make some Answer. That, if he thinks there is something in *hating God*, which is *not sin*, but very *good*, as being one of God's Creatures, (which he sufficiently intimates, by distinguishing the *sin* of the *act*, from the *sinful act*, as if the very *act* of *hating God* were not a *sin*,) the world may know him to be a *Libertine*, without the protection of his *disguise*. Had he foreseen that challenge, to which I call'd for his Answer, in my Letter to Doctor *Heylin*, (pag. 266.) I had not met with an occasion for this last Section.

The true state of sin (Specified) as it differs from either part of sin, and from sinfulness in self.

§. 13. But because he seems in this place to use the word *sin* for *sinfulness*; I will first intreat him to remember, how *sin* is taken in holy Scripture, by D. Twisse, by M. Whitf. by M. Barlee, and by himself, (as I have shew'd in this chapter, §. 1. 6. 7.) Next I will help him to understand, what is the *sinfulness* of *sin*, and wherein it lies.

* See Aquinas in particular, 1. 2. quæst. 75. art. 1. & art. 2.

It is granted (I think) by *all*, that *sin* is that *whole* or *complexum*, which doth consist of two parts, *material*, and *formal*, so as neither part singly can either be, or be conceived to be a *sin*. And it is granted (I think) by *all*, that the *materiall* Part of *sin* is *positive*; it being an *action*, or *quality*, (and when a *quality*) an *act*, or *habit*, as hath been shew'd. The only *privative* Part of *sin* (mark the *emphasis* which lyes on Part) is the *defection* from the

Rule,

Rule, which yet is founded in a positive act, of which the other is onely a superadded relation, unavoidably resulting by the positive act's application to the Rule. Thus I think we are to speak, if we may rightfully distinguish the two parts of sin, which D. Field will not allow, nor indeed is it possible, so to distinguish the one from the other, as to intitle God to the one without the other; and that I suppose is the Doctors meaning. But now for the abstract of this concretum, it is that which resulteth from both united: For after the manner that inequality doth arise from the Relation of a Bicubitum to a cubit, so the sinfulness of a sin (to wit of the action of hating God, or of Cain's killing Abel,) doth arise by resultance from these two things, [God's forbidding it to be done, and its being done when thus forbidden.] so then. The positive action of hating God, (as the material part) which carries with it a defection from the rule of God's Law, (as the formal part) is that complexum or whole sin, which I have proved and shall prove to have a positive being. The meer defection from the rule, or *repugnance to it, (without the action of hating God) is not the sin, but the formal part onely. The meer action of hating God (without its defection from the rule, which for once I will suppose, *decedi gratiâ*,) would not be the very sin, but the material part onely. But the sin (as I said) is both united, viz. The action of hating God in a repugnance to, or defection from the rule of God's law: whereas the sinfulness of this sin, (that is, the abstract of this concrete) is not both parts united, (for then it would be concrete, and so identical with sin) but that which resulteth from both united. As the humanity is not the man made up of a body, and a rational soul, (any more then the man is either of these, without the other,) but that which onely resulteth from both united; whereas the man is both united.

§. 14. But now (for a while) let us admit, that the

2011

though we should grant him his Reduplication, but rather insist all he says at.

* Note, that D. Field hath asserted, that very repugnance to be a positive thing. l. 3 c. 23. p. 120. and hath said that sins are positive acts (p. 119.) not obligations of the acts.

M. Hickman gets nothing:

Question were of *moral evil*, as *such*. It would then be comprehensive of *all moral evil*. For à *quatenus ad omne valet consequentia*, by his own confession p. 85. what then mean's he by a *privation*, when he saith that *sin or moral evil*, as *such*, is a *privation*? unless he means a *more privation*, and nothing else, he speaks not against the *positivity* of *sin*; which even they who do assert, do also hold there is a *want* of such a *rectitude* as is *due*; but they say there is something *besides* that *want*. As in *walking to kill a neighbour*, there is something *positive*, besides the *want* of a *good end*, to which the *walking* should be directed. And if any thing could be due to the *hating* of God, to make it *good*, (as nothing can be) there would be an *action*, besides the *want* of that *due*, as M. Hickman confesseth p. 94. Nay in saying that that *action* is essentially evil, (*ibid.*) he confesseth the very *action* to be the *sin*. And taking *sin* in the right sense for *complexum quid*, (as he confesseth (p. 95.) we may allow him his *own way* of stating the Question to his undoing.

Nay proves
himself a Car-
nendist or Li-
bertine.

§. 15. Again he is *ruin'd* by his *preservative*, as may appear by this Dilemma. Does he think that *privation* is a thing *real*, or onely *nominal*? *something*, or *nothing*? If *nothing*, then for M. Hickman to *filch* and *plunder*, is but a *sin*, and therefore *nothing* in his opinion, and so is a *Carnendist*. If *something*, then he thinks it Gods *Creature*, or *not* his creature. If his *creature*, then he thinks that God is the *Author* of *sin*; and so he must think that *sin* is *good*, or *not good*; if he thinks it to be *good*; he will scruple to *commit* it. If *not good*, he thinks that God can create what is peculiar to the *Devil*, (as Master Calvin inferreth against the *Libertines*.) If he thinks it *not* Gods *Creature*, though something *real*, then he must eat up his former saying, viz. That it belongs to the *universality* of the *first cause*, to produce every *Real Being*. pag. 95.

§. 16. I shall conclude this Chapter with the Concession

sion of *Benaventure*; that the sin of *Concupiscence* imports *two things*, to wit an *appetite*, and an *excesse* of that *appetite*. In which *excesse* he confesseth there seemes to be a *Positi- on*, though he endeavours by a *simile* (which doe's not run upon all its feet) to make it seem a *privation* rather. Which however it may *infer*, yet it cannot wholly *be*, with- out implying a *contradiction*. And if either of the two is *something positive* (the act of the *appetite* it self, or the *excesse* in the act,) sure that which consisteth of *both toge- ther*, (I mean *concupiscence*,) cannot be *lesse*, then *either* of them.

petitum; dicit nihilominus in actu, appetitum excessum. &c. apud Voss. Pel. Hist. p. 217.

That sin is posi-
tive and con-
crete may be
concluded from
Benaventure,
in lib. 2. sent.
dist. 32. quest.
1.

Concupiscen-
tia duo dicit
(secundum id
quod est) Di-
cit enim ap-

CHAP. III.

§. 1. **H**AVING hitherto cleared, and (in the doing of *that*) accidentally proved the thing in question, I might immediately proceed to shew the *littleness* of the *Tricks* in which our *Gambler* is wont to deal; but that I think it incumbent on me to effect that *first* which is most *material*, and of which most *Readers* do stand in the greatest *expectation*; to wit the proving by such convincing and cogent *Arguments*, that *sin* (which is properly so called) hath a *positive Being*, as to put a *conclusion* to the whole *Controversy*; and that by enabling the weakest *Reader*, to stop the mouth of the strongest that shall oppose him. And because I cannot but have observed (what hath also been observed by many others) that whatsoever is thought *strong* in Mr. H.'s *Rhapsody* (by such as are partial to his *Adventure*) he hath taken after *his manner*, (that is *dishonestly*, without the citing his *Author* so much as *once*, to whom he was beholding ex-
tremely

Mr. H.'s chief
strength from
Mr. Barlow's
youngest writ-
ings. Why first
encountred.

treably *often*,) from an *Exercitation de natura mali*, which had been pen'd and printed more then 20. years agoe by my very good Friend Mr. THOMAS BARLOW, who (I conceive) at that time could be but a wly Master of Arts, (though now the learned and Reverend Provost of Queens College,) I shall begin with that instance, of which I verily believed I had been the first urger, 'all since I found it in Dr. Field, and in other writers of great Repute, whom I have now consulted on this occasion. I mean that, which is drawn from the Sin of *bating God*, (and by consequence from all other *sins of commission*, whereof this one is the fittest Instance,) to which Mr. Hickman pretends an answer (though without the will, and consent, yet by the assistance of Mr. BARLOW. The insufficiency of the Answer I intend to shew by my Reply. Which being done, I shall submit it to the consideration of Mr. Barlow: That if he approves of my Reply, he may make me glad with the knowledge of it; and that if he doth not, he may shew me the reason of his dislike. I suppose his judgement may now be altered, from what it was in his younger years. If not, I shall desire to discuss the matter rather with Him, who is able to tie me the hardest knots, and to shew me my Error in case I erre, then to contend with such a Trifler as Mr. Hickman appears to be, who is fitter to *bury* then maintain his Cause.

An account of
Dr. Field's
Reasons for the
positive entry
of sin. 1. 3. of
the Church. cb.
23. Edit. 2. p.
119. 120.

§. 2. That the sin of *bating God* is nothing more then a sin, and that it hath a *positive being*, I have so often proved (mine own way) in my *AUTOCTONOUS* (besides what I have done in my Letter to Dr. Heylin, and in the sections of the foregoing Chapter,) that I suppose it high time, to shew how others have proved it, as well as I. Both that the greatness of their Authority may help prevail with some men to accept of reason, and that I may take an opportunity to speak mine own sense in their *Vindication*.

I will the rather begin with Dr. Field, because He,

2 if

* if any other, (saith Mr. BARLOW himself who doth oppose him) was a learned Writer of our own Church, which he hath studiously defended against the Papists. First tis his peremptory assertion, That the sin of Commission, which is the doing of that the creature is bound not to do, is merely positive.

* Doctus, aliquis alius, Ecclesie nostrae scriptor Richardus Field. Exer. 2. p. 71. Edit. 2.

His first Reason for it is this. *As the affirmative Act of Gods Law is broken, by the not putting that in being, which it requireth, so the negative is violated positively, by putting that in being, which it would not have to be.*

The first Reason.

Again he saith a little after, *That sin of commission is an evil act; and that there are some evil Acts, which are not evil ex fine & Circumstantiis, but ex genere & objecto, which are therefore denominated evil (not by* passive denomination, as if they wanted some Circumstances, that should make them good, but) by active denomination, because no Circumstances can make them good, and because by way of contrariety they deprive the sinner of that orderly disposition, that should be found in him, and some other of that good, which pertaineth to him. As it appeareth in the acts of injustice spoiling men of that which is their own, (which Mr. Hickman cannot endure to hear of) and in the acts of blasphemy against God, or the hate of God, in which the sinner as much as in him lieth, by attributing to God what is contrary to his Nature, or denying that which agreeth unto the same, maketh him not to be that which he is, and hating him wisheth he were not, and endeavoureth to hinder what he would have done.*

* Note, that he who commits such sins, is denominated evil in part by passive denomination, (for that he wanted that orderly disposition which should be in himself) though chiefly indeed by active denomination &c.

Now (saith the Doctor a little after) *That that sin of Commission which is an evil ex genere & objecto is not denominated evil passively, from the want of rectitude due unto it, it is evident, in that no rectitude is due to such an Act. For what rectitude is due to the specificall Act of hating God? or what rectitude is it capable of? This he urgeth against*

The 2. Reason.

* Notandum,
S. Patres in-
terdum mali-
tiam peccati
explicare per
privationem
boni, non
quod debeat
in esse ipsi a-
ctui peccati,
sed quod de-
beat ineffe ho-
mini operan-
ti, &c. *Lectio
de perf. Dni. l.
31. cap. 16. &
Order. 3. 196.*

*The first rea-
son was never
answered.*

*The second an-
swer'd by Mr.
Barlow in his
younger years.*

against Those, who affirm the *act is self*, in the *hating* God to be very good; and the *deformity* of the Act to be *only evil*; which *deformity* they fancy to be the *want* of a *rectitude* which was due to that *act*. not at all considering, that there cannot be * possibly any such thing, as a *right hating* of God, or a *rectified injustice*; these things im-
plying a *contradiction in adjecto*. Yet such absurdities they will swallow, rather than *confess*, (what yet they find, saith D. Field,) that *some sins are positive Acts*. pag. 119. Nay the Doctor advanceth farther, and certainly farther than he needed, if not farther than he ought, (I am sure much farther than I have done) That in the *sin* of *commis-
sion* specifically considered there is *nothing* but *merely posi-
tive*, and the *deformity* that is found in it is *precisely a po-
sitive Repugnance to the Law of God*: which he doth not say upon his own account only, but farther backeth it with the Authority, and concurrent Judgements of many eminent Schoolmen, and great Divines, (many more than M. Hickman so much as attempted to produce) whose names and words shall be seen anon.

§. 3. To the first Reason of the two, which the most learned D. Field (as the learned M. Barlow does once more call him, p. 74.) was pleas'd to give for his asserting the *positive enmity of sin*, M. Barlow doth not make any answer; nor doth he take the least notice, that there was any such thing; though as it is his first reason, so I conceive to be his best too: which I shall probably shew when occasion serves, especially if I chance to be put in mind.

To the second Reason his answer is, That *no rectitude is due to the hatred of God*, in as much as it is limited to such an object, to wit God. But (as he saith a little before, to which he here refers his Reader,) * *The hatred of God being taken by it self may be good, and so by consequence the being of the act shall not be evil per se. Just as walking*

* Sic ut Ambaleio per se sumpta potest esse bona; Sic odium Dei per se sumptum po-
tест esse bonum: & per consequens, ipsum esse illius non erit per se malum. pag. 74.

is good

is good of it self, though walking to kill or commit adultery cannot be made good by any Circumstance.

§. 4. To this Answer I reply in the behalf of D. Field. first, That it granteth the very thing which it pretendeth to deny, and which alone was the thing that D. Field contended for, to wit, that no Rectitude can be due to the hatred of God, which is no longer the hatred of God, than the hatred is limited to such an object, to wit God. So what is urged by D. Field is exactly yielded by M. Barlow, and I appeal unto himself, whether it is not as I have said. For the Doctors words are, [what Rectitude is due to the specificall act of hating God?] now it cannot be the specificall act of hating God, unless the act be limited to that very object: and when it is, 'tis fully granted, that nothing of Rectitude or goodness is due unto it.

Secondly I reply, That when he saith, the hatred of God being taken by it self, may be good, he flatly contradicth what he had said a little before, to wit, that the hatred of God remaining, it cannot be possibly made good by any circumstance whatsoever. And the subject of the Dispute being the hatred of God, it must needs remain till it is taken away; And being taken away, there is nothing of it to be disputed, no kind of thing, either good or evil.

Thirdly, It is an uncount sentence (to say no worse) which affirms any goodness in hating God, let the hating God be taken in what sense it can be. For 'tis acknowledged by all, to be Intrinsically evil, evil in genere & objectu, so as nothing to be imagin'd can make it otherwise then evil. And to say that that can be good in any notion, which is confessedly good in none, is to add impiety to contradiction. For the hatred of nothing, excepting sin, can be morally good. And therefore to say, that the hating God (in any sense) can be good, is to imply that the hating God is (in some kind of sense) the hating of sin.

Fourthly. It is far from good sense, to say the hatred of God being taken by it self, that I would gladly think it an error of the Press, if I did not find it so often used.

The answer shewd to be invalid in five respects.

I.

By its granting what it pretendeth to deny.

II.

By implying a contradiction,

III.

By being offensive to pious minds.

IV.

By offending against the rules of sense.

However I am confident his meaning was, That *Hatred* being taken by it self (without relation to God) may be good. For the *hatred of God* cannot possibly be taken by it self, so as *hatred* may stand without relating to the object to which 'tis join'd; for then the *hatred of God*, were not the *hatred of God*, which would be an express contradiction. And his meaning being granted to be so different from his words, as *hatred* taken without God for its object, must needs be from the expression of *hating God*, I then profess it to be true, but not at all to the purpose. For 'tis affirmed by D. Field, that no retribution can be due to the *hatred of God*: not that it cannot be due to *hatred*, either considered in it self, or in relation to any object which is not God.

v.
By the twofold
wisdom of the
Smith alleged.

Fifthly, The simile taken from walking of it self, and walking to kill or commit adultery, is very halting in two respects. For 1. walking by it self hath no proportion with the *hatred of God*, whatever it might have had with *hatred by it self*. The *hatred of God*, being rather represented, by walking to kill or commit adultery. 2. The Doctor spake of such acts, as are evil ex genere & objectis, so as nothing of circumstance can make them good; and are denominated evil by active denomination: from which walking of it self is as wide as Heaven from North to South.

And thus I have vindicated the Doctor, for the love of the Cause which he asserteth, (not from the learned M. Barlow who now is Provost of Queens in Oxford, and I am confident doth condemn the aberrations of his youth, but rather) from M. Barlow, who was but newly Master of Arts, and Junior even to M. Hickman, who yet hath nothing any otherwise to be vouchsafed a Confutation, than as he hath thought it worth stealing out of so young a mans Essayes, as M. Barlow was when he was Metaphysick Reader: from whom, as I dissent, without the least diminution of solid Friendship, so I have not express'd it without his leave.

§. 5. To the Argument urged by GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE (which was the same in effect with Doctor Field's,) M. Barlow thus answers, (p. 73.) *That the hatred of God is only evil through the defect of a due object: for that hatred would be good, were it terminated on sin.*

GULIELM.
de RUBIONE
NE vindicated
by way of reply
to M. BAR-
LOW'S ansu.

* *Odiū Dei est malum solum ob defectum objecti debiti, nam si terminaretur ad peccatum, esset bonum.* pag. 73.

But I reply to this Answer, That the hatred of God, being an act determin'd upon an object, can have no other object than what it hath, (for if it be the hatred of any thing else, then is it no longer the hatred of God) much less can it be terminated on the hatred of sin; the hating God rather implying the love of sin: if by the hatred of God he means nothing but hatred, (in which case the word God must be blotted out) then tis quite beside the purpose, as hath been shew'd; for tis not hatred per se, much less hatred of sin, which was said to be so evil that no circumstance advenient can make it good; but rather the contrary, the hatred of sin is so good, as that it cannot be made evil. And therefore the hatred of God being the term in the Argument propos'd, should also have been the term in the Answer pretended.

Whereas it is added to his answer, that the hatred of God is not taken aggregately, or by way of connotation, when tis said it may be good by the position of the due circumstance (p. 73.) I also add to my reply, that though hatred can (per se) yet hatred of God cannot be possibly so considered; for it implies a contradiction. Hatred there being the *Act*, and God the *object*, and both together the *Aggregate*: which whilst it is, it cannot be but what it is. If by hatred of God, he means hatred of nothing, or of sin, then he must say what he means, and not the contrary to what he means; which when he shall say, twill prove to be nothing to the purpose.

§. 6. That which follows in M. Barlow's Answer, is

so fully expressed by M. Hickman, that I will set down his words, and then discover the infirmity of them [The hating of God is *complexum quid*, and must not be spoken as of one: The vital action of hatred is a thing positive, but the nature referring or terminating of that act to such an object which is altogether lovely, that's the sinfulness of the action, and not positive, but privative. p. 95. In evil works there are two things considerable, the works themselves, and their pravity. The works themselves (we doubt not) are positive and from God, as all other positive things; but their pravity adds no new entities to them, &c.]

M. Hickman's answer proved vitious in three respects.

I.

By such a gross Fallacy, as by which he is proved no man, but either a beast, or somewhat worse.

To shew the Ayles of this Answer, I will proceed by these degrees. First it labours with the Fallacy, à *benè conjunctis ad male divisa*, for the sin of hating God doth so inevitably import the whole *complexum*, viz. that very self in conjunction with that very object, that it cannot so much as be conceived to be the sin of hating God, when the act is supposed to be divided from the object. To shew him the fruit of his Distinction, I will put the case into other colours. Let him prove he is a man, by the best medium that he can use, and I will prove (*ad hominem*) he can be none; For man is *complexum quid*, and must not be spoken of as One: there is something in him material, and something formal. The Animal is one thing, the *Anima rationalis* is quite another. And M. Hickman being either without the other, may be a Brute or an Angel, but not a man. And being for certain not an Angel of light, he must (if an Angel) be one of darkness. This is every way as pertinent, and as tolerably applyed, as what is spoken by M. Hickman against the positive being of hating God. If this Coin is not current, let him not pay it to other men. And if it is, let him accept it when it is paid.

II.
By such a shifting from the Question, as proves him convinced of his maintaining a gross error.

Secondly, He so shamefully flies from the thing in Question, to that which he knew neither was, nor can be, as to discover the mean opinion which he really hath of his own Tenet, and to prove his Book written, against nothing so much as his own conscience. 1. He knew it was not

not the Question, whether *hated*, without relation to God as its object, is a *sin*, or whether any thing, without *hated*, is the *sin* of *hating* God. But he knew (by what I had said in my *AUTOLOGON* 1075) that the thing in Question, was the *hating* of God in *sensu composito*. For I had said in the plainest terms, That to *hate* God is a *sin*, or a *sinful act*, (two expressions for one thing.) That the *sinfulness* consisteth neither in God without *hating*, (for he is *purity* it self) nor in *hating* without God, (for *hated* in it self is a thing *indifferent*, and apt to be good as well as *evil*, God himself *hating sin* with a perfect *hated*) but in the *union* and *application* of that *act* to that *object*. As the nature of *man* consists not in a *body* only, nor only in a *soul*, but in the *union* of the *one* with the *other*. (p. 13.)

2. He knew it could not be a Question, whether *hated* is a *sin* when taken *per se*, without an *object*; or whether the *pravity* of *hating* God can be any thing at all, without the *act* of *hating* God; or whether there can be possibly any *act* when there is *none*. And yet his answer is as impertinent, as if one of these had been the Question.

Thirdy, In saying such *works*, as the *hating* God, are from God, which the Scripture calleth the *works* of the Devil, he speaketh *Blasphemy*. And in saying, the *sin* of *hating* God is *complexum quid*, which must not be considered of as *One*, he contradicts his other sayings, that *sin* and *sinfulness* are the *same*, that is, a meet *abstract*, and which cannot else be considered as *sin*. So that here I must ask him a second time, (and challenge him to give me a Categorical Answer) can the *hating* of God be conceived to be a *sin*, or can it not? when he answers, I will reply. But for his *Blasphemies*, and *self-contradictions*, let him read my letter to Dr Heylin, p. 265. to p. 270.

§. 7. Having insisted thus largely on my *Reply* to those *Answers*, which appear to shew us the very utmost, that can be pleaded in the defence of so gross an Error; and having detected the obvious *Fallacies*, in which the whole force of the answers lyeth, I shall study to be the *briefer*

By Blasphemy
expressed, and
contradiction
implied.

in.

in all that follows, without the least fear of being thought to be *obscure* by my plainest Reader. To Dr. *Field* his 2. Reasons above recited,

As REASON
taken from H.
GROTIUS a-
mounting to
the same with
Jacob Almain.
Quidam
mala sunt eti-
am citra le-
gem, & possi-
t ac manente
eius obligati-
one, procura-
re ut aliquis
contra L. faci-
at, naturaliter
malum est,
Hic Grot in
Luc. 12. 32.

Mr. Barlow's
Answer, p. 66.

Proved faulty
in 7. respects.

A Third Reason may be added from *HUGO GROTI-
US who saith that *some things are evil without the Law*; and that the Law being, & continuing to oblige, it is nat-
urally evil to procure any man's acting against the Law, or to
make a Law to the contrary, and therefore repugnant to the
Nature of God. From whence there follow 2. things, (1.) that
some whole acts are immutably evil, and (2.) That they
cannot have any being from the Almighty. JACOBUS
ALMAIN giveth an instance in the *hating of God*
and in *Adultery*, and saith they could not but be for-
bid.

To whom 'tis answered by Mr. Barlow, that if God
did not forbid theft, it would not be a sin, and that he
may dispense with his Law, as when he said to *Abraham*
go kill thy son.

But I reply, 1. That he speaks not to the Instances
brought by *Jacobus Almain*. It had been ill to hate God,
had it been possible that God had not forbid it. 2. Theft
is not of those things which are onely evil because forbid-
den, (as the eating swines flesh among the Jews) but of
those other things which are onely forbidden for being e-
vil. And therefore, 3. It was not possible, that God should
never have forbidden all manner of *injustice*, of which
theft is one species. 4. God did not say to *Abraham*, Go
kill thy son, but go and offer him up; which he also did,
without killing. 5. Had he done it, he had not dispensed
with his Law, which onely forbiddeth such a killing, as
ipso facto becomes a Murder; not such as ipso facto be-
comes a sacrifice, else a thief could not be hanged for the
fulfilling of one Law, without the breach or dispensation of
another. The prohibition of murder comprehends not
killing by commission from God, who may as lawfully take
away *Isaacks* life by *Abrahams* hand, as by a Fever. 6. If
the

the act of *stealing*, or *hating God*, be affirmed to be *good*, and so a *positive entity*, abstractly considered from Gods *forbidding*; it must be granted to be such when it is *forbidden*, I mean a *positive entity*, although not *good*, and so the *Answer* destroys its end. Mr. Barlow's words are, *si illud mandatum abfuisset, idem numero alius horrendum fuisset homicidium* (p.66.) Had it been *murder*, it had been *sin*, (for murder cannot but be *sin*) and so we have his *confession*, that *sin* may be a *positive act*. But 7. It does imply a *contradiction*, to say the *same numerical act* can be *forbidden*, and *not forbidden*, which I therefore leave to consideration.

§ 8. What Mr. Barlow calleth a *concession* in his behalf, I call an *argument* against him, viz. That if God could produce that act [of *hating God*] in respect of the substance of the Act, then it would not be evil: but (say I) that act is proved by me and others, (yea and confessed by Mr. H.) to be *wholly*, because *intrinsically* and *essentially evil*, evil *ex genere & objecto*, and *antecedently to the Law*; therefore it cannot be Gods *production*, for all its *having a positive Entity*. This I retort to Mr. B. his p.66,67. and it pincheth Mr. H. more ways then one.

The words of
Capreolus
make for me

§ 9. Whereas it is said, (p.67.) that if the man that *hates God* whilest yet in's *wits*, shall continue to *hate him* being mad, the act remains, but not the *obliquity*, because the act, to be *sinful*, must be *rational and free*.

Mr. Barlow's
Plea out of
Hortadius pro:
ved faulty in 6
respects.
Answer:

I deny that any man can *hate God* or *love him* without the use of *reason*, but I further return six things, 1. That for a man to *hate God*, is the greatest *madness* in the world 2. That if he is not so altered, but that he continues to *hate God*, he is not altered so far, but that he continues to be a *sinner* in *hating God*. 3. Whilst he continues to be a man, he continues to have *freedom* and *rationality* enough to *sin* by. 4. This Argument would prove (if it had real force in it) that not only all *infants*, but *some adults* are in a state of *Impeccability*. 5. It would follow from hence, that the

goodness of a *vertuous* act doth not consist in the *substance* of it, because it would then become impossible, that the substance of the *act* should continue without the goodness. Whereas it is said in this Evasion, that the Act of *hating* God may remain in *substance*, without the presence of its *obliquity*. But (6.) to answer yet more expressly to his reason taken from *Rational* and *free*; I say the *sinfulness* of the *act* is *one* thing, and the *sinfulness* of the *agent* is quite another. The *obliquity alone*, or the sole contrariety of the *act* to the *Law* (in conjunction with the *act* from which it cannot be disjoyned) is enough to constitute the *sinfulness* of the *act*. But the *Liberty* of *will* and *use* of *Reason*, are required onely to the *sinfulness* of the *agent*. Which yet again is no otherwise, then in respect unto God *imputing* or *punishing*, according to the *Equity*, [or *ἐκείνου*] of the *second Covenant*. For though otherwise considered, (without the *Equity* of the Gospel) *sin* of *ignorance* are *sin*, and *Original sin* which is born with us is our *sin* still.

The *act* of *hating* God now, and of *sin* hereafter, unduly granted the *same act*.

§. 10. And whereas it is added a little after, that *with the very same act wherewith he now doth hate God, a man should afterwards hate sin, the same act for substance would be morally good*; (p. 67.) I reply that this supposeth an impossibility, and confutes it self with the contradiction which it implies. To *hate* God one day, and to *hate sin* the next, are so far from being the *same act* numerically that Dr. Field doth rightly make them to be specifically distinct. And the supposing them to be *One* was to me at first such an *ἀπορροήματα*, that I admired how Mr. Barlow could so impose upon him-self, untill I doely considered his want of years, when he engaged himself for so great an Error.

A denial of positivity betray's its owner's to deny a reality also in sin.

§. 11. The two arguments which follow, to prove that *sin hath a real being*, whereof the one is urged by FER-RARIENSIS the other by GREGORIE ARIMINENSIS, I forbear to prosecute (as I might) because they do not prove the *positive* but onely the *real being* of *sin*; which Mr. Hickman grants, though tis denied by

by *Mr. Barlow*, (p. 69.) or rather it was denied by him, when he was newly *Master of Arts*. For that he should still be so much mistaken, is more then can enter into my thoughts. And therefore unless he shall friendly invite me to it, I will not meddle with the Infirmities of the two next pages. But onely observe how the belief, that *sin* hath no positive, is apt to pass into a Belief, that it hath not so much as a *Real being*. And indeed by the same figure, that *sin* is called a mere privation, it is also called a mere nothing. The reason of which I shall shew anon.

§. 12. **A**ND so I pass to a fourth Reason, why the *sin* of hating God hath a positive being. Because this *sin* is intrinsically evil, (as *Mr. B.* objects against himself out of *JOANNES de RADA*) and therefore not onely evil through some privation, because (saith he) it is impossible, that any privation should be intrinsical to a positive act. And *Gulielmus de Rubione* doth press it thus. A positive act which is so evil, that no kind of circumstance can make it not evil, is not evil for any defect or privation, but precisely for the substance of the act. (p. 71.)

A fourth Reason out of *JOANNES de RADA*.

To the Argument of *RADA*. *Mr. Barlow* thus answers, That such an act is called intrinsically evil, not because its obliquity is of its nature and essence, but because by the law of nature it is evil of it self, without the addition of a positive Law; or because it is evil ex genere & objecto, and not onely for the want of some circumstance. p. 73.

Mr. BARLOW'S Answer.

But I reply. 1. It implies a contradiction, to affirm its being intrinsically evil, and at once to deny it essentially evil: for ratio formalis, and ratio intrinseca, are synonymous with Philosophers; and *M. Hickman* hath dropped a good Confession, that the action of hating God is essentially evil. (p. 94.) 2. That it is evil of it self, antecedently to any positive Law, evil ex genere & objecto, is a concession whereby to prove it essentially evil. 3. No part of this answer pretends to prove that it is not indeed intrinsically evil, but onely quarrell's about the reason, why the act is so

Proved invalid in 4. re: *Shells*.

called 4. It doth not speak to the chief thing of all, [that no privation can be intrinsecall to a positive act] and so it seemeth by silence to give consent.

A 5th Reason
out of AQUIL.
NAS. 1. p. 9.
48. art. 1.

§. 13 **M**oral evil is proved to be a positive thing, because vice is set against virtue, by an opposition of contrariety, (as Aristotle saith, L. Cat. c. 10. § 1.) for each term of such opposites must needs be positive, because they are both predicamental species: which things are so true, that they are granted by M. Barlow (p. 80.) who therefore endeavours to elude the Argument, by saying the same thing, which I have often replied unto: to wit, that in respect of their material signification, virtue and vice are opposita contrariè, but not in respect of their formal signification.

A Reply to the
Answer of Mr.
BARLOW,
proving in fact
ty in three re-
spects.

Οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐν-
σθεν διαφέρει
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν
τῷ διακρί-
σθαι ἐν τῷ
διον. Αὐτοῦ
de Div. No. c.
2, §. 2. p. 492.

Ἀπὸ τῆς ἀν-
τιθέσεως τῆς
ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ
ἀντιθέσει. Idem
ib. c. 4. §. 18.
p. 572. look
forwards on
p. 5, §. 4. num. 5

To which I reply, first (as before) that this is the old fallacie à rectis conjunctis ad malè divisa, and so a flat transiſion à theſi ad hypotheſin. And if it be put into Syllogiſm, there will be found to be unavoidably, an Ignoratio Elenchi. The Question being of sin or vice in sensu composito, and the Answer onely considering it in sensu diviso. Secondly, Vice cannot be vice, nor be imagined so to be, without its material, as well as formal significatum: for without the act of hating God, the sin or vice of hating God (which is the act) cannot be so much as supposed to be, much less to be repugnant to any law, wherein its formalty is said to consist; for that would imply a contradiction. And thus the Answer (or rather evasion) doth so far forsake, as in- dede to null the thing in Question. Thirdly, supposing the vice to be taken from the Act or habitu, of hating or hatred, (by its having sin for its object,) it must be granted to be a virtue, and therefore not opposed to virtue, by any kind of opposition; which M. B. observes to be replied by Ferrariensis. To which although it is rejoyned by the same Ferrariensis, yet the rejoynder is nothing else, but a gross return to the old fallacie just now discovered in the Answer, and so is equally refuted by every part of my Reply.

By

By the way I note one good confession, (and from the words of *Aquinas*) that *vice* as well as *virtue* may be taken for a concrete; whereas *M. Hickman* was fain to say, that *sin* (or *vice*) is so perfectly an abstract that he cannot conceive it to be *sin*, unless he conceive it as an *Abstract*, and that he is to seek what *vox abstracta* is, if *sin* be not such. (p. 54.) It may very well be, that he is to seek; for he elsewhere confesseth, that *sin* is *complexum quid*. And if he thinks that *abstractum* doth signifie *complexum*, he is a small *Latinist* indeed, if he doth not, he is a self-confessor.

M. Hick. contradicted by his Masters, and himself too.

Virtus & virtutum si semantur concretæ sunt contraria, & species positiva. Aquin. l. 2. contra Gent. c. 8.

§. 14. **A** *Sin* of commission is proved to have a positive being, because it necessarily requireth some positive act, whereby to become a perfect *sin* of commission; which as it is granted by *M. Barlow*, so it seemeth to be also confirmed by him, p. 84. where he approveth that of *Suarez*. (*Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 11.*) *Malum simpliciter est illud quod est in se malum; hoc est carere aliquo bono sibi ipsi debito, ad modum perfectionis propriæ: quale est omne peccatum, præsertim commissionis.* For if every *sin* of commission is not simply evil only, but wholly too, (as that must needs be, which doth *carere omni bono sibi debito*, and though I deny the supposition, that any good thing can be due to *sin*;) then the positive act (without which it cannot be) must needs be morally and simply evil; It being the *sin* of commission, which is spoken of in both places; not any action or quality, which is no *sin* at all; so as the ordinary shift, of flying from the Act of hating God, (which is the *sin* of commission, and so the subject of the Discourse) to the act of hating, without relation to any object, (which is no *sin* at all) or with relation onely to *sin*, (which makes it a high moral good) is foreseen and prevented by what I now say.

A *fixed Reason* is taken out of *FRANCISCVS de MAYRON* and divers others.

What is said by *M. Barlow* of the threefold difference betwixt a *sin* of omission, and commission, (p. 86.) concerneth nothing that I know, excepting those words which he

Not answer'd by *M. Barlow*,

frames to himself in his objection (p. 82.) *In hoc SOLVM distinguitur peccatum omissionis & commissionis, quia omissio dicit nudam carentiam actus: et commissio necessario requirit actum.* The word *solum* is very strange. And if he found it in *GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE*, as it is more then I know, so I am not concerned to make inquiry. It is sufficient for me, that my Argument, being *unanswer'd*, needs not the help of a *Reply*. I hasten therefore to another way of eviſion.

A seventh Reason alledged by several Authors, partly cited by D. Field.

§. 15. **T**Hat is properly a *sin*, which is forbidden by the Law. But the positive act (of *Adultery* *theft*, or *hating God*) is forbidden by the Law. And therefore the Act so forbidden is very properly a *sin*; we commonly say it is a *sin*, to do this, or that, (as to hate God, and to love the world) because God hath forbid us to do the one, and the other.

M. B.'s Answer.

To this it is answered by *M. Barlow*, (who not producing any *Author* for the objection, and putting in the word *Formaliter*, (p. 82.) may seem to have adapted the Argument for an Answer,) That the Act precisely taken is not forbidden as a positive Act, (as in *Murder*, merely to kill, is not forbidden, *quoad esse physicum*; (for then it should not be lawful to kill a malefactor, who is justly condemned to be put to death,) but as it recedeth from the Rule of right reason, and is subjected to the privation of that rectitude which is due. pag. 86.

Proved faulty in 5. respects.

But I reply, 1. That this is the old fallacie so often mentioned; for an act without reference to a negative precept of the law, is not an act which is forbidden, nor pretended by any to be a *sin*, much less of *commission*, which alone was the act spoken of in the Argument; and so instead of an answer, we have onely an escape from the thing in Question. 2. It is affirmed by *Aquinas*, (1. 2. q. 71. Art. 6. and q. 72. art. 6. (That *Austin* put two things in the definition of *sin*, to wit, a material, and formal part; that is, a positive act, and its repugnance to the Law, wit-

ness

nels his citation p. 85.) And what is this but to say, that *sin* is *totum essentiale*? which it cannot be, without one of its two essentials; so that the Answer doth offend against the Answerer himself, by considering the one without relation to the other, notwithstanding his Acquiescence in St. Austin's Definition. 3. The Answer doth not deny that the positive act is forbidden, and so a sin; but onely speaks of that thing, in respect of which it is forbidden. And to this it may easily be replied, that as an * *act* is not morally evil, without relation to the Law which doth forbid it; so an act hath nothing of moral goodness, without Relation to the Law which doth command it, or to the Counsel which doth commend it. And again as no *act* can be a sin, without repugnance, to the Rule of right Reason; so can there be no such repugnance, without an *act*. 4. It is not *all killing*, but killing properly called *Murder*, which is forbidden by the Law, (which commands the killing of the Murderer, and thereby makes it an *act* of Justice.) And therefore that should have been the instance; for all such killing is forbidden by the Law, and such *alone* doth belong to the adequate subject of our Discourse. 5. To hate God is a sin, and a positive *act*, to which (it hath been proved that) no kinde of rectitude can be due. And it had naturally been evil, though it had never been forbidden: which yet it could not but have been, because the not forbidding of it, had been repugnant to Gods nature. For though the *act* of hating God could not be from Eternity, yet this proposition is *eterna veritatis*, and might truly have been spoken from all eternity, that it is evil to hate God. * Therefore this and the like acts were forbidden by the Law, even because they were evil; and are not onely evil, by being forbidden by the Law which yet those men do presuppose who will have every thing good that hath a positive being, and nothing simply evil, but an abstracted repugnance unto the Law: not considering the difference betwixt the breach of a positive and moral Law; betwixt a Jew hating God, and his eating swines flesh. The latter

* Note, that this is spoken of such acts as are not evil antecedently to the Law.

* See Dr. STEARN on this subject, in his *Anima Medela*, 2. cap. 15. p. 271. ad p. 278.

ter, which was *evil* because *forbidden*, was after the Law, for that very reason. But the former, which was *forbidden*, because *twas evil*, was *such* (in order of Nature) *before* the Law. The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove, (by insisting on it a second time) because I think it is the parent of many errors.

An 8. Reason
gathered out of
FRAN. DIOTALLEVI-
VS.

§ 16 **H**AVING thus done with my *Reply* to the several *Answers* of M. Barlow, I now proceed to another Argument, which I lately gathered out of *FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS*, and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before, because it will make for its *Confirmation*.

* Opera ma-
la, & opera
nobis à Deo
veritasynony.
ma sunt. —
In nostra po-
testate relin-
quitor vias no-
stras ex nobis
malas facere
quod non
contingeret, si
Deus non per-
mitteret mo-
do, sed effica-
citer etiam fa-
ceret ut † fa-
ceremus quod
vetet *eye*.
Diotall. quæ.
Theol. pag. 83,
84.

Evil works (saith this Author, who for *strength* and *acuteness* gives place to none) are * *synonymous* with *works* which are *forbidden* by God Almighty: who hath left it in our power to make our *ways* evil; which yet could not be, if he did not onely *permit*, but *efficaciously make* us to † *do* the thing that he *forbiddeth*. Now the thing that he *forbiddeth*, will be confessed *not* to be *this*, [That when we *act* what he *forbids* us, we do *not* suffer to come to pass, that *formal obliquity* annexed to all such *acts*, by the *repugnance* which they have to the Law *forbidden* them,] But the thing *forbidden* to us is *this*, [That we do *not* produce the *positive being* of that *act*, with which the *moral obliquity* is inseparably annexed.] The former cannot be the thing; because the law being given, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God*, we cannot possibly *bate* him, without a *repugnance* unto the law, which by *commanding* our love, *forbids* our *hatred*. The latter therefore must be the thing, which we are *forbid* to *put in being*. And which is properly our *work*, though a *positive* entity, because it is absolutely impossible, that God who *forbids* us the *act* of *hating him*, should *make* that *act*, which he thus *forbids* the *making* of; or that (by *acting* us with his power which is *irresistible*) he should *make* us to *do*, what he *forbids* us the *doing* of. But (to return to *Diotallevis*) when it is

it is said, *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife*, the meaning of it cannot be this, [Beware, that whilst thou producest the free act of concupiscence, the moral obliquity do not follow it, (for alas! it cannot but follow.) The meaning therefore must needs be this, [see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence, because of that obliquity which is inseparably annexed. Or determine not thy will to that object, which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason.] And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole * Council at Trent, (which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration,) That God's concurrence is onely permissive to the free determination of the created will, in producing the very being of the evil act. And God's permission is so distinguished (both by † Fathers and Schoolmen) from his effectuation or operation, as to signifie no more, then the negation of an impediment or cohibition. Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act, which by consequence is not a positive act. And it is not an action (saith Distallorini) but the negation of an impediment, in respect of that operation, which doth depend upon our free determination. From whence it follows, that he who hates God (be he man, or devil) is the sole cause of that act, which for that reason also is wholly sin.

* Quare Concilium vult, Deum permitt. sive solum concurrere, ad liberam Arbitrii creati determinationem ad producendam ipsam actus mali Entitatem. Id. id, † Aug. in Enchir. c. 96. Durand. in p. d. 46. q. 1. Aqu. p. 2. q. 19. art. ult. Greg. p. d. 46, & 47. q. 1. art. 1. Scotus in 1. d. 47. q. 1. 3.

§. 17. **T**His is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum. For if God does concur to the positive act of hating God, not onely permissively, by not hindering it, but physically too, by prädetermining the will of the Sinner to it, then he absolutely willeth the actually hating of himself; which of all absurdities is the greatest. And again, when man is forbid by God to hate him, and when God does grievously complain, and threaten to punish with Hell fire, the man that doth not obey his prohibition; It cannot choose but follow, that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth (to wit, the sinners hating of him) he willeth and nulleth the

Confirmed by a ninth Argument, leading the Adversary (M Hick.) to the most horrid absurdities to be imagined.

same thing, and after the very same manner, which is a blasphemous contradiction. And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman, (to whom alone I am henceforth speaking) that the *sin* of *hating God* hath a *positive being*, because that *quality* or *action* which hath a *positive being* is clearly proved to be a *sin*. And it is proved to be a *sin*, by being proved to be a Thing which is not *made* or *produced*, but onely *suffered* or *permitted* by God Almighty to come to pass. And only *made* or *produced* by them that *hate* him.

A tenth Argument or Reason out of Cardinal CAJETAN. in 1. 2. q. 79. art. 1. et 2.

§. 18. CAJETAN proves the positive Entity of sin, because (saith he) it *consisteth*, as well of a *conversion* to an *object* contrary to the *object* of *virtue*, as of an *aversion* from the *law*. And hence (saith the Cardinal) there is in *sin* a *double nature* of *evil*, the one arising from the *object*, the other from the *not observing* of the *law*: the first is *positive*, the second *privative*. The first inferreth the second; for it cannot be that a man should *hate God*, but that in so doing he must *break the law*; because it is *simply* and *intrinsically* evil, so that *to do it*, is a *sin*. And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine, (1. 3. c. 23. p. 120.) so I find the same Cardinal * elsewhere saying, that in *moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum*; and *est in moralibus malum dupliciter*. Implying the whole *sin* to be a *concrete*; not a *repugnance* to the *law* without an *act*, which doth imply a *contradiction*.

* Idem. ib. q. 18. art. 5.

An eleventh Argument collected from EPISCOPUS VS. part. 1. l. 4. c. 11. p. 380 col. 2.

§. 19. THE most acute EPISCOPUS doth implicitly thus argue, although by way of *paralipsis*. As an *act* commanded by the *law* is the *virtue* it *self*, or *ordination* of the *Will* unto the *law*; so the *act* forbidden by the *law* is the *vice* it *self*, or *inordination* of the *will* against the *law*. And as the *act* of *virtue* doth not contain or connote any real thing *positive* superadded to the *act*, which may be called *ordination*; so the *act* of *vice* doth connote nothing *privative*, superadded to the *act*, which may be called *inordination*.

§ 20. DOCTOR STERN (a very late, but Learned Writer) doth briefly urge six Arguments, to prove that *sin* may have a *positive being*; four of which I *pratermit*, because I have already shewd them, as long since urged by other men; though otherwise urged by him than others, and perhaps in some places to more advantage. The other two I shall mention, as not yet touched.

First (saith he) a *Non-entity* may be morally good, and therefore an *entity* may be morally evil. The Consequence is evident, both by the Rule of opposites, and because there is not more repugnance betwixt *Obliquity* and *Entity* (as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party) then betwixt goodness, and *Non-entity*. The Antecedent is proved, because a mere omission of a forbidden act, although a *Non-entity*, is morally good.

actus prohibiti, licet sit merum non-ens est moraliter bonus. pag. 280.

Again, the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment, the one of *sense*, the other of *loss*; whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God, as is also the former of a conversion to the creature; so that if *sin* were nothing but mere privation, the *pæna sensus* would be inflicted without all justice, under the notion of *Revenge* for a conversion to the creature.

§ 21. A Gain it may be thus argued, (and out of BARONIUS his *Metaphysica Generalis*) That which hath not a *positive entity* cannot be the cause of any thing. But *sin* many ways is the cause of something. For 1. it is the cause of punishment; and (2) one *sin* is the cause of another. A vicious act is the cause of a vicious habit. A vicious habit is the cause of vicious actions. And a natural propension to evil (which Baronijs calls *original sin*) is said by him to be the cause of all the vicious actions of our will.

G 2

Tis

A 12. and 13. Argument urged by Doctor STERN in his *Animi Medulla* l. 2. c. 16. p. 280, 281.

Non esse, Bonum moraliter esse potest, proinde & esse potest esse moraliter malum. Antec. probatur; quia pura omisso

Schola constituit pœnam duplicem, &c. ib. pag. 281.

A fourteenth Argument out of BARONIUS his *Metaph. Gen. Dial. 54.*

It is true, he *answers* this argument; but his answer may be *refuted* by my *Replies* to Mr. Barlow; and by what *Baronius* grants; (of which anon,) as the Reader will finde, if he makes a triall.

*The Arguments
back'd by the
Authority of
the most dis-
cerning.*

§. 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged, and that from many more Authors, then Mr. *Hickman* hath named for his opinion, I shall exhibit a *Larger Catalogue* (but with a lesser expence of time and paper) of such eminently learned and knowing men, as have justified my judgement with the authority of their *own*, and of whom (unawares) I have undertaken a *justification*. I will begin with those Writers, with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. *Field* thought fit to credit his.

§. 23. *ALVAREZ* saith, (a) *the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law*, which is not broken but by a positive *Act*. *Aquinas* also saith, b that though in a *sin of omission* there is nothing but a *privation*, yet in the *sin of commission* there is some *positive thing*. c Nay he saith more plainly (what Dr. *Field* doth not observe) that the *ratio formalis* of *sin* is two fold, whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner. d And that it consisteth essentially in the *Act* of the free-will. He also infers it to be an *accident*, whilst he e saith that every *sin* is in the will, as in its subject. And very often, f that in every *sin* there are two things, whereof the one is a quality or action, and so the whole *sin* must have a *positive being*. Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of *Cajetan*, (g saith *Gregory de Valentia*) that *sin*, formally as *sin*, is a *positive thing*, which he expressly also affirmeth in *primam*. 2da q. 71. art. 6. Some hold (saith b *Cumel*) that the *formal nature* of *sin* consisteth in some *positive thing*, to wit, in the manner of working freely with a *positive repugnance* to the rule of Reason, and the law of God, i *Ockam* saith further, that the very deformity in an *act of Commission* is nothing else but the *act* it self (viz. *actus elicitus*) against the *Divine Law*. And these are cited by Dr. *Field*. l. 3. c. 23. p. 120.

a *Alvarez*. l. 6.
de auxiliis div.
Gra. disp. 44.
b *Aqu. Quæst.*
2 de malo art.
2. ad. 4.
c. *Idem* 22.
q. 10. 5. ad 1.

d. 12 q. 77. 6. 0

e 12 q. 74. 1. 0.
f. 12 q. 71
6. c. de possum.
alibi.
g *Greg. de Va.*
lent. Tom. 2. d.
2 q 13. p. 203
art 5.
h *Cumel* disp
ver. ad pri.
mam cy 1. 2.
p. 104.
i *Ockam*. l. 3.
sent. 12.

§. 24. To these I add many more, which partly were not, and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field. k LESS:US saith that *an evil act is in some sort evil even according to its Physical Entity*. Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIUS, *Omne ens quod ens bonum est, l Piscator* himself hath this note, (and it is a note of exception) *At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis, unde oriuntur actus illi peccata, bona non est*. The learned m Professor of Divinity in Academia Tubingensi affirms Original sin to be an accident, as the opposite member to *substantia*; and calls it the accident of a *substance*; and compares it to the image of God in man, which (he also saith) was not a *substance*, but an Accident. And that will be yielded to have a positive being; especially if he means as *Piscator* did, that that accident is a Quality. Another n learned Professor in Academia Oxoniensi, by saying *Concupiscence* is a sin, inferreth that sin to be a positive entity, which *concupiscence* will be granted by all to be. And if it is with consent, it is an actual sin; if without consent, it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh, against the law of God. He also takes it to be an accident, by ascribing to it *subiectum quo*, & *subiectum quod*: because by entering at the flesh, it did infect the spirit. o Dr. GOAD, who was sent to the Synod at DORSET, whilst he was speaking (in that Tract which some do call his Retraction) against an ordinary Calvinian distinction, which he conceived to make God the Author of sin, expressly used these words. *Might I here, without wandering, discourse the nature of sin, I could prove sin itself to be an action, and confute this groundless distinction that way*. The tract is a Manuscript, but divers have Copies as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it, if not by other men's care at least by mine.

That Great Divine Dr. JACKSON, (who was withall a great Philosopher, and inferiour to none for skill in Metaphysics,) doth not content himself to say of original sin, p that it is not a mere privation, but also defineth it to be a positive Remotency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against

k Lessius de perfect. divinis, l. 13 cap. 26. num. 176.
l. C. Vorst. Amica Collatio. p. 141 Sed 64. m Manb. Ha. siue offeras in Loc. Theolog. l. 3. Stat. 2 p. 246. 247.

n Dabur Pri-deaux in Pas-cual. Controv. c. 3. p. 100. 113. 126.

o Dr. GOAD in his disput. of the Necessity and contingency of events 2. Arg. for Theol. 1.

Dr. JACKSON l. 102. 3024.

ch. 10. p. 302⁸. gainst the spiritual law of God, especially against the negative Precepts, &c. And as he highly commends *Illyricus*, (for an extraordinary writer,) so he vindicates his notion, by explaining his true sense of *Original sin*, which if the Dr. took by the right handle, Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong, in the latter part of his 2. *exercitation*. It was the *q* business of *Illyricus* (saith Dr. JACKSON) to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions, as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of *Theology*, and to put in continual cautions against the Admission of *abstracts*, or mere relations, into the definition of *Original sin*, or of that *unrighteousness* which is inherent in the man unregenerate. The judicious Doctor doth also tell us, (and who could tell better then he ?) that *r* St. *Austine*, *Aquinas*, and *Melauchton*, do say in effect as much as *Illyricus*, if their meanings were rightly weighed, and apprehended by their Followers, Nay *Calvin* and *Martyr*, and many other good writers,* consort so well with *Illyricus* in their definitions of *sin* in the unregenerate, that they must all be either acquitted, or condemned together. *Illyricus* himself explains his meaning, by producing the definitions of *Original sin*, not onely given by *Calvin* and *Martyr*, but explained by themselves into *Illyricus* his sense. In so much that Dr. Jackson, (ranking *Calvin* and *Martyr* with *Illyricus*) doth affirm them to * make *original sin* to be the whole nature of man, and all his faculties, so far forth as they are corrupted. Yet still their meaning was no more then the Scripture meanes, when it saith, the old man, and the body of sin, thereby expressing (most briefly) all the works of the flesh, all unhallowed desires, and vicious habits, which are contrary to the law or spirit of God. For so I gather from Dr. I. p. 303⁹. where he also gives notice: that *Illyricus* his book was commended to him, upon very high terms, by the Reverend Dr. Field then Dean of Gloucester.

§. 25. Next for the Reverend DOCTOR HAMMOND (who ever occurs to my Remembrance, when I hear or speak of judicious, Hooker, or Dr. Jackson,) he hath

q See ILLYRICUS his aim made apparent by Dr. JACKSON l. 10. c. 12 p. 3035, 3036.

r *Austin*. and *Melauchton*, (as well as *Aquinas*) say as much in effect as *Illyricus* did. *ibid.* * *ib.* ch. 13 p. 3036.

s *Calvinus* & *Martyr* quod *Illyricus* lib. cui *Titulus*, 770⁸ *et* 770⁹ *et* 770¹⁰ *et* 770¹¹ *et* 770¹² *et* 770¹³ *et* 770¹⁴ *et* 770¹⁵ *et* 770¹⁶ *et* 770¹⁷ *et* 770¹⁸ *et* 770¹⁹ *et* 770²⁰ *et* 770²¹ *et* 770²² *et* 770²³ *et* 770²⁴ *et* 770²⁵ *et* 770²⁶ *et* 770²⁷ *et* 770²⁸ *et* 770²⁹ *et* 770³⁰ *et* 770³¹ *et* 770³² *et* 770³³ *et* 770³⁴ *et* 770³⁵ *et* 770³⁶ *et* 770³⁷ *et* 770³⁸ *et* 770³⁹ *et* 770⁴⁰ *et* 770⁴¹ *et* 770⁴² *et* 770⁴³ *et* 770⁴⁴ *et* 770⁴⁵ *et* 770⁴⁶ *et* 770⁴⁷ *et* 770⁴⁸ *et* 770⁴⁹ *et* 770⁵⁰ *et* 770⁵¹ *et* 770⁵² *et* 770⁵³ *et* 770⁵⁴ *et* 770⁵⁵ *et* 770⁵⁶ *et* 770⁵⁷ *et* 770⁵⁸ *et* 770⁵⁹ *et* 770⁶⁰ *et* 770⁶¹ *et* 770⁶² *et* 770⁶³ *et* 770⁶⁴ *et* 770⁶⁵ *et* 770⁶⁶ *et* 770⁶⁷ *et* 770⁶⁸ *et* 770⁶⁹ *et* 770⁷⁰ *et* 770⁷¹ *et* 770⁷² *et* 770⁷³ *et* 770⁷⁴ *et* 770⁷⁵ *et* 770⁷⁶ *et* 770⁷⁷ *et* 770⁷⁸ *et* 770⁷⁹ *et* 770⁸⁰ *et* 770⁸¹ *et* 770⁸² *et* 770⁸³ *et* 770⁸⁴ *et* 770⁸⁵ *et* 770⁸⁶ *et* 770⁸⁷ *et* 770⁸⁸ *et* 770⁸⁹ *et* 770⁹⁰ *et* 770⁹¹ *et* 770⁹² *et* 770⁹³ 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hath proved, as well as taught, that the *All* of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act, (the act of Blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemy,) the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is straight, & consequently he that predetermines (or makes) the act, must needs predetermine (or make) the obliquity, so far is the act of sin (which is granted by all to have a positive being) from being one of Gods Creatures, (as Mr. Hickman feareth not to say) that is all acts of sin saith Dr. Hammond) God doth not so much as incline, and the Devil can do * no more then persuade any man. For his demonstrating of these, and other things, (as that the men of that way which Mr. Hickman walks in do unavoidably make God the Author of sin) consult the latter part of his 16 (chapter of *Fundamentals*). And now for the Reverend Dr. SANDERSON, he hath abundantly inferred the positive entity of sin, even in that very Sermon which he preached in his younger years, before he changed his judgement as to the 3. points in controversy; I mean that Sermon, which Mr. Hickman would have wrestled to serve his turn. For the Doctor there teacheth (as St. Paul doth to Timothy, 1 Ep. c. 4 v. 4. that every creature of God is good. And therefore to hate God, which is an action intrinsically evil, can be none of Gods creatures, in his opinion; though it hath in the Devil a positive being and existence: for that there is goodness in hating God, is the sole opinion of Mr. Hickman and his Instructors. 2. Common reason taught the *Maniches* (saith Dr. S.) that from the good God could not proceed any evil thing, no more then Darkness from the Suns Lustre, or gold from the scalding of the fire. But the positive act of hating is wholly evil, and so a sin notwithstanding its having a positive entity. 3. God hath imprinted some steps and footings of his goodness upon the Creatures (saith Dr. S.) but in hating God there cannot be any such; therefore he holds it to be a sin, though a positive entity. 4. Look upon the workmanship, and accordingly judge of the workman (saith Dr. S.) but we cannot judge of God, by the positive being of hating God.

D. Hammond of
Fundamentals,
p. 182.

ibid p. 183.
* So Aquinas.
1. 2 q. 80. art.
1. Resp.

Dr. SAN.
DERSON in
his Sermon on
1 Tim. 4-4.

ibid p. 278.

ibid p. 279,
280.

ib p. 281.

ib. p. 281.

God; therefore he holds it to be a *sin*, although it hath a *positive being*, 5. Doctor S. saith, *we must not blame Gods creatures, or say why was this made? or why thus? What good doth this? or of what use is that? it had been better if this or that had never been, or if it had been otherwise.*] But there are many *positive entities*, which we may blame; as *Blasphemy, pride, hypocrisy, hating of God;* and we may very well say, *why did David contrive the murder of Uriah?* and *why thus treacherously?* what good did that murder of so loyal a subject? of what use is the Devils *hating God?* it had been better there had been no such thing: therefore those are all *sins*, as well as *positive entities*, in the opinion of Dr. SANDERSON.

VASQUEZ
in pt. 2. d. 1.
95.

* Cajetan in 6.
art. 6. postea
art. 5 q. 18.

† Scotus in
Quodlibet. 18.
art. 1.

S. 26. VASQUEZ inquiring into the *formal part* of *sin* divides his Disputation into thirteen Chapters. The subject of the first is the opinion of Cajetan, that the *moral obliquity* doth consist in *ratione* positivâ*. The subject of the third is the opinion of sundry modern Writers, that it consists of a *privation* and *something positive besides*. The subject of the fifth, is to shew how they vary and disagree among themselves, who are against its *positivity* about the assigning of that *privation*, in which they suppose it to consist. In the tenth he gives the judgement of subtil † Scotus, that *obliquity* sometimes is *positively contrary* to *Rectitude*. Then adds his own in these words. Ego tamen existimo, omne peccatum commissiois, siue fiat defectu circumstantiæ debiti, siue habeat circumstantiam contrariam, semper esse peccatum ex relatione extrinsecâ oppositionis & inconvenientiæ, cum Naturâ rationali: Vtque autem modo actus contrarius est. In the eleventh Chapter he answers to the *Authorities* alledged for its consisting in mere *privation*. In the twelfth he answers to the *Reasons* offer'd for that opinion. In the thirteenth he considers, what was the Judgement of Aquinas in this affair, which though at first he seemingly conceives to be somewhat doubtful, (Aquinas speaking in diverse places as if he had been of diverse minds too) yet he proves

his

his true Judgement to have been this, That sin according to its *Formality* hath a *positive being*. [*Affirmat malum in moralibus esse differentiam Actus moralis, non quâ ratione est privatio debiti finis, sed quatenus est entitas quadam & positivum, cui privatio conjungitur. Idem docuit 3. contra Gent. c. 9. Præterea in hac primâ secunda q. 18. art. 5. ad 2. & q. 72. art. 1. affirmat, species peccatorum non ex privatione, sed ex ordine ad objecta desumi. Eo quod privatio per accidens se habeat cum peccato, objecta vero per se. Cum igitur supra q. 19. art. 1. dixit malum & bonum esse per se differentias actus, in ratione actus, Intelligi debet, non de malo quod in privatione consistit, (quia privatio non potest essentialiter & per se in actu aliquid constituit, sed de malo positivo. Quare ex hac parte aut nostra, aut Cajetani sententiæ favet.*

Our late *Apologist* for *Tilenus* (who is very much consider'd by knowing Readers) hath so far asserted the *positivity of sin*; and so baffled *M. Hickman*, even upon some of his own Grounds; that instead of some *Answer*, which *M. Hickman* by promise had obliged himself to give, he hath given no more than a *Tergiversation*.

That *MEDINA* held sin to have a *real, positive, absolute Entity*; And that *Vasquez* would have it to be a *positive Relation*; *M. Barlow* did acknowledge in his dissent from both, *Exer. 2. p. 53, 54.* *Templerus* held sin to have an *efficient cause per se*, and so by consequence a *positive being*. Reprehending *Suarez*, for allowing it no more then an *efficient per accidens.* *Durandus* & *A Dola* are acknowledged by *Churchman*, (as *Mr. Hickman* is conceived to stile himself in that *Paquil*,) to deny Gods concurrence to *sinful acts*, and by consequence to hold the *positive entity of sin*. Three Reverend *Bishops* have prefixed their approbation of what is asserted by Doctor *Stearn*, in his *Animi Medela*; of which I have given an account §. 20. And though I have not a convenience to examine the Truth of what is told me, yet it is told me by a person of great repute for integrity, That *Ariaga, Amicus*,

H

and

Aquinas in præp. 2. q. 48. art. 1. in sol. 2.

The learned Apologist for Tilenus in his Preface to the Calvinists Calvin unlocked p. 23. to the end.

Medina in 1. 2. q. 71. art. 6. Vasquez in 1. 2. q. 95. cap. 9. Templerus apud Rob. Barro. Met. Gen. Sess. 5. p. 60. Durand. & A. Dola.

Ariaga. Amicus. Cardinal de Lago.

1. The Bishop of Damascus.
2. Cleo. Devillius.
3. Emanuel Chalom, in approb. præfix. in opus Theol. Fr. Distall.

The Protestant Divines (indefinitely) in their Disputes against the Papists.

* REMON. in Exam.cens. c.7.p.85. A.

By the explicit and implicit confessions of the Adversaries themselves.

* ROB. BARON in Met. Gen de naturâ mali p. 49. 50. Resp. verum quidem esse illud quod asseritur in Argumento, *Ipsum positivum Existentem vitiosæ actionis esse quid non appetibile, sed fugibile.* — quia cum ea entitate positiva inseparabiliter connexa est quidam Disconvenientia &c.

and Cardinal de Lugo, do ex professo assert the positive entity of sin. I am sure the Bishop of Damascus, and Claudius Devillius appointed to censure Books by the Archbishop of Lyons (Claudius de Bellême) and Emanuel Chalom, his Vicar General, (An. Dom. 1611.) did very highly approve of what was taught by Distallivius of Ariminum, concerning sins having a positive being; from whence I groundedly conclude them to have been of that judgement. Mr Hickman confesseth he cannot deny, but that our Protestant Divines, in their Disputes against the Papists, do make a positive as well as privative part of original sin. (pag. 85.) and though he labours to save the matter with a distinction of positive (out of Macca-vius) yet that appears to be a *shift*, (and a shamefull one too) by what I have cited from Doctor Jackson and other Writers of greatest Note, and by what I shall cite from the Fathers also, (Chap. 5. §. 3.) as well as from some of the learnedest Moderns, Chap. 5. §. 4.

Last of all the REMONSTRANTS do say expressly, *« Culpa est altius hominis, & divina.* A very short, but an important Instance.

§ 16. The case in hand is so clear, that I need no other proof, then the confessions of those on the other side. For sure that Truth is irresistibly prevalent, which is submitted unto by such, as do most endeavour to oppose it. Doctor Robert BARON was one of the learnedst of those men, who were engaged (by education) to deny what they felt, and had a daily experience of; to wit, the positive being of sin. But yet he was forced to *confess* it to be a very great Truth, That not onely the privation annexed to the vitious habit, but even the habit of vice it self, the very positive entity of the habit of luxury, and the positive entity of a vitious action, is not quid appetibile (or good)

but fugible, (or evil.) An instance was given (from the objection) in the *action of lying with a beast*; which very *allusion* he confesseth to be *quid execrabile*. And though he saith that such an entity becomes a sin, *by reason of a Disconvenience which is inseparably annexed*, yet he doth not (by that) deny the *positive entity of the sin*, but onely saith *how* it comes to be a sin, which all men say, as well as he, who affirm the most professedly its *positive being*. It being granted to be impossible for any *action* to be a sin, without some kind of *disconvenience*, as to the rule of *right reason*, and to the perfect *nature and will of God*. He also * ascribeth, unto the *will of man*, a *real efficacy and production of the effect*. And farther saith that † *sin original is a natural propension of the will to evil*. Nay giving the definition of *ens positivum*, he saith it is that which puts something in the thing to which it is attributed. And whether *sin* doth not do that, I leave the Reader to judge by his own experience. In a word he joyns with *Timptler*, in refuting the vulgar Error (which hath imposed so much on Mr. *Hickman*) of sins having onely a * *deficient cause*, and smartly sheweth the *absurdities*, to which it leads.

§. 27. Mr. *Barlow* also doth seem to have implicitly confessed the *positive entity of sin*, by acknowledging that God (in the sin of *hating God*) is *merely positive in terminating the act of hatred*, and does not *actively excite the act*. 1. If his meaning is onely this, that God is *passive altogether*, and the *sinner alone active*, in producing the act of *hating God*, then he grants the *very act* to be the creature of the *creature*, and not of God; which he cannot grant possibly, but by granting also, that the *act is self* (although *positive*) is *wholly evil*; Because he every where saith, (in terms equivalent to these,) that God is *active* in the production of every thing that is *good*. 2. If his meaning is precisely, That God is *onely passive*, (so as *merely not to hinder*, but to *suffer, or to permit*,) whilst the sinner doth *determine his will to hate God*; Then he grants

* Ib. p. 55, & 59.

† Ib. p. 57.

Ens positivum est quod ponit aliquid in esse cui attribuitur, ib. p. 54.

* Ib. p. 58.

Mr. Barlow exer. 2. p. 75.

Deus Op-Max. se solum positivum habet actum odii terminandos non active eum excitando. Ib.

* Deus Opt. Max. potest esse causa, vel occasio moralis, & obiectiva malitiae in actu odii ad eum terminati. *ibid.*

that All of determining the Will to a thing forbidden to be the meer production of the Creature, and by consequence a sin, for the reason now mentioned. And in granting that all which hath a positive being to be a sin, he must needs grant a sin to have a positive being. One of these two things I suppose he must mean, (and which of the two, it matters not,) because though he saith a little before, That * God may be the cause of the very pravity (or obliquity) in the act of hating God, (which he certainly doth wish he had never said) yet he explains his meaning (of the word cause) to be nothing but a moral or objective occasion of that obliquity: which proves his sense to be onely this, That God is altogether passive, (the *conditio sine qua non*;) in the creatures determining his will to sin, (which determining of the will is a sin also) and in producing that act, which is intrinsically evil, and so the sin of hating God. If I have hit his right meaning, I have my end: But if I have not, I shall be glad to be told another, which may agree with the context as well as this which I have given: besides he confesseth (with Hurtado de Mendoza) that in the exercise of the will there is a positive act (p. 63.) Such as is the act of willing sin. And that to will sin is sin, I know he will not deny.

By numerous confessions of Mr. Hickman self.

§. 28. But now Mr. Hickman, out of all measure confesseth the thing that he denies, I mean the positive being of sin. For 1. he confesseth it a sin, to hate God, which he also confesseth to be an action, and so to have a positive being. (p. 93, 94, 95.)

Again 2. the first sin of Angels he supposeth to have been a proud desire to be equall unto God. (p. 103.) Now that pride and desire are both in the predicament of Quality, and have as positive entities or beings, as any qualities to be nam'd, is so vulgarly known to every youngster, that Mr. Hickman dares not sure deny it, for fear the youngsters should fall aboard him, which he professeth to fear in another place. They might well fall aboard him for calling proud desire, an action, (p. 103. lin. 13.) as a little before he

he call'd *hatred* (p. 95. l. 17.) but that it is likely they know him too well. to think it much that a Thistle should bear no Grapes. I shall not therefore insist upon his no skill in Logick, (whilst again and again he takes a *quality* for an *action*, and a *positive* entity for a *privation*, unless he purposely writes against his own enterprize in calling a proud desire a *sin*,) but onely pluck him by the ear, as Cynthius did Tityrus, and admonish him for the future not to act the *ultracrepidantist*, by taking upon him to be a *Scholar* and a *School-Divine*, when he was mimically ordained to be no more then a *Lay-preacher*. Could any man but Mr. Hickman have intitled his Book against a *truth*, which he was forced to acknowledge, whilest he meant to deny and disown it onely?

3. He doth not onely acknowledge, that the *act* or *habit* of any sin hath a *positive being*, but further adds (beyond all example) That the *privation it self* is an *evil Quality*, (p. 56.) even that *privation*, which is called by some the *formall part of sin*; and is said by himself to denominate the *act*, or the *habit*, *evil*. Nor will a *quasi* superadded serve to do him a good turn. For let him call it an *action*, or any thing else, to which an *Epithet* may be added; he will still imply it to have a *positive being*. And whilst he saith [an *evil quality*] he implies the *privation*, which he so calleth, to be a *concrete*. Not remembering his famous saying, that he cannot so much as conceive of *sin*, unless as perfectly an *abstract*, (p. 54.) and that *sin* is synonymous with *sinfulness it self*. (p. 53.) Again he seems here to speak of an *external denomination*, as if he were not aware of what he was afterwards to say concerning the *action of hating God*, That it is *intrinsically* and *essentially evil*, not merely through the want of some *Circumstance*, (p. 94.)

Again he saith, 4. That in *hating God*, the terminating of that *act* to that *object* is the *sinfulness of the action*. (p. 95.) Now we know it is an *action*, for the will to determine or fix an act upon an *object*, and so (according to

Mr. Hickman) *sinfulness is self hath a positive being, even whilst he saith it is but privative.*

5. He goes but one line farther, when he saith in plainest terms, that *moral goodness and evil are rather modi entium than entia.* (p. 95.) whereby he yields me as much advantage as I can wish to my whole cause. For when *sin or moral evil, is allow'd as much entity, as moral goodness, and moral goodness as little entity as sin; It must either be his Tenet, that sin hath also a positive being, or that goodness hath none at all. If the first, he at once betrays his whole cause: and withall makes God to be the Author of sin, (for he saith, He is the Author of all positive beings.) if the second, he must needs deny God to be the author of goodness, or lose the benefit of the *positif*, by which he would seem not to make him the Author of sin.*

6. Again, *If the evil works themselves be positive, (which he confesseth p. 96.) there needs no more to be added by him. For that there is also some privation, none is concerned to deny, whilst what is positive in sin is so fully yielded.*

7. He grants as much as a man can wish, p. 103. viz. *That man is the efficient cause of the evil of the Action. And the youngsters Argument against it, holds as much against good, as evil actions. See his Confession, p. 103.*

8. That the *deficient cause is reducible to the efficient, the cause of the action per se, of the viciousity per concomitantiam, he confesseth p. 103.*

9. Farther yet he confesseth, that *sin in Scripture doth not signify abstractly, but that it signifies our faculties which do lust against the working of the spirit. p. 100, much less will he deny the very lusting it self to be a sin; which is as positive, as the faculties, to which the lusting is ascribed.*

Nay 10. he confesseth that a *sin is an action, if he is not unpardonably impertinent, p. 102. for an account of which, see forward chap. 8. §. 24.*

CHAP. IV.

§. 1. **B**UT Mr. H. being convicted of (what himself doth Acknowledge) the greatest Blasphemy, to wit, of making God to be the Author of sin, by bluntly affirming he is the Author of whatsoever is found to have a positive being, (by name, of that very action of hating God p. 95. 96.) hope's to lessen the odium which cannot but lye on so foul a Doctrine, by putting his Trust in the common shift. I mean by making such a distinction betwixt the *Act* and the *obliquity*, as to entitle God unto the first, and the sinner only unto the second. That action of David, his lying with Uriah's wife, (which in Scripture is called *Adultery*.) He saith is positive and from God, and therefore one of God's Creatures; And thus he saith over and over, (p. 79. 81. 95. 96.) But the *pravity*, or *obliquity*, (which he call's the evil quality that doth denominate the *Action*) he is content to fasten upon *MAN TOO*, (ibid.) Now it remaines that I endeavour to make him ashamed of so lewd a Refuge, as doth but serve to encourage (by giving shelter and protection) not at all to extenuate his great Impiety.

Mr. H's distinction of the positive Act of hating God, and its obliquity frees him not from making God the Author of sin.

look forwards
on Ch. 5. S. 3.

§. 2. For first (to condemn him out of his mouth) he speaks a while after without the Vizar of this Distinction, whilst he saith (it doth belong to the universality of the first Cause to PRODUCE not only EVERY REAL BEING, but also the real positive. MODIFICATIONS OF BEINGS p. 95.) Now that the very repugnance of the *Act* to the *deity* hath at least a *Real* (if not a *positive*) Being Mr. Hickman doth many times acknowledge, as when he ranks it with *Moral Goodness* in affirming both to be *Modus entium*.

Proved first out of his mouth.

^{1b} Field of
^{2c} Church l.
 .237, 120.

entium. p. 95. That profound Divine and subtil Disputant, Dr. Field, allows nothing to be in the *sin* of *hating God*, but what is positive. The very *Deformity* that is found in it is *precisely* (saith he) a *positive Repugnance to the Law of God*. And his reasons for it are such as Mr. Hickmans Teachers are puzzled at. But letting that passe, Mr. Hick, is convicted of the crime alleaged in the Indictment, if the *Repugnance* hath nothing more then a *reall Being*: nor dares he say, it hath *no being at all*; for that were to cast the whole *Adultery* upon God, by affirming Him to be the *producer* of all that is *positive*, or *Reall* in it, (they are every one Mr. Hickmans words) and to *acquit* the *Adulterer* from having any share in it, whereby he also doth infer him to be but *Titularly* such.

2. By *Reason*.

§. 3. But secondly let us suppose, the man had never charged God in so gross a manner, as to intitle him to the *production* of all things *Reall*; Yet his shift will not save him from being found to *make God the Author of sin*. For when he saith that *Action* of *hating God* is *from God*, he means it is from him as the *mediate*, or the *immediate cause*. If as the *mediate*, so as to *move* the *second cause* to be *immediately* the *cause* of such an *action*, it follows then that the 2. *Cause* being *subordinate* and *determined* by the first, to that *Numerical* and particular *Action*, which hath its *specification* from the *influx* of God, either the *action* of *hating God* cannot possibly be a *sin*, or not imputed as a *sin* to the *second Cause* (thus acted by the first, as hath been said;) But whatsoever it is, must rest upon God, as its *Cause*, and *Author*. If Mr. Hick, (for an escape from this impiety) shall rather say it is from God, as the *Immediate Cause*, his case will then be so much *worse*, as it is worse by some odds to make God a sinner, then only the *cause* of his *Creatures sin*. Now besides that God is said to *make* the *action* which he *forbids*, (and at the Instant that he forbids it,) we know the *obliquity* to the *action* is so *inseparably annexed*, that the *Author* of the *One* must needs be the *Author* of the *other*, the *inseparability* is granted

granted by *Baronius* (§ 5.p. 50. 52.) and not denied (I think) by any. But I am truly so much in pain, whilst Mr. *Hick*, makes it my duty to expose him thus to publick view, that I will onely refer him to the several parts of my *'Astronautica 1715*; for the applying of this to his Distinction, and choose to shew him the *Danger* of it, out of other mens *Writings*: partly that Reason may not be slighted, for want of *Authority* to commend it; and partly to shew him I am no *sharper*, then the necessity of the *Case* doth make it *needful*: Because no sharper then other men, who yet are famous for *moderation*. I will begin with Dr. *Field*, and the great Divines by him alledged; and then proceeding to Dr. *Goad* (one of the *Synodists* at *Dart*) to Dr. *Jackson*, and *Distallevins*, and other valuable Writers, I will conclude with Dr. *Hammond*, whom nothing but love to the truth of God, and perfect zeal to his Honour, could make to utter the least word that looks like sharpness to a Dissenter.

1. 3. 4. 237. 123

§. 4. This distinction (saith Dr. *Field*) will not clear the doubt they move, touching Gods efficiency and working in the sinful Actions of men. Whensoever (saith *Durand*) two things are inseparably joyned together, whosoever (knowing them both, and that they are so inseparably joyned together) chooseth the one, chooseth the other also. Because though haply he would not choose it absolutely, as being evil, (and by the way no sinner doth so choose sin) yet in as much as it is joyned to that which he doth will, neither can be separated from it, it is of necessity that he must will both: The case appeareth in those actions, which are voluntary and mixt; As when a man casteth into the Sea those rich commodities, to save his life, which he would not do, but in such a case. Hence it followeth, that the act of hating God, and sinful deformity, being so inseparably joyned together, that the one cannot be divided from the other, (for a man cannot hate God, but he must sinne damnably) if God doth will the one, he doth will the other also.

3. By Authority in conjunction with Reason.
Durand. l. 2. d. 37. q. 1.

Suarez Metaphys. Tom. 1.
d. 22. Sed. 4.
h. 522.

§. 5. This of *Durand* is confirmed by *Suarez*, who saith, He shall never satisfy any man that doubteth, how God may be cleared from being author of sin, if he have an efficiency in the sinful actions of men, that shall answer, that all that is said touching God's efficiency and concurrence, is true in respect of the evil motions of mens wills materially considered, and not formally, in that they are evil and sinful. For the one of these is consequent upon the other. For a free and Deliberate act of a created will, about such an act, and such circumstances, cannot be produced but it must have deformity annexed to it.

Cumel Disput.
var. ad pri.
mam supremam.
2. p. 104.

§. 6. There are some operations or Actions (saith *Cumel*) that are intrinsically evil, so that in them we cannot separate that which is material from that which is formal; as it appeareth in the hate of God, and in this act when a man shall say and Resolve, I will do evil, so that it implies a contradiction, that God should effectually work our will to bring forth such actions, in respect of that which is material in them, and not in respect of that which is formal.

Dr. Field ubi
supra.

§. 7. And this seemeth yet more impossible (saith *Dr. Field*) if we admit their opinion, who think, that the formal nature and being of the Sin of commission, consisteth in some thing that is positive, and in the manner of working freely, so as to repugne to the rule of Reason, and Law of God; so that it is clear in the judgement of those great Divines, that if God hath a true reall efficiency in respect of the substance of these sinful actions, he must in a sort produce the deformity, or that which is formal in them. And again the *Dr.* saith, If God doth determine the will of man to work repugnantly to the Law, he must needs move and determine it to sin; seeing to sin is nothing else, but to repugne unto the Law. (p. 125.)

Dr. GOAD in
his Disput.
of the Necess.
of Cons. of events, &c. 2d. Arg. for Thef. 1.

§. 8. "Its a hard case (saith *Dr. GOAD*) when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from Sin-

"ning.——And then he confutes the evasion thus.——
 "That which is a *principall cause* of any action, is a *cause*
 "of those *concomitants* which *accompany* that action ne-
 "cessarily. This Rule is most certainly true. Therefore if
 "God by his *Decrees* do force us to do those actions which
 "cannot be done without sin, God himself (I am afraid to
 "rehearse it) must needs be *guilty of sin*—— He gives
 "an Instance in Adam's *eating the forbidden fruit*. And
 "I will gratifie my Reader with a Transcript of it, because
 "the *Doctors Disputation* is not commonly to be had. " If
 "God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the for-
 "bidden fruit, seeing the *eating of that fruit* which he
 "had forbidden must needs be with a *gross obliquity*, I
 "do not see (saith the Doctor) how this *Distinction* will
 "justifie God. For Adam sinned because he ate that fruit
 "that was forbidden; But they say God decreed that he should
 "eat that fruit which was forbidden, necessarily & unavoid-
 "ably; The Conclusion is too blasphemous to be so often
 "repeated. The Reader may see (as the Dr. goes on, by which
 "tis plain he intended his Disputation for the Press) how wel
 "that common distinction holds water. Yea if this nicety
 "were sound, man himself might prove that he commit-
 "ted no murder although he stabbed the dead party into
 "the heart. For at his arraignment, he might tell the
 "Judge, that he did indeed thrust a dagger into his heart,
 "but it was not that which took away his life; but the ex-
 "tinction of his natural heat and vital spirits. Who seeth
 "not the wilde phrenzies of him that should make this Apo-
 "logie ? yet this is all our Adversaries say for God. They
 "say his Decree was the cause that Adam took the forbid-
 "den fruit and put it into his mouth, and eat that which
 "he had commanded he should not eat ; yet they say he
 "was not the cause of the transgression of the Command-
 "ment, &c. But let us hear Dr. Jackson also.

§ 9. The Hypothesis, for whose clearer Discussion
 these last Theſes have been præmised, is this ; [*Whether*
 "it being once granted or supposed, that the Almighty Crea-

Doſter JACK:
 SON in exalt.
 Collec. Book,
 10. c. 5. p 3011
 3012.

"tor was the cause either of our mother Eves desire, or of
 "her actual eating of the forbidden fruit, or of her delivery
 "of it to her husband, or of his taking and eating it, though
 "unawares; the same Almighty God must not upon like ne-
 "cessity be acknowledged to be the Author of all the obliquities
 "which did accompany the positive acts, or did necessarily
 "result from them] This is a case or Species Facti which
 "we cannot determine by the Rule of Faith: It must be
 "tried by the undoubted Rules of Logick, or better Arts.
 "These be the onely perspective Glasses which can help
 "the eye of Reason to discover the truth or necessity of
 "the consequence; to wit, [whether the Almighty Cre-
 "ator, being granted to be the cause of our mother Eves
 "first longing, after the forbidden Fruit, were not the
 "cause or Author of her sin,] Now unto any Rational
 "man that can use the help of the forementioned Rules of
 "Art (which serve as prospective Glasses unto the eye of
 "Reason) that usual Distinction between the Cause or
 "Author of the Act, and the Cause or Author of the
 "Obliquity which necessarily ensues upon the Act, will
 "appear at the first sight to be False or Frivolous: yea,
 "to imply a manifest contradiction. For Obliquity or
 "whatsoever other Relation, can have no cause at all, be-
 "sides that which is the Cause of the Habit, of the Act,
 "or Quality whence it necessarily results. And in par-
 "ticular, that conformity or similitude which the first
 "man did bear to his Almighty Creator, did necessarily
 "result from his substance or manhood, as it was the
 "work of God undefaced. Nor can we search after any
 "other true Cause of the First mans conformity to God,
 "or his integrity, besides him who was the cause of his
 "manhood, or of his existence with such qualifications as
 "by his creation he was endowed with. In like manner
 "whosoever was the cause whether of his coveting or
 "eating of the Tree in the middle of the Garden, was the
 "true cause of that obliquity or crooked deviation from
 "Gods Law, or of that deformity or dissimilitude unto
 "God himself which did necessarily result from the for-

" bidden Act or Desire. It was impossible there should
 " be one Cause of the Act, and another Cause of the Ob-
 " liquity or Deformity whether unto Gods Laws or unto
 " God himself. For no Relation or Entity merely rela-
 " tive (such are obliquitie and deformity) can have any
 " other Cause, beside that which is the cause of the (Fun-
 " damentum) or Foundation whence they immediately re-
 " sult. It remains then that we acknowledge the old
 " Serpent to have been the first Author; and Man (whom
 " God created male and female) to have been the true po-
 " sitive Cause of that obliquity or deformity which did
 " result by inevitable Necessity from the forbidden Act
 " or desire, which could have no Necessary cause at all.]
 and more to this purpose p. 3013. &c.

§. 10. *Dissallevius* doth also prove, that they who
 make God the Author of the positive *act* of *hating* God,
 do make him the Author of the *obliquity*, Because (saith
 he) God himself cannot effect (what doth imply a contradic-
 tion) that the moral obliquity of an Act which is intrinsec-
 ally evil and freely exerted by the creature, shall not fol-
 low (or rather attend) the positive entity of the act, which
 is such as hath been said, and so exerted. For it implies a
 contradiction, that an act intrinsically evil, (to wit, the act
 hating God) should be freely exerted, and yet not evil, or
 that it should not have a moral pravity conjoined with it.
 2. They who hold all positive entities to be effected by God
 himself, must needs believe him to be the cause, as much
 of the worst, as of the best actions in the world; both be-
 cause *hating* is as positive, when it is fixed upon God, as it
 can possibly be, when it is fixed upon the Devil; And be-
 cause an *obliquity* is as unavoidable to the one, as rectitude
 or conformity can be possibly to the other. 3. If an im-
 mediate working of the formal obliquity, be required to make
 an Author of another's sin, then neither Man, nor Devil,
 (in perswading another to do wickedly) can possibly be the
 Author of it: because they are not any otherwise the cau-
 ses of the obliquity, then by rempung to that act to which

Dissallevius opus:

Theol. p. 24. 57

101.

Nulla ratione

potest Deus

efficere, ut ad

entitatem. A-

ctus intrinsecè

mali liberè e-

liciti non se-

quatur mali-

tia moralis;

quia implicat

contradictio-

nem, ut Actus

intrinsecè ma-

lus, v. g. *offen-*

diu liberè

eliciatur. Re-

malus non sit,

sed multum

formalem

conjunctionem

non habeat.

Sic.

the *obliquity* is annexed. And for the very same reason; no creature could be the *cause* of any such *sin* within himself; because he doth not produce the *moral obliquity* of the *act*, but by producing the *act* to which the *obliquity* is annexed. 4. When we do *absolutely* and *simply* inquire after the *cause* of another mans *sin*, we do not inquire after the *cause* which *immediately* reacheth to the *obliquity* of the *act*, but after the *inducing* or *moving cause*, by which he is led to such a *voluntary act*, whose object is repugnant to the *rule* of *Reason*. (That is the method of *Aquinas*, *De malo*, quæst. 3. art. 1. & 3. & 1. 2. q. 75. per totam) from whence it follows, that if God doth induce us efficaciously to an *aversion* from himself, and so to a *hatred* of his *Divinity*; it is every whit as true, that he is the *Author* of our *sin*, as that he induceth us efficaciously to that *aversion* and *hatred* which is *intrinsically evil*. And therefore Mr. *Hickman* must recant the *first*, or contentedly smart for the *impiety* of the *second*.

Dr. STEARN
de Animi Me-
diciæ, 11. p.
248,
249.

§. 11. Doctor STEARN is very severe, (and upon very just ground) to the use that is made of the same *Distinction*. For he doth not content himself to say, *that to be the cause of the action from which the obliquity cannot be separate, is to be the very cause of the obliquity it self*, because the *obliquity* is annexed to the *entity* of the *Action*, and that in a manner *unavoidable*; Nor doth he only add this, That man himself is *no otherwise* the *author* of his *sin*, then as he is *author* of that *action* to which the *obliquity* is annexed; But he saith yet farther, [** That if God, well-knowing the absolute inseparability of the obliquity from the action, doth willingly produce that very action; he is so far from being free from the obliquity of the action, that he is more guilty of it, then the man himself, in whom that action is so produced; as who does seldom or never think of the obliquity annexed, quam Deus nun-*

* Proinde, si
Deus est sci-
ent malitiam
esse ab actione
inseparabilem, & volens, ipsam
suo concursu
producat, non

tantum non immunis erit à malitia, verum etiam illius magis erit reus, quam ipse homo: utpote qui raro vel nunquam de malitia annexa cogitat, &c. ib. p. 249.

quam

quam non cognoscit & animadvertit. Nay he chargeth the Adversaries with a higher blasphemy than that, even with making God more guilty than the devil; which how they can answer, let them consider whom it concern's. I shall onely, for the present, subjoyn his words. "Immo, Dæmones hominem ad peccandum tentantes, minori jure Authores peccati sunt censendi, quàm Causa Libera Actionis illam producents, & non tantùm sciens maliciam esse illi annexam; Nam Dæmones non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa, sed tantum sollicitant, &c. — multo itaque magis Malitia reus est, qui sciens & volens non tentat aut sollicitat, sed actionem ipsam producit, cujus malitia (ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis) ipsi quàm clarissimè patet. What kind of Adversaries they are, whom the Doctor thus handles, and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concern'd, he gives us to know by his two instances, in Twisse, and Zuinglius.

§. 12. A whole Colledge of Remonstrants, (men of renown for their piety and learning too) thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two ways of Argumentation. 1. Whensoever a superior and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferior and impotent, that it being so moved cannot choose but sin, Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superior and omnipotent cause. But according to those men, who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God, the inferior cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superior, as that it cannot choose but sin; Therefore according to those men, the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superior cause. 2. When two causes do concur to one action, (to wit the action of hating God) whereof the one act's freely, and the other of necessity, then must the cause which act's freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass. But according to the men aforesaid, God act's freely in the producing of such an action, (which M. Hickman reckons amongst Gods creatures) and the inferior cause of necessity; Therefore

A whole society of Remonstrants in defense. Sent. Remonstr. circa prim. de prad. art. 3. 254. Quandoquocunque causa superior & omnipotens ita inferiori & impotentiori movet, ac determinat, ut ea sic mota non possit non peccare, tum sane jure super. & omnipotens causa tota peccati culpa transferetur. &c.

fore according to those men, God sustains the whole fault of its coming to pass. And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity, as well as the act.

*The Apologist
for Tilenus in
Prof. Epist.*

§. 13. The Apologist for Tilenus, doth make this Answer to the distinction. 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin, or consent to it, with a designe to oppose himself to the divine Law, but to enjoy his Pleasure, and satisfy his appetites. 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin, with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law. And then infers, that (according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine) that consent, and that purpose (being positive entities and acts of the soul) are from God and of his production, from whence it follows, either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act; or that the fault is imputable to God, who is (called by Mr. Hickman) the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply.

*Dr. Hammond;
of Fundamen-
tals ch. 16.*

§. 14. But after all, and above all, I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND, who having shewed how those Doctrines (which are commonly called Calvinistical) are so noxious to the practice and lives of men, as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity; (those I mean by him fore-mentioned.) And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity, which the Assertors of those Doctrines have commonly used as an Artifice, for the avoiding of those consequences, by which their Doctrines are rendered odious; at last proceeds to make it appear, [* That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God "from being the Author of that sin, of which he is said (by those men) to predetermine the act. For 1. Though a "free power of acting good or evil, be perfectly distinct "and separable from doing evil, and therefore God, that "is the Author of one, cannot thence be inferred to be the "author of the other, yet the act of sin is not separable "from the obliquity of that act, the act of blasphemy "from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemie, the "least evil thought or word against an infinite good "God

p. 156.

p. 180.

p. 178.

p. 182, 183.

"God being as *crooked* as the rule is *straight*, and consequently he that predetermines the *act*, must needs pre-determine the *obliquity*.

"Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter, it would more truly be affirmed on the contrary side, that God is the *author* of *the obliquity*, and *man* of *the act*, for God that gives *the rule*, in transgressing of which all obliquity consists, doth contribute a great deal, though not to the production of that Act, which is freely committed against that rule, yet to the denominating it *oblique*; for if there were no Law, there would be no *obliquity*; God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised, thereby constitutes *uncircumcision* an *obliquity*, which, had he not given that law, had never been such; But for the act (as that differs from the powers on one side, and the obliquity on the other) it is evident that the *man* is the cause of that.]

To conclude this Chapter. It is a thing so undeniable, that the Author of the act of *hating God*, must needs be the Author of the obliquity, that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both, and God of neither, so the rigid *Presbyterians* (as well as *Papists*) affirm God to be the Author, not only of the act, but of the *obliquity* of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer (so much commended by *Thomas Godwin*) in his *Comfort for believers* p. 36. 37. Mr. *Whitfield* also, and Mr. *Hobbs*, *Oceham* in *sent. 3. q. 12* (cited by Dr. *Fild* p. 128.) and Mr. *Hickman* in effect, when he saith that God is the Cause of all Beings, p. 78. and p. 95. and *Pet. Mart.* in 1 *Sam. c. 2.*

CHAP. V.

The positive
entity of sin
made undenia-
ble from scrip-
ture.

Psal. 115. 4 &
Psal. 135. 15
Idolum hoc
loco (Inquit
Beza, ad
1 Cor. 8. 4.)
sumitur pro
simulaculo ad
Numen re-
presentan-
dum affecto.
ὁ θεὸς ἰδωλὸν
ἐν εἰκονίᾳ
1 Cor. 8. 4.
ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἰδωλὸν
ἴσα τὰ ἴσα
ἀλλὰ ἄρρηκτα.
1 Cor. 1. 28
1 Cor. 7. 19.
ὁ θεὸς ἀκαρτέ-
στα ὁ θεὸς ἰστῶ.
Ista. 41. 24.

1 John. 3. 8;

§. 1. **T**HE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scrip-
ture, and from the writings of all the Fathers
both Greek and Latine; that as Mr. Hickman
hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion, so
the FATHERS are very few, whose very figurative spec-
ches do look that way. And their meaning is so conspicu-
ous, by what the same Fathers say (before and after,) that
if he drank out of the *Fountains*, as I see he hath done
out of several *Cisterns*, I admire the greatness of his delu-
sion: His performance being no better, then mine or any
mans would be, who should prove that an *Idol* hath not
a positive being, (although the work of mens hands, and
made of Massy Gold or silver) because it is said by the A-
postle, an *Idol* is nothing in the world. Or that the *Planters* of
Christianity had not onely no positive, but not so much as a
Real Being, because it is said by the same Apostle, that
God hath chosen the things that are not, to bring to naught
things that are. Yet this *ad hominem*, is a strong way of
arguing; very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans, by how
much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the
world. Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost, that
Circumcision is nothing, that the *forekin* is nothing, that
wicked men are of nothing, that every man is but vanity, yea
and altogether lighter then vanity it self, (which will
be grapted by all the world to have positive beings) yet
doth he not say in any one text, That *sin* is nothing in the
world, or that *Blasphemies* and *Rapes* have no positive be-
ing; but on the contrary, sins are said to be the works of
men and devils. And now to prevent any exception to the
propriety of the word,

§. 2. Those are properly called sins, which God himself in his written word doth commonly call by that name. And how many things are there that have positive entities or beings, (by the very confession of Mr. H. and all that are of his way,) of which wickedness and sin are found to be predicated in scripture? As for example, For the man to lie with the Masters wife, Joseph called a great wickedness, and a sin against God. To take another mans wife, was called a great sin by King Abimelech. And Jeroboam, in driving Israel from following the Lord, is said to have made them sin a great sin. Davids sin is called a deed, that is, an act or fact 2 Sam. 12. 14. If St. Paul had not thought that some sins are actions, and that other sins are qualities, he would not certainly have told us of the motions of sins, and the lusts of sins. The motions of sins which were by the Law, did work in our members to bring fruit unto death. (Rom. 7. 5.) So in the 7. verse of that Chapter, he expresseth sin by lust, as lusting by coveting. And yet so far is the Apostle from ascribing those positive things to God, that speaking there of wilful sin (in the person of a Carnal unregenerate man) the doing that which he would not do, he doth not add (like Mr. Hickman) It is not I that DO it, but GOD that DOTH it in me. No, his words (on the contrary) are justly these, It is no more I that do it, but SIN that dwelleth in me. That I may not be over-long in so clear a case, I fain would know of Mr. Hickman; whether those works of the flesh which are manifest (saith the Apostle), and set in opposition to the fruits of the spirit, (and by an opposition of contrariety too, Gal. 5. 17.) I say I would know of Mr. Hickman, whether those lusts of the flesh are not properly called sins. And whether Adultery, Fornication, Uncleanness, Lasciviousness, Idolatry, Witchcrafts, Hatred, Variance, Strife, Seditions, Heresies, Envyings, Murders, Drunkenness, Revellings, and such like, have not real and positive beings. He will not sure deny this, because he knows that these things are either qualities or actions. Nor can he deny they are sins, because they are

God is first to be the Judge of what is properly called sin.

Gen. 39. 9 & carefully compare it with vers. 7: Gen. 20. 9. 2 King. 17. 21

Rom. 7. 5. Rom. 6. 12.

Rom. 7. 20.

Gal. 5. 19, 20, 21.

set in a *contrariety* to the *Fruits* of the *spirit*, and because it is added presently after, that *they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God*. And (as I take it) they must be *sins*, for which the *Doers* are to suffer the *loss* of *heaven*, which is waited on with the *paines* of *Hell* too. When *Judas* said, *I have sinned*, in that I have *betrayed* innocent blood, & *Cain* complained that his sin was greater then he could bear, meaning the *killing his brother Abel*; who sees not that sin is predicated in *Rebels* of two such *actions*, as are granted by all the world to have *positive beings*? It is but dipping into the *Scripture*, to finde abundance of such examples.

Confirmed by
the Concur-
rent of Anti-
ent Fathers.

* Athanasius
ἐν λόγῳ 239
Ἐκκλησιῶν, p. 3

† Οὐκ ὄντα
τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀ-
γῶν, ὅτι ἐν ἡ-
μετέροις ἀν-
θρώποις ἐν
τῷ αἵματι,
πλάσσει, p. 5.

* ἡ ἐξουσία
τῶν ὁρίων αὐ-
τῶν ἔστιν ἡ
ἐξουσία, p. 4.
Ibid. p. 5.

§. 3. 'Twere easy to write a just volume, in shewing the concurrence of Antient *FATHERS*; and even the least that I can shew (with a desire of Brevity) will be more then Mr. *Hickman* was able to wrest to his seeming interest. I cannot better begin, then with the great *ATHANASIUS*, whom several mens misapprehensions have helpt to speak for their judgement, against his own. * First he delivers his true meaning, when he useth the expression of τὰ ἐκ ὄντα applied to καὶ δὲ. And therefore with the Apostle, he first applies it unto *Idols*, which had as *positive beings* as those that made them: ὅθεν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἰδωλῶν ἐπινοίαν ἱεροῖς ἀνεπλάσασαι, τὰ ἐκ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα λογιζόμενοι. Next he sets down the reason, † why he useth that expression, τὰ ἐκ ὄντα; and his reason is, because they are not from him who is indeed the τὸ ἐκ, but from those free and depraved Agents, who revolting from their maker made them *Idols* or *Gods* of their own invention: ἀποστάτες γὰρ τῆς πρὸς τὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄντα, οὗτον λέγω, κατὰ τοῦ σιῶς καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πόσε, λοιπὸν εἰς διαφέρετος καὶ εἰς τὰς κατὰ μίαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνίστασθαι τὸ σῶμα. p. 4. where the lusts of the flesh (which he calls the body) are given as Instances of the *sins*, to which the creature was now descended, and by much repetition had made * *habitual*. After this he asserteth the opposition of *contrariety* twixt *vice* and *virtue*, thereby proving the *positivity* as well of the one

† ἵδ' ἀντὶ
αὐτῆς ἀδυνα-
τον, διὰ τὸ
ἀντιρριζῶν
ἀλλήλων ἵδ'.
p. 7.

* Πολὺν αὖ ἄν
ἔτι τὸ τοῦτον
εὐσπερ, —
ἀδυνατοῦσιν
εἶναι τῆς
ἀμυνήσεως ἵδ'
ἀντὶ ἀδυνα-
τον. p. 7.

Note, this is a Con-
firmation of
the whole 4.
chapter.

shews the folly of their distinction, who so endeavour to put a difference betwixt the *act* of *hating* God, and the *sin* of *hating* God, (which they call the *obliquity* of the *act*) as to affirm the first to be *from* God, and therefore good; the other *evil*, and from the *Creature*, † whereas 'tis impossible (saith the Father) that good and evil should be so inseparably together. For what he * saith of a good and an evil God, is as true of a good and an evil *act*, and in a sense as cogent as that he speaks in; for it implies a contradiction, that one and the same should be a good and an evil *act* too, to wit, that the *act* of *hating* God should be no less a good *act*, as being *from* God, then it is an evil one, as having an *obliquity* which is from *man*. I say such a mixture of good and evil, in one and the same numerical *act*, must needs be absolutely impossible and contradictory, διὰ τὸ ἀμυνῶν καὶ ἀβουλοῦν ἀντὶ τῆς φύσεως. And is not that an unchristian Fabrick, which hath no better a *Foundation* whereon to lean? But I must hasten to other Fathers, before, and after *Athanasius*.

DIONYSIUS the AREOPAGITE, how much sooner he lived before the great *Athanasius*, I thought the fitter in this place to follow after, the more conducible I thought it for the finding out his right meaning; of which at first I began to doubt, because I found him so much mistaken by so learned a person as Mr. BARLOW, to whom Mr. Hickman is beholding pag. 56. Its true he useth such expressions, as I lately shew'd and explained in *Athanasius*, (and Master Barlow saith in what pages, though Mr. Hickman doth not.) But he useth the very * *same* of God himself in some places, whom yet I hope Mr. Hickman will not thence conclude a meer privation, or a Non-entity. * God (saith Dionysius) is deprived of essence. Nay † He is neither a substance, nor a spirit, nor any thing of the things that are, or exist: shall an Atheist

Ad quinti se-
culi ultima
vel sexti ini-
tia pertineat
quæ Dionysii
Areopagite
nomine lau-
dantur. Della,
us de confir-
matione. p. 203

* καὶ ὅτι
ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἔ-
στιν, οὐκ ἔστιν
οὐσίονος. Di-
onys. Areop. de
Div. Nom. c. 4. p. 374. † Οὐδὲ ὅτι οὐσία, οὐδὲ πνεῦμα, οὐδὲ ἀγαθόν τι, οὐδὲ τι ὅ-
τι ἔστιν ὅτι.

Idem de mysticâ Theologia, c. 5. p. 45, 46.

now say, that *Dionysius* was of his mind, and urge the letter of these words to bear him out? No, Mr. *Hickman* will tell him, the words are spoken in a sublime and figurative way, and must be explained by the context, to yield the Authors true meaning. The very same shall I say in the other case. That when the Father saith of *sin*, ἁμαρτία ἁπλῶς ποιεῖ, — — ἐστὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐστὶ, he must be so understood, as *Aquinas* understood *Anselm*, denying the * act of sin to be anything; opposing that act (being an accident) to *res simpliciter*, which is *substantia*. And accordingly *Corderius* does render ἁπλῶς by *substantia*, not by *essentia*, much less by *entitas*. What gave occasion to *Dionysius* to speak of evil in that stile, *holy Maximus* tells us in his *Schulion* upon the place. For *Dionysius* having said, that that which is * not doth desire that which is good, [ἐπιστά γὰρ αὐτῷ [ἀγαθῷ] καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι] and again a few leaves before, that there is a will in that which is not: † *Maximus* tells us that the words being spoken against the *Manichæans*, he must largely explicate what is meant by μὴ εἶναι, and why the thing that is evil is called that which is not: of which, as I have spoken in the precedent paragraph, so I shall speak once for all in the § 5 of this Chapter, Number 9. But if the Question is to be carried by words and phrases, even so the very truth will be found to rest on my side. For the † *Antients* (saith *holy Maximus*) did express the same thing by the word *matter*, and *extreme turpitude*, which is expressed also by μὴ εἶναι, or that which is not: and thence forwards when he speaks of things that are not, (meaning evils) he * explains himself presently by things material. In a word, *Dionysius* does give the reason, why that which is evil is said not to be, even because it is more remote from God, then that which is not in being. For that I conceive must be the sense of the *Greek*, (what ever was

* Look for-
wards on §. 5.
num. 8.

* De Divin.
Num. cap. 4.
Sic. 18. pag.
570.
† S. Maximus
in locum jam
cit. p. 617.
— — — — —
* Ενδυναμὴ μα-
χίῃ μαλιστα,
ἢ Μαριχά-
ου
δὴ πλατύν-
ον τὸ ἁγί-
ον, τὸ ἁγί-
ον μὴ εἶναι,
ἔτι.
† Τὸ μὴ εἶναι
ἐν τῷ ὁλοῦ
ἐκείνῳ οἱ
ἀδελφοί, ἢ ἡ
ἕκαστος αἰ-
νῶσι τὸ ἁγί-
ον.
ib. pag. 618.

* Οὐτε ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὄντιναις — — — — — ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἢ ἐν
τῷ ὄντι, &c. ib. pag. 620.

thought

† *Dionys. Are.*
op. de Div.
nom. c. 4. p.
571, 572.

† Ὁ αἰετα.
εἶς. ἢ ἕξ.
εἶς) τ' αἶσα.
δὲ καὶ τὴν
ἀλλοτρὶν ἐν
θυμῶν, ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ὅτι
ἐστίν, ὅτι ὅτι
ὅτι ἀποθυμῶν.
ib. p. 575.
* *Baltha. Cord.*
observ. Gen. 8.
p. 21.
Note his Im-
plying the a.
Briety of sin,
whilst he
saith, τὸ κα-
κὸν κακῶν;
καὶ ὁμοίως τὴν
ἐξ ἑσῶν ἴσως.
same, p. 317.

thought by the *Translator*, who seems not to hit the *Fathers* meaning.) † τὸ ἢ κακὸν ἔτε ἐν τοῖς ἔσσιν, ἔτε ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔσσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ μὴ ἔσθαι μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ τ' αἰετα, ἀλλότριον, καὶ ἀντισυμμετρικόν. Which how many several wayes it makes against Mr. *Hickman*, the indifferent Reader is left to judge. So clear to me is the meaning of that figurative Writer, that he saith of the *sinner* (not onely of the *sin*) that he is † *not in being*, so far forth as he is a *sinner*, and desires *nothing* that is. Had Mr. *Hickman* prepar'd himself for the Reading of the book (if at least he ever read so much as a *page* or *line* of it) by reading the *general observations* prefixed to it by *Corderius*, in particular, * that of his making *God* to be the *possession* and * *privation of all things*, [πάντων ἔσθαι, καὶ πάντων ἀφαίρεσιν] I think he could not have swallow'd so great an error. That something is *positive*, as well as *privative in sin*, *Dionysius* (or whoever is the Author of that book, which is thought unduly to wear his name) hath sufficiently inferr'd by his answer given to this Question, τί τὸ ἐν δαίμοσι κακόν; to which he answers, θυμῶς ἀλογῶντος ἐπιθυμίας, φαῖσας προσημίας (pag. 580.) and again, τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ πλημμελὲς νυνεστος. (p. 584.)

But I have dwelt so long upon these two *Fathers*, that I must study to be brief in those that follow: and that by satisfying my self with one or two instances out of each. The force of which I shall not *show*, (as I have hitherto done) but modestly leave to my Readers judgment. I shall onely propote to consideration, whether those *qualities* or *actions* are not worthily called *sins*, of which the word *sin* is wont to be *predicated in reſta*. And whether that which is *granted*, to be a *true proposition*, (by all the world,) can possibly lose of its *Truth*, by the attempts of so gross a *Fallacie*, as à dicto simpliciter ad Dictum secundum Quid.

CLEMENS ALEX. Strom. lib. 8. edit. Cambr. pag. 219. & edit. Paris. p. 511. ————— ὁ κακὸς αἰμαρ.

ἀμαρτάνει, καὶ τῇ ποίᾳ ἐνεργείᾳ μολύνει τὴν ἀνθρώπου περ-
συχολίαν, καὶ ὃ ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ καὶ ἔργον Θεοῦ. ἀμύλει τὸ
ἀμαρτάνειν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ταύτῃ, διὰ τοῦτο ἔργον Θεοῦ.
Here to *sin* is by such an *action* to pollute the Title of man,
and is said to be placed (or to consist) in the *action* or *ope-
ration*, not *substance*, or *essence*; and this is the ground,
why it is not the work of God. So afterwards *sin* not
brought to repentance is defined ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. λόγ. 5. p.
181. And though elsewhere he calls sin a variation from
right reason, yet there is added a * *positive entity* of each,
ἔργον, ὡς αὐτὸς, ὑπαρξίς ψυχῆς. (But I am ready to
break my promise, almost as soon as I have made it.)

CYRILLUS HIEROS. Ἱερ. κατὰ β. edit morell. p.
30. Δεὸν ἡ ἀμαρτία, καὶ νόσος χαλεπώτατη ψυχῆς
παρανομία, ὑποτίμνωσα μὲν αὐτῆς νύμφη, καὶ πρὸς ὃ
αἰώνως γυνομένη παρακίττει καὶ αὐτὴν ἐξέσθιν, βλάστημα
παρανομίας.

HIERONYM. in Malach. c. 3. p. 284 A. Nequa-
quam levia putemus esse peccata, perjurium, calumniari
viduam, & opprimere alienigenam, quæ maleficio & ve-
neficiis & adulterio comparantur.

BASIL. in Hex. Homil. 2. p. 19. Τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ κα-
κὰ ὡς αἰετὶ ἀνιέρει καὶ μετεχόντων τῇ βίᾳ. τί ἔν φαμεν;
ὅτι κακὸν ἐστὶν ὅχι ὥς αἰετὶ καὶ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ διὰ
τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κακίως ἔχουσα πρὸς αὐτήν.

CHRYSOST. in 1. ep. ad Cor. c. 6. Hom. 16. p. 167.
Ἐἰ γὰρ καὶ κατ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀμαρτήματα τὰ πρὸς
ἀδελφὸν κέινονται, τὸ ἐπὶ ἐκκλησιῶν ποῶν ἔχει συνῆ-
μον;

ATHENAGORAS in Legat. pro Christianis. p. 35. c.
Εἰ μὲν ἔτι τὸν ἱστανθ' βίον βιάσασθαι πεπρωμένα, καὶ ὑ-
ποπαινεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀδελφούσας σκεπὶ καὶ ἀμαρτίᾳ, ἢ κλέπτειν, ἢ
ἐπιθυμίας ὑλῆτος γινόμενος, ἀμαρτάνει.

ANSELMUS super 2. ad Hebr. Peccatum est vel
facere vetita, vel non facere iussa.

JUSTIN. MART. Q. & Resp. ad Origen. p. 419.
Παραστρέφεται ὁ ἡμῶν ἰσχυρὸς τὰ κακά, φαῖλα ὑφί-
σταται.

* Idem Πλατ.
λογ. βιβ. α.
κεφ. γ. p. 39.
l. 39.

εἶσαι. — τα γὰρ φαῦλα χεῖρσι ἀλόγῳ εἰσὶ φαῦλα, καὶ ὁ φύσει. περαιρεῖν δ', τὸ κερχεῖσθαι, ἢ καλῶς, ἢ φαῦλως.

Sancti. THEOPHILUS ad Antiochum lib. 3. p. 125. Οὐ μόνον διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὁ ἅγιος λόγος, τὸ μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρ' ἐς ἰστοίας, τὸ κοινῇ τῶν καρθία ἰννοῦνται περὶ τινος κακῶς, ἢ διασάμειον τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀλλοτρίων γινώσκειν ἰπιδυμῶσαι.

TERTULLIAN. de Penit. p. 375. Porro peccatum, nisi MALUM FACTUM, dici non meretur. Nec quisquam benefaciendo delinquit. — * Cum Deum grande quid Bani constet esse, utique Bono nisi Malum non dispiceret, quod inter CONTRARIA sibi nulla Amicitia est.

MACARIUS in Hom. 15. p. 100. c. Ἡ γὰρ ἀμαρτία ἢ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν τις ἔσα λογοῦ τῷ Σατανᾷ καὶ ὁσία, ἰστοῦται τὰ κακὰ πάντα, (having spoken before of Adam's disobedience.)

Hom. 14. p. 137. ἢ ἀμαρτία λογοῦ τις καὶ τοιούτ' ὁνομαζέται τῷ Σατανᾷ.

Hom. 38. p. 104. Ἐν ᾧ ἐνὸς τὰ κακὰ ἰσχυρίζεται τὸ μῖσος ἀπὸ τῷ θυμῷ, ὁ θυμὸς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας, ἢ ὑπερηφανία ἀπὸ τῆς σκληροκαρδίας, &c. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μὲν τῆς κακίας ἀλλήλων εἰσὶν ἐκκεντρωμένα. — And long before (Hom. 3. p. 15. A.) οὐ εἰσὶ μόνον τέλα μὲν τῆς ἀμαρτίας, εἰς δ' ὀφίλη τις ἀσφαλίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μύερα : ἢ τυφλωσις, ἢ ἀφασία, ἢ ἀπιστία, τὸ μῖσος, ὁ φόβος, ἢ ὑπόκρισις πόθεν ἰστίν;

LACTANTIUS in Instit. l. 2. c. 7. p. 102. Duplici ratione peccatur ab insipientibus; primum quod Dei opera Deo preferunt; deinde quod elementorum ipsorum figuras humana specie comprehensas colunt.

— * Hac facere, peccatum est. — † Nesciunt quantum sit nefas, adorare aliud, præter Deum.

Si libido appetit thorum alienum, licet sit mediocris, vitium tamen maximum est. — * Cupiditas inter vitia numeratur, si hæc quæ terrena sunt concupiscat, &c.

Recons

libid. p. 376.

• L. c. 18. p.

215.

† ib. c. 19. p.

216.

ib. l. 6. c. 10. p.

249.

• ib. c. 17. p.

264.

—† Recens natos oblidere, maxima Impietas, exponere & necare, duplex scelus. See much more l. 5. c. 9. p. 199. especially c. 20. p. 319. So whilst the Blasphemy of *Marcus the Magician*, and his Followers, or their positive speaking against the honour of Gods essence, is called an Impiety by * IRENÆUS, and ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀσεβειῶν above all Impiety, he unavoidably imply's the positive being of Impiety, which (I hope) M. Hickman will not affirm to be good; or say impiety is one thing, and sin another.

† ib. c. 20. p. 371.

* IRENÆUS
adv. hæres. l. 1.
c. 13. p. 94. A.

AMBROS. de Cain & Abel. lib. 2. cap. 9. fol. 260. Quanto gravius peccato ipso, ad Deum referre Quod finceris? There the positive fact is said to be a sin, though the ascribing it to God (which is done by Mr. Hickman) is said to be worse then the sin *it self*; that is to say, a greater sin.

CYPRIAN. de Eleemosynâ, 1. Serm. p. 179. Coarctati eramus, &c. nisi iterum pietas Divina subveniens, ———viam quandam tuendæ salutis speruisset, ut Sordes postmodum quacunque contrahimus Eleemosynis abluamus. compare this with *Daniel 4. 27.*

—* Quia voluntas non erat in culpâ, providit Deus generali Damnationi remedium, & suæ sententiam Justitiæ temperavit, hæreditarium ONUS à sobole removens, & misericorditer ablutione & unctione medicinali corruptionis primitivæ Fermentum expurgans.

* ib. p. 452

ORIGEN. ad Joau. 2. in Cat. pat. Gr. p. 77. Δι' ἐν πλείῳ τῆς χονίας, ἐν τῷ ἀμαρτανίῳ, καλῶμεθα. χονία ἀμαρτανίων, τὰ ἀμαρτήματα λέγεται — Ἀδυνάτω αἱ χεῖρες αὐτῆς συμπλέεσθαι — Σφαγὴς ἡ ἐκείνη ἀμαρτιῶν ἵνα σφίγγῃται, τὰ ἴσα. καλῶμεθα — καὶ οἱ νομοὶ ὅ ὅπως, θανάτω τὸς ἀνθρώπου ὑπέβαλον, δι' ἀμαρτημάτων τὸν ἰὸν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἰδίας πομπῆς ἐνέειπεν.

* ib. p. 95.

AUGUSTINUS Confess. c. 11. Talis moris (nimirum voluntatis) Delictum atque peccatum est. — * Mortuus ille Aversianis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, vide quod pertineat, &c.

* Id de lib. Arb. l. 2. c. 10. apud Author. Anim. med. p. 258.

ib. p. 237.

SALVIAN. l. 4. p. 128. Furtum in omni quidem est homine malum *Facinus*; sed damnabilius ab que dubio, si *Senator* furatur aliquando. Cunctis Fornicatio interdicitur, sed *Gravius* multo est, si de *Clero* aliquis, quàm si de *populo* fornicetur. Ita & nos qui *Christiani Catholici* esse dicimur, si simile aliquid *Barbarorum Impuritatibus* facimus, *Gravius* erramus. *Avocius* enim sub *sancti nominis* professione peccamus — quanto *minori* peccato illi per *Damiania* prestant, quàm nos per *Christum*? Quanto *minori* Res *Criminis* est, Jovis nomen, quàm Christi &c. The force of this last testimony may be learnt by Mr. H. from Dr. Field, [It must not be said, that God is the original cause, that man hath any such action of will as is evil ex objecto, for if he should Originally and out of himself will any such act, he must be the author of sin, seeing such an act is intrinsically evil, so that it cannot be separated from deformity. p. 125, 126.] after this let *Salvian* speak — Nil ad Deum pertinens Leve ducendum est; quia etiam quod videtur exiguum esse Culpa, Grande hoc faciebat Divinitatis Injuria.

Idem l. 6 p. 207.

ETIPHANIVS adv. Har. l. 1. Tom. 3 p. 265. Ἀλλὰ ὅλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἡ γραφή — ἅλλαν τινὰ, λέγω δὴ τὴν ἐκ διαβολῆς ἐνομιμένην ὑπερὰν ἐνθ' ἡμῶν, καὶ βορβορώδους λογισμοῦ τῆς ἀμαρτίας· εἶναι γὰρ αἷς ἀπὸ πολλῶν δυσοδμία τε καὶ ἀκαθάρτος ἀποροῦσα, λοιδώδης τε καὶ βορβορώδης. — πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πορνικὸν ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, αἷς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ βέλεται τὸ πορνικόν. — καὶ συλλήβδον κραιπαλᾶν, ἀσώτειά, καὶ θυμῶδαι, ἀδίκων, καὶ τὰ ἅλλα τῆς πορνείας ἔργα, ἃ μὴ ἠθέλην, ἐποίησιν μὲν, &c. — κενώθεντες μὲν τὸ ἐμφυσημαῖον τῷ Θεῷ, πληρωθέντες δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ὑλικῆς, ἢν οὐ πολὺ πλοκος ἐνέπιπυσεν εἰς ἡμᾶς ὅρις, &c. — ἢς δὴ (ἀμαρτίας) καθάπερ βλαστήματα νέα, καὶ κλάνη· οἱ φιλήδονοι περὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὶ λογισμοὶ συνίστανται, —

ib. p. 671.
ib. p. 585.

ib. p. 587 p.

ὁ γὰρ

ὁ ὅς ἐν ἡμῶν ἀντιπαράθεσιν, καὶ ἀντιπράσσειν τῷ ib. p. 588.
 ἡμῶν τῷ Θεῷ, ὁ ἐν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῷ νοῷ, ἔτος ἐστὶν ὁ
 τῶν ἐμπαθεῖς ἀναφύων αἰὲς, καὶ ὑλικῶς πρὸς ἀγομίαν
 περισπασμὸς, παντάπασιν πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὧν ἑλκικῶς.
 More instances may be seen p. 281. 548, 549.
 And [to sin] is expressed at every turn, by ποιεῖν
 τὸ κακόν, ἐργάζεσθαι τὴν παρὰ κακὴν, πράσσειν κακόν,
 βλασφημεῖν ἀμαρτίαν, and by ἀδικεῖν, for ἀδικα πρά-
 ττεῖν. All importing the *possibility* of sin.

BERNARDUS de modo bene vivend. Serm. 37 p. 1281.
Superbia est radix omnium malorum. Superbia & Cupidi-
tas in tantum est unum malum, ut nec superbia sine cupidi-
tate, nec cupiditas sine superbiâ esse possit. — Quid est
omne peccatum, nisi Dei Contemptus, quo ejus præcepta
*contemnimus? — * Luxuria flagitium est, Avaritia spi-*
ritualis nequitia, unde illud vitium corporis, istud Animæ,
viz. quia nullum est peccatum, quod ita inquinat corpus,
sicut Luxuria, — similiter super omne peccatum, avari-
tia inquinat Animam; unde & Idolorum servitus di-
citur.

* Idem in
 Serm. de ver-
 bis sapientia,
 p. 1702.

Nor do I see how * those Fathers, who say that an
habit of sin is gotten, by the custom of such acts as are avoid-
 able of themselves, can be imaginable not to hold the *possi-*
bility of sin; or to hold that such acts can be imputable
 to God, which they affirm the Creature might have avoid-
 ed. *Evitabilem Alitum* consuetudine censent *generari* in
 homine habitum vitiosum, so Ger. VOSIUS in Hist.
 Pelag. p. 215.

* Ἀκρόπολις τῆς κακίας ἡ φιλαργεΐα. — τῇ τρυφῇ ἀ-
 μαρτίαν λογιζέται. Τετηφανία τῶν κακῶν ἀκρόπολις.

* Τὸ κακὸν ἡμίτερον ἔργον ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν so he
 calls Idolatry ἕχατον τῶν κακῶν καὶ πρῶτον Orat. 38.
 p. 620.

* BASIL.
 Homil. 1. in
 Psal. HIE-
 RONTM. l. 2.
 adv. Pelag.
 ATHAN. O-
 rat. con. Gent.
 Et de et. Chri-
 sti incarnat. p. 58.
 AUGUST.
 confess. l. 8 c. 5
 CHEM.
 ALEX. Pa-
 dag. c. 3. p. 162
 D. ib. l. 2 c. 1.
 p. 143.
 THEOPHYL.

LACY. la. Rom. 1. 13. * GREGORY NAZIAN, Orat. 40. pag. 13.

Φυκτὸν.

† TATIANA
NUS Affri-
ni in Orat. cont.
Græci. p. 164.

† Φουκτὴν, τὸ συγγίνεσθαι μπελ — ἢ παιδε-
ρασία μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων διώκεται, — ἄλλαν τὴν
ἀλλαχὴ δαίμονα κακοπραγίας ἐπαναστροφῆς πρᾶγ-
ματωμένον κατ' ἑμαυτὸν γινόμενον, ἐξ ἧτον, δια-
τρώπων τ' ἀληθὲς ἐξυφρεῖν δύναμαι.

* PROSPER
de vitâ Con.
templ. 3. c. 2 p.
254.

* Initium omnis peccati superbia — non solum peccatum
est ipsa, sed nullum peccatum fieri potuit, potest, aut poterit
sine ipsâ, siquidem nihil aliud omne peccatum, nisi Dei
contemptus est, quo ejus præcepta calcantur; which com-
pare with Eccles. 10. 13.

FULGENTIUS ad Monim. l. 1. p. 275. so also p. 303
Si initium peccati requiritur, nihil aliud nisi *superbia* inve-
nitur, — quæ tunc initium sumpsit, cum Angelus adversus
Deum elatus, per *concupiscentiam* (quæ est radix omnium
malorum) volens usurpare &c. — mala opera, hoc est,
Peccata, præscisse tantum; non etiam prædestinasse: quia
ibi non opus Dei esse dicitur; sed judicium. Ideo in pec-
cato opus Dei non est — sine operante Deo malus ope-
ratur.

LOMBARDUS l. 2. d. 3. Dist. 40. c. Opera ipsa peccata
sunt, ut *furtiva, stupra, Blasphemia*, — sunt nonnulli *actus*, qui
peccata sunt — & mala per se — quærimus quis *Actus* pec-
catum sit, — dignosces quis *Actus* sit Peccatum,

In lieu of producing more Antiquity in words at length
(which would increase my Readers trouble) I shall insert
the confession of Learned VOSSIUS,* That the greatest part
of the Antients do so speak, as if they thought Original sin to
be something positive, (to wit,) either a *Habit*, or some other
Quality. I call it the confession of GERARD VOSSIUS,
because I find it is none of his own opinions, that *Original*
sin is something positive, whatever he speaks of *actual*
sins. And I think his confession to be of the greater consi-
deration, because of his being so very conversant in Anti-
ent writers, and because of his ability to understand their
true meaning, and lastly of his unwillingness to understand
them against himself. Nay when he speaks of those Anti-
entists

The Confession
of VOSSIUS
for the greatest
part of them.
* Plerique Ve-
terum ita lo-
quuntur, quasi
peccatum ori-
ginale cen-
seant esse al-
iquid posi-
tium, sive ha-
bitum, sive a-
ctum Qualita-
tem. Hist. Eccl.
l. 2. par. 3
209.

ib. p. 312.

tients, who were otherwise minded, he takes their meaning to have been, (not so much that this sin was a meer defect of Original Righteousness, as) that it was rather an habitual averſion from God, proceeding from the defect of Original righteousness.

They that held it to be a quality, could not otherwise hold it (in his opinion) then by holding also that the soul was begotten with the body, and sin begotten with the soul; or that the spirit being created was at least infected by the flesh, some thought that the soul was as it were kindled by the soul in generation; and that the Leprosie of sin in childrens souls, was by infection from the leprosy with which their parents had been infected. Of which Opinion was TERTULLIAN, APOLLINARIUS, and the greatest part of the Eastern Fathers. [Quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic animam nasci ex animâ, TERTUL. Apoll. & maxima pars Orientalium autumavit, ut scribit Hieronymus ad Marcellinum & Anapſychiam, Epist. 45.] RUFFINUS also and AUGUSTIN are cited for it. But because of the latter tis said by VOSIUS, that he durst not publicly avow, what was privately his opinion; His words are the worthier to be observed.

For thus he writeth to OPTATUS, *ſe neque legendo, neque orando, neq; ratiocinando, invenire potuiſſe, quomodo cum animarum Creatione peccatum Originis defendatur.* And for more to this purpose the Reader is referred to other places, as Epist. 28. ad Hieronymum, Lib. 10. in Genes. ad lit. cap. 23. & lib. 1. Retract. c. 1. Nay even then when he is doubtful of the souls extraction, (whether created or begotten,) he still adheres to his opinion, that it is infected by the flesh with some positive Quality, as wine grows ſowre by being put in a ſowre veſſel. And VOSIUS himself doth ſo explain him. Hæc enim mens eſt verborum Auguſtini, [*proſeſſo aut vitium; vitiatum & ex-*

*Potius habitalem à Deo a-
verſionem ſec.
ibid. p. 210.
Aliqui, uti
corpus à cor-
pore formatur
ita animam
ſtatuunt ab
animâ accen-
di ſec. p. 211,*

APOLLINARIUS by name, and the greatest part of the Orientals, as JEROM whineſſeth. RUFFINUS & AUGUSTIN apud eundem Voſſid.

AUGUST. Epist. 157. held the tradition of the ſoul, and original ſin to be a positive quality. Aſſeſſio quædam mala qualitatis, & morbidus affectus Carnis, AUG. dicitur l. de Nupt. c. 31.

Adverſus Julian. lib. 5. cap. 3. ſee him also cited by Aquinas for making Original ſin an Habit. l. 2 q. 83. art. 1 He also calls ſin malum qualitatem, l. 6. contra Julian. c. 7. *humana*

homine trahitur, aut alterum in altero, tanquam in vase vitiatum corruptitur, ubi occulta iustitia divina legis includitur. Quid autem horum sit verum, libentius disco, quam dico, ne audeam dicere quod nescio.] It seemes he doubted whether the soul were *ex traduce*, or not; although, unlesse it were *ex traduce*, he knew not how to defend *Original sin*. But that he concluded it had a positive entity, appears as by all that hath been spoken, so by the *motus bestialis*, & *bestialis Libido* by which he expresseth the sin of Adam.

§. 4. As the most of the *Antients*, so the most eminent of the *MODERNS*, have held the soul to be *ex traduce*, and *Original sin* a positive entity, two of which number are commended by learned *Vossius* (but just now cited) for men of *Excellency* and *Renown*. And *Vossius* himself, in divers places, doth sufficiently assert the *positivity* of sin: not so much when he saith of *Original sin*, that it *inclines the minde to vitious acts*, so that it may, and is wont to be called a *Habit*; as when he saith of its effects, (which are *Actual sins*) that they are *grown over the soul as a spiritual Rust*; that carnal *Concupiscence* is *wholly vitious*, as being a *deflexion of the appetite* from the *Law of its Creation*, from whence ariseth a disposition and propensiry to *Rebellion*; that *Morally vitious Acts* are *freely drawn on*: from that propensiry; that by the custom of such acts there is engendered in the sinner a *vitious Habit*. Cum affectus sic effrenis lascivit, ut rationis imperium antevertat, plurimum adversus rationem insurgat, ac (nisi diligenter a ratione valletur) facile aurigam rationem curru excutiat: In graviore tentatione semper sit superior nisi ratio speciali juvetur Dei Iudicio.

2. And as they who affirm the *propagation* of the soul so also they, who deny that God doth *concur* to the *act* of sin, do so ipso hold sin to have a *positive being*: such as *LOMBARD*, *BONAVENTURE*, *ALEXANDER ALENSIS*, *ASOTO*, *DURAND*, *AUREOLUS*, the learned *ARMACHANUS*, and others cited by Dr.

STEARN

De pecca. mir.
Et Remiss. l. 1. c.
16.
In Julian l. 4.
c. ult.
Georgius
SOHNIVS
tam. 11. loc. de
pecc. Orig.
Et Philip.
MARNIXI-
VS Sax. B.
ALDEGON-
DIUS.
Ger. Voss. ubi.
supra p. 214.
215. 216.

STEARN in his *Animi Medela*, p. 256, 257. And though the Master of the sentences doth seem to some not to define which is truest, (the *negative* or the *affirmative* of Gods concurrence to acts of sin, but leaves the Reader to judge of both tenets, (to *Dist.* 37.) yet he is cited by CAMERACENSIS (l. 1. q. 14.) for the defence of the *Negative*. Because according to his opinion, God doth only permit those evils which are sin, (as saith our learned Dr. FIELD, p. 128,

3. HEMMINGIUS (the Scholar of Melancthon and known to be of his minde) defineth sin, in general, by disobedience against God, and affirms Disobedience to import four things in holy writ, *Defect, corruption, inclination, and action*. Original sin he defines to be a *propagated corruption of humane nature*, in which there is a *material* and *formal* part. The *Material* (saith he) containeth, both a defect in the intellect, and a *concupiscence* in the heart. In the fall of Adam there was a concurrence of these 8. sins 1. A doubting the truth of Gods word. 2. A loss of faith, or incredulity. 3. Curiosity. 4. Pride. 5. Contempt of God, 6. Apostasy. 7. Ingratitude. 8. A murdering of himself, and his posterity. And is expressed in Scripture by divers names: *Concupiscence, Flesh, the old man, the Law of sin, sin dwelling in us, Rebellion, the Law of the members*, and sometimes sin without any epithet. * *All* sin he defines to be something done, omitted, said, or thought, fighting with the Law of God. (Or as he puts it in other tearmes) *Actual sin* is every action committed against the Law, both in the intellect and the will and in the heart, and the outward members. Thus that Regius Professor, famous for learning and moderation.

Nicol. HEMMINGIUS in apoc. Theol. Class. 1. c. 8. de peccato. p. 355, 356.

Duo sunt ob-
servanda in
peccato ori-
ginali, materi-
ale & formale,
materiale est
in mente de-
fectus, —
In corde con-
cupiscentia,
p. 356.

* De actuali
peccato dicen-
dum est, quod
res est destricta
esse cognatum,
dictum, factum,
omissum, pug-
nans cum le-
ge Dei. Scv,

peccatum actuale est omnis actus pugnans cum lege Dei, cum in mente, cum in voluntate, & corde, cum in membris externis. p. 358.

4. GREGORIE MARTIN of Silesia, stating the sin

MARTIN apud Keckermannum in syst. lig. part. 2. p. 653, 654.

M

GREGOR. 1
of

Lapsus accipitur pro *actu* hominis, qui *vitiosus* sit, & quo aliquid *malè* agit, aut in alterum committit. — *aquipollens lapsus* primo-rumpatur, & *peccatum*, aut *Reatus* &c. — Nos priori modo sumimus *peccatum*, prout est *actio*, ut patet. *lib. 2. p. 654.*

of our first parents, begins to expound the word *Lapsus*, which he saith importeth a *vitious act*, with which a man does any thing ill, and is the same with *peccatum*. Then coming to speak of the term *original sin*, he professeth to take the word for the *positive act* of eating the fruit which was forbidden. And so the expression of *Original sin* (he saith) doth also include an *actual*. From the importance of the word, he comes to speak of the thing signified. Which first he consider's as to its *Genus*, which he saith is *Action*. Its *genus remotum* is *actio hominis*. Its immediate *genus*, is *actio vitiosa*, & *privativa*. Mark good Reader; he doth not say 'tis a mere privation, but a *privative action*. Positive in one respect, as 'tis an action; though privative in another, as destroying the Agent from whence it is. Take that excellent Logician in his own expressions of himself. — Vidimus nomen, *Genus* secundo loco considerandum est, quod vel remotum, *actio hominis*; Propinquum *actio hominis vitiosa*; proximum *actio vitiosa, destruens ipsum agentem, seu privativa*. upon this I lay the greater weight, because the judgement and approbation of another great *Methodist* and *Logician*, even *KECKERMAN* of *Dantzick*, adds credit to that of this wise *Silesian*.

FRANCO-BURGERS-DICIVS in *Instit. Metaph.* lib. 1. c. 29. p. 122, 123, 124. Hinc sequitur, malum bono potius esse contrarium, saltem quoad proprias formas, quam privativum op-poi.

3. A late professor of Philosophy in the University of *Leyden*, and a great *Aristotelian*, saith, that evil includes ens, and adds a real relation to it, after the manner that Good doth. And this he affirmeth of every evil. [Malum ergo omne, simili modo quo bonum, includit Ens & Enti addit Relationem realem, quâ, quod malum dicitur, ita se habet ad aliud, ut illi inconveniens atque adversum sit.] To which he adds, that those relations are contrary, and have contrary affections; from whence it follow's, (as he goes on) that good and evil are opposed, rather contrariè, than privativè, and that according to their proper forms too. *Convenientia & inconvenientia*, being no less contrary, than equality and inequality. His reason is, because a thing is not said to be evil, to any one, for being only not convenient,

ent, but in as much as it is *adverse*, or *affirmatè inconve-*
nients (p. 123.) To the objection which he *foresees*, he an-
 swers thus. This is the *nature of immediate contrariety*,
 that *one extrem* is inferred from the *negation* of the other.
 And he means, by *Inconvenient*, *whatsoever is positively*
adverse to that which is convenient.—*licet inconveni-*
ens, & adversum sit positivè quicquid non est conveniens,
 &c.—All which doth strengthen my *Reply* to Master
 BARLOW'S *Answer to Aquinas*. (for which look back
 on chap. 3. §. 13.) He concludes with a *caterum, actiones*
sunt mala per se; Habitus, quatenus ex hujusmodi actio-
nibus orti sunt, quæ rationem culpa habent. p. 126. If
 BETULETUS had not been of the same opinion, he
 would not have used that proposition, wherein *sin* is
 prædicated of *that which will be granted by all to be a*
positive entity. *Racha fratri imprecari, peccatum est.* (Be-
 tuletius in Lactant. l. 6. c. 16.)

6. I forgot (till just now) to note the Doctrine of Mr.
 CALVIN, who saith that *sin original doth bring forth* in
 us *those works of the flesh*, Gal. 5. 19.) which he also calls
sins, though *positive entities*. Nay he saith our *whole na-*
ture is quoddam peccati semen; that *sin hath a force* and
 an *operation*; that the *whole man of himself is nothing else*
 but *concupiscence*.

CALVIN. In
 sit. l. 2. c. 1, 3.
 2. fol. 75. opera
 in nobis pro-
 fert, quæ Scri-
 ptura vocat
 opera carnis.
 qualia sunt A-
 dultéria, for-

ea, &c. quicquid in homine est, aut ut brevis absolvatur, totum hominem non aliud ex
 seipso esse, quam concupiscentiam.

7. It is observ'd by ALSTED, that as the Hebrews
 call *original* *Iezer hara*, *plasma malum*; so *peccare*, to
sin, doth signify nothing but an *action*; not *omission*, or
absence, or *merer privation*. And as Cicero define's it, by
leaping over the hedge which the law doth set us; so accord-
 ingly by Junius, it is derived from * *pecucare*; because
 a *sinner*, like a *stray sheep*, doth *leap over bounds*. And
 Bellarmine saith, that *evil* surpasseth *good* in this respect,

Joban. Haer.
 ALSTED. in
 Lex. Theol. c. 8
 Cicero. in 3.
 paradox. pec-
 care, est tan-
 quam limites
 transilire,
 Junius in l. de
 pec. Adami

primò, q. 1. a. 2. p. 92. Bellarminus apud Alsted. ubi supra.

that it aboundeth more in expressions; for to *signifie* an *Action*, we have *peccatum*, *crimen*, *delictum*, *scelus*, *facinus*, *flagitium*, *culpa*, *erratum*. And after all we have *vitium*, which peculiarly signifies an *habitus*, whereas to signify an *action*, or an *habitus* of *virtue*, we onely use the word *virtue*.

CHEMNITI.
VS in Herm.
Evang. c. 59.
p. 792.
Gerhard. in
Herm. Ev. p. 70.

8. *CHEMNITIUS* speaking of the *sin* against the *holy Ghost*, reckons up six *Ingredients* in it, whereof the most if not all, have a *positive being*. And *GERHARD* does the like by the *sin* of *Peter*, who *abjur'd* his *Saviour* no less by his *works*, then by his *words*; adding *perjury* to *cursing*; and both, to *lying*. Whence he notes the *fruitfulness* of *sin*, for which 'tis called the *Devils net*, *Prov. 5. 22.*

GROTIUS de
Ver. Chr. Re-
lig. edit. Lugd.
1643 p. 27,
28.

If I shall now add *GROTIUS*, who is *inftar multorum* (although but *one*,) no knowing Reader will look for more. He, in setting forth the *verity* of *Christian Religion*, to all the nations of the world which have a *prejudice* to the *Gospel*, takes special care to let them know, that when God is said to be the *universal cause*, or the *cause of all things*, it is onely meant of those things that are *good*, or of all those things which are indued with a *subsistence*, and are commonly known by the name of *substance*; * which substances are the *causes* of *certain accidents*, such as are *actions*; And therefore God is thus freed from being the *originall cause* of *sin*. So that 'tis clearly his opinion, that *sins* of *commission* at least are *Accidents*, even because they are *actions*, which will be granted by all to have a *positive being*.

* Nihil enim
prohibet, quo
minus ipsa,
quæ subsistunt,
deinde causa
sint acciden-
tium, quales
sunt actiones.

This is the judgement also of *Prosser* and *Anstis*. lib. sent. ex *August.* pag. 444.

The severall
ways of RE-
CONCILE

ING. such Writers unto themselves, who plainly holding the *positivity* of *sin*, do sometimes seem to speak against it.

§. 9. And this doth prompt me to shew the way of reconciling the words unto the meaning, and of proving un-

deniably

deniably what must be the *true meaning* of certain Writers, whom some men's *prejudices* and *prepossessions* have unhappily tempted them to *mistake*.

1. When they say that *all entities* are good, they onely speak of *all those*, which are the works of *Gods creation*, or *unavoidably produced* by natural Agents, so as the *origin* of their being is duly imputable unto God; which all our *voluntary actions* cannot possibly be. For

2. When it is said in the common Axiom, That the cause of the cause, is the cause of the effect, it is meant of causes which are *physically* and *essentially* subordinat. (as saith the Learned BISHOP OF DERTY in his Reply to Mr. Hobbs.) It is meant of such effects; as do follow their cause by an *antecedent necessitation*. But the case is quite otherwise when the effects do not follow by a *necessity of nature*, but by the *intervention of humane liberty*. (for which I have the suffrage of Dr. STEARN.) Again 3 it is meant of such effects, as proceed from such second causes, as transgress not the order they ought to have upon the first. (and for this I have Aquinas 1. 2. q. 79. art. 3. When God is said to *work all things*, (Eph. 1. 11.) it is meant in the same restrained sense, in which it is said by S. James, *that every good and perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights*, (Jam. 1. 17.) Implying the contrary to be from below, as coming up from the Father of Lyes. And therefore

4. When it is said, That God is the *Maker of all things visible, and invisible*, (in the Nicene Creed) it is explained in the COLLECT for Evening Service, [O God from whom all *holy desires*, all *good counsels*, and all *just works* do proceed &c.] It is not set thus, (as Mr. Hickman, and the *Libertines*, it seems, would have it) O God from whom are *all desires, holy and unholy*; or from whom are *all counsels, good and evil*; or from whom are *all works, just and unjust*. I say Mr. Hickman would have it thus, because he saith, the very work of *hating God* is from God, pag. 95, 96. nay he saith that *every positive*

Bish. BRAM.
HAL'S Reply
mibi p. 105.

Anim. Medul.
p. 270.

In what sense
God is said to
be Almighty,
see LOM.
BARD. L. L.
dist. 42. F. G. 1.

entity is either God, or from God (p. 75.) and from him as his Creature, (p. 79.) Nay that every reall Being is produced by the first cause, that is by God, (p. 95.) Now it is granted by all the world, That all thoughts, words, and actions, all desires, counsels, and works, have either a positive, or a reall, (and indeed a positive) being. Which being is not diminished by any addition of good, or evil. For to hate God, is as reall, and as positive a thing, as to hate the Devil.

5. When it is said of God, that he can do every thing, (Job. 42. 2.) and that to him all things are possible, (Mat. 19. 26.) it must needs be meant with a Restriction of all things that are good: because there are Texts which say the contrary, to wit, that he cannot do every thing; as that he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2. 13. and that all things are not possible to him; as that it is impossible for God to lye. Tit. 1. 2. In a word, It is no truer, that God can do all things, (meaning things that are good,) then that he can do nothing, which argues uncleanness or imperfection. I may say to Mr. Hickman, as the antient Fathers were wont to do unto the Hereticks, (Austine to Faustus, and Origen to Celsus, and Isidore to the Sceptick, God can do all things, that is, all things that become him; yet cannot do any thing that is evil. because he cannot not be God. is *Δύναται ἀγαθὰ ὁ Θεός, ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὁ Θεός δύναται μὴ εἶναι Θεός.* Or as the Reverend Bishop Bramhall to Mr. Hobbs, (p. 93.) God is said to harden the heart, not causally, but occasionally; that is, by Gods doing good the sinner takes an occasion of doing evil. And as this is a good consequence, [such a thing is from God, therefore it is righteous:] so this consequence is as good, [such a thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God.] We must not therefore thus argue, A Lye is no reall thing, because it is impossible for God to cause it; but rather thus, because it is impossible for God to cause it, therefore all things reall are not from God. And therefore

See corrected co-
pied 21, 23.
Havsa 72
Havsa 20.
79.

6. When it is said of *sin*, that it is *nothing*, or *not in being*, that it *hath no essence*, or is *not amongst the things that are*, (as *Dionysius the Areopagite*, and others speak,) me thinks the very extremity of the *literal falsehood*, should have convinced *Mr. Hickman* that they are *figurative expressions*. And no more to the support of his *sinking cause*, then it would be to that *Atheist's*, who should dispute against the *verity*, because against the *wisdom and power of God*, by citing the words of our Apostle, [The *foolishness of God*, is wiser then men, and the *weakness of God* is stronger then men. 1 *Corinth.* 1. 25.] how many *blasphemies* might be broached from the many *inconsistencies* or *seeming contradictions* of holy Scripture, if by rational distinctions we might not be suffer'd to reconcile them? As it is said by *Saint Paul*, that the *invisible things* of God are *clearly seen*, (and being so are *very visible*;) and as it is said by the *Comedian*, *hoc aliquid Nihil est*; so I may say with great reason, *hoc nihil est Aliquid*. This *nothingness of sin* is *something positive*. And I will prove that *Mr. H.* himself is *nothing*, at least as well as he proves that *sin* is *nihil positivum*, *nothing positive*. For *M. Hickman* is a man, who thinks himself *something*. And *St. Paul* hath said it, [If a man think himself *something*, when he is *nothing*, he deceiveth himself, *Gal.* 6. 3.] *Mr. Hickman* cannot be ignorant, that *generation and corruption* are two species of motion; whereof the first is defined to be *motus a Non esse, ad esse*; the second to be *motus ab esse, ad Non esse*. But would he not be thought a prodigious Disputant, who should write a Book of ten sheets, to prove that *Generation* is a creation out of *nothing*, and so that the *Generant* is a God? or that to *dye*, is to be *annihilated*, and so that there is not a *Resurrection*? Yet those two definitions will bear him out to *Mr. Hickman*; how preposterous he would be to all men else. But as the meaning is, that *corruptio est motus ab esse tali, ad non esse Tale*; so *something positive, simpliciter*, may be said to be *nothing secundum Quid*. And in this very sense those words are spoken.

Ovidius i. elar d' h'is. ely wou. — u d' is tois t. m i. c. v. Dio. ms. Atm. Peccatum est nihil. Aug. de lib. Arb. l. i.

Rom. 1. 20.

* *Modis* q' d' causis opera. talis. Being: nothing, he deceiveth himself. *Gal.* 6. 3.

spoken by the *Psalmist*, *Since age is nothing in respect of thee*, *Psal.* 39. 5. But to make it yet more apparent,

7. By *whom* can the writings of the *FATHERS* be better explained then by *themselves*? If then the very *same Father* who saith at one time, that * *sin is nothing*, doth also say at another, that † *Sin is no other thing then a contempt of God*, (an example of which is in my Margin) 'tis plain that the *former* proposition must be explained by the *latter*. the like example I shew'd out of *Scripture*, and out of the writings of *ATHANASIUS*, in the *first* and *third* Section of this present Chapter, and the like may be shew'd of all the rest, by the severall citations of the *third* and *fourth* Sections. So what is said by *AQUINAS* and his *Followers* amongst the *SCHOOLMEN*, must of necessity be explained by such *conspicuous assertions* as these that follow. — a *omne quod fit, habet Causam, sed peccatum fit: est enim dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, contra legem Dei* — b *Dicendum, quod peccatum est Actus quidam inordinatus: & ex parte actus potest habere per se causam.* — c *Peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem Boni, quæ est Inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali privatione &c.* — d *nihil habet rationem mali, antequam applicetur ad Actum.* — e *Ipsæ voluntatis actus, præmissis suppositis, jam est quoddam peccatum.* — f *Peccatum consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis.* — *Peccatum nominat ens & actionem quodam defectu.* Thus frequently and plainly doth *Aquinas* assert the positive *entity* of *sin*, and therefore by *this* we must explain him, and reconcile him unto himself, whensoever he seem's to say the contrary; or at least accuse him, of *contradictions*. So he saith of *original sin* that it is. * *not a mere privation*, but a corrupt *Habit*, comparing it to a bodily disease, which hath something

* *positive*, as well as *privative*.

* Peccatum nihil est, inquit Bernard. in omnium. B. Mar. Serm. 2. p. 123.

† Quid est omne peccatum, nisi Dei contemptus, quo ejus præcepta contemnimus. 2. Idem 1. de mor. b. viv. Ser. 97. p. 128.

a AQUIN. in 2. 2. quæst. 75. art. 1.

b ibid. ad 1.

c ibid. ad 3.

d ib. art. 2.

e ib. ad 2.

f ib. ad 2.

* Sicut agri-endo corporalis — ali. quid habet

positivum. Ita etiam peccatum originale — non est privatio pura, sed est quidam corruptus Habitus. Idem. 1. 2. q. 82. art. 1. ad 13.

8. It must be carefully observed in *ANTIEN WRJ-TERS*, that because an *accident* cannot exist without the subject of *Inhabitation* which is *substantia*; and because *substantia* is *ens per se subsistens*; they do often take *res* to signify a *substance*, and express an *accident* by *nihil*, or *non existens*; meaning, *non per se subsistens*. Which as I have hinted by some examples already given, so now I will make it undeniable by one taken out of *Saint AUGUSTIN*. Who saith of the very *act of sin*, (which is acknowledged by all to have a *positive being*) that it is *not any thing*. *Actus peccati non est Res aliqua*. To which *Aquinas* makes Answer, † that by *res* he means *substantia*, which is *res simpliciter*; not intending to deny, that it is an *Accident*, which (with *Aquinas*) is *res secundum quid*. And therefore *GROTIUS* (in imitation of the *Antients*) opposeth such *accidents* as *actions* are, to things which have a *true subsistence*. Cum diximus, *Deum omnium esse causam*, addidimus, *eorum*, quæ verè *subsistunt*. Nihil enim prohibet, &c. (ut superius paulò cit.) so *εἰρησὶς* is opposed to *ἀντικειμένη*, by *Maxim*. on *Dionys*. p. 317.

q. 79. *Art. 2. ad. 1.* GREG. NYSS. *Hom. 9. in Ecclesiasten*. p. 417. opposeth *εἰρησὶς* to *ἐναντιότης*, as that is explained by *substantia*, ἐν τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ τῷ ἡσυχίῳ ἀντικειμένη.

9. Again it must alwayes be carried in mind, that all those expressions of the *Non-entirety of sin* were taken up in opposition to *SCYTHIANUS*, and *MARCION*, and the following crue of the *MANICHÆANS*, who ascrib'd to evil a *being of it self*, and *by it self*, and that *eternal*, no less then *God*. * *Nay duos Deos adfert* (saith Tertul. of *Marcion*) *tanquam duas symplegadas naufragii sui*. *Scythianus* (before *Manes*) composed four books, in which he asserted two distinct, and coequal principles of

† Τὰ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὰ ἰσχυρὰ ὅτι ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ ἐκείνην καὶ ἐκείνην. EPIPHANIUS l. 2. tom. 2. *Heret.* 45. seu 55. pag. 619. B. D.

An accident oppos'd to *Res simpliciter*. See *Propter's sent.* ex Aug. p. 444.

* *Augustin de perfect.* *Iustitia non longe à pri. lib. in resp. Rationis.* 4. to 7.

† *AUGUST.* nominat ibi *Rem id quod est Res simpliciter*, sc. *substantiam* sic enim *actus peccati non est Res.*

AQU. in 1. 2.

THE MANICHÆAN doctrine refers occasioned figurative expressions.

* *TERTUL.* *advers. Mar. l. 1. c. 1. & 23. & 26.* *HIERON* in *Nahum. c. 3.*

* Ex omnibus Physicorum, five Metaphysicorum terminis obsecris, nulli explicatu digniores, quam isti duo, id est *id*, & *esse*. *Metaphysica. Metaphysica. de verbi usu. p. 334.*
Manichæi habent expressam Substantiam by Natura. Aliquid & Res.
VASQUEZ. Disp. 95. c. xli.

As Aristotle himself by Hoc aliquid.

Whom the Ancients followed in their expressions. Not including Accidents in the word *natura*. But granting *id* to be an *act*, and the work of our will.

things, to wit, of white and black, of moist, and dry, of body and soul, of heaven and earth, of just and unjust, of good and evil. Now however this Heresie is very worthily exploded by all true Christians, yet right may be done upon a very wrong ground. And so it is, if all the ground be the Non-entity of sin, which yet the Fathers did onely use (by a catechesis) in opposition to that substance, or self-subsistence, which that many-headed-sect ascrib'd to evil. And this I say in justification of the Fathers and Schoolmen, from those mistakes of their meaning, by which the mistakers would make them fall from a great error into a greater. It brings worse (of the two) to think that sin hath no being, or that God is the Author, (it it hath any) than to think that good and evil did proceed from two fountains, and both eternal.

10. I am exceedingly confum'd in what I say touching the Fathers, and their acception of the word *natura*, *res*, and *aliquid*, by what I find to be the judgement of learned VASQUEZ, whose words I think you wth to be inserted somewhat at large. [Observandum est (inquit) Patres fere omnes, Doctrinam Manichæi, obiter, aut ex professo, refutare voluisse, qui assererat substantiam aliquam in se & ex se malam esse; omnem autem substantiam naturam appellabat, & aliquid, & rem. (sicut Aristoteles in Categor. c. de substantiâ, omnem substantiam dixit esse hoc aliquid.) Quare nomine Naturæ quoties S. Patres disputant cum Manichæis de hac re, non continentur operationem & accidentia, (quæ aliquam habeant naturam,) sed solum substantiam, secuti sententiam Aristotelis, (2, phys. c. 1. & 5. Metaph. c. 4.) qui solum materiam & formam naturam, appellat. Immo ex his proprie solum formam, materiam autem metaphoricè tantum. Contendunt igitur Patres, nullam esse naturam substantia malam, quatenus substantia & natura est; De actu verò non loquuntur. Concedunt enim malum esse opus arbitrii nostri, & actum. Sicut Augustinus l. de peccat. sect. instit. qui ratiocinatione 4. quærit, quid sit peccatum, actusne,

Autusne, an Res. Quia si res est (inquit) habeat Auctorem; & si Auctorem habet, jam alter erit auctor, quam Deus, alicujus rei. Quod si hoc impium est, necesse est dicere, peccatum esse actum, non rem. — Patres non tam curarunt propriam rationem vitii & peccati in genere moris exprimere, quam per aliquid conjunctum nobis magis notum eam describere. Quare cum per boni privationem peccatum definierunt, non sunt ista intelligendi, quasi sit ipsa essentia & ratio formalis peccati, sed quia est necessario peccato conjuncta, & Christianis maxime nota. Multo enim facilius per negationem intelligimus.

An example
taken out of S.
AUSTIN.

11. To this let me add (what does just now occur to my present purpose) That *substantia* with many *FATHERS*, as well as with *GROTIUS* and other *MODERNS*, hath often carried away the name of *ens*; because *ens* is *Analogum*, (as every *smatterer* in logic *knows*, though *Masters* in it sometimes forget,) and the common Rule is here verified, *Analogum per se positum pro samosiori stare presumitur*. Whosoever therefore is found to say, *Peccatum est non ens*, must be known to mean that it is not *substantia*, unless he be one who dares add, that it is not an *accident*. And so if any is found to say, that every *finite entity* is produced by God, he must be charitably concluded to understand *every substance*, unless he shall dare to add also, That God produceth as well the *worst*, as the *best* of *actions*. It being granted by all the world, that the *former* are *accidents*, no whit less than the *latter*.

Why *ens* many times is used onely for *substantia*.

12. Some perhaps, in good earnest, do think the best way to confute the *Manichees*, is by saying that sin is *nothing really*. Because, denying it *such a being* as *Manes* gave it, and yet allowing it a *being*, (although not *that*) it must needs have a being either from God, or some *Creature*. If they shall dare to say from God, they sadly fall into the *Blasphemy*, which *Manes* (or rather *Scythianus*) devised his principle to avoid. If they say from some *creature*, they make that *creature* a kind of *Creator*, in making it able to give a *being*, where God himself doth give none.

How unappropi-
ately some men con-
fute the MANI-
CHIEES.

How the sin-
ner is able to
give the whole
being unto his
sin.

* Eccles. 15. 14

* Eccles. 7. 29.

How they that
deny it, must
submit to the
MANI.
CHEES, or
worse.

But (omitting that this last were the *safest* error, if it were any) these men do not consider, that God was able to make a *creature* with such a *light* of understanding, and such a *liberty* of will; as to be fitly left * *in the hand* of his own counsel; and to be a *self-determiner*, to this or that object which lyes before him; And so to be an *Artificer* of such *nucleus works*, (by *abusing* the liberty of his will,) as could not by any possibility have been produced by his *Creator*. God made man *upright*, but he hath * *found out* many *inventions*. And if it be in the *power* of man, to give being unto any thing, most easily may he be thought to give Being unto *sin*; sin it self being no more, then what is *displeasing* to God Almighty; and no where else to be *imagined*, much less to be, but in the *voluntary actions* of created Agents, in *contrariety* to the law which they receive to act by. That so it is, is very evident, by the *negative* precepts of the Almighty, whereby he *forbids* us to give a being to this, or that, which he tells us he *hateth* the being of. *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife*, is as much as to say, thou shalt not *put* such a *concupiscence* in being. And yet to *covet* another man's wife, is as *positively* something, as to *covet* his own; and more *positively* something, than *not* to *covet* another man's; though that is the *vice*, and this the *virtue*.

13. They indeed who deny this natural *freedom* of the will, must either yield to the *Manichees*, or else do worse, as hath been shew'd. But this being granted, there needs no new principle (as the Manichees dreamed) for the *production* of what is *evil*. For he that may do good (by making use of that *Talent* which God hath given him) hath *eo ipso* the power to do the *contrary*, unless he is *irresistibly* and *unavoidably* good, which no man is, on this side heaven. Now since both the *habits* and *acts* of *sin*, are as *positive* as the *habits* and *acts* of *virtue*, (and equally reducible to the *species* of *Quality*, and that there needs no other power for the *production* of the former, then what is given us, whilst it is given us to be truly *free agents*; It will

will be fit to make it appear, that I have not onely my private, but publick reason also for what I teach.

§. 6. DIONYSIUS the AREOPAGITE, who refell's the two principles in the Manichean sense, doth set them up, and assert them in the sense of the Scripture. Affirming God to be the principle of every thing that is good, and the Devil on the contrary of every thing that is evil: to wit, the evil of sin, which is evil properly so called. He asserts the first in these words of Saint Paul, (Rom. 11. 36.) Καὶ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα καὶ εἰς αὐτόν. which he explains by the Restriction thought fit to be added by Saint James, (c. 1. v. 17.) Πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δῶμα τῶν ἁνθρώπων ἐστὶ ἐκ. he affirms the second in these terms — * ἡ διαμονία πλεονὺς ἐκ ἐφίεσθαι καλῶς καὶ ἀγαθῶς, πρὸς οὐλῶν ἢ ὅσα, καὶ τῆς Ἀγγελικῆς περὶ τὴν ἱερίαν ταχάως ταχύνει. τῶ ἀποπειρώσῳ, κακῶν ἀποκρίσιν αἰτία καὶ ἐκείνη καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ὅσα κακῶν ἐκείνου λέγεσθαι. Yet (3.) the * power to sin (though not the act of sin it self) he rightly affirm's to be from God; which power is innocent, as in Adam and the Angels before their Fall. who could never have sinned, if before they actually sinned, they had not had the power to sin. But for the exertion of that power into act, that being evil † cannot possibly proceed from so good a fountain.

The concurrence of the Learned, both ANTIENT and MODERN, for the Affirmative, That the sinfull Agent is the sole cause of the sinful Act. DIONYS. AREOP. de Celsi Hæret. c. 1. p. 1.2.

* De Div. Nom. c. 4. sect. 18. p. 570. cum quâ confer. p. 571.

* Τα μακρότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἵσκι καὶ μετὰ τὴν δυνάμει. Ibid. p. 574.

† Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ibid. p. 577.

τοῦτο, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἵσκι καὶ μετὰ τὴν δυνάμει καὶ ἵσκι. Ibid. p. 577.

IGNATIUS in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. Ἐάν τις ἐπιβῇ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ Διαβόλῳ ἐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης γινώσκου.

JUSTIN. MARTYR. in Apolog. 1. pro Christ. p. 35.

* Οὐκ ἀποκρίσιν τὸ, τε καὶ ἡ Ἀγγελικὴ γένεσις καὶ ἡ ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεός, ἀδικίας ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν πλημμελήσασιν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν δυνάμει περὶ κομίσσονται. see him especially in Quæst. & Resp. ad Orisod. p. 396. & 436.

TERTUL. contra Marcion. Lib. 2. cap. 5, 6. Sux pō. testatis invenio hominem a Deo constitutum lapsūque hominis non Deo, sed Libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum.

ATHANASIUS (de anima humana loquens) jin erat contra Gent. p. 5. — Δύναται ᾧ ὡς περ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ νέειν, ὅτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀποσφίρεισθαι, ἀποσφίρεισθαι ἢ τὸ καλὸν, πάντως τὰ ἐναντία λογίζεται παύσασθαι ᾧ καθόλου ἢ δύναται, τὴν φύσιν ὅσα, ὡς προῦπκον, ἐκίνηται, καὶ γνώσκειν, τὸ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὁρᾷ ἐκείνην δύνασθαι κατ' ἀμρότιον τοῖς τὸ σώματι μέρεισι χεῖσθαι, — ἔστι καὶ ὁ φαῦλα παρὰ βέλουςιν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, — ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁ δημιουργὸς γινώσκειται, — τὸ κακὸν ἢ παρὰ θεῷ, ἢ δὲ ἐν θεῷ, ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, ὅτε * ὡς ἂν τίς ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώποι κατὰ ἐκείνην τῆς τὸ καλὸν φαντασίας, ἐκείνοις ἐπινοοῖν ἤρξαντο καὶ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ ἐκ οὐρα, καὶ ἄπαι βέλονται. — ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἐποίησεν εὖ, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐζήτησαν λογισμὸς πολλούς — ὅλας ἡ τῶν εὐδαιμονίας εὐρεσις, ἐκ ἀπὸ ἀγαθῷ, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κακίας γέγονε τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχον κακὴν ἐν ᾧ δὲ ποτε καλὸν περιείη, ὅλον ἐν φαῦλον ἐκ ἀρχαῖς δὲ τῆς κακίας ἐπινοῖα ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴ κατ' ὀλίγον καὶ εἰς τὰ χεῖρονα ἐκείνην ἐξέγειν ἤρξατο And very much more to this purpose p. 9. 37. Ὁ * de Incar. verbi dei p. 57, 58.

id p. 7.

* Neq. ullam ejus substan-
tiam esse, Pe-
trus Nannius
interpretatur
p. 8.

* Ἐκ ἀμα-
ρτίας ἡ ἀλλο-
θασίαν ἀρτῶν
κακίας — παρανομιᾶς ὡς ἀνὴρ ἀλλοθασίαν,
ἀκρίβειαι μετὰ τὴν ἀμαρτάνην γένεσθαι.

— ἐκείνη φιλονεικῶντες ἐν τῷ παρανομοῦν
p. 58.

AUGUSTIN. Retraff. l. c. 9. per totum. Malum non exortum nisi ex libero voluntatis Arbitrio, — Quid opus est queri unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur

ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum, cum eum non nisi animi & voluntarium, & ob hoc culpabile esse fateamur, &c.

* Quæ tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem Causa voluntatis? Aut igitur voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima Causa peccandi.

Non ergo est cui rectè imputetur peccatum, nisi voluntati, voluntas est quæ & peccatur & rectè vivitur.

NAZIANZ. orat. 40. p. 671. apud. D. Barl. p. 52. Πιστεύετε μὴ εἶναι τινὰ τῶ κακῶ εἶναι, ἢ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ὑποστάσαν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ θεῶ γεννημένην, ἀλλ' ἡμέτερον ἔργον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ποιηρῶν.

Ποιητοὶ ποιητῶν δαιμόνων καὶ πλάσαι, καὶ μυσάγωνοι vide D. D. Hammondi, Annot. in 1 Cor. 8.4.

FULGENTIUS apud Aqu. 1.2. q. 79. art. 3. Deus non est ultor istius rei, cujus est Actor.

PROSPER. in senten. ex Aug. p. 444. Iniquitas per ipsum facta non est, quia Iniquitas nulla substantia est. Mark his Reason, and the two things which it implies. 1 That iniquity is an Accident, and 2. Such, as is not from God; and therefore elsewhere he saith, that the sole cause of evil deeds is the liberty of the will — ad quam solam male gesta recurrunt.

CLEM. ALEX. λογ. β. p. 167. ἡ ἀμαρτία, ἐκείσιν αἰδία, ἀδικία δὲ, ἐκείσιν κακία, εἴςιν ἢ ἡ μὲν ἀμαρτία, ἡ μὲν ἐκείσιν, δὲ καὶ φησὶν, Ἀμαρτία γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐκ χειρὸς ἐστίν. — Παρανομίαι ἀνδρῶν ἀγορεύουσι: οὐκ αἱ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἐκείσιν σφίγγεται, καὶ εἴςιν ὁ θεὸς αἰτία. And so in the place above cited (p. 3) he saith all substances have their production from God, but not all Actions or operations, unless when they are good. The Original of the evil he * imputes to free-will. And thus he disputes against them, who feigned another creator even of substances, beside the onely true

Deus non est causa ejus, quod homo sit deterior.

Idem apud Aqu. 1. 2. q. 79. art. 3.

Idem in lib. de ingratis p. 573.

ib. p. 169.

* Ἀλλὰ, ἵνα εἴπω ἡ ἐκ χειρὸς ἐστίν. Idem λογ. β. p. 319.

true God. Κτισὴν ἄλλον εἶναι παρὰ τὸν πρῶτον Θεὸν δογματίζουσι.

CYRILLUS HIERO. Ier. Κατὰ β. p. 30. Ἐκ προαιρέσεως τὸ κακὸν, ὁ φουργὸς ἀναίτιος, citing that Text Eccles. 7. 30. And that of the Apostle Ephes. 2. 10. ὁ μὲν ἐν Κτιστὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς ἔκτισα· τὸ δὲ κτιστὸν ἐξ δικταίας προαιρέσεως εἰς πικρίαν ἐπέστη. And after in the same page, τί ἐστὶ τὸτο τὸ ἐμμεγρὸν; ἐκ ἔσθῃ ἰχθύος ἔξωθεν, ἀνθρώπου, καταγανίζομενος, ἀλλὰ βλάστημα κακὸν, αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁ μὲν. ὃ δὲ καθεστῆκε τῷ πράγματι ἀρχηγός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλος τις ἐστὶ κακὸς ὁ ὑποβολὸς διαβολος, and a little after, p. 34. speaking of the Devil, and applying to him that of Ezek. 28. 12. ὥς ὃ ἐυρίθη τα ἀδικήματα ἐν σοι, he adds, it was very well said ἐυρίθη· ὃ δὲ ἔξωθεν ἐπισπινέχθη, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἐγέννησας τὸ κακόν, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξῆς εἰρηκεν, ὃ ἦν ἡ καρδία σου ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει σου.

ib. p. 34.

AMBRASIUS de Cain & Abel. l. 2. c. 9. fol. 260. H. Qui peccatum suum ad quandam (uti Gentiles asserunt) Decreti aut operis sui Necessitatem referunt, Divina arguere videntur, quasi ipsorum vis Causa Peccati sit. — sed quanto gravius Peccato ipso, ad Deum referre quod Feceris, & Reatus tui invidiam transfundere in Auctorem, non Criminis, sed Innocentix?

ETIPHANIUS l. 1. To. 3. Hæres. 36. p. 266, 267, 268. ὅτι ὃ δυνατὸν ἄνω τὸ Θεὸς τι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐκ ἔχουσα ἀρχὴν βίβης, καὶ εἰς τὸ τέλος μένουσα, ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ ἐπιστάτως γινώσκῃ, καὶ ἀφ' ἡμῶν πάλιν παυομένη. Nothing can be without God except sin — ἐξ ἧς [τριάδος ἀγίας] τὰ πάντα καλῶς ἐκιστάμενα ὁ πονηρὰ τινα ἀλλὰ, ἀγαθὰ κατὰ τὴν ὕψος

ἵνα ἐκκαθήσασιν ἀγαθότητα, ἢ ἐκ ὄντων κενώμενα
εἰς τὸ εἶναι. — ἢ ἢ αἵτις μὴ ὁ φαινόμενος τό-
τε ἔφης, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν τῷ ἔφῃ ἔφης λαλῶν. ἢ τὸ εὖλον
ἢ ἀμάρτια. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ πονηρὸν φύσει. — πλη-
ρωότες ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ὑλῆς, ἢ ὁ πολὺ πλοῦς ἐκείνου
εἰς ἡμᾶς ἔφης. and more to this purpose p. 265. 588.
yet (saith he) God doth not hinder men from sinning (by
violence or force upon their wills) μὴ βιάσθῃς πρὸς
χρῆμα τὰ τῷ χρῆμα ποιεῖν, p. 671.

AUGUSTIN. *de civit. Dei*, l. 5. c. 9. *Mala voluntates
à Deo non sunt, quia contra naturam sunt, quæ ab illo est.*

— Sicut omnium Creaturarum Creator est, ita omni-
um potestatum dator, non * voluntatum: where by the
will, he means the action of the will.

§. 7. That God gives onely the power to act what he
forbiddeth, and that no more is meant by those Fathers,
who say that all things in some sort do come from God,
(still implying the act is self to be solely from the creature
when it is wholly against God, as the act of hating God is
confess'd to be,) I have already made apparent by diverse
instances recited, And Doctor Stearn hath don it by di-
verse others, (*An. med.* l. 2. p. 256, 257.) of which I
shall mark but three or four.

ANSELMUS *de concord. Præd. & Præsc.* Nul-
la Res habet potentiam ullam volendi aut faciendi nisi illo
Dante.

AUREOLUS in 2. D. 37. Neque ego video
quod dicunt, omnis actus est à Deo (dato quod sit posi-
tivus) nisi fortè conservando potentiam quæ elicit, & natu-
ram actus elicivam.

ALEXANDER ALENIS *part. 2. q. 100.*
Adjuvat ipsum ad actionem in quâ est malum; quia
dat Potentia, sive Libero Arbitrio, quod possit operari.

RICHARD. ARMACHANUS l. 17. *Quæst. Ar-
men. c. 3.* Nec Deus attingit hoc modo actiones immedi-
atè ad actum, seu effectum productum, sed ad agens im-
mediatum ipsius effectus; puta intellectum, aut volunta-

*Idem l. 2. tom.
1. Har. 64. p.
587.*

* Mala volun-
tas Peccatum
dicitur meto-
nymicè, seu
Lombard. l. 4.
dist. 30. A.

The power to
act is from
God, but the
volitions action
is not.

tem.—Si quis poterit ex sacris Scripturis probare hanc cooperationem divinam, cum omni agente creato; erit mihi mirandus, & libenter probationem illam acciperem; quoniam hoc facere me nescire fateor.

LESSIVS de Perf. Div. l. 11. c. 3. Hac ratione, Creaturæ possunt dici instrumenta respectu Dei, & Deus omnia per illas operari; *omnia* (inquam) *bona*, non mala, quæ Deus non *intendit*, neque ex perfectione virtutis à Deo insertæ, sed ex defectu Creaturæ sequuntur.

DURANDUS 2. D. 37. *Actio* non procedunt à Deo, nisi secundum indifferentiam ad bonum & malum. Deus enim non est causa actionum liberi arbitrii, nisi quia liberum arbitrium ab ipso & est, & conservatur; sed liberum arbitrium in esse conservatum, adhuc est *indifferens* ad eligendum Actum bonum v. l. malum, nec determinatio ejus ad malum, est à Deo. Actus enim malus naturam bonam sed imperfectè bonam (cujus Author Deus est) non necessariò sed liberè sequitur. Naturæ itaque imperfecte bonæ, non Deo (qui Deus est non volens iniquitatem) imputandus est. (vide *Anim. Med.* l. 2. p. 270.)

FULGENTIUS de Prædest. ad mon. l. 1. p. 251. Sicut ergo peccatum in eo non est: ita peccatum ex eo non est. Quod autem ex eo non est, opus ejus utique non est. Quod autem nunquam est in opere ejus; nunquam fuit in Prædestinatione ejus.—Peccatum, homo, non ex prædestinatione Divina; sed ex voluntate sua, malè concupiscendo, cepit, & malè operando, perfecit. But I return from this Antient, to other Writers more modern.

MELANCHTHON, de cau. pec. p. 48. Diabolus pater: id est, *primus fons*, & causa mendacii. Discernit autem Christus mendacium à substantia: quasi dicat, substantiam quidem habet Diabolus aliunde acceptam.—Habet autem proprium quiddam Diabolus, non à Deo acceptum, videlicet mendacium: id est, peccatum, quod libera voluntas Diaboli peperit. Neque hæc inter se pugnant,—substantiam à Deo conditam esse & sustentari, & tamen voluntatem Diaboli & voluntatem hominis causas esse peccati

peccati. Quia voluntas abuti libertate sua potuit, seque à Deo avertere. — Primus Author peccati est Diabolus. ib. p. 49,

— Hæc mala non sunt res conditæ à Deo, sed horribilis destructio humanæ naturæ. — *Voluntas libera Evæ* ib. p. 50.

proprie & verè erat causa lux actionis, ac sponte se avertit à Deo. — Quia peccatum ortum est à voluntate Di-

aboli & hominis, nec factum est Deo volente, sic erant conditæ voluntates, ut possent non peccare. Est autem causa contingentis nostrarum actionum *Libertas* voluntatis. (p. 51.) — Imò Ecclesia Dei, cum sciat Deum verè, seriò & horribiliter odisse libidines Neronis, nequaquam dicet eas aut necessariò accidisse, aut volente Deo accidisse. — Deus est essentia — volens justa, ib. p. 53.

casta, non volens pugnantia cum suâ mente, injustam crudelitatem, incestus libidines, &c. — Deus adest Creaturis, non ut *Stoicus Deus*, alligatus causis secundis, ut moveat simpliciter, sicut movent secundæ: sed ut agens liberrimum, *sustentans naturam*, & suo consilio aliter agens in aliis.

— Sic agit Deus cum voluntate, *sustentans* & *juvans* ordine agentem: Sed non *juvans* rvenientem contra ordinem, etsi eam *sustentat*. Sic enim condidit voluntatem Evæ, ut esset liberum agens, quod posset tueri ordinem, aut deficere. Sit igitur hæc crassa solutio: secunda causa non agit sine prima, scilicet *sustentante*. Hoc universaliter verum est: sed non semper *adjuvante*. Non enim adjuvat prima effectum, quem non vult. Est igitur voluntas Evæ immediata causa sui actus, cum avertit se à Deo. And again, Sed Christianis necesse est discernere bona & mala. Secunda non agit sine prima, scilicet *sustentante*: sed multa facit prima causa præter secundas, quia est agens liberum. Et secunda, libera: ut voluntas Evæ vitiose agit *sine primâ adjuvante*, quia talis facultas est *libertas*. And again, Adest Deus suo operi, non ut *Stoicus Deus*, sed verè ut liberum agens, sustentans creaturam, & multa moderans. This shews the meaning of *MELANCHTHON*, when he saith in one place (in compliance with the vulgar) that original sin is *nihil privativum*, ib. p. 55, 56.

— *MELANCHTHON'S Distinction of the first cause sustaining, but not assisting the second, in evil actions.*

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¶ Vitiū o-
riginis est i-
plarum Parti-
um hominis
inquinatio &
confusio (ib.
p. 49.) acce-
dunt motus—
qui sunt res
positiva, et si
sunt minus er-
rantes, & quor-
dam ordinis
Confusio &c.

p. 50. † 53.

He also saith (*in collat. W. mat.*) Peccatum vel est defectus, vel inclinatio, vel alia
pugnans cum lege Dei.

Defens. seu.

Rem. circa 1.
de grad. art. p.
230.

M. BAXTER
of Judgement.
p. 151, 152.

tivum, which according to the Rule of *aquipollence* in *Logic*, must needs be tantamount to *aliquid positivum*. And this he shews to be his meaning, by saying it is *that* which requires a *subject*; that it is an ** Inquisition* and *confusion* of the *man*; which *confusion* he explains by *wandering * motions*, which he also saith are *things positive*. And he illustrates it farther by a *ship* that is *tossed with winds and tempest*, as well as *desolante of sails and oars*. By the *former confusion* he means *original*; and *actual sin* by the *latter*: giving his instance in *Nero's † lusts*, which he denyeth to have been by the *will of God*, they having been *sins*, though *positive entities*. By which *Mr. H.* may understand his misapprehensions of *Melanchthon* p. 68. besides his forgetfulness of the proper task he hath set himself, which is not to prove that *some sins* are *privative*, but that *no sin* is *more* than a *mere privation*.

The REMONSTRANTS call it a blasphemy, to say that *no creature* can either do *more good*, or *fewer evil* acts, then now he doth. And yet that this is the sequel of *Master Hickmans* Doctrine, the *Apologist* for *Silennus* hath well evinced.

Mr. BAXTER himself (it just now comes into my memory) doth frequently ascribe a *self-determining* power to the *Free will* of *man*, however *biassed by habits*. And though himself hath printed as blasphemously as the *most*, in charging *God* with the *causing of evil*, (which, two lines after, he calls a *truth*,) yet he trounceth some of his brethren, for holding *God* the *determiner of the will in every sin*, as the *first efficient immediate physical cause*. And also saith of *Freewill*, that 'tis a *high self-determining principle, the great spring of our actions*. (*of Judgement. page 152.*) But *Mr. B.* (as many others) is produced by me in no *fit place*; I not observing any order either of dignity or
of

of time, but giving to every one a place, as he meets my memory, or my eye.

The words of *GROTINS* deserve great heed, whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vitious; but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vitious; that is an action; meaning that a vitious action (as the action of hating God) is meerly from the sinner (man or Diavel) and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God, either as a mediate, or immediate cause. And though I cited some part of his words before, yet (not to fail of his intent) I shall intreat my Reader to weigh the whole. Neque ab eo, quod diximus, dimovere nos debet, quod mala multa evenire cernimus, quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse, ut qui perfectissimè, sicut ante dictum est, bonus sit. Nam cum diximus, Deum omnium esse Causam, addidimus, eorum quæ verè subsistunt. Nihil enim prohibet, quominus ipsa, quæ subsistunt, deinde causa sint Accidentium quorundam, quales sunt actiones. Deus hominem & mentes sublimiores homine, creavit cum agendi libertate, quæ agendi libertas vitiosa non est, sed potest suâ vi aliquid vitiosum producere. Et hujus quidem generis malis, quæ moraliter mala dicuntur, omnino Deum adscribere auctorem nefas est. p. 27, 28.

LYCERNUS vindicating God from the very same calumnie, with which Mr. *Hickman* hath not feared to asperse him, saith that the Diavel did peccare ex semetipso, (according to our Saviour *Joh. 8. 44.*) that he alone is pater & fons malorum, *lux ex tenebris*, the first inventor of evil things: to which he accommodates that of *Augustin*, Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem, sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium.

God is said to be omnipotent, not because he can do all things (saith *LOMBARD* out of *Augustin*) but because he can do whatsoever he will; who cannot will to do any thing, but what is good. But there are some things (saith

posse omnia facere, sed quis potest esse quicquid vult. sic, vide Aug. Enchir. cap. 96. in fin. tom. 3.

GROT. de ver. Chr. Rel.
p. 27, 28.

POLYCAR. LYCERNUS
in Harm. Evang. c. 103.
p. 1460.

PET. LOMBARDUS
1. diff. 42. c. 10
248. D. 4. F.
Omnipotentia est, non quod
Aug. Enchir.

v. Artic. con-
dem. & ex-
comm. d
Stephani Pa-
ris. Episc. &
per Magistrum
Parisienses ad
calcem Lond.
p. 953, 957,
969.

ibid. p. 971.
col. 1, & 2.

† p. 79, 95.
96. &c.

Bp. BRAM-
HAL in a re-
ply to T. H.
Ainsw. Adv.
p. 94, 95
id. Ib. p. 97.

ib. p. 101.

Distallectus in
Opusc. Theol. p.
103. p. 2. q. 29
art. 1. ad 3.

he) which God cannot do, to wit, those things which are unjust, sunt alia quædam quæ Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut peccata. (p. 247.) *Non potest Deus facere injusta* p. 248. These following Doctrines, [quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult & eligit, & quod liberum Arbitrium est potentia passiva — & quod necessitate movetur ab Appetibili, — item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata, Item quod aliquis faciat aliquid omnino, ut Deus vult ipsum facere voluntate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet, &c.] were condemned with an Anathema, by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. & 1341. together with the Blasphemies of Joannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order, that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act; And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature, is so caused by virtue of the first cause. And that God is the cause of every mode of the act, and of every Circumstance that is produced. All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Necessary truths by Mr. † Hickman, & accordingly do call for a condemnation.

Bp. BRAMHALL shewes it to be his judgement, whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying, that God wills and effects, by the second causes, all their actions, good and bad; and saith it implies a contradiction, that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer. Act. 13. 18. & Act. 14. 16. Then he thus states the matter. God causeth all good, permitteith all evil, disposeth all things both good and evil. — The general power to all is from God, (in him we live move and have our being,) this is Good. But the specification and Determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from our selves, and proceeds from the free will of man — it is a good consequence; This thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God.

Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Distallectus, not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act, but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the will,

will, which abuseth its liberty in determining it self to the evil act, and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil, not the cause by which we do it. And so saith * *Aquinas*, *Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani, quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium, hoc non esse à Deo, sed à ipsà*, again he saith, *non à motione divinà sed à dispositione humana voluntatis oriri, ut male potius actiones quam bona sequantur*. He also * cites for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin; and of which the result is this, *Determinationem ad producendam huius actus emittentem esse à voluntate humanà, non autem à Deo, & Deum ita nolle antecedenter, ut hac curitas sit; ut eam etiam esse patiatur, suum concursum non subtrahendo: si conditio id exigat ex Creaturæ libertate opposita*. p. 92. 93. 94. mark how it is expressed by Dr. GOAD.

God made Adam able to be willing to sin, but he made him not to will sin, — that he chose death, it was by the strength of his will given him by God, but God did not binde him to chose death, for that were (a contradiction) a necessitated choice — if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed, this point will be most evident.] And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all.

“He that first gives the Law, and then predetermines the Act of transgressing (the disobedience, the doing contrary to) that law, that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge, and then predetermines Adams will to choose and eat what was forbidden, is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act, and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity: And indeed if the obliquity, which renders the act a sinful act, be it self any thing, it must necessarily follow, that either God doth not predetermine all things, or that he predetermines the obliquity; and Regularity bearing the same proportion of Relation to any act of Duty, as obliquity doth to sin, it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act, should

* Greg in 2. d. 34. & 37. q. 1 art. 3. ad 8. & 12. Capreol. ib. q. 1. art. 3. Scotus in 2. d. 37. q. 2 Suarez in opuscul. 12. de concursu Dei ad actus malos. c. 3.

Dr. GOAD at the end of his Dispt. Mf.

Dr. HAMMOND of Fundamentals ch. 16. p. 183, 184.

"should not be the Author of the obliquity, as well as the
 "Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknow-
 "ledged to be the Author of the regularity of it.

* Dr. ED.

REYNOLDS
 of the falsi-
 tude of his p.
 212. in 4to.

To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds,
 "Let not any man resolve sins into any other original, than his
 own Lusts.

CHA P. VI.

An account
 of those
 things which
 Mr. H. calls
 his Artificiall
 Arguments.

§. 1. **H**AVING bestowed so much paper on what is
 thought of most moment, I shall need spend but
 little in the dispatching of those flies, to which Mr. H.
 gives the name of *Arguments Artificiall* p. 69. The first
 he confesseth was Mr. Barlees. [*If sin as sin be a positive
 entity, then it is a thing in it self good.* For twas added by
 Mr. B. but now subtracted by Mr. H.) *every positive
 thing is good.*

* *Arrowsdale.*
 ch. 3. p. 10. 10
 p. 153.

Sect. 2. To this I answered * many things (of which Mr. H. reply-
 eth onely to a few.) As 1. That if *sin is a thing positive*, he seeks to prove
 (by this Argument) that *sin is good*. 2. That I had proved *sin a thing
 positive*, in my two last sections; which continuing firm and not dispro-
 ved, evinceth the force of his Argument to serve for nothing, but on-
 ly to prove that *sin is good*. 3. That a thing which is privative in one
 respect, is also positive in another. As that which is privative of life
 and sight, must needs be positive of Death, and Blindness. 4. That
 Mr. B. himself did grant as much, in confessing the *efficient cause of sin*,
 and saying, *there may be something of positive in a privation*. 5. That in
 saying *sin is privative*, he confesseth it is not a meer *privation*, because
 a privation is but the abstract of privative; and what is most positive
 in one case, may be privative in another. 6. That *sin is not conceiv-
 able*, unless as a concrete, (which hath something positive as well as
 privative) there being no kinde of difference betwixt Davids lying with
 Bathsheba, and his Adultery with Bathsheba, at the time of her being
 Uriahs wife. 7. That *bonum metaphysicum* hath quite another signifi-
 cation, then *bonum morale*, to which alone we oppose *sin*, or *malum mo-*

rale

rale, 8. That a *Libertine*, a *Ranter* or a *Carneadist* will be glad to introduce an opinion that *sin is good*, by calling it *bonum Metaphysicum*, and confounding that with *bonum morale*. 9. That the subject of *Metaphysics* is *ens quatenus ens*, *reale illud*, not *omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum*, and so (in one sense) it comprehendeth *Res & aliquid*. 10. That *bonum metaphysicum* doth not signifie good in English, as *Canis astronomicus* doth not signifie a *dog* in our english streets and apprehensions. 11. That Dr. *Twisse* was betrayed into one of his worst errors [that it is better to be tortured to all eternity, then not to have a real being] by not considering this very thing. 12. That a lye is *verum*, as much as *sin* is *bonum Metaphysicum*; because it hath a positive being, which proved the Argument to be impertinent at the best.

§. 3. Now Reader observe, what an *incomparable confusion* I have to deal with. There are but four things of twelve, on which his courage would serve him to try his teeth; which finding also to be *too hard*, he does as lepidly nibble at them, as the tame creature did at the *Thistles*, which made *Philemon* so full of laughter. For to the first he thus replies. *The designe of the argument is to fright Mr. P. out of his sad opinion concerning the positivity of sin, by bringing him to the grand Absurdity, of saying sinne is good* p. 70.

But I rejoyne. 1. That my answer was designed to fright Mr. *Hick*. from his opinion concerning *Gods being the Author of all things positive*, nay of all things † real too, (neither *Blasphemy*, nor *Buggery*, nor *hating God*, being excepted,) by bringing him to the grand Absurdities, of saying *God is the Author of the greatest wickednesse in the world*, and withal of saying, *the greatest wickednesse is good*. 2. He cannot bring me to saying that *sin is good*, but onely he can say he designed to bring me; which shews the folly of his designe too. For. (3.) as I said that *Bonum* amongst the *Heathen Metaphysicians*, did not signify good in our English acception of the word, any more then *malum* which is latine for an apple, can signifie evil in a Translation, (though *malum* is latine for evil too,) so I shall make it undeniable by appealing even to them who are partial to him, whether we can properly say in English, That it is good to hate God, or good for Mr. *Hickman* to

Of 12. things
answered but
4. replied to.

A rejoyndee
to the first.

† See his page
93, line. ult.

lie with a beast, because they are *allions* which have positive entities, and therefore are *Bona Metaphysica* in Mr. Hickmans *Dialect.* Nay in very broad English Mr. H. will tell us that they are *Good*, and from *God*, if he dares say twice, what he hath said too often, by saying, *once* (to wit, in his pages 95, 96.) 4. I told him *Aristotl.*'s phrase [of every entity being good] should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe, (and so returned to that *Heaven* from whence it came) then have been used by a *Christian* to prove it good to hate *God*. And accordingly Dr. Stearn doth somewhere deny that *metaphysical Axiom* to be of universal truth; for when it was urged that the *All* of hating *God* must be good, because *ens & bonum convertuntur*, he called it the *begging of the question*, as well he might. 5. Mr. H. saith the *Maxime* is, *ens & bonum convertuntur*, (not *quatenus positivum*) and so ascribes an equal goodness to the formal obliquity, (which is *ens*) as to the *All* itself to which the obliquity it annexed. 6. Twere easy to prove to Mr. H. that the greatest *Lye* is as true, as the truth itself because it is *Aristotle's Maxime*, and as generally received as that he urged, *ens* and *verum convertuntur*. 7. I had told him whilst it was time, that if by *good*, he means *bonum morale*, (as to be pertinent he must) he must also prove *parricide*, *incest*, *witchcraft*, or *Rebellion*, (a thing neither better nor worse then *witchcraft*;) either *meer privations of being*, or *moral good things*. For according to his dreaming, they must be nothing, or 2. no sins, or 3. moral virtues, or 4. sins and moral virtues too.

To the 2d.

S. 4. He replies to the third, by a full *Concession* p. 70. 71. But conceiving it a disgrace to stick at nothing, he wholly passeth by my answer, and onely quarrells my *Illustration*, which yet in one sense he doth approve too. That sense was *mine*; and as pertinent it was, as whatsoever similitude he hath stoln from *Mr. Morice*, what I said of *darkness*, he confesseth to be a truth, and with a [*But it is very vulgar.*] p. 71. As if the *Sun* were the worse, for being an every day spectacle. He thought his *axiom* the better

better, for being *vulgar*; and gave it this commendation, that it is *commonly received*, p. 70. when he impertinently saith that *darkness* cannot be felt (p. 72.) he should have excepted the *Egyptian*, and that of his own *apprehension*, which is now so palpable to every Reader. 2. I gave an instance in the *transgression of the Law*, which I said was sin, and yet a *thing positive*, as well as *privative*, to wit, *privative of virtue*, and *positive of vice*. To this Mr. H. was deeply silent; and so hath yielded my answer, without the offer of a reply, that what is *privative* in one case, is also *positive* in another.

§. 5. He replies to the 8^t. Mr. P. hath deserved his *humble thanks who bestows a positive entry on sin*. p. 72.] For this crude speech, I first referr him to the third and fourth part of my Rejoynder to the first part of his Reply, §. 3. I onely add for his Instruction (of which he proves his present want) that *Carneades* spake in a *morall sense*; when he took away the difference 'twixt *right* and *wrong*. And Mr. *Hickman* hath done the same. For if God is the *Author* of that *positive act*, [the *Diavol's* hating God] as Mr. *Hickman* affirmeth him to be, (p. 96.) then the *Diavol* doth *nothing* but what is *right*, as *all* must be which God himself is the *Author* of.

To the 3^d.

§. 6. His Reply to the ninth, hath been already spoken to, in the third and fourth part of §. 1. of this Chapter, I onely add, that if the *positive action* of *hating God* is so *intrinsically*, *essentially*, and *wholly evil*, as he hath liberally confessed (p. 94.) It will be hard for him to shew, where lyes its *goodness* in any sense; much less in *theirs*, who when they describe *metaphysicall goodness*, *per ordinem ad appetitum*, understand it *primarily with relation to the Divine will*; yet so they do saith Mr. *Hickman* p. 74. Could the man have contrived a greater unhappiness to himself? He confesseth a little after, that a *thing is not good*, because *desired*; therefore *sin* may be *desired*, and yet *not good*: when he add's, *it is desired, because it is good*, he should have said, because it *seems so*. And yet the *Diavol*

To the 4th.

desireth evil, because it is evil. Or if it *seemeth* good to him, it doth but *seem* so; *odisse Deum est fugibile secundum se totum*; and Mr. Hickman must say, how it *bonificates* a *subject in which it is*, who affirms it to be *good* and the *work of God*; not I, who confute him for so affirming.

His second Argument arithmetical;

SECT. 7. His second Argument (he tells us) was in his Letter to Mr. Barlee to this effect. *If sin be a positive entity, then it is either God, or from God.* p. 75.] mark, Reader; he doth not say, it was in these words, (he is it seems ashamed of them) But to this effect only. Whereas in Mr. Barlee the account is thus given *, [*If sin is a positive entity, it is God. For (as a learned friend of mine wrote to me not long since) what ever positive thing is not from God, is God.*] But how does [he mean, it is from God? He tells us plainly (p. 79.) It is from God, *as his creature*; for so he explains what he means by that other passage, *I here is no medium betwixt Deus and creatura.*; whereby he is so far from understanding, That the *action of hating*, God is the *creature of the sinful depraved creature*, (man, or Devil) that he often scoffs at it, as a *ridiculous conceit*. And expressly saith of *all such actions*, as have a *positive being*, (though never so *intrinsically and essentially evil*, as that of *lying with a beast*, of *hating*, *blaspheming*, and *cursing God*.) That they are FROM GOD, as well as the CREATURE. p. 82.] speaking of the *creature*, by whom such *villanies* are committed.

* See the place cited in my dissent. c. 3. p. 154. & examin'd till as far as p. 166.

How largely suffered,

§ 8. To shew him the state of his affairs by this so desperate adventure, I spent no less than twelve pages. And first I objected the *Devils pride*, or proud desire to be equal with God, (which Mr. Hickman supposeth to have been the first sin, p. 103.) which will be granted by all the world. (Mr. Hickman not excepted) to have a *positive being*. And yet it being the very *filthiness of the filthiest spirit*, All the world will also grant, that it was none of *God's creatures*. And if not so, then Mr. Hickman will have it *God*; which is as *horrible a blasphemy*, as the wit of Hell could have invented. It would be tedious

ous

ous to the Reader, should I here *Epitomize* what I opposed to this Argument. And therefore I must referr him unto the place before cited.

§. 9. *How now doth Mr. Hickman defend himself?* Doth he deny the *Divels* pride to have a *positive being*? no such matter. Doth he deny it to be *God*, by calling it one of *Gods creatures*? no, not a syllable comes from him touching the *one* or the *other*. Doth he take the *third course*, and deny it to be his *creature*, by asserting it to be *Him*? no, that is too *intolerable*, to be expected from the *evil one*. What then doth he *resolve* on, to help himself at this *pinch*? Doth he confess he was *hasty*, and *inconsiderate*, and so crave *pardon* from *God*, and *men*? No, it seems he is too *stomachfull*, and too *rigid* a *Presbyterian*. But what at last doth he say then, if he doth neither *accuse*, nor *excuse* himself? Truly he saith never a word, but *sleeps-over* the *Business*, hoping that *few* or *no Readers* would see that part of my *discourse*, or examine what *answer* he might attempt to make to it. For the better amusing of his *Readers*, he begins with a fault which he finds in *Cajetan*, (though he doth not say where,) then he *steals* a *witty passage* (word for word) from *Mr. Goodwin*, as far from the *purpose* as it was possible, (and though the *passage* is *not*, yet the *impertinence* is his own;) Next he skips to the *Trichotomie*, which I had told him he was to know, for the distinguishing of *God*, and *Gods works*, from the *Works of the Devil*, 1 Joh. 3. 8. To which his Reply is briefly this, [*If I must*, there is no remedy, (p. 76.) And yet, against this, he will give me his *Reasons*, and saith he will do it without fear; whether not without wit too, it now comes to be examin'd.

§. 10. His first Reason is, *Because he finds that those who had to do with the Manichees and heathen Philosophers, building their Argument upon this Basis, Omne ens est vel primum, vel à primo; and that malum is therefore not caused by God, because it is not ens, but non ens, as they commonly call that which is but a privation.* p. 76.] to which he adds five passages for example, p. 77, 78.

His remarkable Tergiversation, without the shadow of a reply.

His offers of Reason, why all things positive are either from God, or God himself, and primarily none from men or devils.

First

The infirmities
of the first,

First for his Ignorance of the Fathers, and his gross mistake of their meaning, and what Absurdities he incurs by such mistaking, I have abundantly shew'd in the former Chapter; where I was willing to consider it once for all, that I might not repeat one thing too often, whereby to delay, and distract the Reader. I shall onely here add, 1. that 'tis apparent by the confession of Mr. Hickman that if his Testimonies are valid, as to their literal importance, they serve to prove the Non-existence (that is, the nullity) of sin; which Mr. Hickman (with a bare forehead) hath not hitherto asserted, whatever he hath done by way of equivalence and consecution. And if they are figuratively spoken, when they say that sin is nothing (which is but *non-ens* in English) why not figuratively spoken, when they say, that sin is a privation? especially when there are testimonies out of the very same Writers, not onely for the reality, but positivity also of sin? 2. The little Greek he produceth, hath so very many faults in so very few lines, (not observed in his Errata) that I conceive he did he knew not what, with an implicit Faith in the skill of others, from whom he borrow'd at second hand; which I believe so much the rather, because I find his own Authorities do overthrow the very error for which he brings them. Witness the * words of Athanasius, which prove that sin hath no substance, in opposition to those Greeks, who contended that sin had a subsistence of it self; whereas to the having a positivity, there is nothing more required then that it be some kind of Accident. Witness also those other words, affirming no evil thing (positive or privative) to proceed from God, who being the τὸ εἶναι, gives occasion to the expression of τὰ ἐκ οὐκ εἶναι; which evil things may be called, as not derived from him, who is τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐκ οὐκ, & αὐτὸς. So when it is said by St. Austin, ex uno Deo esse omnia quæ sunt, he explains his meaning to be of all good things, and of none besides, because he presently adds, & tamen non esse peccatorum autorem Deum. And if, when Austin doth elsewhere say, Peccatum nihil est, he

* Εἰς ὁμοίαν.
ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ.
αὐτοῦ ἵδμεν
καὶ αὐτὸν ἀπο-
φύγετο —
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ
ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός,
ὁ καὶ καὶ αὐ-
τὸν ἵδμεν
καὶ αὐτὸν ἵδμεν
Alban. contra
Gentes. mibi
p. 6. c.

he means according to the *letter*, that *sin is nothing* in very deed, first 'tis a gross contradiction to what he saith in other places: and secondly, 'tis the worst of his many *Errours*. 3. The meaning of *Aquinas* I have * elsewhere shewed. And yet if I say (with Dr. Jackson) that *Aquinas* and his followers have sometimes spoken *unexcusably* concerning God, I shall but speak to the dishonour of *Popish Writers*, by whom the rigid *Presbyterians* have been unhappily corrupted in these affairs. Lastly where-as he saith, that *heathen Philosophers did see this*, (giving an instance in *Salustius*, and no one else,) a man that shall affirm the *eternity* of the world, may urge *Aristotle* for it, and say the *Heathens themselves discern'd this truth*. Thus I say a man may argue, who can find in his heart to argue no better then Mr. *Hickman*. But be it that a *heathen* is of the *Presbyterian* judgement, the *Christian Fathers* and *Schoolmen* are still of mine, unless when they speak in such a manner against me, as to speak as much against themselves too.

* Look back on ch. 5. §. 5. num. 7.

§. 11. His second Reason is, *because he knows no other way of defining what ens primum is, but this, that it is such a Being, which is not from any other being, and which is the cause of all the Beings that are* p. 78.

Of the second.

First I observe from these words, that the *Libertine* advanceth more and more to a clear discovery of *it self*. For if he thinks that *any sin* (as hating, cursing, blaspheming God) hath *any being* in the world, he professeth to believe that *God himself* is the *cause of it*. And the *cause* is the *Author* of any being. And so he is caught in the act of that very crime, which himself had confessed to be the worst of all blasphemies, and which is the Quintessence of all blasphemy, saith *Theophilus Churchman*, which is thought to signifie three men, of which number Master *Hickman* himself is one, in the rationall conjectures of all I meet with. If he thinks that *sin* hath *no being*, and by consequence that it is *nothing*, then his words are most impertinent, and prove him besides a meer *Carneadist*. Secondly,

By which he is proved (out of his mouth) to be the worst of Blasphemers.

P. 171.

condly, In saying God is the *cause* of all beings, meerly because he is the *first*, he seems to think there is but one way of *priority*, whereas a Freshman in Logick could have told him there are *five*. Is it not enough that God is the *first* of all Beings, and was from *eternity* without beginning, whereas all things else *began* to be, and so was *before* the being of sin (and of all things else) in four respects, but he must also be *before* it as the *cause* of its being? Thirdly, It may suffice to the defining of *ens primum*, to say it is that, which alone did never begin to be, or that, than which there is *nihil prius*, and which *præcedeth* all others, as much as *eternity* præcedeth *time*. Or if the word *cause* must needs be added, let it be said he is the *cause* of all good things that have a being, whether naturally and necessarily, or voluntarily acting. But not the cause of those acts or actions, which cannot but argue in the cause either wickedness and guilt, or imperfection.

Of the third.
Wherein he
makes God the
Fountain of
the Essence of
sin.

§. 13. His third Reason in effect is but the same with the second, as the second is the same with what he call'd his second Argument p. 77. And so I referr it for its answer both to the Section before going, and to what I have said in my whole fifth Chapter, especially to §. 5 and 6. Onely I add my observation, that whilst God is by him affirmed to be the fountain of all essences, (p. 79.) who yet ascribeth one essence unto sin, whilst he saith, the action of hating God is essentially evil (p. 94.) he affirms God to be the fountain of all the sins in the world, and that not only of the act, but of the very essence of sin it self. And because he seems to stumble most at the common axiom in Philosophy, which is found urged by Mr. Barlow, severall times upon one account, [to wit, that the cause of the cause, is the cause of the effect] I will first send him back to what I have said in Answer to it, chap. 5. §. 5. num. 2. Next I will set him down (at large) Aquinas his Answer unto the same. "[*effectus causa secundæ procedens ab eâ, secundum quod subditur causæ primæ, reducitur etiam in causam primam. Sed si procedat a causâ media, secundum*

Mr. Barlow in
his exercit.
2. de naturâ
mali, p. 45.72

Aquinas 1.2.
q. 79. Art. 1.
ad 3.

"cundum quod exit ordinem causæ primæ, non reducitur
 "in causam primam. Sicut si minister faciat aliquid contra
 "mandatum Domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum,
 "sicut in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium
 "committit contra præceptum Dei, non reducitur
 "in Deum, sicut in causam.

§. 12. His fourth pretended reason is most ridiculously pretended; He believes no medium, because (forsooth!) Mr. P. hath not been able to find any; for whereas I told him the works of the Devil are a medium, (he saith) I could not sure but think he would distinguish in blasphemy, lying, &c. betwixt the vital act and its deficiency &c. p. 79.] The folly of this being discovered throughout my whole fourth chapter, and in the beginning of this sixth, (and I may say throughout my fifth too) but most expressly in my third chapter §. 6. (which is too long to be here repeated) I shall onely here observe two things. 1, His affirming the act of Blasphemy to be from God, (as he doth expressly lin. 13, 14.) Next, his denying those things to be the works of the Devil, to which the Scripture hath given that Name. He denies it here partly, and partly pag. 96. what yet the Scripture asserteth plainly 1 Job. 3. 8. But more of this Reason in the following Section: For

§ 13. After five pages of impertinence, he argues thus. *If a thing be therefore sinful because it wants some perfection that it ought to have, and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have, then is sin privation; but a thing is therefore sinfull, &c. Ergo, pag. 84.]*

As this is also taken from Mr. Barlow (but no more acknowledged by the Taker, then all the rest,) so an Answer to it is given in my Reply to Mr. Barlow, in vindication of Dr. Field: who having proved that there are acts, to which no restitution can be due to make them perfect, (as the act of hating God) had such an answer from Master Barlow, as I shew'd to be invalid in five respects. And in each of them Mr. Hickman is equally concern'd. But yet

Q

Of the fourth: Wherein he ascribes unto God, what God ascribeth unto the Devil.
 1 Job. 3. 8.

His third Argument artificial.

* Look back on c. 3. §. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. & 7.

I add,

I add, 1. that this makes against those sins onely, which are onely *sins* because *forbidden*, not at all against those, which are onely *forbidden* for being *sins*. (of which I have spoken ch. 3. §. 6.) That something may be *evil* *not* *because* *it is* *evil*, is affirmed by Saint Basil, as he confesseth. And that the action of hating God is *intrinsically* *evil*, we have his word, p. 94. But 2. This onely proves that some sins are *privative*, not that sin is a *mere* *privation*. And what is *privative* of *one* thing, is also *positive* of *another*; (as hath been shewed §. 1. and 4.) 3. Doctor Field and others have often told him, of a *positive* *repugnance* to the *Law* of God. And when it was said by himself (pag. 79.) *he could derive the irregularity from corruption, and the Devils Temptation*, he did not say, it was *not* *positive*, unless nothing can be *so*, that is from *corruption* and the *Devil*. A man may thus make him confute himself, of the vitall acts, *speaking*, and *Blasphemy*, or *lying*, he saith the former is *from* *God*, the latter from the *Devil*; and yet the *Blasphemy* is as *positive* as *speaking* can be, because it is *speaking* to Gods dishonour: and so at once in *opposition*, and yet according to Mr. Hickman (who is often *Antipus* to himself) there are some things *positive*, which are neither *God*, nor *from* *God*, but from *corruption* and the *Devils* *temptation*.

§. 14. What he is willing to infer from the word *ἀνομιαν*, (p. 85.) which he law urged by Mr. Barlow in no less then * *three* *places*, I shall shew to be faulty in six respects. 1. He seems not to have *known* (what Mr. Barlow well knew, but *considered* *not*) that [*α*] in composition hath a threefold importance, and thence is called by three names, *ἐπινομία*, *ἀντινομία*, *ἐναντινομία*. And that the *Law* is *transgressed*, by him who *adds* to it, or goes *beyond* it. 2. By this way of arguing, he might endeavour to prove *God* to be *merely* *privative*, because he is said to be *ἄπειρος*, *Infinite*; that is, *without* any *bounds*, or

The positive
importance of
ἀνομιαν, not
considered by
Master Bar-
low, *Extr. 2.*
p. 39. 51.
65.

Qui ante-
pular dicit,
qui scortatio-
nem, qui fur-
tum dicit,
aus semper dicit, *materiale & formale.*

Affid. Lex. Theol. c. 8. p. 233.

terms of being. And *Dionysius* the *Arcopagite* delights to tell us what he is, by telling us what he is not. (as hath been shew'd chap. 5.) 3. What *St. John* hath expressed by *ἀνομία*, others commonly do express by *παράνομία*, and *παράνομος*, and *παράνομον*, each of which I now see in the same page of *Athanasius*, who also puts *φονεύων* as an instance of *ἀνομία*. (contra Gentes pag. 4.) 4. There is nothing commoner in the *N. T.* then for words compounded with [α] to have a positive signification in one respect, as well as a privative in another. As *Rom. 1. 30. 31.* we find *ἀπειθεῖς* to import *Rebellious*; *ἀσυνέτους*, *covenant-breakers*; *ἀσπόνδους*, *implacable*; *ἀνέλκυντος*, *cruel*; *ἄφρων* is *foolish*; but so as *foolish* signifies *unreasonable actions*; as *ἐχθρός* doth *malice and mischief* against *Christ*, *Luk. 6. 11.* and *ἀνόμοιοι*, those that were guilty of *brutish practices*. *Tit. 3. 3.* (v. D. H. in locum.) so *ἀπόστολος* in *Damasius* is positively *liberal*, and used as an *Epistle* of *God*. *ἀποβέβη*, positively *confident*; *ἀδύνατος*, a positive *servile*. The word *ἀδύνατος* *Rom. 1. 28.* does not onely denote a man, who goes *without a reward*, but that is positively *opposite* to every thing that is good, as *Doctor Ham.* observes upon the place (*Noteth.*) 5. *ἀνομία* in equivalence is the same with *ἀδικία*, which with the learnedest *Remonstrantis* *actus hominis*: (as hath been shew'd ch. 3. §. 25.) And so it is with *Hemmingius*, who saith the word [*ἀδικία*, *unrighteousness*,] which is used by *Saint John*, doth signifie (in concreto) *whatsoever thing is done in a contrariety to the Law*. And accordingly I observe in the most Judicious *Doctor Hammond*, that he takes the * *Transgressing of the Rule* to be a positive thing, a doing contrary to *Gods commandment*, from whence ariseth the obliquity of any act. 6. Nay *Mr. Hick*, implies as much, in the simplicity at least of his understanding, (which one *Mr. Bagshaw* was so ignorant, as to believe he had expressed by a simplicity of heart) whilst he confesseth that *pravitas, malitia, ἀμαρτία*, † *κακία*, import the same with *peccatum*. p. 54.

Ἀνάγινε δι-
στα ex a. ὁ-
ἰοῦ, &c.
ἐκ τῆς α, ut
obseruat. Alist
ex Fran. Ju-
sio.

Vocabulum
ἀδικία quod
hic videtur Jo-
hannes signi-
ficat quicquid
est contra le-
gem. *Ham.*
de viâ vitæ. p.
554.

* D.H. Ham.
in Fundamen.
c. 16. p. 183.

† See the po-
sitive instan-
ces of ἀδικία
Rom. 1. 29-30.
31.1

The like Importance of *peccatum*, proved by reason and experience.

Peccare significat *Adiunctionem* tantum non etiam *Omissionem*. *Alfred* ubi *Supra*.

* *Omnis* peccatum *DUO* connotat. Dr. Twisse. *Vin. Gra.* l. 2. part. 1. p. 155. *Martham* vero & *Marcus* monstrant, quod materia *Peccati* in *Sp. Sanctum* sit contemptus *Christi* & *Evangelii*. *Hemming.* ubi *supra*. p. 554.

His 4th. or last Argument

§. 15. And that *peccatum* doth import (concretively) both a positive *Act*, and an *obliquity* (or *inordination*) may be made undeniable from the origin of the word, as well as from the Authors by whom it is used, 1. *Pecca.* is a verb *active*, *peccare*, an *action*, (just as much as *malefacere*.) *Peccatum* clearly comes from the *passive voice* of that verb; even as much as *benefactum* from the *passive voice* of *benefacio*; *multa peccantur*, *legitur apud Cic.* 1. *Off.* And *peccare* is a *Transitive*, *Plaut.* *Bacch.* d. 8. 29. And *peccatum* is sometimes a *passive participle*, *Terent.* in *prol. Eunuch.* 27. And accordingly 'tis said by all kinde of writers, (as well by our *Enemies*, as our *Friends*;) that *sin* connoteth two things, whereof the one is *material*, the other *formal*. Not *Aquinas* onely, and all his followers, but Dr. *Twisse*, and all his; do affirm * *all sin* to import 2 things, *sin* of *Omission* not excepted. And *Hemmingius* saith that the matter of the *sin* against the *holy Ghost*, is a *contempt* of *Christ* and his *Gospel*; which he also saith is demonstrated both by *St. Matthew* and *St. Mark*. I hope Mr. H. will not say, that the *contempt* of the *Gospel* being *positive*, is very good and from *God*; which yet he must, or he must sing his *Recantation*. In a word, It can no more be proved that *sin* is a *privation* and nothing else, from the saying of *St. John*, that *sin* is *ἀνομία*, or the *Transgression* of the *Law* (1 *John* 3. 4.) then that *Christ* himself is not *positive*, from the tropical saying of *St. Paul*, that *Christ* was made *sin* (2. *Cor.* 5. 21.) or that *darkness* is as *positive* as *iron*, because the *Angels* were delivered to *chains* of *darkness* 2 *Pet.* 2. 4. And whether it is not indeed a *sin* (without any such figure, or *cataphorical* way of speaking) to *ravish Virgins*, and *lie with beasts*, to *hate God*, and to *love the Devil*, (which are confessedly as *positive*, as any *actions* that can be named) I appeal to the usage of the word *Sin*, in the common experience of all mankind.

§. 16. His last argument (as he calls it) is very rare. *Original sin* is not *positive*, ergo *sin* as *sin* is not *positive*; p. 85.] First for the manifold Absurdities (as well as guilt into which

which he falls by his reduplication [sin as sin] I briefly refer to every part of my second chapter, especially §. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 &c. Next for what he saith of *Original sin*, I refer to all I have produced from the *Antient Fathers*, and learned *modern Divines*, (who held it to be a *positive quality*) in the third and fourth *Sessions of the fifth Chapter* of this Book, and also in the 3. Ch §. 23. But (thirdly) as I never yet said, so neither am I concerned to say, that all sins are *positive*, It is enough that some are, and those the *worst* to be imagined. Nay Mr. H. must be concluded a strange kinde of Blasphemer, in saying all things positive are either Gods *Creatures*, or God himself, although there were but *one sin* that had a *positive being*, such as was the Angels pride, and the Devils hatred of God Almighty or the lusts of the Devil Joh. 8. 44. Yet now to speak more of *Original sin*, as that doth signifie the *proneiness of the will to evil*, after the image of *Adams will*, (from after the time of his Depravation) it must needs be also *positive*, to wit, a *conversion to the creature*. And why might not *Adams* acquire (by his sin) the image of *Satan* unto himself and offspring too, as well as † sin-away the Image of God? But this is not that, upon which I am obliged to lay a stress. Nor shall this be the subject of new disputes, whether a man doth beget a man, as much as a *Horse begets a Horse*. It may be argued for ever on either side; but I believe, with greatest force, for that part of the question to which St. *Austin* was most inclined, and all that is said by Mr. H. doth but help to disprove *Original sin*, for which *Pelagians* and *Socinians* may chance to thank him. I know St. *Paul* held that the whole of man doth consist of three things; *Body, Soul and Spirit*; concerning which Dr. *Hammond* hath a most profitable Discourse, with a Reference to which I will shut up this Section. (see his Annotation upon 1 *Thess.* 5. 23.)

§ 17. Having seen his Reasons, let us see what he saith to some few of mine; or rather how guiltily he sneaks from the whole duty of a respondent p. 90. For though he knew what

I had

Bellè dicunt
Scholastici in
omni Peccato
considerari
terminum à
quo, & ad
quem. Omne
namque pec-
catum est de-
fectio à Cre-
atore ad Cre-
aturam. *Alfred*
lex. Theol. c.
8. p. 232.
† p. 88.

A short ac-
count of
those shifts,
which pre-
tend to be
Answers to
some few Ar-
guments.

† *ἀπολογ.* ch.
3. p. 156.
Mic. 6. 16.
Gal. 5. 19.
Col. 1. 21.
Eph. 5. 11.
Heb. 9. 14.
1 John 3. 8.
Rev. 9. 20.
*Of sins being
called the
works of the
Devil.*

I had said † to wit, that Sins in Scripture are called *works*, (*works of Darknesse, works of the flesh, works of mens hands, and works of the Devil,*) as it were on purpose to shew that they are *positive things*; yet he passeth by that, (as if the word *works* had been of no consideration) and onely nibbles at my saying, *That that was positive that Christ came to destroy*, concealing also from his Reader, what I had cited from St. John, of Christs being manifested in the flesh, that he might destroy the works of the Devil, 1 John 3. 8. nor taking notice of what I said about *vacuum vacui* implying *locatum*, as the privation of a privation implyeth *positum* by all confessions. I shewed it implies a contradiction, to say an *habit* is a *privation*, because it is called by a *Catachresis*, the *privation* of a *privation*, when after a losse it is recovered; from hence I argued, that if the *works of the Devil* (which are also called the Lusts of the Devil Joh. 8. 44.) had been meere *privations*, the *destruction* of them could have been none. But Mr. H's very *weaknesse* doth serve him here instead of *strength*, for not considering that *Death* is said to be capable of *destruction* (1 Cor. 15. 16.) by the same *catachrestical* way of speaking, whereby it is said in other places to have a body, and a *string*, (and so I might prove it, at least to him, to have a *positive entity*) he urgeth his ignorance for a proof, that of a meere *privation* there may be properly a *privation*. How much better might I prove that *death* it self hath a *positivity*, from Rev. 21. 8. where to be *burning in a lake of fire and Brimstone* is expressed by the name of the second death. But the *work* of the Devil is *keyon* properly so called, and therefore *positive*. The words of St. John are even *literally true*, ὁ ποιῶν ἀμαρτανίας ἀπομύκει ποῦν 1 Joh. 3. 4. and *lusts* are *qualities*, John 8. 44.

§. 18. To the Argument which I urged from *sins habitual*, or *habits of sin*, (such as *Drunkennesse* in a man who is seldom *sober*;) it seemes he knew so exactly that no good answer was to be given, as to resolve to supply it with *meer scurrility*, and *impertinence* p. 91. He is faine to say that I intended

His Concessions and contradictions about the habit of Drunkennesse

tended a *Sorites*, or rather *seemed* to intend it, that he might seem to have something at which to nibble. But no such thing as a *Sorites* was any more in my thoughts, then in my mention. And therefore this is so vile a practice, as may be used by any *Archeist*, who hath a minde to calumniate any passage of any writer. It is an easy thing to say, that such an Author makes a face as if he intended this, or that, which we have reason to believe he could not possibly intend. But what saith the *Rhapsodist* to my Argument, * that vices are habits as well as virtues, and therefore positive Qualities, as well as Virtues? He doth not deny that some sorts of vices indeed are Habits, for he cannot think, that an *all* of Drunkenness is a vice, and that an habit of Drunkenness is none at all, nor can he think it impossible to be *habitually drunk*, and that an habit is a thing positive, he is so far from denying, that he affirmes it, he professeth not to doubt of it (p. 92.) to that now there is no question, whether Drunkenness, when an habit, is positive or not. But whether or no it is a sin, or whether it is not from God, in Mr. Hickman's judgement: one of the two (we are assured by himself) is his opinion, he having taught expressly, that all things positive are either from God, or God himself. Nay he plainly enough affirms the habit of drunkenness; as he professeth not to doubt the positivity of the habit. And he does both within the compass of 7. or 8. lines. But he denies that this habit is a fit instance of habits in *postpradicamentis*, yet that is a Quality, and so is this; as I will make him to confesse by putting the case in another colour. for he professeth it is an action for the Devil to hate God. And that an action implieth a quality, he will be his'd by the youngsters, if he denies; (this being one of the 4. things, which are required to every action.) And as the habit of hating God is as much a sin as the habit of drunkenness can be, so it serves as fitly to evince the thing that I am proving. If he means vice by vitiosity, (as sin by sinfulness) (p. 53.) then he doubts whether that is positive which he saith he doubts not to be an habit; and being an habit, he as li-

* Autocracy.
ch. 3 p. 151.

P. 94.

tle.

the doubts of its *positivity*. If he means that *vitiosity* is the *abstract* of vice, he contradicts what he had said, p. 53: unless he thinks he may distinguish betwixt the *vice* and the *sin* of Drunkenness. If he makes a separation of the *habis* of drunkenness (which he will have to be *from* God, as being *positively* something) from the *obliquity* of the *habis*, which he expresseth by *vitiosity*, then he incurs the several dangers, which my whole *second Chapter* doth warn him of. So great and many are the distresses into which this *Medler* betrays himself.

His Concessions and contradictions about the positive filth of sin

§. 19. I had said (in my *Autograph*, p. 163.) 1. *There must be something positive to make a man positively foul*, 2. *Which foulness suffers a privation, when the man is cleansed of his filth.* The truth of the first Mr. H. confesseth in words at length, p. 93. and the truth of the second he doth not question; for he doth not speak a word to it. What then doth he do for an answer to me? Why, it goes for an answer, to call me *Reitor*; and for a jest, to adde *Ridiculous*. The text which I cited from *Rev.* 22. 11. (*let him that will be filthy be filthy still*) he found misprinted, *Rev.* 22. 11. on which he fastens, as an occasion to shew his deep knowledge, that there are not so many Chapters in that Epistle. (Nor did the Printers Apprentice suppose there were.) He saith I did not offer at any other proof, when yet he knows I also added the words of God to the people Israel, *I have purged thee, and thou wast not purged, therefore shalt thou not be purged from thy filthiness any more.* p. 262. from whence I made this observation, that (as the *filth* of sin is many times so ingrained, that after Gods own cleansing, the habitual sinner remains *unclean* so) the *filth* which is *positive* is mans own *Creation*, whereas the *cleansing* which is *privative* is Gods own work. To this Mr. H. doth not answer one syllable, but falls to his old trade of *begging*, (what he was sure to be *denied*) the thing in Question. And yet he is somewhat more bashful then at his ordinary times. Only saying what may be said, not what he dares affirm for truth [we may make the spiritual filth to consist in the want of

Ezek. 23. 13.

that

that *Nitor Gratia*, which either was, or should be in the soul. p.93.] But 1. he contradicts what he had said a little before, unless he will deny that they are *positively* foul, who are not purged, though God doth purge them, because they are grown so inveterately and *habitually* foul, that as soon may the *Ethiopo* change his skin, or the *Leopard* his spots, as they do good, who are accustomed to do evil. 2. He makes God (if not the only, yet) by far the *chiefest* cause of the greatest filthiness to be named in men or devils, whilst he makes it to consist in a *meer want* of grace, which 'tis impossible for us to want, but as God doth withhold or withdraw it from us. 3. He makes not any the least difference, betwixt *not-blessing* (which is one kind of filthiness) and *curfing* God (which is another.) betwixt Ammon's *not loving*, and his *ravishing* and his *hating* his sister *Tamar*. 4. To hate God, is an *Aktion*, by his acknowledgement; which however it be attended with, yet it is also somewhat more, then a *want* of Grace. which although there are men who do wholly want, yet the *Devils* are more filthy, in whom the hatred of God is more *habitual*. And even of those very men, in whom is wanting a *Nitor gratia*, their filthiness is the greatest, who draw iniquity with cords, and sin as with a carrope. 5. Whilst he speaks [of a want of Grace, which either was, or should have been in the soul,] he implicitly makes God the sole delinquent, in the latter part of his *disjunctive*; as if he thought there were a case, wherein God did not doe, what he should have done; unless there can be grace, and not of God. But 6. It is not so much the want, or absence, as the *refisting* of grace when it is present, by which the filthiness of a sinner becomes exceedingly more filthy. The Jews were *† filthier* then the *Ninevites*, not because they more wanted, but more abused the grace of God; because they sinned against greater light, and against more means of grace, to abstain from sinning. The ** unprofitable servant* was to be cast into outer darkness, not for having no talent, but for wrapping it in a napkin. All which M. H. is now to take into consideration.

Jer. 13. 23

* Ps. 5. 18

† Am. 11. 45

* Mat. 25. 30

*His concession,
& tergiversa-
tion concerning
blasphemy, and
Atheism, &c.*

§. 20. To what I argued from *allmal sins*, such as *lying, blaspheming*, and positive believing there is no God, &c. he returns just nothing, besides his back, *Hosibus hic tergo, non sorti pectore notus*. And yet as if he were proud of such an unmanlike tergiversation, he steals a passage from M. Morice, that he may glory in his shame with the better Grace. And though he had found me often urging that diabolical sin of hating God, yet he talks of supposing my Instance to be made in the very worst, and most intrinsically evil of all actions, even that of hating God. p. 93. hoping his Readers would believe, he had given my *Argument* some advantage. But how many *Blasphemies, contradictions*, and other *absurdities* of remarque, this piteous creature hath committed in what he saith of this subject, I have sufficiently discovered in my printed letter to Dr. Heylin, (p. 265. 266. to p. 271.) To which I have added diverse things in severall parts of my present enterprise which as I must not repeat, (without a reason to excuse me for so unnecessary a labour,) so it is every whit as *needless*, as it is *easy* to add more. I have enough in his *concession*, that to hate God is an action, and such an action as is essentially and intrinsically evil, evil *ex genere & objecto*, and antecedently to the Law: I say, in this I have enough, whereby to prove him most clearly his own Refuter. And yet I add, that if the undue referring of hatred to God be not positive, but privative, (as he unskilfully saith p. 95.) then hatred, being positive, doth cease to be positive by being fastened upon God, (as Mr. Hickman must needs infer, unless he denies the hatred of God to be a sin,) and yet the fastening it on God is as positive, as the fastening it on the Devil.

*The unmanlike
forgery of
an Argument
in his Adversary's
name.*

§. 21. After this, having *itself* to steal a discourse from Mr. Barlow, concerning several grounds of Difference betwixt the sins of omission and commission; And knowing not how to bring it in (either by head or by shoulders) by way of answer to any argument which he had seen in my writings; thought fit to forge such a syllogism, as might be suitable

suitable to his purpose, and (setting a bold face upon it) to tell the Reader that it was mine. (pag. 97.) I stood amaz'd, for some time, at his resolution; especially when I saw him making as good a profession of such impiety. For although he had directly laid his child at my doore, and pronounced me the father without Reserve, yet few lines after he confesseth in effect that it is his own. For he confesseth he does but suppose, that if my words were reduced to mood and figure, they would appear in such a Form as he hath now represented, (p. 97.) But least his Readers should see my words concerning sins of omission and commission, by being directed to the page where I had spoken of that subject, he straight creates an ignis fatuus, whereby to lead them out of their way. For he saith my words are p. 167. whereas in all that page there are not onely no such words, but no occasion or hint for so leud a Fiction. The onely place (for ought I know) wherein I used any such terms, as sins of omission and commission, (but without any likeness to what he forgeth) was pag. 146. And there my words were precisely these. If sins of omission (as not praying and not giving alms, &c.) had but a deficient cause, yet sins of commission (as cursing and Sacrilege, &c.) have a cause efficient with a witness. Its true I said in another place, (p. 163.) that whilst M. Hickman denies sin to be something positive, he seems to make no difference betwixt a simple negative, and a privative properly so called. And again, confounds a privation properly so call'd, with a thing call'd privative secundum quid. He makes no difference betwixt not blessing, and cursing God. &c, where first I say not, he makes no difference, but that he seems to make none; meaning mine, as to the point of its positivity. And as to the force of my Accusation, he hath not uttered one word in his own defence. Nay he hath proved his gross mistake of a simple negative, for a privative properly so called. And so he proves I had used him with too much candor.

S. 22. Of all the Texts which I had brought, for the
His stupendi-
 unsuperincence, and supposal of Grace in Hell; or some privation besides All;

proving of sins being something *positive*, (*αὐτοματὴν*, p. 163.) He wilfully passeth by the rest, and shews his impertinence upon *one*, in which the force of my Argument did least consist, unless as it relates to the *next text after*, of which M. Hickman would take no notice. My Argument was, that as we read of great and little sins in comparison, so we read (in proportion) of greater and lesser damnation, *Mat. 23. 14. Luk. 12. 48.* Now 'tis so evident in it self, and so acknowledged a thing amongst the men of all parties, that all the Damned souls in hell are wholly destitute of Grace, and that of those who have a total privation of it, some shall have fewer, and some more stripes, some a lesser, and some a greater damnation; that I thought Mr. Hickman could not choose but understand me; but being convinced of the truth, which yet he resolved to abjure, sought to hide his conviction by this incomparable Impertinence; [That he would answer if he could guess where the vein of proof did lye; and if he may guess, it lyes in this, that there can be no degrees in a privation. p. 99.] In which words, 'tis hard to say, how many wayes he is unhappy. 1. He cannot guess wherein the force of the proof doth lye, and yet he will answer for all his ignorance. But 2. he will not answer neither, unless he may have leave to forge the thing, to which he conceives he can give an answer; if he may make a man of clouts, he will adventure (on that condition) to strike at it, when he hath done. 3. He either thinks there are degrees even of total privations, of which some are privations of no more than all grace, but others of all and some too; or else 4. of those that are damned in hell, he thinks that some have more grace, some less, or some none at all, some less than none at all. Because some have a greater, some a lesser damnation. For my Inference is this; That of those that are wholly deprived of grace, some are greater sinners than others, and more tormented: Whole sin by consequence must be something, besides a whole privation of grace. It was indeed for want of Grace, or by resisting Grace given

ven, that Ammon lusted after first, and secondly loathed his sister Tamar; But besides that want or privation of Grace, there were some positive effects which were damning sins. 1. He lusted after, 2. He dissembled with, 3. He violently defiled, 4. He hated his injured sister. It is not through a want of Grace, but abundance of wilfulnesse, that some do † resist the holy Ghost, and depart from grace given. And sure besides the privation of Grace, there is that in some sinners by which they are ἐπινοηταὶ κακῶν, inventors of evil things. In a word, there is some thing positive (above the total privation of Grace) by which it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgement for one reprobate, then another. So Mr. H. aymes purposely beside the mark, unless he thinks there is Grace in hell.

Sect. 23. I having argued that sin is said to work in the Sinner all manner of concupiscence, (Rom. 7. 8.) & perfectius est agere, quam esse; Mr. H. saith, that in such speeches sin signifies not abstractly and formally, but it signifies our nature and its faculties, as under corruption, &c. p. 100] Here is work for a volume, if I could think it not below me to pursue Mr. H. in all his follies. First I note his Confession, that sin doth signifie something positive, concretively and materially, and that in Scripture. Next his self-contradiction, in that he had said (p. 54.) sin is so perfectly an abstract, that if we conceive not of it as an abstract, we cannot conceive of it as sin. 3. His vertual denial, that sin and sinfulness are synonymous, (which yet he affirmed p. 53.) unless he thinks our very nature may be said to be sinfulness it self, or that our nature and our faculties are meer privations, which yet he cannot say soberly, because he absolutely denies, that sin doth signifie abstractly. 4. Dr Hammond (who knew best the true importance of the Text) thought fit to paraphrase it to us, by customary sins, not by nature and faculties, as Mr. Hickman. 5. By this he justifies Dr. Jackson and Flaccius Illyricus, whom before at (adventure) he did so liberally condemn. 6. In saying that the faculties by reason of privations, do lust against the working of the spirit,

ibid

2 Sam. 13. 14.

Act. 7. 51.

Rom. 1. 30.
Math. 10. 15.
Luk. 10. 14,
& 24.

Of sins working Concupiscence.
Mr. Hickmans Answer absurd in 8. respects.

(ibid) he implies that lusting to be a *sin* (without a *figure*) and yet implies it (as much) to be something *positive*. 7. If he quarrels with me and others, for expressing the hatred of God by *sin*, which is *positive*, but not good; how hath he railed in effect at the blessed Apostle, for expressing that by *sin*, which he confesseth to be good, as well as *positive*, and therefore good because *positive*? 8. Let *sin* be taken for *nature* and its *faculties*, (as he desires) yet *concupiscence* is not, which *sin* is said to bring forth. And that *concupiscence* as it is *positive*, so our *self-contradiction* will hardly deny it to be a *sin*.

Of the efficient cause of sin. Mr. H.'s conviction, & confession in despite of his whole Enterprise

SECT. 24. To prove the efficient cause of *sin*, I argued thus in the first place. If man is the cause of *sin*, and not *efficient*, he is the material, *formal*, or *final* cause; if the *deficient* is none of these, (as none will say it is) it is no cause at all. If *sin* hath no cause, it hath no real being, much less can it be the cause of punishment: and so God is inferred to punish men without cause, ἀντομαί, p. 145.] Now comes the Answer of Mr. H. as much for my interest as I could wish. [Rather then we will seem to be too much frightened, we will say, that man is the material or subjective cause of the Action: such a material or subjective cause, as evil can have. p. 102.

To which I reply, 1. That Mr. H. did either intend to speak to the purpose, or else (for fear of that) he speaks industriously beside it.) if the first, he fully grants that *sin* is an action, and so a *positive being*, if the second, he is convinced of sinning against his own Light; and effectually confesseth he cannot answer: when the Question is of the cause of *sin*, why does he answer touching the cause of the Action, if he does not believe it to be a *sin*? and if he believes it to be a *sin*, why undertook he in his Titlepage to prove that *sin* is a mere privation? Here I leave him to be hift by the Colledge-boyes, for having written, as if he had written, on purpose to make himself the object of scorn and laughter. Nor is it fit it should go better with such as write against God, as the cause of all sins, because

because of all *actions, acts, and habits*. 2. That here by *action* he means *sin*, one would believe by what he saith in his second *clause*, as an explication of his first,— *cause of the Action, such a material cause as evil can have*, if he means, it can have none, why did he yield a *material cause*? if he means it can have *any material cause, ex quâ* or *in quâ*, then he confesseth it hath a *cause*, which is not merely *deficient*, if *ex quâ*, it is a *concrete*; if *in quâ*, an *accident*, if either, *positive*. It hath besides *materialism circa quam*, and so a threefold subject, *constituent, recipient, occupans subiectum*. As for his confession (which next ensues) of the *efficient cause of sin*, which must needs be meant by the *evil of the action*) and how again he falls into the *youngsters hands*, I have long since shew'd, Chap. 3. Sect. 28. num. 7. so ill he prospers with *stollen goods* out of *Robert Baronius*, which he would certainly have cited *Baronius* for, had he so well understood it, as I hope he now doth. For how he builds up my cause upon the Ruins of his own, by what he saith of the first sin, *a proud desire to be equal with God* (p. 103.) I have largely shewed ch. 3. Sect. 28. Num. 1.

25. To my 2. Argument, that *where there is no efficient, there is no effect, that is, there is nothing*; and so (according to mine Antagonist) *men are either not damned, or damned for nothing* (AUTONOT p. 145.) He is so far from the courage to frame an answer, that he dares not be so *boastful* as to repeat my words fairly; but tells his Readers of my *inference*, without a syllable of *my premises* from whence my inference was drawn; for fear his Readers should discern, how *unconscious* he is of his *disability*, and how resolutely bent on *Tergiversation*, which he had nothing to keep from being *seen*, but an *easy boast*, so that still I am to ask, 1. How that is an *effect*, which hath no *efficient*; and 2. How that can be *something*, which is effected by *nothing*; and 3. How *nothing* can be the *cause* of a mans *damnation*. To these 3. things he should have
answe

Of sins being nothing, if no effect. Mr. Hickmans vain attempt to prove knavery to be nothing.

answered, had he been able : but *nemo tenetur ad impossibile*, and so he thinks he hath a privilege to be *impertinent* what is meant by *nihil*, applied to *sin* (in one case) and to *substance* it self (in another) I have abundantly inform'd him throughout my *fifth Chapter*, especially §. 1. 3. and § 5. num. 6. &c. But since he shews himself a *seeker*, he shall not fail to find my meaning. My meaning is, that (p. 104.) God will *punish* impenitent sinners with *damnation*, both for *not having* in their faculties, Habits, and Actions, what *should* be in them ; And also for *having* that, which *should not* be in them. He will not therefore *damn infants*, for their merely *not-having* original *righteousness* in the root ; (for he *accepteth* according to what a man * hath, not according to what he hath not,) but he will *damn* those *adults*, who *work unrighteousness*, and *continue* such working unto the end. To this I add 2. things.

1. That no *willfull sinner*, who is liable to *wrath* can so *omit* that which is *good*, as not to *commit* that which is *evil*.
2. That God will *punish* such sinners, not onely for *having* something in their actions and habits which they *should not have*, but for *having* such *habits*, and for *exercising* such *actions* ; or for *putting* those things in *being*, which God would *not have*, and *forbids to be*.

3. There is a *positive abnegation* of God, *Tit. 1. 16* and so *Mr. Hickman* doth *deny* him. So did they also, who *forsook* God, and *followed Baalim. 1 King. 18. 18.* And therefore that *passage*, which *Mr. Hickman* took from *Dr. Robert Baran*, without so much as saying, *by your leave Sir*, (as an Anonymous writer is known to say) cannot stand him in any *stead*. For a man cannot *not pay* the money which he *owes*, without *detaining* or *keeping back* the money which he *should pay*. And however *non payment* is a *negative* thing, (not a *privative*, as *Mr. Hickman* heedlessly supposeth) yet the *knavery* and *deceitfulness*, which is the *cause* of *non-payment* will be granted by all to be something *positive*. And so *Mr. Hickman* saith very well, *I could well enough bear his being punished, for not paying me my arrears*, (and bear

* 2 Cor. 8. 12.

bear it I will when that day comes) and for *usurping a Possession*, to which he hath not a better right, than *Ahab* had to *Naboth's vineyard*; as I shall usefully demonstrate, when I come to that subject. Let *non-payment* be what it will, yet *usurpation*, and *violence*, *obduration*, and *obstinacy*, *resolving to be rich*, and *hastening to it by any means*, are *positive entities* with a witness. And now we see how his *principles* are run out into his *practice*. For whilst he pleads against *amendment* and *restitution*, by saying that *non-payment* is no *positive entity*, and that I know not how to place it in any *predicament of beings*, doth he not wipe his mouth (with the lew'd woman in the *Proverbs*) and confidently say, *he hath done no wickedness*? Let the shop-keepers beware how they lend to such a *Logician*, lest he tell them, *non-payment* is no *positive entity*, nor in any *predicament of beings*, and therefore *not to repay*, is a thing of *nothing*. But then they may serve him in such a manner, as *Zeno* serv'd his *saucy man*, (whose *like opinion* debauch'd his *practice*) even keep him in *Bocardo*, (or some such prison) and tell him that *non-releasement* is no *positive entity*, nor doth he know how to place it in any *predicament of beings*. So much for his *impertinence* pag. 104. by which he hath made it very *pertinent* for me, even to speak out of order concerning *that*, to which I have design'd a peculiar place.

* Χρηματισμός
ἀπομαρτυρία. ὅτι
ὁ ἀπομαρτυρῶν
ἀποστρέφει τὴν ἑξέ-
σιν,

Prov. 30. 29;

* Satis perspi-
cūe intelli-
gent, nequa-
quam Stoicas
opiniones in
Ecclesiam in-
vehendas esse;
— Zenonis
servus dice-
bat se injuste


plecti, quia satis cautus esset peccare, Melanchthon. in loc. com. pag. 54.

§. 26. I had said that *sin* is the *cause* of *punishment*, and therefore *positive*, because *the cause cannot have a lesser being than the effect*.] In stead of this, Mr. *Hickman* obtrudes these words upon me. *Sin is a punishment*, but *punishment is a positive entity*, ergo, p. 105.] Had he spoken my words, he would probably have cited my *pages* also. A thing, which he seldom thinks *safe* for him to do. And yet he saith of the *punishment* of *sense*, ('tis well he speaks of it at all, although he gives no reason for it)

The cause of
punishment.
Mr. H. denial
of any positive
damnation, un-
less he thinks
it no punish-
ment to be
damn'd.

it) that it is not positive, if we consider that in which the evil of that punishment formally consisteth] It seems the man is of opinion; that because he takes sin to be a meer non-entity, the punishment of it can be nothing, but a privation of life, added to the loss of the joys of heaven; and what is said of those torments which are inflicted upon the Reprobates, (made to be firebrands of hell) he conceiveth (with some of the Heathen, Diodorus Siculus, and his peers,) to be but [Hypothesein πανταπεινω] a fabulous *Mormo*, or *Bugg*, whereby to fright such silly babes, as we *Prelatists* and *Arminians* are thought to be, for being so simple as to suffer the loss of all in this world, rather then hazzard a greater suffering of somewhat more then a loss in the world to come. This (I say) is his opinion, for ought I can guess at his opinion, by his expressions if he did steadfastly believe, there is an infinite pain in Hell, besides the totall privation of bliss and glory; why would he say it is not positive? if he thought the very evil of that unspeakable punishment doth not consist in that infinite pain; why did he not tell us what it is, wherein he supposeth it doth consist? If (besides the meer absence or want of pleasure) the pains of hell are not positive, and the worst evil of punishment to be imagined; I will say to Mr. Hickman (as Bishop Bramhall to Mr. Hobbs,) *Redd ut mihi mimam Diogenes*. And had I not * reason to withstand Dr. Twisse, in his withstanding our Blessed Saviour, by asserting it to be better, to be eternally damned, then reduced to nothing? Yet Mr. Hickman is very angry with my resisting that Doctor, in whose behalf he raises at me, but nothing else. p. 106. At least he makes as if he were angry, that so he may take that occasion to slip the neck of his Credit out of the very same collar, in which he hath sense enough to see that his cause is strangled.

See
D. SANDER-
SON'S 4. Res-
sons for his
rejecting the
way of Doct.
Twisse, in Do.
for Ham-
mond's *Χειρ*
αγία. p.
22, 13.



An Appendix.

§. 1. **H**AVING done with the main subject, upon which Mr. *Hickman* should have spent his *whole* Book, but upon which he was carefull to speak the *least*, (as if he were conscious to himself of speaking *sinfully* of *sin*, whilst he saw he was to speak, as either a *Libertine* on the one side, or a *Carneadist* on the other,) I must now, in a large Appendix, review his Book from the Beginning, and shew him the *wickedness* or the *folly* in many particulars of the whole, of which he hath not been yet admonish'd. And I must do it so much the rather, that he may not say I have *only stuck upon his sick and sore parts*, of which he worthily * complains in the Tail of the *Body of his Discourse*.

* p. 108.

§. 2. I begin with his *Epistle to the Lecturers of Brackley*; wherein having premised by a significant implication, That he, and such as he is, are some of the *worthiest men alive*, pag. 1. and yet implicitly too confessing, *They are not worthy to live*, p. 2. (I having proved out of their writings, that they are guilty of such a *whole*, the *half* of which (saith Mr. *Hickman*) makes them worthy of death,) he proceeds from his *self-flattery*, and from his *self-condemnation*, to do me the honour of being *slander'd* in the same breath with Doctor *Hammond*, who must not look for better usage than *God himself*, from such an Advocate and Patron of all *impiety*, as teacheth the *action* of *hating Good*, to be *God's own creature*, or *God himself*.

Mr. H. his flattery and condemnation of himself.

§. 3. To begin (in his order) with his calumniating my self, he first tells his Brethren, that *what I charg'd his*

His wilful falsehood.

Masters with were the meer *Chimera's* of my brain. But how much to the shame both of him, and them too; I have already made apparent in the beginning of my Book. By which I leave it to be judged (and even by them of his own Sect) whether it is not as willful and as malicious, as it was an unoccasioned and groundless slander. If he examin'd my citations, I have proved to his own, and his Readers eyes, that he is guilty of a studied and a deliberate wickedness. But if he examin'd them not at all, then it appears that he was resolute to write as bitterly as he was able, without resolving to consider whether his writing would be found to be right, or wrong.

His self-contradiction, and confession of having written against his conscience,

§. 4. Nor doth he content himself with this, but adds a cast of his virulence (though not more impious, yet) much more obvious to the discovery of the Reader; to wit, That *God's being the Author of sin does necessarily follow on an opinion which I maintain*, p. 3. But does he offer at any proof, or at any thing else to supply it's place? no, nor so much as tells his Brethren, what opinion he means of my maintaining. Nay he afterwards confesseth *He thinks it no way consistent with the ingenuity of a Scholar, or of a man, to charge me with Blasphemy: nay that he cannot, without perfect affront to his conscience, return me Blasphemer for Blasphemer.* (Book p. 4.) If this is reconcileable with what he saith of me in his *Epistle*, Then whatever I have said against Calvin and the rest, must be affirmed by this *Rhapsodist* to be no accusing them of Blasphemy. But who is a Blasphemer, if he is not, who maintaineth an opinion from which the worst of all Blasphemies (Reader, they are his own words) doth unavoidably follow? we see the greatest of all memories is exceedingly too little for a man of his Trade. For not remembering in his *Epistle*, what he had written in his Book, he hath rail'd it out against me, to no better purpose, then to his own self-condemnation. For if in his Book p. 4. he had any truth in him, or ingenuity, he must needs confess he had none at all whilst he was writing to the *Bracklesians*,

and

and boldly committing that very *crime* which he had called a perfect *affront* to his conscience, and inconsistent with the ingenuity both of a Scholar and of a man. It now appears (to do him right) that all his Rhapsodie was not stoln; for his *self-contradictions* are all his own.

§. 5. His next irreverence is the more, for being shewed to the most learned and truly Reverend Dr. Hammond, from whom he pretendeth a Citation, which hath no truth in it, but is injurious in 4 Respects, for the better elucidating of which, I shall first transcribe Mr. Hickmans words. [*The privatenesse of moral evil is not a monster hatched under the wings of a few Disciplinarian Zealots; nor a perfect phantasy, a mere Scholastical Notion, as Dr. Hammond is pleased to call it, Fundam. p. 178.*] First it is to be observed, that all these words (from monster, to notion) are printed in the same letter, which doth discriminate Citations from Mr. Hickmans own text; so as no one Reader who looks no further, and is not *fore-armed* with that distrust, with which the writings of such a Gamester are of necessity to be read, can escape the error of apprehending that all that passage is Dr. Hammonds, and withall to be met with, in the page there cited; whereas in all his publick works, in which I hope I am as perfect as any man of my memory (which I confesse is none of the greatest) is like to be, there is not any such word, as *Monster hatched under the wings of a few disciplinarian Zealots*. Nay I am certified by the Doctor, (in his answer to my request, that he would search his own Memory,) that no such expression hath ever passed from his tongue, much less from his Pen, on any occasion whatsoever, much less on this. But on this I lay no weight, because it is no other then an *implicit Falsification*. His 2. fault is more gross, whilst he citeth the page, and misreporteth the words of that Reverend Doctor. In lieu of [*School-nation*] Mr. Hickman forgeth him to have written [*a mere Scholastical Notion*] where tis plain the word [*mere*] is a mere interpolation; whereby to intimate an enmity betwixt the Doctor and the

Dr. Hammond, vindicated from Mr. H. his several Falsifications.

the *Fathers*, of which there had else been no appearance. For a Father may say that, which is withal a *School-mation*, though not a mere *Scholastical* notion. But neither should I have mentioned this, which in a man of his practice is to be reckoned a *Peccadillo*, if it had not stood betwixt me, and his *third misrepresentation*, which seemes to me of greater weight and yet to receive some increase by those additions. I say it is his *third injury*, that he groundlessly fastens the *Doktors censure* to the above-said *privativenessse of moral evil*. Upon which it was so far from having been fastened by the Doctor, that he neither used any such words, nor any other which can bear any Analogy with such; unless the *privativenessse of sin* doth import no more with Mr. Hickman, then doth the *non-entiy*, or *nothingnessse* of it; which as it will prove him a *Carneadist*, so it is the most that he can plead, to that with which I now charge him. That Reverend Doctor having but mentioned the perfect Phantasie of some, that sin is a *Non-entiy*, (that is) a *nothing*. So that now (good Reader) thou knowest the meaning of Mr. Hickman, whensoever he asserts the *privativenessse of sin*. He means tis *Nothing*, or a *Non-entiy*, or else he wilfully prevaricates, as well with thee, as with Dr. Hammond.

His confounding the things which he once distinguished.

§. 6. I thought the man had made a difference, betwixt a *simple negative*, and a *Privative*; especially when the latter is not a want of all being, but onely of a Rectitude or conformity to a rule: else why did he distinguish (when it was sutable to his need) betwixt a *negative*, and a *privative Nothing*? Besides, *privativenessse* being but a word of relation, referring to somewhat that it had, but lost, or should have had, but *miss* of having, (that I may gratifie him for once with this distinction) And *Relation* being but an Accident Adveniens enti in actu existenti, It follows that that which is *privative* in relation to something of which it is so, may have a positive being pre-existent to that *privation*, in order of nature if not of time. Thus in every Transmutation, and in corruption more

more especially, there is a *privation* of a form, but not of all; for as one goes out, another enters, *Night* succeeds *Day*, as *Satan's* image doth *God's*. And what if the *last* be a *privation* in respect of that which was before? can it possibly argue no *entity* of the *action*, by which the Image was introduced, or of the *Image* it self abstractly taken? I with Mr. Hickman would minde his *Grammar*, and know that *privo* is a verb active, as much as *pono*; as *privo*, no less then *ponere*, is an *action* properly so called; and by consequence *privatio*, just as much as *positio* is. Thus the *kill- ing* an *innocent Christ* (which was we know, the *sin* of *murder*) however twas a *privation* (in one respect) was yet as *positive* an *action*, as the most lawful *execution* of the *blaspheming thief*, which (in one respect) was a *privation* also: yet the murdering of Christ was neither a nullity, nor was it produced by *God* himself, as Mr. Hickman hath said that every *real being* is.

The sad effects
of the Calvi-
nian Scheme.

S. 7. But there remains a fourth thing, of which our Rhapsodist is to be told, to wit, that the error on which Reverend Dr. Ham. affixt that Character [a perfect phantasm and School notion] was not simply and meerly this, [that sin is nothing or a non entity, but together with this addition [so that all things may be predetermined by God and yet not sin. Fundam. p. 178, lin. 23. where shewing the tricks of those men, by which they would hide the ill consequences of the Doctrine which they teach, (to wit, that all manner of things were predetermined by the Almighty,) he mentioned this as the first, [That sin is but a non-entity, a nothing;] so that all things (forsooth!) might be eternally predetermined, and yet not sin. Thus they are *Liber- tines*, or *Carnadists*, or both by turns, (do what they can,) so long as they adhere to the *Calvinian Scheme*. But Mr. H. omitted what he found of most weight.

S. 8. Whilst I am on this subject, I mean the clearing of Dr. Hammond, from this *Falsificator*, I shall annex to his Epistle, a parallel passage out of his Book, where speak- ing of the *positiveness* of sins of omission, he saith (as is sa

Mr. H.'s sin-
ciness and
irreverence;
to Dr. Ham.
added to all his
wilful forga-
ries.

STRANGE

STRANGE, that they also should be positive, that he knows not whether ever it were asserted by any, but *Cerberus*, alias *Champneys*, *Mr. Dukes* the keeper of the great Ordinary at *Hell* in *Westminster*, *Mr. P.* and (whom he would not joyn with such company) the Reverend and learned *Dr. Hammond*. p.69. Here, for brevities sake, I shall but make these demands, 1. With what colour of excuse this can be said of *Dr. Hammond* (or indeed of *Mr. P.*) who never spake of this matter by word or writing, more then what hath been shewed in my former sections? whereas *sins of Omission* have not been specified, so if they had, it had not followed, that either I, or *Dr. Hammond*, had ascribed to such a positivity. 2. Why the man should invent such ugly names, as *Cerberus* (importing the *Dog of Hell*) and next to that, the keeper of *Hell*, to joyn with a *Dollor* of so much eminence in the world, not more for his *Learning*, then for the holiness of his life, 3. Whether calling him the Reverend and Learned *Dr.* and expressing to him a seeming tenderness, is not a bitterness of Jeere, and so a horrible aggravation both of the falsehood and the sanctity, which I have noted in my first and second Quere? yet this is the meek spirited man, who complains that he is used with too much sharpness, and exhorts his Brethren very demurely, to let their moderation be known unto all men.

His scurrilous
usage of *Dr.*
Taylor and its
occasion, Original sin

S. 9. Having done with *Dr. H.* He begins afresh to ease himself on *Dr. Taylor*. Whom having taught in what manner he should have Intituled his Book, (Not *Deus*, but) *Pelagius*, or *Socinus justificatus*, (p.4) He immediately lets fly (in as known a falsehood as could be spoken,) That the *Dr.* would bear us in hand, he onely quarrelleth with the Presbyterian Notion of original sin] whereas it is clear that *Dr. Taylor* in his *Deus justificatus*, extends his Quarrel (though very civilly) even to those whom he owns as his Friends and Brethren, sons (with himself) of the very same mother, the Church of England. Let *Mr. Hickman* read, and hold from blushing if he is able, whilst he beholds

holds the *Transition* the Doctor makes in solemn manner (p. 54.) from his *Presbyterian*, to his *Episcopal Opponents*, whom he worthily calls his *Dearest brethren*. That he denies *Original sin*, he very plentifully denies, and saith he cannot but confesse that to be, which he feels and groans under, and by which all the world is made miserable. p. 12. But now suppose him a flat denier of that *Catholick Doctrine*, which is taught by our Church, of *Original sin*. And let us consider what it was which made him erre in this point: whether it was not his contemplation of the horrible consequences and *Tenents*, which *Presbyterians* are accustomed to *superstruct* on that Doctrine. As (for example) that all being dead in *Adam*, there was yet no remedy for the far greater part, no not in the sufferings and satisfaction of Christ, see how rightly the Doctor gathers the odious consequential *Blasphemies*, in the former part of his enterprise, (as far as p. 54.) from what is taught by the *Presbyterians*. Of he also confesseth his Brethrens Opinions to be free, and such as (if they were all agreed) he would not move a stone to disturb. p. 56. The *Presbyterians* therefore are to be blamed, for whatsoever error he may have published in this particular; And not at all the Church of England; which by liberally allowing, that Christ hath dyed even for all who were dead in *Adam*, directs the only both pious and unquestionable way, of making good the Antient Doctrine of *Original sin*.

§. 9. Had Dr. Taylor indeed affirmed (what is but suggested by Mr. Hickman, too unintelligent a thing to passe a judgement in such affaires,) that he was not opposed but by *Presbyterians*, his own letters would have confuted him (as now they do Mr. Hickman) which he directed to the Right Reverend, my Lord of Rochester. But as it is, the result is this. That Doctor Taylor in one point is of a singular opinion, or way of speaking, in which the other sons of the Church of England do avow their sorrow and dissatisfaction; who are the only men that can lay sure grounds, whereon to plead with Dr. Taylor to good advantage.

T

§ 10.

The Dissatisfaction of R. Episcopal Divines.

*Dr. Taylor's
error on the
right hand, ex-
tremely better
than the heresie
of Presbyteri-
ans on the left.*

§. 10. I am one of the meanest (though not I hope the least obedient) of all her children. And though I am well enough qualified, for the clearing this learned Doctor from the calumnie and falshood of his *Reuiler*; yet am I too much a *Junior*, to undertake his conviction, as to that which I conceive he hath said amiss. But (with a *Præsumpt* be it spoken to so acute and eminent an Author, who I conceive hath onely erred for fear of erring,) I think it better to insist upon the *end* of *Christ's Death*, then to define what *would have been*, had he *never died*. Concerning the wisdom of God's *economy* in the disposal of *All things*, I think the best way to judge, is to judge as God judgeth, and is revealed to have done in his written Word. We are assured by *revelation*, that Christ was given for all in Adam, or for all who are born from Adam: which had he not decreed to have done as he hath revealed, we have no measure of judging, what should have been the just consequence of *Adam's sin*; or whether, any besides Adam, should have been concerned in it. We cannot know God's *counsels*, but by *words* or *deeds* revealed to us. Had Christ been given, but not for *all*, in particular not for *Heathen infants*, I think we can as little guess, what should become of those Infants, as what the other world had been; if God, in stead of *This*, had created *That*.

By this I am willing to make it known to Mr. Hickman and his *Abettors*, both how much I dissent from the Doctor's error on the right hand, and how much more I joyn with him, against their *Heresies* on the left.

*Dr. H's prefer-
ring Calvin to
the 4. Evan-
gelists.*

§. 11. The man of scorn goes on to reach us, how unfit he is for a *Divine*, or to be so much as a *lay-Preacher*, were he in *terra Forteriali*, where *no-ordinating* is to be had. For speaking of us, and the *Presbyterians*, in relation to our Tenets of God's *Decrees*, he saith *we befriend them in giving the people occasion to think, that they only are the men, who would contend for the Faith once delivered to the Saints*, p. 5. } See how little he understands that

cause.

*easy Text in St. Jude. If Calvin's Doctrine in point of Decrees, is the faith delivered to the Saints, of which Saint Jude spake, then it must not onely be truth, but the whole divine Truth delivered to us as we are Christians. And so farewell (by this Logick) to the four Evangelists, who have nothing of the Faith that was once delivered to the Saints; But welcome John Calvin, who hath it all. For the whole Doctrine of the Gospel is meant by *πίστις πνευματική*, Jude 2. And unless Mr. Hickman did take it too in that sense, how does the affixing the assertions upon Calvin and his following Presbyterians (p. 3. and 4.) give any occasion to the people, to think that they are the ONELY MEN? It is no wonder, if Bishop Hooper (one of the first of our holy Martyrs, who suffered from the Papists for our Religion, as others have done from the Presbyterians,) did express these men by the name of *Gospellers, as having found out another Gospel, than what had been written by the four Evangelists, (to use the words of Sir Edwin Sandys.) Our Gospellers (said Bishop Hooper) are better learned than the holy Ghost. — over every mischief that is done, they say it is Gods will. And what prodigious stuff it is, which Mr. Hickman calls the Faith which was once delivered to the Saints, I leave to be judged by the words, and lines, and pages, which I have shewed from Mr Calvin and other Writers. Had an Angel from heaven taught such a Gospel, Saint Paul had set him packing with an Anathema Maranatha.*

§. 12. Bishop Carleton saying, [*some take it for a sign of such as are looking towards Popery, Sec. p. 5.*] gives leave to others, to take it otherwise. When a thing has two handles, one may take it by the right, as well as another by the left. As I, and my Betters are wont to take it; Our disclaiming the Doctrines of Presbyterians is the way to stop a Papist's mouth; who hath nothing to accuse the Protestants of, but what the Presbyterians have introduced; and that in a perfect opposition to the true Protestant religion.

* See the Requinquartian History, part. 3. c. 16, p. 2.

The way to stop a papist's mouth.

*Mr. H.'s sense
of his scurrility,
with his de-
sire never to
mend.*

§ 13. In the eighth page of his Epistle (for the sixth and the seventh are fill'd with one large Transcript, verbatim taken from Mr. *Prin*, without acknowledging the Author from whence he took it,) he appears to be conscious of his *scurrility*, by which he supposeth he hath departed from that *meekness of spirit*, which is required in a Minister. But he desires his Brethren to think it as lawfull as they may (as if he were acting *zeal of the Lord* in his Address to *Rabbi Buij*) to put some *vinegar* into his ink, and so to continue in his departure from *Christian meekness*, (supposing he cannot fall totally, much less finally from Grace,) or else in *meekness of spirit*, to call me *Bolsec*, and *Fevardentius*, and what he pleaseth. But here I arrest him with one mild Question whilst he is furious. Was my saying that their speeches could be no less then *Blasphemous*, who said that *God was the Author and cause of sin*, *A making their Graves amongst Blasphemers*? or a proving by their *pages, lines and words*, where they had made their own Graves? Perhaps they thought their speeches innocent. And thence I censur'd their speeches, not the thoughts they had of them. Suppose the Author of a *Dispensatory* shal put a *Receipt* into his Book, which I know hath poyson'd some, and is as likely to poyson others; will my giving a timely warning to beware of that *medicine*, be censured as the making that Author's Grave among *murderers*? It will it seems by Mr. *Hickman*, but who can help it? I plainly proved to Doctor *Reynolds*, That for all I said of *Blasphemous Doctors*, I had not onely Doctor *Whitakers*, but Mr. *Calvins* good leave. And so Mr. *Hickman* (unawares) hath rail'd it out against both. But if *Bolsec* is reformed, I hope he will do the less hurt. And that he is so in earnest, *Eathyllus* tells us.

*His new sense
of his carnality.*

§ 14. He falls again to confession, p. 9. that 'tis hard for him not to exceede his bounds; whereupon he prays his Brethren, to give him a call unto repentance. And compares them to the old *Puritans*, as to the exercise of their

their patience. But who were the old Puritanes? were they such as took upon them to ordain Ministers at Brackley? or such as took joyfully their neighbours goods? if so, he said ill, That the world was not worthy of such inhabitants. The Apostle applying the words to them, who suffer'd the spoiling of their own.

§. 15. The malignity which he concludes with against Episcopal Government, which yet he holds to be better than none at all, (and none at all hath been the Government which they have hitherto set up) doth onely serve to put us in mind, in how many respects they have been perjur'd, as well in swearing, as forswearing their Scottish Covenant. They may be said to be Reformers of Episcopal Government, (and if they please, of Regal too) as the Heretick Marcus was said (by many women, and few men) The Reformer of all that had gone before him. But what kind of Ministers he ordained, and after what an enormous manner, and how he Reformed the womens Purges to fill his own, would be tedious to tell upon this occasion. They that will, may consult Epiphanius, Haresf. 34. And especially Irenaeus, lib. 1. cap. 9. My observation is chiefly this, That he was reckon'd a great Reformer.

And malignity
to the Episco-
pal Govern-
ment.

ἡ γὰρ κακοποίη-
σις ἡ ἐκείνη
ἀπορροήσας τὴν
ἐκείνην, &c.
Iren. l. 1. c. 8.
p. 68.

An Appendix for Master Hickman touching his Preface to the READER.

§. 16. Having gon over the main of Mr. Hickmans Dedicatory Epistle, I now proceed to his Preface, his tedious Preface to the Reader. On which I shall make the shortest strictures that I am able, untill I meet with such things as do call for length. And because Doctor Hyslin

hath unanswerably spoken to the *Historical part*, both in his *Certamen Epistolare*, (wherein he Refutes it *ex professo*) and in his *Quinquarticular History*, (wherein he virtually Refutes it, though not by name,) I shall not therefore say more to that, than is omitted by Doctor *Hrylin*, or at least omitted for ought I am able to remember.

The first page of his Preface proves all that follows to be but the fruits of his revenge.

§ 17. He tells his Reader in the beginning, 1. how much he had been taken with (I know not what) rich vein of Rhetorick, which (he saith) he saw running through all my writings which he had seen. 2. That he hath not mentioned my name without those prefaces of Respect which are due to a Scholar. 3. That notwithstanding his being debased to the Dunghil of *Doltism*, he is not so much as tempted, to detract from my *Credit and Reputation*, &c. p. 1. If this hath any Truth in it, then there is no truth at all in the far greatest part of his whole performance. For Mr. *Baxter* himself, in all his *Kidderminster-stuff*, is a puny Railer in comparison. Not onely all the ill language which he was able to invent, but even all that he was able to filch from others, he hath made it his business to throw upon me; and all for no better Reason, then my asserting Gods honour, to the disgrace of those men who have rail'd against him.) I am so ignorant in his eyes, p. 71. And he espies such a darkness upon the face of my understanding, p. 71. that from thence you may discover how he respects me as a Scholar. And rather then detract from my Reputation, he onely chargeth me with downright impudence, p. 47. with ridiculousness, and malice, and a Treatise dirty enough to justify all the ugly brats of the Wild-st Sectaries, that G. C. hath murther'd into the world. p. 13, 14.

But (not to transcribe a great part of Master *Hickman's* Rhapsodie, by giving in a full Catalogue of all his calumnies and railings) It shall suffice me to observe, how all the rest of his pages do run *Antipodes* to his first. And how big of rancor, he must confess himself to have been, when nothing could ease him but the delivery of

of such an *unnatural* revenge, as could not be *whelp's* without the *torment* of such a *self-contradiction*. For first to profess so much respect, and so much *tenderneſſe* of my Credit, (as hath been shewed;) and to profess himself farther, A cordial friend to my person; nay (after that) to declare, that he † *disliked* the sharpneſſe of Mr. Barlees stile; And yet after all, (nay in the midst of all this,) to behave himself in such *waysomewiſe*, as if he had *licked up* the * *Vomits* of all his Brethren, on purpose to cast them up again, and all at Me; (for what he does to the Church of England and to her persecuted Children, I take as done unto my self, and with a greater indignation, then if it were done to my self alone,) this is to very much his *mifery*, as well as it is his *Misdemeanour*, that to discover it as I have done, is all the punishment I intend him.

§. 18. To what he saith of my Reputation, acquired amongſt the young Gallants, by putting the good Greek and Latin of the old Philosophers into as Good English in my Practicals, (p. 2.) I onely answer four things.

1. That the Prophets and the Apostles were no Heathen Philosophers, from whom my practical Divinity hath been derived. 2. But after my reasonings out of Scripture, I reason also out of the Heathen, to serve the turn of such * Professors, as Mr. Baxter, and Mr. Hickman, who live undaunted and shameless in some kinds of sin, at which a wellbred Heathen would Blush, or tremble. And I would make them strive to be better then they are, by their scorn-*ing* to be worse then their inferiours. 3. My use of Heathen learning is no more then may be justified by the practice of Dr. Reynolds, who hath translated more of them then I have done, and this I speak to his honour, because the more he abounds in his Humane learning, the liker he is to immortal Grains. Nay the great Apostle St. Paul in his Sermon at Athens, citeth Aratus (a Heathen) in

fence of using the Heathens in our writings; in his Sermon of Imaginations. p. 31.

* Pref. p. 6.
† Book p. 1.
* See Epist. before Hist. Quidquid. p. 6.

His frivolous exception to Heathen learning.

* See my reason for the use I make of the Heathens in my flower implended, par. 1. ch. 1. Sect. 5.

See Ep. Andrewes his de-

commodate, and apply. And what I really *Translate*, I ever own the Translating of; directing my readers by my Margin, where the *Original* is to be sowed. Nor can I possibly be blamed, (unless Mr. *Hickman* has any *Peeres*) if I make some Philosophers to speak as good *English*, as *Greek*, and *Latin*.

§. 18. Tis true indeed that Mr. *Hickman* hath given no proof of his *Humane learning*, but onely of stealing other mens, which is *inhumane*. I cannot finde him translating, and honestly citing the Philosophers *Greek* or *Latin*; But chiefly trading in *English* Writers, out of whom he compiles what he thinks is most *Pretty*, (in both senses of the word, as Dr. *Heylin* hath observed in his † Epistle to the Reader) Which having done he makes *publick*, without a fear that his Larcin's will come to light. Had the man been a Fox, he would have preyed *afar off*, in *Greece* or *Latium*; not where every one may snap him who has the skill to read *English*. But if he thinks it *no sin* to *steal*, (like the *Heathens* in * *Polybius*) because to *steal* is an *action*, and so a *positive* *entity*; which he professeth to think *no sin* can be; yet methinks he should esteem it a great unhappinesse to be Caught; For fear his Auditors should suspect, if he shall Preach against *stealing*, that he *steales* the very Sermon rebuking *stealth*.

The Heathenish Nature of his own.

† See it pre. fixed to his Hist. Quin. quar. A. 3.

* Polyb. l. 4. p. 285.

§. 19. How, and whence he hath borrowed (without a thought of *Restitution*) whatsoever can be thought to be *smart*, or *handsome*, I have already set out in order, by way of Letter to Dr. *Heylin*, when having promised to discover from whom he stole his little *all* on the thing in Question, (I mean, against the *positive* *entity* of *sin*.) I am content in this place to be as good as my word. His strength is taken chiefly from my learned Friend Mr. *BARLOW*, but partly too from Dr. *Robert Baron*, a learned Scot, Neither is cited (so much as once) for any one syllable of the whole. But how they ought to have been cited, if Mr. *Hickman* had not desired to passe for a kinde of *Metaphysician*, let it be judged by this parallel, which is as short as I can contrive it.

A new Discovery of his stealth.

Mr. Hickman.

The privative nature of sin may be thus—evicted. If a thing be therefore sinful, because it wants some perfection that it ought to have, and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have. than is sin a privation; but a thing is therefore sinful, &c. Ergo, &c.

*Book, 2. Edit. Arg. 3.
p. 84. l. 16. &c.*

If sin, as sin, be a positive entity, then it is a thing in it self good. The consequence—Ens & bonum convertuntur.

Arg. 1. p. 70. l. 4. &c.

This positive being of sin, is it a finite and participate being? If not, &c.

p. 78. l. ult. &c.

If sin be a positive entity, then it is either God, or from God, &c.

Arg. 2. p. 75. l. 4. &c.

M. Barlow.

Malum esse privativum rationibus evinco, —si res quævis, quæ est mala, sit idè præcise mala, quia caret aliquo bono sibi debito; & idè non sit mala, quia non caret aliquo bono sibi debito; tum malitia formaliter erit in carentia seu privatione boni. At idè res est mala, &c. Et per consequens, &c.

*Ratio 2. p. 42. l. 5. à fin.
&c.*

Si malitia aliqua esset ens positivum, —tum est bonum, —Ratio est, quia bonitas est passio entis reciproca.

p. 44. l. 21. &c. Ratio 5.

Impossibile est, ut sit entitas aliqua finita, & creata, &c.

*Ratio 3. p. 55. l. 5. à fin.
&c. ad 10. lineas,
vid. & p. 54. l. 19. &c.
Ratio 3. & p. 56. l. 23,
&c.*

Si—ipsa malitia esset ens positivum, tum—vel erit, &c.

*Ratio 6. p. 45. l. 9. &c.
ad 16. lineas.
vid. & p. 73. l. 2. &c.*

Mr. Hickman.

If original sin be a thing positive, 'Tis either the soul it self, or some of its faculties, or some accident or adjunct agreeing, &c. — but none of all these, Ergo, &c.

*Arg. 4. p. 87. l. 18. &c.
for 20. lines.*

Such actions are called intrinsically evil, both because they are evil antecedently to any positive Law, and because they are evil, *ex genere & objecto*, and not meerly through the want of some circumstance: for a Scholar to walk, &c. *so on for 7. lines.
p. 94. l. 6. &c.*

Sins of omission and commission are sufficiently distinguish'd, notwithstanding —: omission will be the transgression of an affirmative precept, commission the transgression of a negative precept. Secondly, they differ in respect of their immediate foundation, the *fundamentum proximum* of a sin

Mr. Barlow.

Si præter privationem, entitas aliqua esset malo originali intrinseca, tum entitas illa vel erit ipsa natura vel ejus adjunctum aliquod accidentale. At ex his nulum — dici possit. Ergo, &c. *ita porrò ad 4. lineas.*

*Ratio 2. p. 58. l. 23. &c.
Vid. & p. 59. l. 7. &c.
ad 19. lineas.
Vide etiam p. 90. l. 6. &c.*

Actus illi dicuntur intrinsecè mali, quod talis malitia ipsis inest ablatà omni lege positiva. — non solum sunt mali ex defectu circumstantiarum alicujus, sed ex genere & objecto, — ut ambulare, &c. *Sic deinceps ad 5. lineas.*

Exer. Metap. }
2, Edit. 2. } *p. 73. l. 12. &c.*

Differunt [malum omissionis & commissionis] tamen.
1. Quòd omissio omnis sit legis affirmativæ violatio, commissio præcepti negativi.
2. Differunt, quia malum omissionis in ipsa anima rationali, &c. immediate fundatur, non in actu aliquo aut habitu. — (l. 30.) Malum su-

Mr. Hickman.

of commission is some act or habit: but these are not the *fundamenta proxima* of a sin of omission.

Ans. p. 98. l. 1 &c.

Because covetousness is a privation of liberality, as it puts a man upon honest spending, prodigality is a privation of liberality as it doth incline a man to avoid superfluous spending.

Ans. p. 99. lin. 3. &c.

That there can be no degrees in a privation, — is a meer mistake. Among privations some are greater, some less, with relation to that form unto which they are opposed: — that may *Physically* be accounted the greater privation which removes more degrees of the form —: if we reckon *morally*, then we may also calculate the degrees of privation, &c. *as for 3. lines.*

Ans. p. 99. l. 4. à fin. &c.

There is a punishment of loss, which scarce ever any

Mr. Barlow.

tem commissionis — in actu aliquo aut habitu, in quo tanquam fundamento proximo & immediato consistit.

Sol. p. 83. l. 11. &c.

Vid. & p. 64. l. 22, &c.

Avaritia dicit privationem liberalitatis, in quantum liberalitas inclinatur ad sumptus necessarios, prodigalitas vero dicit privationem liberalitatis, in quantum à superfluis sumptibus liberatur.

Sol. p. 82. l. 13. &c.

vid. & p. 81. l. 5. à fin. &c.

Dico quod privatio potest habere magis & minus — Ratione termini privati; boni sc. quod tollit. Sic utilitas — majorem dicimus, quæ majorem subjecti perfectionem tollit; sic in naturalibus illa cæcitas, &c. Et in moralibus illud vitium est majus quod bonum morale majus tollit.

Sol. p. 79. l. 16. &c.

Hoc [pœna damni] (nullo quod sciam dissentiente) man

Mr. Hickman.

man said was positive. There is a punishment of sense, and this—is no other way an evil—, than as it doth deprive us of some perfection of which we are capable. So

an for five lines farther.

Ans. 105. l. 3. &c.

The hating of God is *complexum quid*, &c. on for 6, lines.

Ans. p. 95. l. 14; &c.

[Tis not] a *relatio rationis*, which is affirmed by *Vasquez*, but against all good reasons, &c.

Pag. 83. l. 5. à fin. &c.

See p. 95. l. 3. à fin.

Dionysius Areopagita's testimony,

p. 36. l. 13. &c. see in

The testimonies of *Dionysius's* two Greek Scholiasts *Maximus*, & *Pachymera*, ib. l. 22. &c. & l. pen. &c.

See in

Gregorie Nyssen's testimony,

Mr. Barlow.

est solum privatio—(p. 50. l. 6.) —*pœna sensus* est solum homini malum in quantum privat hominem perfectione debita.

Sol. p. 47. l. 19. &c.

Vid. & p. 50. l. 15.

&c. & p. 78. l. 23. ad

5. lineas,

Vide p. 73. l. 4. à fin. &c.

Quod non sit *relatio rationis*, — quod velle videtur *Vasquez* in 1.2. q. 95. cap. 9. &c.

p. 53. l. 4. &c.

p. 40. l. 12, &c.

pag. 40. l. 12, &c. & l. 29, &c.

*Mr. Hickman.**p. 57. l. 5. &c.*

See in

*Athanasius's testimonie,**p. 76. l. 4. à fin. &c.*

See in

*Greg. Arimin. a noble Schoolman.**p. 85. l. 10. &c.*compare *p. 58. l. 5. à fin. &c. with**Mr. Hickman.*

How many men have been imprisoned for not paying summs of money which they did owe?

p. 104. l. 19. &c.

Suppose the first sin of Angels, to have been a proud desire to be equal unto God: the cause of this proud desire was the wil of the Angel. But it was of the vitiosity of the Action—onely the cause *per accidens, & per concomitantiam*. Nor doth the vitiosity of the effect always suppose a vitiosity in the cause; though it always presuppose an imperfection in the cause. And where the cause it self is vitious, its

*Mr. Barlew.**p. 41. l. 13, &c.**p. 55. l. 9. &c.**Gregor. Arimin. nobilior Scholasticus.**p. 19. & 124.**p. 53, l. ult. & p. 30. l. 14. &c.**Rob. Baronius**in Metaphysica Generali.*

Apud homines debitor in-carceratur ob non solutam summam pecuniz, quod negativum quid est.

§. 5. p. 54. l. 5. &c.

Supponamus primum *ma-lum* culpæ in Angelis fuisse vitiosam *volitionem* æqualitatis cum Deo, causa efficiens hujus vitiosæ volitionis fuit—ipsa voluntas Angelica. Verum—per accidens & per concomitantiam quandam producta est ea vitiositas—vitiositatem effecti non semper præsupponere vitiositatem in causa. (*p. 59. l. 4. &c.*) Non—ergo volumus vitiositatem causæ per se efficere vitiositatem effecti—
vicio-

vitiolity is not the cause of the vitiolity of the effect: for vitiolity of it self neither can effect, nor be effected: but the vicious cause, taking together the being, and the supervenient privation, is the cause of the vicious effect, taking it in like manner for the being, and the superadded privation.

p. 103. l. 9. 10 l. 20.

Et: quia vitiolitas causæ per se nihil operari potest; vitiolitas verò effecti per se produci non potest; sed tantum asserimus Causam vitiolam, prout includit ens & privationem enti superadditam producere effectum vitiolum, sumendo similiter nomen effectus vitioli, prout includit ens aliquod & privationem enti superadditam

p. 61. l. 12. &c.

Had Mr. *Hickman* been *Haire* apparent to Dr. *BARON* and Mr. *BARLOW*, (as sure I am. he is to neither) he should have waited for the *Decease* as well of the second, as of the first. For how liberally soever a man intends towards his childe, he seldom puts off his *shoes*, till he goes to bed. Nor will any, but such Vermin as are *Followers of a Camp*, (not at all to fight, but to prey and plunder) *strip* a man of his *cloathes*, before the *breath* is out of his *body*. Dr. *ROBERT BARON* indeed is dead, and knows not what is done to him. But I hope Mr. *BARLOW* is both alive, and live-like; and so tis too soon for Mr. *Hickman*, to * take his goods into possession. If *M^r. Hickman* shall deny, what is become so *proverbial* for *Notoriety*, and excuse himself by an older proverb, that many times good *wits* do *Jump*, (which being true when Mr. *H.* doth knock his head against a *post*, can have no truth here, even for that very Reason,) A man may fitly say to him, as I have heard Sr. *Thomas More* once said to *Gallus* in a *Tetrastick*; (Although what *Gallus* had done in verse, as Mr. *H.* hath done in *prose*, was many centuries of years, before Sr. *Thomas* was yet in being.)

With their Aggravation

*Nulla fides
pietasque viris
qui Caltra se-
quuntur. Lu.
can.*

* Note the Rule in the civil Law, that he who steals or purloynes another mans writings, or bonds, or the like, is liable to an action of theft &c.

Digst. 47. 2. 27 & 32: cited by Dr. Zouch in his *Cases of civil law* p. 95.

Vatibus.

*Vatibus idem animusque, & vere spiritus idem,
Qui fuit Antiquis, est modo (Galle) tibi.
Carmina namque eadem, versusq; frequenter eosdem
Quos fecere illi, Tu quoque (Galle) facis.*

Now because that great and good man was no *Philosopher* of the *Heathens*, Mr. *Hickman* will not be angry at it, if I try to put his good *Latine* into almost as good *English*.

Thou (*Gallus*) hast the same both *spirit* and *mind*,
With them that writ in time of *yore*.
For when thou writest *Verses*, oft I find
Thou writ'st it the same they writ *before*.

His mistake of
Justice for
Drollery.

§. 20. Whereas Mr. *Hickman* adds further, (p. 2.) that I abused Mr. *Barlee* with *Drollery*, as handsome as ever dropped from the pen of of *Ben Johnson* in his polemicals, I thank him as much as if I did, but I do not accept of his Commendation, of which how ambitious Himself hath been, we see by other mens *Drollery*, to which he hath put his own name. *Vindicative Justice* is such a necessary Vertue, as without which it is impossible for humane society to subsist. Which if Mr. *Hickman* will needs call *Drollery*, I must needs assure him he shews his ignorance of the word. My doing of justice on some offenders, in vindication of God and Man, I own as a Duty incumbent on me. And in particular this last which I have done upon this Compiler, I take to be such, as could not safely have been omitted. For *Diagoras* turned *Atheist*, upon his seeing a *Plagiary* escape unpunisht.

The Calvinists
an Tenet ten-
ders all study;
uselesse.

§. 21. He saith, he reckons me unfortunate in choosing the tremendous mystery of reprobation for my first publick essay. p. 2. Not that he thinks me to be unfortunate indeed, but because his fingers itch to be stealing a passage from Mr. *Hales* (on

(on 1st Pet. 3. 16. concerning *Eccius* his saying, that he chose to speak of *Reprobation* as an *Idoneous* subject, in quo juveniles astus exerceret, which Mr. H. knew not how to introduce with any *finesse*, unlesse he might say I was *unfortunate* in making choise of that subject. But was not the Refuting of *irrespective reprobation*, (and of the horrible Blasphemies deduced from it by its *Assertors*) a subject fit for my *πρωτογενεια*, or *first endeavours* when if that Tenet is once swallowed down, all further study is rendered *uselesse*, (that I may not say pernicious too?) And when no more then common *Reason*, improved a little by *Philosophy*, is required to refute it upon the principles supposed? And when in the *principles* I speak of, all who have read our *Church Catechisms* are very sufficiently instructed? Whether so, or not so, let it be judged by them, who have read me at least as they were *running*, and not by him, who will not read me. As Mr. H. professeth he neither hath, nor will (p 3.) though he professeth the contrary in other places. For which and other Contradictions, I leave him wholly to their lash, who bid him go forth and be a *Preacher*, though not a *Priest*, especially for his saying I was *unfortunate* in any thing; because by using that word, he hints the *falsehood* of his own and his Brethrens Doctrine, That *whatsoever comes to passe was fore-determined by an absolute unconditional decree*, importing the *Necessity* of all events. Which doctrine must needs be *false*, if I was *unfortunate* in my choise; and as *false*, if I was *fortunate*. But if he will have the Doctrine *true*, then it was clearly the *will of God* (even according to his own and his Brethrens Doctrine) that I should make it my *first endeavour*, to *confute* their doctrine of *Reprobation*.

§ 22. What he saith next of Bp. *Montagues* visitation. (p 3.) and of his *Majesties Declaration*, which was not intended as a *two edged sword* (p. 4.) is many ways to my Advantage. For 1. the end of that *Bishops inquiry* in his *Episcopal visitation*, was to *silence* the Doctrine of *irrespective Decrees*. And the same was the end of my *publick*

* Note that that Sermon was long since Printed, before reprinted in the *Remains* of Mr. HALES.

The Kings declaration for bidding his being preached.

Notes. . Next that ought to have been the end both of the one, and the other, because Mr *Hickman* doth now confesse that even *that* was the end of the Kings Majesties Declaration, to which we thought it our Duty to yield Obedience 3. The *two edged sword* is strangely joyned by Mr. *Hickman*, with a charitable designe to settle peace, or stop mouths. 4. Whilest he saith it was designed to stop the mouthes of the *Orthodox*, he means by *Orthodox*, those men, who taught (as since the Assembly men have done) that all things are ordained by God; and so the murdering of the innocent, as well as the punishing of the guilty. And why (forsooth!) were they *Orthodox*, but because *Authority* had designed to stop their mouthes? How much rather may *Independence* bestow on themselves the name of *Orthodox*, whose mouthes were designed to be stoped by the *Presbyterians*? 5. The very truth of it is this: That Declaration was intended to stop Discourses on either side, any farther then our Church had given a Rule whereby to teach, both in her *Catechisme*, *Liturgie*, *Homilies*, and *Articles*, whose contrariety indeed to the way of *Calvin* had very good reason to put a muzzle upon his followers mouthes, whensoever they were opened to Gods dishonour. And this I am able to make apparent by an eminent Person now living from whom I had the following story, that when a Preacher came to Court, and had put in his Text to the Clerk of the closet then Bp. of Hereford, (*why will ye dye O house of Israel?*) One of the Chaplaines (now a Bishop) was sent to give him a timely warning, not to have any thing in his Sermon against the Kings Declaration. And he undertaking that he had not, was permitted to preach before his Majesty.

No good Art.
going from
evil custome.

§ 23. What he saith of the Lord Falkland his speech in Parliament, speaking in favour of his party in one respect, but quite against them in another. (p. 5.) hath no other force in it, then that he either thought what he spake, and so that he had not yet seen his error, or that at least by his displeasure to some of the Bishops then in power, he was induced

duced to declaim in *General Terms*, without the addition of any proof, or of any thing 'elle to supply its room. And so I could tell of another Lord, who would have (proved I cannot say, but) *persuaded* onely that the Oath in the Canon against Popery and innovations (of which Presbyterianism was not the least) was someway against the King's Supremacy. But wise men knew what these things meant, as well as what the words signifie. And let it be noted by Mr. H, that the Doctrine which he opposeth was then *confessed* by the Lord Falkland (in the very same speech) *not to be contrary to Law*, and had nothing but custom to plead against it. (Not proving whether the Customs, were good or evil.) And of what importance it is in RELIGION, to draw an Argument onely from Customs let it be sadly weighed by *Them*, who do at any time presse for a Reformation. Down goes Presbyterie (if yet I may imply it was ever up) as farre as the speech of that Lord hath any force or strength in it.

§. 24. But now that the Reader may be informed of the *disinterested Judgement*, which that most learned and noble Lord professed to have of those points, I will lead him to his *Reply to the Romanists Answer*, in vindication of what he had written against the pretended *infallibility* of the Church of Rome. My Lord (in his pages 108, 109.) speaking of the great controversy betwixt the Dominicans and the Jesuites, which was debated and heard before Pope Clement, and of the many dayes spent in examining what *St. Austin* thought, his Lordship adds these words concerning *Austin* and his *Ancestors*. And for *Austin*, [*He thought so variously concerning it, that he scarce knew himself which; whereas all the Antients that I could ever meet with (as his Lordship goes on) were with the Jesuits with an unanimous consent.*] Whatever that Lord might think, or say, in any other time, or place, here he shews us his most avowed, (and I have reason to believe) his ripest judgement.

The Lord Falklands judgement against Calvin

Mr Hickman
intimate and
slandrous in-
vocation

§ 25. Now comes the practice of an arrant *Bigot* in *Presbyterianism*, who saith that [*If whilst I have been throwing stones (that is writing controverſie) my children have wanted their bread, or have been ſain to take it divided to them by a more unskilfull hand then mine own ; Then have I put ſomething upon my Doomeſday Book, which he wiſhes, I may have Time to take off by Repentance.* p. 5, and 6.] Here he intimates to his Reader with a barbarous [*If*] a thing as *false*, as it is *malicious*. And I will puniſh him onely by ſaying, what is a great and known truth. That I have been as conſtant a *weekly Preacher* (and ſometimes more then weekly too) ſince I writ what I have publiſht, and all the time that I was writing, as any *Presbyterian* within my knowledge; and more then ſome whom I could name. When indeed I have been vehemently ſick (for it is not *all* ſickneſs that hath excuſ'd me) my flock hath been fed by ſome other ſhepherd. When I have ſometimes been *Absent*, I have ſeldome preach'd the *leſs* for that, but ſometimes the *more*, and ſomewhere *always* where need hath been. If to avoid *ſhifting turns* with neighbour-Miniſters (the *cheap* and *laſie* trick of the *Presbyterians*) I have been at the charge to maintain a *Brother* for my *Aſſiſtance*, (that whether *sick* or *absent*, I may not be wanting to my Flock) what hurt have I done to ſuch covetous worldlings, as (rather then bear that *coſt* for their peoples good) will make a *ſcandalous liſt*, and put their money into their *Pockets*? I think 'twere happy we had a Law, whereby to compell them to uſe *Aſſiſtants*, who ſpread out *half* their matter *thinly*, and call it a *Sermon* in the morning, the other half being reſerv'd to be ſpread as *thinly*, and ſo to be called a *ſecond Sermon* after noon. So mine Hoſt in *Livia* bracht out his *Porker*, that his *Guests* might not grumble for want of a *ſecond*, and third courſe. And *children* are pleas'd with a couple of *ſixpences*, when they will not be content with a *ſingle ſhillling*. Alas, the difference is as great (I mean in one and the ſame man) be-

twixt

twixt Sermon, and Sermon, as betwixt *Gold* in the *ingot*, and in the *leaf*. Nothing is commoner with Preachers, then to thrust up *many* Sermons into *one*, or to beat out *one* into *many*. And whereas it is hinted by Mr. *Hickman* that I have fed my flock by a *hand unskilfuller than mine own*; Let it suffice that I am not so *self-conceited*, as to flatter my self with his *opinion*. My Assistant was very much fitter to teach the people their Christian duty, than Mr. *Hickman* or his peers can be in haste. Fitter (I say) from after the time of his *conversion*, whatever he might have been whilst he was yet a *Presbyterian*. But he hath long since left the world; and well it had been for Mr. *Hickman*, if he had not thus *rake'd* in an honest mans Grave; But that he had rather look'd *inward*, and laid to heart the common Rule, [*Qui alterum ingensat probri, &c.*]

For it it is true, what I have heard from *many* men of *good credit*, (and what I have partly read in print too) that Mr. *Hickman* at the same time possessed three Livings at once, (and had not any right to either) to wit an excellent *Fellowship* in *Mag. Coll.* besides the *Parsonage* of *St. Towles*, as its vulgarly call'd (enough to keep a worthy man who has wife and children) and also the *Vicaridge* of *Brackley*, (where his neglects of his children are most notorious (it I may call them *his*, which by another kind of *Plagium* he seiz'd upon,) then is he of all others, the unfittest creature in the world, to tell his Readers (by intimation) of my *omissions* towards my *Flock*, which are very well known to have been *none*.

Nor will it advantage him now to plead, that he spake with an [if,] and that his inference is true, upon his bare *Hypothesis*, or *supposal*. For then without offence to him, I may also bespeak my Readers thus, [That if Mr. *Hickman* is very ordinarily *drunk*, and if he is given to *swear* fearfully by fits, and if he is a great *striker* when intoxicated with *rage*; Then hath he put something on his *Dooms-day book*, which I wish he may have time to take off by *Repentance*.] This I speak with an [if] and my *supposal* be-

How much worse in himself, then in any other.

Therefore thou art inexcusable O man; — for wherein thou judgest another thou condemnest thy self: for thou that judgest dost the same things.
Rom. 2. 1.
It is odiousness shown by a parallel case.

ing granted, my *Inference* cannot but be *true*. But I abominate these courses, and have onely shew'd him, (as I have done his brother *Baxter*) that their *Trade* is as *easy*, as 'tis *inhumane*.

*His profession
of cordial
friendship,
with its effects.*

§. 26. In his next ensuing words, (p. 6.) he does distinguish my *opinion*, (to which he is an enemy) from my *person*, (to which he saith he is a *cordial friend*.) And yet in the next words to those, he does not equally distinguish betwixt the *persons* and *opinions* of those *Beyond-sea Divines*, of whose *opinions* (I hope) I may use as hard speeches, as Mr. *Hickman* hath used of *mine*, and yet be no less their *cordial friend*. We have seen Mr. *Hickman* his *cordial friendship* towards *me*. But I was never so *unman-like*, as to exercise the like upon his *Divines*; whose *pages* and very *lines* I have laid together with their *words*; whilst *heaven* and *earth* are call'd to *witness*, what they have said against *God*, as well as what (in that case) I have duly said against *them*.

*His sacrilegious
Eulogie
bestowed on
them of his
way.*

§. 27. In that he adds of his *pretious Divines*, that they are scarce to be equalled by any now alive, or to be excelled by those in any *Calendar*, *ibid.*] he hath spoken most unhappily, (to say no worse.) For 1. he knows in some *Calendars*, Mr. *Fox* his *Martyrs* are recorded. And was it not much more excellent to *dye for Christ*; then to write for *irrespective decrees of sin*, and *damnation*? Besides, 2. He either knows, or ought to know, that all the *saints* are in the *Calendar*, *Novemb. 1.* so is *Michael the Archangel*, and (as our *Collett* understands it) All the the *Angels of heaven*, on *September 29.* *John Baptist*, the *Virgin Mary*, (who is no less then *Our Lady*, or *Mother of God*, in the expression of the *Greek Fathers*) *Nay Christ himself*, and the *holy Ghost*, and the *Father* too upon *Trinity Sunday*, are either by name, or in equivalence, at least in some *Calendars*. Thus he commits, a spirituall whoredome, by idolizing Mr. *Calvin*, and other men of his sect, yet has the heart (more then once) to accuse another of *partiality*.

§. 28. Whilst he talks how he will shew, not that the Remonstrants but the contra-Remonstrant opinion hath been the Doctrine of the Reformed Church of England (p. 8.) he talks unskilfully enough for a man of his own Breeding, for 1. The Remonstrants and their Opponents are much too young, to denominate the Doctrine our Church espouseth; to that here he speaks as a *parachronizer*. But 2. I do not pretend that in every point, the Remonstrants agree with the Church of England; our Church having avoided to define in some things. 3. That they agree in some things, is as manifest as the Sun, by what our Article saith of the death of Christ, and the falling away of the Regenerate. And if in every other point they do not speak the same thing, yet they are infinitely liker to one another, then either can be to their common Enemies. And 4. I am sure, Our Church is favourable in nothing to the contra-Remonstrants against the Remonstrants. But 5. If the Remonstrants in some things do adhere too much unto Arminius, wherein the Calvinists and Arminians do but too much agree, (as I have elsewhere shewed of some points and am able to shew of others also,) it is no wonder if our Church doth stand at a distance from both together. And so tis a very grosse Fallacy (whether by ignorance or craft, it comes to passe, I do not say,) To make the Doctrine of our Church, and the Doctrine of the Remonstrants (though the most Orthodox men of the Belgick Churches) to be *indivicta*, or *Aequivalent*, in our Account. I can manifest a difference, whoever else will say he cannot. And holding fast mine Antagonist to the precedent limits of my Discourse, or of the Termes I use in it, I shall proceed to answer his next assertion, first, by denying his *prooflesse* and *helpless* saying, [that the countenancing of *Arminianisme* (as that is a Nick-name for the doctrine which we embrace with the Church of England) is no older then Bishop Laud and Bishop Montague] and for a proof of my Denial, I refer him to Dr. H.'s *Certamen Epistolare*, but more especially to his *Quinquarticular History*. 2. By affirming, that

The Doctrine of the Church of England vindicated, with Bp Laud and Bp. Montague.

if

if Bp. *Land* and Bp. *Montague* did more eminently than others, give great Encouragement and Countenance to what hath been commonly called Arminian, the meaning of it is onely this; that they would not suffer those Doctrines which were exceedingly remote from what was owned by our Church, and in some things contrarie to what our Church had defined, to pass with freedom for the Doctrines of the Church of England, when they were nothing but the mistakes of particular men in the English Church.

Of Mr. H.'s
Impertinence
implying
Presbyterians
to be Idolaters.

§. 29. But what hath Arminianisme to do with the words of the Homily against the Peril of Idolatry (p. 9) that Mr. H. should be so piddy, as to make that an Argument for his position? does he think that Arminius and the Remonstrants were as really Idolaters, as the same Arminius and his Followers are very well known to be Presbyterians? As Presbyterians they might be such, if we believe Bp. Andrews, and Dr Jackson; but as Anti-Calvinians, they could not be so.

The Arch.
Bishop cleared
as to
what he did
against Sher-
field.

And as little force hath that Homily, to prove that Arch-Bishop Land was no obedient son of the Church of England, (unlesse because he was a Father) in that he put Mr. Sherfield to so much cost, and a disgraceful acknowledgement of his faults, and caused him to be bound to his good Behaviour, *ibid*] For Sherfield's fault was no lesse then a publick Riot, even breaking of Church-windows in a private Caprice; such as in which (if he had pleased) he might have broken the Bishops head too. To disallow of pictures, is one thing; and to break them, is quite another. It was decreed at Frankford, by no less then 300 Bishops at once, that images are neither to be broken nor worshipt. And Dr. Hammond himself (who is least liable to the suspicion of shewing any favour to what is Popish) saith in his Treatise concerning heresie, [that we indeed in this matter approve of the Doctrine of the Frankford decrees, as that is summed up in * those few words.] It is so generally known that the Iconomachi were Hereticks, who fell to work in the dayes of old (almost 1000. years agoe) as Mr. Sherfield hath lately done

See Dr. Ham.
of Heresie p.
126.

don, That I thought *Mr. Hickman* might at least have heard of it. And pity it is that any Christian should so far imitate, and gratifie, both the *Mahumetans*, and the *Jews*. I have taken some care to inform my self rightly of *Sherfield's* business, and of the windows at *Sarum* of which he would needs be a Reformer. And by the favour of a Friend (having no acquaintance there my self) I have an accompt from such a person, as cannot easily be deceived in that particular, and cannot possibly design to deceive another. The truth of the Story is briefly this.

§. 30. In a Parochial Church of that City, there was painted in a window the history of the Creation. And in each dayes work there was added the figure of an old man. The glass might be of the colours mentioned by Master *Hickman* (from *Mr. Prin.*) the proportions were small, and so obscurely described, that very difficult it was to discern the History. Few did ever observe, or appear to take any notice of it; so far it was from giving scandal to weaker persons. Many old Bibles have the like in the two first chapters of *Genesis*. Nay the like may be seen in an *Impression* at *Geneva*. (let *Mr. Hickman* mark that) It was a calumny rais'd against the excellent *Archbishop*, that he justified the picturing of God the Father, by that of the *Ancient* of dayes in *Daniel*, (which *Mr. Hickman* perhaps invented, and pretends no more for it, then a simple *Hearsay*.) when he onely chastized the presumption of *Sherfield*; not knowing what mischiefs to Church and State such publick riots might one day end in, if private persons of their own heads might be suffer'd to Reforms in such a manner. 'Tis true the vision in *Daniel* might be described agreeably to *Daniel's Narrative*, that is, by the shape of an old man. What is presented to the mind, and ear, by words and letters, may also by pictures be represented to the eye. But to picture an old man in the History of the Creation (wherein there is not the least mention of any such thing) is to falsifie the History; And I

An Impartial
narrative of
the case.

Y

profess

profess (for my part) to *abhor* it, as much as Mr. *Sherfield* can be imagined to have done. Yet would I not take his riotous course, whereby to testify my resentment; but humbly complain to *just Authority*, and so amend *our fault*, without the making of *another*. Concerning the wisdom and Piety of *Archbishop Laud*: I cannot better convince a *Hickman*, then by the words of *Bishop White*; who (if a Bishop at least can be) is thought a very good man by the *Presbyterians*. This Bishop speaking of a great scandal, withdrawing many from conformity, *Your Grace* (saith he) in your *Metropolitcal visitation*, hath begun a good work, in taking this into your religious consideration, and you have endeavoured a *Reformation*. God Almighty vouchsafe to give a blessing, and good success to your pious intention, and that by your *Graces Authority*, this scandal before mentioned may be removed out of the Church.

Bishop White
in his *Epistle*
Ded. before
his *Treatise of*
the *Sabbath*. p.
22, 23.

The Doctrine
of S. John
concerning An-
tichrist.

§. 31. After one or two more of his empty *bearsayes* of *Bishop Lindsey* and his Chaplain, (too contemptible to be nam'd) he inveigh's against *them* who do not think the *Pope Antichrist* (p. 11.) how ill forever, they *think* and *say* of him besides. That some indeed of our Church have thought and taught him to be *Antichrist*, is very certain. But it does not thence follow, that 'tis the Doctrine of the Church. They that Attribute it rather to *Simon Magus* and the *Gnosticks*, have no less then S. John for their *Authority*. Saint John saying plainly, that *Antichrist* (when he was writing) *was already in the world*, 1 Joh. 4. 3. which compare with what is said, 1 Joh. 2. 18. and 22. What is said in the *AE* for the *subsidy*, of the *Clergy*, as I have not convenience to examine, so should I be sorry to find it in contradiction to Saint John. And if the matter were to be carried by the votes of men who are greatly learned, I know not what can be greater, then *Hugo Grotius*, and Dr. *Hammond*,

Original sin of-
fended in, as
taught in the
Article of our
Church.

§. 32. What he add's against Dr. *Taylor* (pag. 12.) Dr. Taylor alone is concerned in, unless he thinks that *That Doctor* is the *whole Church of England*. Let it suffice Ma-
ster

SECT. 32. 33. touching his Preface to the Reader. 163

fter *Hickman*, that the Doctrine of *originall sin* in the ninth *Article* of our Church, is without any scruple assented too; not onely by *my self*, (who have given a publick proof of it,) but by every other man of my particular acquaintance. What he saith of the Religion, *which was sealed by the blood of our English Martyrs*, (ib.) should suffice to conjure up the very blood of his Feet into his forehead. The best of our Martyrs having been *Bishops*; and such as partly *composed*, or partly *admired* our *English Liturgie*; and such as taught the very Doctrines, which now are nicknam'd *Arminian*, and such as never would *part asunder*, what the Holy Ghost hath joyned in the very *same Text*, (1 Pet. 2, 17.) *Fear God, Honour the King*. And I will hold *Mr. Hickman* so wise for once, as to think a word sufficient for him. But when he adds that his Religion hath been defended (or fought for) by the swords of soldiers (ibid.) I shall tell him too in one word more, That those are very *unfit weapons* for the defending of a Religion, where God himself allows nothing but *Prayers* and *Tears* to guard it with. The Church of England teacheth none to call their strength the law of Justice; or to fight for Religion with breach of Loyalty. We leave such practice to three sorts of men; the *Turkish*, *Papish*, and *Presbyterian*. Our English Martyrs were none of that number.

*Loyalty a part
of our Religion.*

§. 33. Christian Reader, I am now arriv'd at that part of *Mr. Hickmans* Preface, (p. 13.) wherein Doctor *Heylin* hath *ex professo* taken him up. See his *Ceremonial Epistle*, part 3. pag. 150. §. 26. from which place forwards, he hath so fully and effectually performed his enterprise, as to have given a *superseas*: to what I had otherwise detain'd thee with, and am in some measure prepar'd for in my *Adversaria*. And therefore partly not to *worry* thee with that enormity of *Length*, into which I foresee I shall infallibly grow, if I pursue a Fugitive *valla nidos*, (as I have hitherto done) and partly not to do what is done already, and by one of the *exaltiss* *Histo-*

*An account to
the Reader of
the Author's
service in all
that follows.*

ricall hands, and especially because I am no way concern'd in a very great part of the tedious Preface, as well as because that I alone am left to speak, to the remaining parts of the Book it self; I shall resolve to say no more then thou dost probably expect, and hast reserved a patience for. But if I here and there add, what is not observed, (at least not said) by Dr Heylin; I hope the fault will be such, as will deserve its own pardon.

By Tunstall and
Bp. Hooper
out-weigh
Tyndal, &c.

The seven-
teenth Article
two ways fur
us.

§. 34. If that were true which he saith of Tyndal, &c. (p. 13.) yet besides the five things which are returned by Dr. Heylin, (p. 152, 153.) I can requite him with Bishop Tunstall in King Henry the eight's dayes, and Bishop Hooper a little after, who both abhorr'd that Doctrine, which Frith and Tyndal are urged for; and wrote against it to better purpose, then these were able to write for it. The seventeenth Article which he urgeth (p. 15.) is proved two ways to make apparently for us. 1. By the phrase of God's choosing in Christ. 2. By the care which is enjoyned, that we receive God's promises as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture; which why did Master Hickman so very fraudently conceal in his recital, but because his heart told him 'twas quite against the whole Frame of Calvinistical Decrees? See Dr. Hammond's Fundamentals, p. 146.

So the Litur-
gie and Homi-
lies, and No-
wells Cate-
chism, which
Mr. H. produ-
ceth against
himself.

§. 35. 'Tis very remarkable (p. 16.) that he pretends the Common Prayer and Homilies are for his turn, but is not able to cite a word. And Dr. Heylin makes it appear (as Bishop Overal long ago) that all is destructive to his pretensions. What a rare Argument hath he urged, p. 18? From Doctor Nowel being Prolocutor in Queen Elizabeth's time; He concludes the Articles of the Church to be Calvinistical. And then to manifest how ignorant he is in these points, he cites a passage from Nowels Catechism, which he hopes is for his interest, though it is as visibly against it, as can be wish'd. For whereas it is said, [They that be stedfast and constant in this Faith, were chosen and appointed, and (as we term it) predestinated to this so great

great felicity, p. 19.] It is interred unavoidably, That God did choose or predestinate to life eternal the *steadfast, stable, and constant in the Faith*. Which is as much as *Arminius* did ever desire to have granted, whereby to prove the Decree to have been *respective*, to wit, respective of that *steadfastness and constancy in the Faith*, (which imports *perseverance unto the end*) without which it is confessed, God chooseth none. It being impossible for God (even becaute he is perfect) to predestinate or choose a person so qualified (as is expressed by Doctor Nowell) without respect to the qualification. So that Nowell was an *Arminian*, or *Arminius* a kind of *Nowellist*, (no matter which,) and Master Hickman understands not what 'tis really to be either. He could not else so often write (after the manner that he doth) either quite beside, or against his purpose.

§. 36. To his Question, (pag. 19.) how came the Church of England to dispose of her places of greatest influence and Trust to such as were of a contrary persuasion, if she consented to the opinions commonly call'd *Arminian*?] Doctor Heylin's answer is most sufficient, p. 170. &c. But yet I add five things. 1. Our Church in all things was not one way, or other, (there lyes a fallacie in *Arminian*, which we disown,) and so she was not (in particular) for *irrespective decrees*. 2. The Church taken collectively (as when we say the Church of England) or used to signify the Doctrine, never disposed of preferments. But they were ever disposed of (to the better, or to the worse,) as men corrupted with interest and evil principles have been more or less prevalent with those in power, (as of late the Independents dispos'd of all from the Presbyterians, witness the Deanarie of Christ-Church from which Doctor Reynolds was ejected, and the Conscience-stretcher of England (if the song speaks truly) prefer'd before him. And yet whilst I am writing, 'tis vice versa a like case. *Qui color albus erat* &c. does it follow they were both in the right by turns? no, the wisest men say, they were both *Usurpers*.) 3. They could not be *Arminians*, who lived before *Ar-*

It was not the Church of England that put the Calvinists into preferments

minius was alive, 4. If *Calvins* Doctrine was that of our *National Church*, whilst his *Followers* prevailed in point of *Number*, and for that very reason, (as Mr. H. now argues) then the contrary to that was her *Doctrine* too, when the Nick-named *Arminians* did as much prevail, by his own *confession* (p. 4.) The absurdity of which will make Mr. H. renounce his *Logick*, 5. Since he boasts of his *number*, I shall probably name *ten* of worth and eminence on this side, for every *single* man of *Note*, which he names on *that*, not that I favour such wayes of *arguing*, but meerly because I would convince him, by that which he chooseth to make his own. I shall publish (if it be needful) an ample Catalogue of the *Orthodox*, on *whom* such *places* have been conferred in the *Church of England*, as will be granted to have been (ever) of *greatest influence and trust*. But I abstain (whilst it is needlesse) out of that reverence which I beare unto *peace, and prudence*.

Arch-Bp. Bancroft on Anti-Calvinist.

Bancroftus
Dang. Pos. l. 4.
ch. 10. p. 161,
162.

§. 37. If Arch-Bishop Bancroft had hated that which is called *Arminianisme* as the shadow of Death, (which Mr. H. pretends p. 20. he would not have shewed such a hatred to Mr. Calvin and his Followers. Nor would he have published the *confessions* both of Coppinger and Wigginton, touching their publishing their Pamphlet of *Predestination*, to prepare the way to their intended murder and Rebellion; even by laying the blame of their leud attempts upon the absolute decrees of the Almighty, which is inferred by that desperate Doctrine to give a fatal necessity to all events, and I therefore call it a desperate Doctrine, because it was called so expressly by Bp. Bancroft himself, in the famous Conference at Hampton Court.

Dr. RICH-
ARDSON &
Dr. OVERALL
both publick
Professors and
most severe in
the Calvinian
Doctrine.

§. 38. Whilst he saith that in Cambridge there was one Dr. Overall, who was suspected a little to Arminianize [ibid.] He is unhappy in 2. respects. For 1. If he means one, as opposed to more, (and not by way of contempt, as some have taken it) then he must know that Dr. Richardson was one of the Divinity Professors in Cambridge, a very eminent Anti-Calvinist, and commonly called by those men, the

SECT. 38, 39. touching his Preface to the Reader. 167

the *Fat Arminian*. For he lay very heavy on all such men, as *Calvinized* in Disputation. Dr. *Sibbs* in particular was so baffled by him, that he thereupon preached on *God's* to the Clergy. 2. So far was Dr. *Overal* from being coldly, or but a little, what Mr. *H.* calls *Arminian*, that it is hard to name any, more averse to the *Calvinists* in point of *Doctrine*, as well as *Discipline*. For not to speak of his *Exposition* of the *Genuine minde* of the *Church* of *England* in the 5. Controverted points, (which is as crosse to the *Calvinists* as can be wisht,) his large *Epistle* to *Hugo Grotius* doth so inveigh against the Tenent of *unconditionate Decrees* (as well of *saving* as *dammning* men) that he reckons it one of those opinions, * which is by no means to be endured in the *Church* of *God*, as not consisting with the *Goodnesse* and *love* of *God* to *mankind*, with the *nature* of *man*, and with the *nature* of *humane Actions*, with the revealed word of *God* both in the *law* and in the *Gospel*; in a word, tis an opinion, (as the Dr. goes on) which doth not only lead men to carnal security and despaire, and carries along with it many other the like absurdities. But it [affixeth or forceth on *God* himself either counterfeiting and lying, or malice and iniquity, or cruelty and injustice.] such an *Anti-Calvinian* was the most learned Dr. *Overal*; with whom our late *Primate* of *Armagh* did most happily profess his full concurrence.

* Sententia quæ ex altera parte sic asserunt Decretum Dei absolute, gratiamque efficacem, ut tollant voluntatem soluti conditionem, nullam sufficiens, nullo modo in Ecclesia Dei ferenda sunt aut toleranda

ut quæ pugnent cum bonitate Dei & Philanthropiâ; cum naturâ hominis aut modo actionis humanæ; cum verbo revelato tam in lege quàm in Evangelio. Deoq; aut similitudinem & mendacium, aut malitiam & Iniquitatem, aut crudelitatem & Injustitiâ affingant; Hominiibus; aut securitatem carnalem, aut desperationem adferant, multaq; similia Absurda & inconvenientia secum attrahant. JO. OVERALLUS ad Hug. Gro. Mail. 16. 1613. p. 279, 280.

S. 39. But I am challenged to name any one *Doctor* of the *chaire* who was placed in *Oxford*, and not a *Calvinist* *ibid.*] And I am ready to name one who was *inftar omnium*, equal to all that went before, if not superiour in all respects

Dr. SANDERSON no less, since his change of Judgement.

* See Dr. Sanderson's letter accorded with by Dr. Hammond p. 10. & 11.

spects ; even the eminently moderate and most learned Dr. Sanderson, who though he was not before the time of the late Arch-Bishop, yet he is more to be considered then all that were ; because for many years together he had ever acquiesced in the sublapsarian way, and yet upon great and mature deliberation, having all his 5. schemes in his eyes at once and comparing them duely with one another, He soon discerned a Necessity of quitting the sublapsarian way, (in which till then, he did acquiesce) as well as the supralapsarian, which he could never fancy, so that the whole of Mr. Calvin, as a sub, and supralapsarian, (for he is both by fits, as Dr. Sanderson observes, and Dr. Twisse confesseth,) was rejected by him when he was ripest and most impartial which though I knew a good while since, by a letter received from himself, (that I might not doubt of my intelligence,) yet had I not spoken of it here (how much soever for the honour and interest of my cause) had not his change been made publick by his consent.

Persecution is not a mark of Error in those that suffer it.

§. 40. He saith, *As many as trod the Arminian path, were wont to be suppressed and censured, so soon as they began to discover themselves*, p. 21.] First, if this were true, it were a very impertinent and pitiful way of arguing. For we know there was a time, when the Eastern Churches were overspread with the prosperous heresie of the Arrians, as the Western were in great measure with that other Heresie of the Donatists, whilest the Orthodox were suppressed by those, and these. And what objection can it be to the Spouse of Christ, or her children, that in adherence to his Gospel they have borne his Cross too? But 2. It is false, which he so confidently affirmeth, and that without exception too. For did not Mr. Harpsfield discover himself at Pauls Crosse (as may appear by his Printed Sermon, after which he was preferred from one Dignity to another, first to the Mastership of Pembroke-Hall, and after that to the Arch-Bishoprick of York? Let Mr. H. reflect upon what I told him (§. 36.) and retract the rashness of his expression.

Sect.

• Sect. 41, 42. touching his Preface to the Reader 169

Sect. 41, Of Mr. Barret and Mr. Simpson I shall the rather speak in particular, because Dr. Heylin does refer them to his *General Answer* (p. 175.) And I. observe in Mr. Hickman, that he does not name Mr. Barrets Doctrines, for which the censure was passed on him, perhaps he was ashamed to name them. For if they were such as Mr. Simpsons, that the commission of a great sin doth extinguish Grace for a time; 'Tis plain the Censurers themselves were much more worthy of publick Censure. For when our Article saith exprefly, *that the child of God may fall away, by what sin may he fall, if not by a great one?* (But of this I have spoken in My whole third Chapter to Mr. Baxter,) And then for what he spake of Rom. 7. It must be meant in all reason of committing great sins too, (in consent with that which he spake before,) and so they came not home to the business, who understood it onely of a regenerate man according to St. Austin in his *Retractions*. For there that Father is of opinion, that St. Paul in that Chap. did not speak of great sins, but onely sins of infirmity, which that it really was an error, and a gross error too, and what betrayed that Father to it, Mr. Hickman may see though he look no further, then Dr. Hammonds Review of his *Annotations*; especially p. 131. compared with p. 127. where he saith (what doth carry sufficient evidence of its truth in the fore-head of it) that *this indeed is all the difference to be assigned betwixt a regenerate and an unregenerate man, that in the one the Spirit, in the other the Flesh is victorious*, that is, the will of the one is led by the spirit, and the will of the other by carnal Distates.

Sect. 42. Now concerning the *Recantation* supposed to be made by Mr. Barret, besides what is said by * Dr. Heylin to shew its improbability, and the Letter (by him produced) to Dr. Good; I have another letter of Barrets, copied out from his own hand and directed to Mr. Chatterton, the Master (at that time) of Emanuel College, wherein he saith exprefly, *that he would not perform the Retraction required of him*. And he gives such reasons, as are too long to

Mr Simpson cleared from his Censures as to Falling from Grace, and Rom. 7.

Barrets Recanting, an arrant fable * Hist. Quinquag. p. 3. ch. 19. p. 72. 73.

be here inserted; which I therefore defer till some other season, when I may fitly publish *that*, with some other things not hitherto extant. I have also been inform'd of some *selected Masters of Colleges*, that having diligently *sought*, they could *not* find any such thing. So that for ought I yet see, that *Recantation* is but a *Fable*. Nor can I wonder at such inventions of a Puritan faction, when I consider their Forgeries concerning *Hampton-Court Conference*, 'till Doctor Barlow had put them to *shame* and *silence*.

8.
Bp. MONTAGUE'S vindication,

§ 43. To his following *Impertinencies* I shall speak very briefly because they are extremely *such*, p. 23. &c.]
1. As Bishop Montague's Adversaries did indeed object (against him) his *Dissent from the Doctrine of the Church of England*, so to their *shame* (if they had any) he freed himself from that charge. Master Pim's Report to the *House of Commons*, is no proof at all, that he was censur'd by the *Parliament*. And the *Order* of that *House* in the behalf of the *Articles*, was not hurtfull to him who oppos'd them *not*, but understood them *better*, and declar'd as much *for* them, as the *Commoners* could doe.

Mr. Hickman's confession, That men follow Calvin in their younger, and Arminius in their riper years.

§ 44. To Mr. Hickman's rare *Question* p. 28. [*How comes it to pass, that those who now follow Arminius, did heretofore follow Mr. Calvin?*] I thank him for the occasion to make *this Answer*, That the *elder* men grow, they grow the *wiser* and more *impartial*. To what end do men *study* both *men* and *books*, but to discover the *mistakes* of their giddy *youth*? Is it not fit that the *aged Bishop of Winchester*, should understand things better than young Mr. Andrews? But he was a *Bishop*, and one who lived at such a *Time*, when it was *safe* to leave Calvin, as King James (his Great Master) had also done.

The causes of it given by Dr. SANDERSON,

And therefore to satisfy Mr. Hickman, Let the *Question* be put of Dr. Sanderson; whose *change of judgment* was never *publish'd*, untill the last and worst times, whilst

whilst yet the Followers of Calvin had power to * *persuade* their opponents: why did he follow the way of Calvin in point of *Doctrine* (I mean his *sublapsarian* way) before he considered and compar'd it with other ways, and at last forsok it *after* such consideration? The very *Question* suggests the *Answer* which in all reason is to be made; And may suffice for a *general answer* to the farr greatest part of *Mr. Hickman's* long *Preface*. Observe (Good Reader) the most Ingenuous *Confession* of that so eminently *learned* and *holy* man. [† *Giving himself to the study of practick Divinity,* (he saith) *he took up most other things upon trust.*] And this he did so much the rather, because Calvin (at that time) was not so *wholesomely* suspected, as (blessed be God) he since hath been. But (to exprets it in the words of the Judicious Doctor *Sander-son*) * *The honour of Calvin's name gave Reputation to his very errors.* And if so great a Scholar as he did take up opinions upon trust, and was carried down the stream of the common errors, his weaker brethren could not choose but be swept away with so strong a *Torrent*.

§. 45. But they were farr from being *such*, whose Questions in the *Act* *Mr. Hickman* reciteth from *Mr. Prin*, as he hath done the greatest part of his tedious *Preface*. For Doctor *Jackson* might well acknowledge *all* lost in *Adam*, when he supposed a *Recovery* of *all* in *Christ*. And here it is observable, that *Mr. Hickman* hath not stohn fairly. For *Mr. Prin* expressed very honestly, what his juggling *Transcriber* thought it his Interest to conceal. It was the very first of the Doctors three Questions, *An Peccatum originale continet in se aliquid positivi.* And this was held in the affirmative. The other *Act-questions* were Doctor *Frewin's*, the now-Right Honourable and Right Reverend Father in God, the *Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield*, whom I am never able to name, without a *pre- face of honour and veneration*. Who if he did once *Calvinizare*, (as *Bishop Andrews*, and *King James* before the times of their conversion,) let it suffice that his *later*

* See *Inquisi- tis Anglicana*, and other accounts given of the *Triers* at *Westminster*

† See *Doctor Hammond's Pacifick Discourse of Gods Grace and decrees*, p. 10.

* *ibid* p. 9.

Of *Doct^r JACKSON'S All Questions and Doctor Frewin's*, &c.

1 Cor. 13. 11.

judgement is much preferable to his former. It is no more to the disparagement of Doctor Goad, and Master Hales, and Daniel Ikenius (the Synodist at Dort) and Doctor Potter, and Doctor Godwin, and Melancthon himself, and the late Primate, that as soon as they saw, they forsook their errors; then it could be to Saint Paul, that though as long as (in comparison) he was a child, he spake as a child, understood as a child, and thought as a child, yet when he grew to a perfect man, he put away childish things. And hence Mr. Hickman may take the reason, why I parted with those opinions I first embraced, which now he reproacheth me withall (p. 29.) though more to my honour than he imagin'd. But he must know that by the first of the three last Questions, [*An predestinatio ad salutem sit propter pravisam fidem.*] he seems to be ignorant of the difference betwixt the foresight of Faith, and Faith foreseen; as betwixt *ex*, and *propter*; a condition, and a cause; *secundum præscentiam Fidei*, & *propter fidem præcitant*. And so he is like the vain Janglers of whom Saint Paul speaks to Timothy, that they desired to be Teachers, understanding neither what they said, nor whereof they affirmed.

1 Tim. 1. 6, 7.

Of K. JAMES
and Bp. Montague.

§. 46. Of Lambeth Articles, that they were caused to be suppress'd by Queen Elizabeth, See Doctor Heylin his *Examen Historicum* p. 164. That King James before he dyed was an Anti-Calvinist, appears by the Conference at Hampton Court, and by his great approbation of all that was preached by Bishop Andrews, which was as opposite to Calvin, as light to darkness, and by his high esteem of Bishop OVERALL, who was wont to call the Calvinists, The Zemonian Sect, and by his singular favour to Bishop Montague, whom he employed in composing his *Apparatus* and *Diavolismos*, and whose *Appeal* he adorned with his Royal Patronage and Protection. (which yet he could not have done, if he had not been that which they call, Arminian.) That Bishop Montague was encouraged by the special Direction of King JAMES, to Dedicate

dicare that Book to his Royal self, is most apparent to every man, who will but read his own words in his Dedication.

If any Reader can yet be ignorant of King James his deliverance from that captivity, into which he had been led by his first and worst Teachers, let him peruse that Epistle with which the learned *Tilenus Senior* did dedicate his Book to that learned King; even his * Book of *Animadversions* upon the *Synod of Dort's Canon*. There the Reader will be inform'd, how *Tilenus* his *Paranesis* had pleas'd that King; who gave a proof of his special liking by his speciall command to have it Printed. How a little after that, the King invited him by a Letter, to come over into England, and here to try the effects of his Royal Favour. How his Majestie took care, that care might be taken by other men, Not to blaspheme with the Puritans in making God the Author of sin. How he assented to *Tilenus*, whilst he inveighed against the Error of *irrespective decrees*, especially that of *Reprobation*. A more impious error then which, he said a * *Synod of Divels* was not able to invent. Thence he styled it the *Horrendum illud Calvinianum decretum*; and professed to see nothing throughout the whole *Calvinian Scheme*, which did not either flow out of *Zeno's porch*, or from the *Tables of the Destinies*, or from the *stinking Mephitis* of the *Manichees*. By all which it is apparent, that Mr. *Hickman* is unexcusable as far as his 38. page; where he grows less guilty, though guilty still.

King James his conversion from the Calvinian errors.

* Vid. Epist. Ded. præfix. Notis seu Animadvers. Danielis Tileni in Canon. Syn. Dord.

* — Si coactum immundorum spirituum concilio, eorum Princeps Diabolus à paredris suis Angelis, five singulatis, five per faryram rogatis sententis,

quonam commento odium hominum adversus Deum vehementius incendi, atque incendi queat, &c. —

§. 47. That some of our Divines did change their judgement, notwithstanding their employment at the *Synod of Dort*, will not (I think) be denied by any, who hath not the forehead of a *Hickman*. For Mr. *HALES* his conversion is known to most, (as *Tilenus* his to all,) and.

A change of judgement in some Divines who were sent to Dort.

intro. ch. 3.
p. 103, 104.

Div. pur. Def.
ch. 4p. 29.

Mr. H.'s sense
of the Univer-
sity, and his un-
pardonable
scurrility
to the late
Arch-Bp.

and Dr. GOAD'S to very many. That Bp. DAVENANT was at last for *Universal Redemption*, I have long since * proved, and more then once, what hath been said by Bp. Hall against the tenent of *absolute or irrespctive reprobation*, I have elsewhere at large informed my Readers. That Dr. WARD and Bp. DAVENANT were of opinion, that all Infants by *Baptisme* are freed from the guilt of *Original sin*, and in a *state of Salvation*, (implying some to fall totally and finally too, because there are some, who die *Impenitents* being men, notwithstanding being *Infants* [they were Baptized,]) Mr Gataker hath assured us by divulging of their Epistles. If I would passe over to *France*, I could tell him of Famous *Moulin*, who had an interest in the *Synod*, (although not there,) and yet was exactly an *Arminian*, as to the point of *Reprobation*; and accused as such, by Dr Twisse, so was *Camero*, *Amyrald*, *Testard*, and *Daille*, as well accused by *Spanhemius*, as by other followers of *Calvin*, for passing over to the *Arminians* in the point of *General Redemption*: but to speak of such as these, is to pay Mr. H. in more then full measure.

§. 48. To Mr. H.'s two Questions proposed in one breath, [What thinks Mr. P. of the University of Oxon? did not she know the Opinions of the Church of England? p. 46.] I briefly answer; First, that whilest she had the privilege of enjoying a *Real University*, (which she enjoyed until the year 1648.) I think as well of the *University* as when she burnt the *Book*, and condemned the Doctrine of the great *Calvinist Parauis*, who sowed those *Presbyterian seeds* of the late prosperous Rebellion, of which such fellows as our *Compiler* enjoy the harvest. To the 2. I answer by way of Interrogation, Did not the *Church of England* so much as know her own *minde*, when she commanded *Erasmus* his learned *Paraphrase* to be had in such *honour* throughout the Nation, as to any Piece of *Calvin* was never given? how came the prayers of *Erasmus* to have a place in our *publick Liturgy*, from King Henry the 8. dayes unto these our own, if all our Church was fermented with *Calvins Leaven*?

The

The *Univerſity* of *Oxford* knew well her Doctrins, eſpecial-ly then when ſhe was moſt of all knowing, which was in the time of the late *Arch-Biſhop*; in the vilifying of whom, *Mr Hickman* hath ſhamed his own dear Faction. For whiſt he calls him an evil inſtrument (p. 48.) he makes himſelf an example of *Puritanical Petulancy* and paſſion, whereby the men of his Faction will grow more vile. And whiſt he ſaith they were never well, till they had ſpewed out his Grace as an evil inſtrument (ibid.) he im-plies his Faction was deadly Drunk: ſo indeed were the Jews, when they were ſick of Chriſt, and thought they could not recover till they had ſpewed him out of the earth. But as *Titus Veſpaſian* came about 40. years after and cured thoſe Jews of all Diſeaſes; ſo if our *Phariſees* will be pa-tient but half that time, they may perhaps meet with that, that will ſtop their ſpewing.

§. 49. Now I come to the objection, which *Mr. H.* con-ſeſſeth doth lye againſt him, [*the Church of England*, is for *Univerſal Redemption*; *The Calviniſts* that are *Anti-Armini-an* are againſt it. p. 43, 49.] To which he answers two wayes, Firſt, by a confeſſion, that *King James* gave it in charge to the Divines ſent to *Dort*; 'Not to deny that Chriſt died for all; and that this was affirmed by *Bp. Uſher*, (for ſo he calls the late *Primate*,) who alſo ſaid, 'That he gave in his own judgement to *Dr. Davenant* for *univerſal Redem-p-tion*; and accordingly it was one of *Bp. Davenant's* con-cluſions, 'that the death or Paſſion of Chriſt as the *Univerſal cauſe of mans ſalvation*, doth ſo far appeaſe and reconcile God the Father to Mankind, by the very fact of his Oblation, that he is truly now ſaid to be ready to receive every man into Favour, as ſoon as he will believe in Chriſt, notwithstanding the aforeſaid death of Chriſt reſtoreth us man (no man at leaſt who is come to ripeneſſe) into a ſtate of actual favour,

conciſſatum Humano Generi, ut verè nunc dicatur paratus quemvis hominem recipere in gratiam, ſimul ac in Chriſtum crediderit. Neminem tamen, ſaltem ex adultis, peccatis Chriſti mors in ſtatum gratiæ actualis, Reconciliationis ſive ſalutis, antequam credat. Theſe the words of *Bp. Davenant*, by *Mr. H.'s* confeſſion pref. p. 50.

* Note the breeding of a lay-preacher ordained at *Brackly*, to-wards the *Primate* of all *England*, whom *Chamier* al-lows to have been a prince.

Univerſal Re-demption, held as well by *K. James*, the late *Primate* of *Armagh*, and *Bp. Davenant*, as by *Armini-us*.

* Mors ſive Paſſio Chriſti, ut univerſalis cauſa ſalutis humane De-um patrem ipſo facto ob-lationis cate-nus reddit pa-carum & Re-

Recon-

Reconciliation, or salvation, untill he actually believes.] No man (saith the Bishop) no not any of the elect, before he is qualified by faith; meaning that faith which worketh by love, an Universal obedience to the commandments of Christ. But by the offering of himself upon the Crosse, the Bp. saith that he made God appeased and reconciled (observe the word) not onely to the Elect, but indefinitely to all Man-kinde; and that as an Universal cause, not onely of salvability, but (saith the Bp.) of salvation. Arminius never said more, no nor ever so much, for ought I am able to remember. Nor was ever so much said by the Church of England, as that Christ reconciled his Father to Man-kinde, ipso facto by the oblation of himself, [ut Universalis causa Salutis Humanae,] as the Universal cause of mankind's salvation. but I suppose by Salvation, he only meant Salvability, or no more by cause then meritorious. And then indeed he doth no more then Arminianize with the Church of England, (as Mr. Hickman is wont to phrase it.) It being the Doctrine of our Church, that Christ by his own oblation of himself once offered made a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. And again more fully, † that the offering of Christ once made is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world both Original and Actual. So exactly opposite to the Calvinists is the Church of England in her belief.*

This doth prompt me to tell the Reader (if he knows it not, or hath forgot it) that at a conference held about the Books of Bp. Montague, One of the Lords made it his motion, that the Doctrine of the Dort Synod (as to the points we speak of) might be received into the Articles of the Church of England, But this was opposed by Bp. White, and even for this very reason, because our Church in her publick Catechisme, doth teach her children to believe, (what is denied by the Synod of Dort) *Christ died for us and for all mankind.* Why Bp. Chappel (before Bp.)

did

* In the COMMUNION BOOK, after the act of Consecration.

† In the 31. ARTICLE of the 39. See Mr.

Clerk's Martyrologie, part 2. in the life of Dr. Preston, p. 129. to p. 134.

for a partiall account of the dispute between Dr. Preston, Dr. White, & Mr. Montague

did refuse an excellent place in *Ireland*, because he would not subscribe to *Dam man*, (alluding merrily to *Dammam*, who had the office of *Scribe* in the Synod of *Dort*) And how at last he became one of the *Bishops* of that Church, by the advantage of that Canon, (procured by the power of *Archbishop Land* in Intuition of *Bishop Chappel*) That a man was qualified for preferment in the Church of *Ireland*, without subscribing the *Irish*, if he would but subscribe the *English Articles*, is so very well known to many men, that *Master Hickman* himself perhaps hath heard it.

§. 50. *Master Hickman's* second Answer is by a proofless affirmation, and even in *that* his heart fails him; so as he clogs it with an [*almost*] a word which *saves many a lie*, (as the proverb is amongst country people.) Reader, take notice, that these are all his own words, [I am almost as confident, that to grant him universal Redemption, is to grant him *just nothing at all*] Thus what he forged of *Dr. Heylin* he fully verifies in himself, (if he is really the meaning of *Theophilus Churchman*.) For he is an unhappy Writer, and marr's every thing he medales with, p. 1.] To grant me *that which was denied*, by *Mr. Calvin*, and his followers, to grant me *that which the Remonstrants were even persecuted for by those of Dort*; To grant me *that for which Spanhemius accused Amyrald as an Arminian*; and for which the notorious *Triers* have deprived so many of their rights; is to grant me *just nothing*, saith our *Automachus*. But what now will he say to save the credit of his *Assembly men*, whom he can never reconcile to the *Lord Primat*, or *Bishop Davenant*, or to himself? Let him read and be ashamed of the publick confession of their faith, chap. 8. Art. 5 & 8. especially the last. Where *Redemption* is so far from being held to be universal, that 'tis extended onely to *them*, to whom it is certainly and effectually applied, and who are effectually persuaded by the Spirit of Christ, to believe and obey, &c. Now can it be thought by *Mr. Hickman* that all mankind

Mr. H. grants the whole cause but does not know it. His opposition to the Assembly-men's confession of FAITH.

hath Christ effectually applied, as is there expressed? if so he is (it seems) for universal salvation, of which the *Arminians* never dream'd; they were never so void of sense and reason. If not so, 'tis evident, how ill he thinks of his *Assemblers*, and how little he can comply with their *Novel Creed*, unless he is a kind of *Gnostick*, and so can side with all by turns.

Mr. H. proved
to grant the
whole cause at
which he rails,
and so to be a
Calvinist
Arminian.

§. 51. His Answer is not so ridiculous, but that his reason is somewhat more. Take it too in his own words [For what though Christ did so far dye for all as to procure a salvation for all, upon the conditions of Faith and Repentance? what's this to the absoluteness of God's Decrees? &c. pag. 49.] But that the world hereby is made my witness, that the man is indeed a meer Compiler and a Rhapsodist, and is excessively ignorant of these affairs, I would permit my inclinations to follow their bent upon this occasion. Had the Reverend Dr. Reynolds said such a thing, I should gladly have spent a little Volume in his Conviction. But no such words could have proceeded from so intelligent an Adversary. Such as he cannot but know, how * inconsistent this is with *irrespective decrees*, that Christ should dye for all mankind, and so as to procure their *salvability*; or so as to make satisfaction for all the sins of all the world, as well actual, as original; or to as to make God appeased and reconciled to all mankind. How, I say, can this be, (which yet is granted by the Lord Primate, and Bishop Davenant,) if God decreed from all eternity to reject or reprobate the greatest part of mankind, either without respect to their very creation (as Doctor Twisse) or to their fall in Adam's loynes, (as the common *Supralapsarians*) or to any the least of their *Actual sins*? (as the *Sublapsarians* do hold and teach.) They that were absolutely reprobated cannot possibly be saved, or have a *salvability* procured for them. And so they imply a contradiction, who holding the absolute decree of Reprobation, do also hold that Christ procured a capability.

* See Doctor
SANDER-
SON'S two
Reasons, why
his soul is
much abbor'd,
and why he
was forced to
forsake the
Sublapsarians.
2ap. 2. §. 14. 15.

capability of salvation to all mankind. (But of this I have
* spoken to Dr. Bernard, p. 159.)

Besides, I will prove by three as great men, as Mr. Hick-
man probably can name of the *Anti-Arminians* (for so at
least they are called by their *Disciples* and themselves) That
Mr. Hickman hath now granted, what Dr. Twisse doth
call the *Arminian Cause*. For 'tis confessed by *De Moulin*,
in the letter which he sent to the *Synod of Dort*, and
by *Parans* the Professor of Theologie at *Heidelberg*,
(whose judgement was much regarded by the *Synod of Dort* too) and by Doctor *Edward Reynolds* by unavoidable
implication, That if *Christ dyed for all*, so far as a pro-
cure salvation for all upon condition, then God decreed he
should procure it upon condition for all. (without which
condition he did not procure it for any one.) *Peter Moulin's*
words are these. * "Non est dubium, quin ob quam
" causam Deus damnat, ob eandem damnare decreverit.
" Damnata autem reprobos ob peccata actu commissa. Lu-
" unt enim poenas in Inferno, non solum peccati Origina-
" lis, sed & actualium omnium. Unde & inaequalitas pœ-
" narum. Ergo & Deus eos damnare decrevit ob eandem
" peccata. Nihil enim obstat quo minus Deus confide-
"rans hominem jacentem in corruptione & pravitate na-
" turali, eundem quoque consideret pollutum iis peccatis
" quæ per istam pravitatem naturalem est commissurus.
" And again. † Deum quenquam destinasse ad poenam æ-
" ternam sine consideratione Impœnitentie aut increduli-
" tatis, nec dicimus, nec sentimus. — Impœnitentia
" antecedit ordine Reprobationem. Now this is down-
right * *Arminianism*, saith Doctor * *Twisse*, who could
better judge of *Arminianism*, than young *Rashdell*. Now
let *Parans* his words be weighed, that we may see if he
doth not also conspire professedly with the *Arminians*; (as
Dr. Twisse expressly affirms of *Moulin*)

yet confesseth as much as makes himself *Arminian* too. lib. 1, part. 1. pag. 77. See *Phil.*
lan. cap. 3. pag. 124.

* In the Ap-
pendix to
say'ss.
Equipped by
the confessions
of *De Moulin*,
Parans, and
Dr. Reynolds,

* *Ab. Synod.*
Dordr. part.
sess 143 p. 339

† *ib. p. 340.*

Confirmed
further by *Dr.*
Twisse.
* *Vin. Gra. lib.*
1. part. 1. fol.
4. Digt. 6. cap.
1 pag 92. who

† *Paras in
Explic. Dubior.
c. 9 ad Rom. p.
880.
* Id. 82. col. 2.
† Id. p. 887.
Col. 1.*

* *In proof to
the corrupt.
eur.*

*And by the Syn-
nod of Dort.*

† *Statutum
est, pro accusa-
tissimo eo
judicio & con-
sensu in Do-
ctrinā gratias
esse agendas.
Sess. 144. pag.
348.*

* *See Divine
Philanthropy
defended, ch. 3
p. 124, 125.
His scurrilous
usage of D. Hey-
lin shows the
length of his
unreason.*

† *Justus Judex non aliam decernendæ sententiæ, aliam
“exequendæ causam habet, sed unam utriusque, nempe
“capitale flagitium. And again he saith, * Denique posse
“uti jure suo absolutis in Reprobis ad interitum ordinandis,
“abstinuisse tamen. And yet again. † Propter quod De-
“us in tempore aliquos reprobat à gloria, propter id eti-
“am Reprobare à Gloria olim decrevit. And accordingly
* Doctor Reynolds thought fit to prove (as well he might)
that God decreed from eternity to permit sin in time, be-
cause in time he doth permit it. And so by consequence
he must grant, that God decreed to reprobate in respect or
intuition of actual sin, because he reprobates in that re-
spect and intuition. So farewell to Master Calvin, and the
Synod of Dort. Welcome the men that are call’d Armi-
nians. And if we allow Doctor Twisse to have known
the Doctrine of Arminius, Then the Synod of Dort was
unawares Arminian too. For they decreed to Peter Mou-
lin the † solemn thanks of the Synod, for his most accu-
rate judgement and consent in Doctrine. And how the ve-
ry same Doctrine which he presented to the Synod hath
been affirmed by Doctor Twisse to be Jesuitical and Ar-
minian, I have largely shew’d in * another Treatise. Now
then let Mr. Hickman himself be Judge, who hath con-
tended with his own shadow; and what a shame it is for
him, to have rail’d so much at Arminian Doctrines, to
which (when he hath done) he is fain to yield.*

§. 52. To his slanderous insinuation concerning a Book
of Doctor Heylin’s, which he affirms to have been burnt
by the hand of the common Hangman, as (he saith) he is
informed, (p. 53.) Doctor Heylin himself hath made
his own Answer. I onely here observe, what *stiff* is
made by this zealot to revile an aged and Reverend Divine,
without the least fear of the execution which the *Bores*
made upon the *Boyes*, who made a mockery of *Elisha* his
Reverend Baldness. But what they did was less unexcusa-
ble. For they were *licke young Boyes* who wanted teach-
ing. But this great Boy is a Boy of years too, and profes-
seth.

Sect. 53. 54 touching his Preface to the Reader. 181

seth (with the *Gnosticks*) to be a teacher of others, a guide of the blind, and an instructor of the foolish (Rom. 2. 19, 20.) Those children in years reproached the Prophet with what they saw, and were sure of, to wit, his bald head. But this child in manners and understanding makes use of a slander to shew his virulence. And hath no more to excuse him, then that he Heard it, which is possibly as false as the *Fall* it self. But be it so that he heard it; what would become of such creatures, as Mr. Hickman and Mr. Baxter, if other men should put in print whatsoever they hear of their misdemeanours? the best of it is, he hath gotten no more by his printed hearsay, then onely to make the world know how much his ears are too long. Nor do I wish him his deserts; for then I am sure, they would be shorter.

§ 53. To his concluding Question (p. 54.) I briefly answer three things. 1. *Delus versatur in generalibus.* 2. There is the fallacie *plurimum interrogatorium*: some are true, and some false. And by those that are true, no advantage accrues to the Calvinian cause. 3. Some learned men there will ever be, of both the opposite persuasions. And therefore the Doctrine of our Church is to be judged of by her *Liturgie*, *Homilies*, and thirty nine *Articles*. In which, as very many things are clearly for, so there is nothing that I can meet with against the Doctrines which I assert,

His concluding Question childishly fallacious.

§ 54. Having done with his Preface, I come to the Remnants of his Book. Where setting out with his dislike of Mr. Barlee's sharp stile, (as if the privilege of railing had been bequeathed to Mr. Hickman by the proprietarie in chief,) and presently falling on Mr. Goodwin in such a sharpness of style, as he dislikes in Mr. Barlee, his elder brother, (for which I see *Mr. Goodwin hath long since made him an example, (he next arrives at a profession,

His self-condemnation and contradiction.

* See his Preface to his Tract of Justification.

Pref. p. 1,

[that he never had perused my Defence of the Divine Philanthropie, nor ever would he pursue it, except he could finde some hours, which belong neither to night nor day. p. 3] yet besides his * Profession of having been conversant in my writings, and the use he makes of my expressions as his own, he frequently cites the words and pages even of that very Book, and farther avows he hath read it over, (p. 101.) Next he quarrels with Mr B. for printing part of his private letter; which if it had not been done by his own consent, he might have told me of it in time, either by word or by epistle; or have conveyed it to me by them, in whole common acquaintance he saith we meet. He is a dull Malefactor, who is not provided of some excuse, and therefore such as Mr. Hickman may finde out many. But how his wit will hold out to reconcile the contradiction betwixt the fourth page of his Book, and the second of his Bookish Preface, I am not qualified to guess at so great a distance.

The Calvinists draw their own consequences from their tenet of Decrees.

§. 55. At last he falls upon a point, which had been very material, had it not failed in one Circumstance, I mean the truth. For telling a story of the Lutherans (which he had read in Bp. Hall) he misapplies it by saying, *This is the case of the Calvinists. They hold an absolute decree of reprobation, hence it follows, says Mr. P. That God is the author of sin (p. 5.) No hence it follows (say the Calvinists faithfully cited by Mr. P. as to their words and pages and very lines,) that God is the author and cause of sin.* It was not I who drew the consequence, (though I might rationally have done it, as well as they.) But it was I who observed by whom it was drawn. Even by them who have contended for their fanciful decrees. I have made this so clear, in all my papers and particularly in this, (Ch. 1. §. 2. p.) that I wonder with what forehead Mr. H. can say I *finde a forehead, to say the Calvinists make God the author of sin.* Indeed when they have said it in plainest termes, they sometimes say they never said it; and thence I condemned them for so much self-condemnation. This the Reader may witness

Se&. 56, 57. touching his Preface to the Reader. 193

ness for me, as by viewing other parts of my *Autocritica*; so particularly the preface, or *Introduction*, p. 7. 8. And Ch 3. p. 140. 141, 142. Now that I am railed at, by such a mouth as *Mr. Hickmans*, upon no other ground, then my reproving him and others, for their often rayling at God himself is a great addition to my contentments; And whilst *Mr. H.* continues either to be what he hath been or to say what he hath said concerning God, I hope I shall not be so unhappy, as ever to have his good word.

2 Chron. 32. 17.

Sect. 56. Had I met with such Blasphemies in any writings of *Bp. Abbot*, or other men of our Church, I should have taken that course which the *Rhapsodist* tells me had been the wisest (.p. 6) But having met with none such, methinks the man should excuse me for my innocent desires to do no wrong. Such English writers as I found guilty, I very liberally named, and as impartially condemned. But our Divines at *Dort*, as well as those that are named by *Mr. H.* were for an *Index expurgatorius*; and so have justified me, in my severity to the Doctrines which they condemned. *Mr. H.* is therefore a very strange Person, in advising me to passe by the guilt of some beyond the sea, and to charge it on some at home, who (for any thing I know) have ever been clear from that offence: or if he means no more then this, that some of our English *Anti-Arminians* have blasphemed as much as *foreign Calvinists* have done let the Reader take notice that *Master Hickman* himself is their Accuser.

How Mr. H. is their accuser.

S. 57. That argument of his, [if sin is a positive entity, either God is the Author of it, or it is God,] He now confesseth to be his own; but only adds, that the Jesuits do use it as well as he p. 7.] I have often noted the affinity betwixt the Jesuits & Presbyterians. But why *Mr. H.* should help my parallel, I cannot guess. Nor do I think that that Argument was ever used by any Jesuit, unless *Mr. H.* himself is one; or unless it were done to debauch the

And how is
own.

the

how an Hob-
bist, and an
Arminian,

the *Presbyterians*, as well in that, as in other points, whereby to lay a new odium upon the *Protestant name*.

§ 58. What he saith of my Agreement, in one particular at least, with *Mr. Hobbs* (p. 8.) he might as easily have said of *Dr. Jackson*, or *Dr. Hammond*, or *Dr. Field*, or any other, who holds that the Author of the *obliquity* or *sinful act* must needs be the Author of the *sin*, and of the *obliquity*; and by consequence that our Adversaries who hold him the author of the one, conclude him so of the other also. And I have made it undeniable that there cannot be any difference betwixt the *act of hating God*, and the *sin of hating God*; because that *act* is that *sin*. *Mr. H.*'s device may be thus retorted. He agrees with *Mr. Hobbs* in the Stoical Doctrine of *Decrees*, in which he knows I dissent from both, would the Reader think that I am a *Hobbi*st for dissenting from *Mr. Hobbs*, and *Mr. H.* an *Anti-Hobbi*st for agreeing with him? so *Arminius* holds God to be the Author of the *act*, when the *act* is sinful. *Mr. H.* agrees with *Arminius*, as much as I differ and dissent which of us two is the *Arminian*, let others judge. And how many things more one might prove *Mr. Hickman*, at such a *Presbyterian* rate of arguing.

How in stri-
ving to clear
he condemns
himself, con-
fesseth him-
self king God
to be the Au-
thor of sin.

§. 59. It was not (as he pretends p. 9) for his *meer oversight in Metaphysics*, that I made him an example of *Antitocatacrisis*; but for holding forth a Doctrine, which *Himself* had confessed to be *Blasphemous*: was not that to condemn himself? what I said of a man in Print, who obtruded this sense upon an Article of the Creed, [that God is the maker of all things real] he knows I meant of an other, in whom I read the words printed, yet I might very well have said it of *Mr. Hickman himself*, who also hath printed his own belief, that it belongs to God to produce every real being p. 95. And hence he plainly now confesseth, that *positive and real are not all one*. (p. 10.) he must confesse he makes God to be the author of sin, though sin should be but a *meer privation* if it is but something real. And yet that it is more than a *meer privation*, himself

Sec^t. 59, 60. touching his Preface to the Reader. 185

himself hath also confessed, by confessing that it is *privative*, (pag. 95.) if he knows the difference between the two *conjuncts*, and thinks the *concrete* to be more then the *abstract*. Thus he is every way guilty, and self-condemned too. He beareth witness against himself with every whit as much *truth*, as with calumny and Falshood against his neighbour.

§. 59. He saith *the darkness* in the creation (Gen. 1.2.) was such, as no wise man will call *positive*, yet all will say that it was *reall*. p. 10.] If he thinks that *darkness* a meer *privation*, then first he confesseth that a meer *privation* is a thing *reall*; and so that God is inferred to be the Author of *sin*, although supposed to be no more then a mere *privation*. Next he contradicts the text, by which it appears there was a *darkness* antecedent to the *light*. When the *light* was created, it was divided from the *darkness*, (vers. 3.) so as the *night* and the *day* were reciprocally *privative* of one another. But thirdly, be it so, that that *darkness* was a *privation*, (though not of that *light*, which was not yet in *falso esse*) It is sufficient for me, that what is *privative* of *light* must needs be *positive* of *darkness*, whatever that *darkness* be said to be. Which if it was not created by God Almighty, Mr Hickman should tell us how it came to have a *being* (Gen. 1.2.) if he does not think it was eternally of it self, and run the hazzard of being thought as mad as *Manes*.

His own thick darkness touching the darkness in the creation.

§. 60. Having said that *Privations* are *reall* things, he presently adds, that they are ranked among *Entia rationis*; And why so? not because they do not antecedere operationem intellectus: but because they are conceived of otherwise then they be. p. 10.] First by this he ranks God amongst his *entia rationis*, when He is (more then any Creature) conceived of otherwise then he is. 2. He supposeth *Reason* to be here a false Judge. 3. He intimates a confession, that if *Reason* judgeth rightly, and not otherwise of the thing then indeed it is, to wit, that *privation* is *privation*, (not positive Blackness) it shall then be no longer *entia rationis*.

How he makes the most reall things entia rationis.

sionis, but *ens reale*. And by necessary consequence, that it is but an *error* to think it *otherwise*. Thus he clearly makes God to be the *Author of all things real*, and so of all *sins*, which he confesseth to be *real*, even whilst he denies that he ever said it.

How he ob-
trudes a new
Article of
Faith.

§. 61. But he asks, *why this is called an obtruding a new Article on the Church?* [p. 11.] To which I answer two things. First, that his *Brother* with whom I dealt, as with a person of his conspiracie, did thus expound the first Article of the Nicene Creed; 2. He who argues in such a manner, as to conclude the Gainsayer either an *Atheist*, or somewhat worse, (and even so doth Master Hickman, who saith that *sin*, if it is *positive*, is either *God's creature*, or *God himself*,) doth implicitly make a new Article of Belief.

And makes it a
point of omni-
potence to be a-
ble to do evil.
* Compare his
words p. 11.
with corr. co-
lls. p. 1.

§. 62. The *profession* which he makes before the Register within him, to which he pretends to owe more reverence, than to affront it with a willfull lye, (p. 11.) he seems to make for no other end, than to * steal those words out of my Notes, and to use them ambitiously as his own. For why should the *privateness of sin* be fittest to reconcile God's purity and omnipotence? Why will not the way of Saint *Austin* and *Lombard* do it as well? Or rather why should God's purity be thus nefariously implied to stand in need of a reconciliation with his Omnipotence? Let it be granted that God is able to do whatsoever is pure and perfect; as well as unable to do the least, that is contrary to both; And all is well upon every side. What need he be able to contradict himself? Or have power to do that, which is contrary to power as well as to purity and perfection? yet such would be the power to produce a *sinful* or wicked action, such as the action of hating God.

He proves his
own sin to be
positive enti-
ties, by ascri-
bing his rage
to his fabrick.

§. 63. He reckons up some phrases out of my *Auto-catechisms*, which though softer than he deserved, were severer it seems then he could patiently endure And to excuse his fit of Rage, into which he proves he was cast through that temptation, he saith I used him so severely

not

not onely upon a small, but upon no reason at all. p. 14.] As if his making a neighbour guilty of sin's 'Apotheosis, and his making God himself the principal cause of all wickedness, were not any the least reason for a Deportment as I had shewn. Thus *Vedelius* did nothing to provoke the anger of the *Remonstrants*, how much soever he had sweated to prove them *Atheists*. And Mr. *Hickman* is such a gentle inoffensive Creature, that though he calls them the ugly brats of the wildest sectaries which G. C. hath midwiv'd into the world (p. 14.) he hath injur'd no man, provoked no man. He professeth, in the same breath, He utters not the words of passion, but sobriety, p. 14. And thus the tame Creature hath meekly proved, That All his sins are positive entities, what ever he saith of other men's. For sobriety is a *veritas*, whose positive entity he allows. And notwithstanding the sad character which is fixt upon railing in * holy Writ, Mr *Hickman* tells us 'tis his sobriety: whereby his Readers are left to guess, what scurrility he had used in a fit of passion, whose very words, of sobriety are so outrageous. As for his virulence towards my self, I pass it over for this reason, That he may know my severity is but the executing of Justice, not for his bitterness to me, but to God himself; whom he hath charged as the cause of all the villainies in the world, which do fall under the Genus of Quality or Action. Whereas the worst he hath said of me, is even infinitely better. And though I must paradigmazize him for his blaspheming the God of heaven, yet I must do it so clearly in that behalf, as not to return him railing for railing.

Sec^t. 64. From his volley of bitter words discharg'd at once against me, he proceeds to calumniate Mr. BARLOW, the Reverend Provost of Queens Colledge, (p. 16.) whom he forgeth at least to have used this Argument, [If sin hath a positive or real being, and is not caused by God, it is God himself.] that is to say, If sin is not nothing, it must be God, or Gods creature. But when and where did Mr. Barlow thus argue? not in private be-

* 1 Tim. 6.4.
2 Pet. 2. 11.

1 Pet. 3.9.

His slanderous charge against Mr. Tho. BARLOW of @ is Oxford.

twist him and Mr. Hickman; for I was told by Mr. Barlow, what makes me know it to be impossible. Not publicly and in print; For I cannot find it in his *exercitationes*. It is therefore a very enormous thing, to steal a-bundance from Mr. Barlow without the citing of any page where the matters really are to be found; And yet to cite him thus by Name, for that which never fell from him, by word or writing. Hence the Reader may judge of this mans Religion. His commendation of Mr. Barlow, (if such it can be, whilst he bestows it,) I very readily grant him to my advantage. For Mr. Barlow hath a better opinion of me, then I have of my self. And I can yield him a greater deference, then he can think is due to him. Nor will he assert his own Judgement, without a submission to other men's, (Doctor JACKSON, and Doctor FIELD, to name no more) who are more his Seniors, then he is mine. Sure I am, that my Learned Friend can never be pleased with a Commendation, which is usher'd into the world with so foul a calumny.

His foul defa-
mation of Dr.
REYNOLDS.

§. 65. And as little can Doctor REYNOLDS take any pleasure in the mockery, which Master Hickman doth mix with his vindication. I did but make it a Question, whether he were not in judgement an *Episcopal Divine*, how much soever accounted a *Presbyterian*, (the reason of which Question I shall alledge in due time) and yet I am said by Master Hickman to have branded Doctor Reynolds with the suspicion of being an *Hypocrite*, and that he could not be in earnest of that Party, whom he hath owned in praying, in preaching, in covenanting. p. 17, 18.] to which I answer by these degrees. 1. In all my writings, there are not found any such words; Had there been, Mr. Hickman would not have feared a citation. 2. Time was when Doctor REYNOLDS did own the King and the Bishops, both in his Praying and Preaching too; as may appear by two of his printed sermons, for obedience and conformity to those that were Rulers at that time, both Ecclesiastical, and Civil. So that in judgement he is now, what he was
twenty

twenty years ago, unless he hath turned with the times, and with those that turn'd them. But of *this* he is accused by Mr. Hickman, who makes him one of the *Covenanters*; whether truly, or falsely, I cannot tell. If *truly*, he disgraceth that learned man. If *falsly*, he wrongs and defiles himself. 'Twere very strange that Doctor Reynolds, who had taken the oaths of *allegiance* and *supremacy*, subscribed the *thirty nine Articles*, sworn obedience unto his *Ordinary*, lived conformably in the Church, and preached for it from Prefs and Pulpit, should swear to *extirpate* those very things, which he had sworn to *assert*. It is much more likely that Mr. Hickman ow'd him a spight, and could not hold from giving it vent, though he had nothing to excuse him for such *Impertinence*. He might have written against the *positivity* of *sin*, without reviling Dr. Reynolds, as a person that had sworn so lewd a *Covenant*. A thing the less credible, because he hath declared to divers Friends, (whom I can name if need require) That the order of *Bishops* in his judgement, was of *Divine Institution*. And if the Question shall yet be asked, I dare adventure a Discretion he will readily say, *yes*. But Mr. Hickman it seems is careless, whom he calumniates in his *passion*; And therefore Doctor Reynolds may the more easily forgive him.

§ 66. To his blind and bitter zeal against the *Licensing* of a Book, which is Intitl'd [*An Historical Narration &c.*] p. 18. 19. I am able to return him this gentle Remedy. The Learned and Reverend Doctor Martin did avow and justify (in the House of Lords) his licensing that worthy and useful Book. And Master Maynard much urging that 'twas *Arminian*, on which he insisted before the Lords, "The Doctor told them he thought it strange, that *That* should be call'd an *Arminian Book*, wherein there was not one person either named, or concern'd, who had not been dead before *Arminius* was alive. Whereupon his Accuser was as much disappointed, as Mr. Hickman must needs be when he reads the storie of that affair. But

His self con-
tradiction, and
blind zeal, as
to Dr. Martin,

his self-contradiction is most prodigious. Because in one and the same page, and at few lines distance, he saith the book was *unlicensed*, which yet he confesseth to have been licensed by *Mr. Martin Bp. Lands Chaplain*. And what credit can be due to his following proofless affirmations, who calls learned *Champneys* by the name of *Cerberus*? Or what shall we think of his tongue and conscience, who calls *Tellenus* an *Ethiopian*, a *scribler*, *impudent*, and a *poor fellow*? (p. 21.) If he treats his superiours and betters thus, I wonder how his equals can endure to come within his Breath: yet in the very next page, he commends himself for *Candor* and moderation, and his *cordial affections* to *Episcopal Divines*, for never vilifying the parts and paynes of any *Prelatist*, because such. And then to shew us his skill in books, he saith he had rather be the *Author* of *Calvins one book of institutions*, then of all that ever were made by *Grotius* (p. 23.) whereby he owns *Mr. Calvin* in the worst of those things I cited from him; and gives me reason to believe, that he never read the *Bookes* of *Grotius*, but takes up his anger upon trust, as he hath done the *materials* which fill his volume.

The nullity
of a Priest-
hood sinfully
given by Pres-
byterians.

§. 67. He next resolves to spend some pages in another way of Impertinence, and Tergiversation. It seemes not caring what course he takes, whereby to patch up a little volume; and yet to stave off his Readers from what he took upon him to prove, to wit, that *sin hath no positive being*. His little project is briefly this; first, to say how much he hath read in *Dr. Taylor*, and *Dr. Hammond*; and secondly to adde upon that occasion, (so dexterous he is at the contriving of a *transition*) that if *Presbytery* be a crime, he must needs say he hath learnt it from *Episcopal men*. p. 23. &c.] will you know his Reasons? The first is this; The *Primate* and *Dr. Holland* were of opinion, that a *Presbyter* and a *Bp.* differ in degree only; not in order. But neither doth he attempt a proof, that this could make him a *Presbyterian*, Or that the *Primate* and the *Dr.* did ever think any such thing, much less that

that they said it either in earnest or in jest. I am sure the L. Primate thought our Presbyters *unexcusable*, for taking upon them the Bishops office to ordain. But he had mercy for the French Protestants, because he thought it necessity, not choice, which kept them from Episcopal order, see the Letter of Peter du Moulin the son sent to a Scotchman of the Covenant, who proves his Father to be clearly for the order of Bishops. Chamier affirms them to be (of right) elected Princes. Their Church would have Bps. but are not suffered. The second reason is that Bp. Andrews ordained a Scotchman Bishop, never made Priest but by Presbyters, which he would not have done, had ordination by Presbyters been unto him a Nullity p. 23. 24] But 1. he brings not any proof that there was ever any such fact. 2. From Fact to Right no good Argument can be drawn 3. Bp. Andrews might be ignorant that the Scotchman had received any such mock Ordination 4. Or he might think the man had invincible Necessity to help excuse him, which yet I take to be most improbable; much less that he could fancy the common Rule had place here. *Quod fieri non debet factum valet*. And therefore (s) my chiefest answer to it is this, that the story proves nothing (supposing truth to have been in it) but what is against Mr. Hickmans interest, for it only proves that such a man who had been sinfully dub'd into a Titular Priesthood, and was therefore no real Priest, in the opinion of Bp. Andrews, might yet *per saltum* be made a Bishop. Because in his being made a Bp. he is *ipso facto* made a Priest. And so it is granted as well of Timothy and Titus, and the rest in their time, that they were consecrated Bishops, without the receiving of previous orders. Others having first been Deacons, were immediately assumed into the order of Bishops. So Linus, who was St. Pauls Deacon as Anacletus and Clement, who were St. Peters, succeeded both those Apostles in the Bishoprick of Rome.

Having thus satisfied Mr. H. as to the case of his Scotchman ordained *per saltum* by Bp. Andrews, I shall tell him that

The recantations of some who were so ordained.

that there are Diverse, who having been *dub'd* by *Presbyterians* (for without an abusive way of speaking they durst not say they had been *ordained*) were so sensible of the crimes of *Schisme* and *sacrilege* in the thing, that they made their *Recantations* to several Bishops within my knowledge; and solemnly *renounced* such Ordinations; and after that, have been ordained by the Bishops themselves. I am unwilling to name the men, that I may not occasion their persecution. But Bishop *Morton* is out of their Reach, and so I am free to make it known what he hath done in this kinde. The reader may judge by this Taft, whether Episcopal men could ever teach Mr. H. his *Presbyterianisme*.

Mr. H.'s Dis-
appointment
by Dr. SAN-
DERSONS
change of
judgement.

68. He produceth a passage from one of the *first Printed Sermons* of the learned and Reverend Dr. SANDERSON, concerning Gods concurrence with *subordinate Agents* (p. 29.) which he hoped some shallow Readers would think conducing to his end, of making the people to believe, that God himself is the Cause of the *wickedest actions* in the world, because the *wickedest actions* have not onely a *reall*, but a *positive being*. But besides that that passage of Gods concurrence (to the sustentation of the Creature) is nothing at all in it self to Mr. *Hickmans* purpose, I have the leave and consent of that most learned and pious person, to communicate as much of his *Letters* to me on this occasion, as I conceive may tend to his vindication, and with all to the advantage of peace and truth.

First,

Doctor Sanderson's Letters, &c.

1. As to the passage in the fifth Sermon ad Populum, p. 278---9. the Doctor saith, That as he did as well at the time when that Sermon was preached, as at all other times before and since, utterly detest; so the thing principally intended and purposely insisted upon in that whole passage was to root out of mens minds the seeds of that horrid Blasphemous opinion, that God was the Author, or efficient cause of sin.

2. He saith, That the occasion which led him to that discourse being the handling of that 1 Tim. iv. 4. Every Creature of God is good: the Inference thence was naturall and obvious, That therefore whatsoever was evil could be no creature of God, was none of his making, nor could he (in any tolerable sense) be said to be the Author or cause thereof.

3. He saith, That if in the Explication, or prosecution of that Inference he should perhaps have let fall some such improper, incommodious, or ambiguous phrase or expression, as a caviller might wrest to a worse construction: then was meant (a thing not alwayes to be avoyded in popular discourses, especially where the matter treated of is of great nicety, or of a mixt consideration between Metaphysical and Moral:) it had yet been the part of an ingenuous Reader, to have made the main scope of the discourse the measure whereby to interpret such phrases and expressions, rather then by a malign interpretation to extract such a sense out of the words, as it is certain the Author (unless he would contradict himself) could not mean.

C c

4. He

4. He saith, That upon as distrust a review of every period and clause in that whole passage, as seemed requisite for his concernment in the present debate, he hath not observed any phrase or expression, which is not consonant to his main scope therein, or whereof Master Hickman (without injury and violence to his true meaning) could serve himself in any of those three points; wherein (as far as he can judge, having never seen Mr. Hickmans Book) he conceiveth the difference betwixt Master Pierce and his adversaries to lye, viz. 1. Gods predetermining of mens wills and actions. 2. The positive entity of sin. 3. Gods concurrence to the sinfull actions of men.

Now that
this Secti-
on shew his
meaning in the
seventh.

5. For the first of which, the Doctor saith, That he is so farr from believing, that God predetermineth the will to evil actions, that he dares not (without farther assurance then he can yet find warranty for) affirm positively, that God at all physically determineth any mans will either to good or evill. It being hard (to his seeming) to suppose such a determination without destroying the nature and liberty of the will. Nor doth he find himself obliged to say or believe; That God hath predetermined or eternally decreed all actions, events, and things; if any more be understood thereby then this, viz. That God ab æterno knowing all both future and possible things, hath eternally decreed to permit the creature to act (that is, not to withhold from it the concurrence of that his power without which it could not act,) in such sort, as that the event, which he foresaw future should certainly come to pass; and the event foreseen as possible but not future, should certainly not come to pass.

6. For the second (the positive entity of sin) although taking

taking a reall entity as opposite to meer nothing, even sins of omission also may be said to have a real entity, as all privations and other *Entia rationis* have: yet the chief contest being about sins of commission (as appeareth, both by the distinction, so frequently used in this controversie, between the act and the obliquity; and by the particular instances, the hating of God, the murdering of an innocent, the ravishing of a woman, &c.) the sins of omission set a side as less pertinent to the present debate, he saith he wondreth with what pretence, or by what subtilty of distinction, any man, that acknowledgeth a sin of commission so to consist of an act as the materiall part, and the obliquity of the said act as the formall part, that if either of both be wanting it cannot be a sin (for without supposal of an act there can be no obliquity, and an act without obliquity is no sin; and acknowledgeth withall the one part (viz. the materiall) to be a positive entity; can deny the totum compositum to be a positive entity. It seemeth to be all one, as if a man should deny Socrates, consisting of a body and a soul to be ens quantum, because his soul (his formal part) is not ens quantum. For no more can the accesssion of the obliquity to the presupposed act whereunto it adhereth, make that act cease to be a positive entity, then the infusion of the soul into a body that hath dimensions can make that body cease to be a quantitative entity. The Doctor acknowledgeth that in a sinfull action the act may be Metaphysically abstracted (abstractione præcisionis, and per primam operationem intellectus) from the obliquity; that is to say, it may be considered precisely as it is a motion of the creature, or an exercise of that naturall power wherewith God hath endued the creature, without considering at the same

time the object about which it is conversant, the end whereunto it is directed, or the circumstances appending: And that the Act also abstractedly considered, hath a distinct essence of its own, whereby it essentially differeth from them, (otherwise the act and the object, should be the same thing.) But yet for as much as no such act can *de facto* (in regard of actual existence extra intellectum) be really abstracted from those things, without which (though extrinsecal to its essence) it cannot exist, and by the occasion whereof it first becometh morally good or evil, (for no act is morally evil in its own abstracted essence, nor otherwise a sin, then as is vitiated by the co-existence of some undue object, end, or circumstance :) it must necessarily follow, that the totum compositum, the vitiated act and that is the * sin, act and obliquity joynly together) is a positive real entity, and morally evil. A positive real entity, from the existence of the act : and morally evil, from the co-existence of those aforesaid vitiating relations, which are accidentall to the act, as to the essence of it, but by adhering to it make it formally a sin.

* Note that the Concrete, or vitiated Act, is here denominated the sin. And the sin said to be a compound, consisting of two parts, act and obliquity; not separately, but joynly.

7. For the third point (Gods concurrence to a sinful action) the Doctor thinketh that what he hath now last said, will sufficiently clear from misconstruction, not only that phrase of aduating the power (p. 279.) if Mr. Hickman have hoped for any advantage to his cause therefrom; but that other short passage also (pag. 29.) wherein is acknowledged the effectual concurrence of Gods will and power with subordinate agents in every, and therefore even in sinful actions also. Especially if the two Texts of Scripture quoted in the margin (viz. Act. xvii. 28. and Esa. x. 12.) be withall taken into consideration. For it is manifest, that by the concurrence signally grounded upon those two Texts there cannot

rational-

rationaly be understood any other concurrence, then such as is according to the importance of those texts, which from Act. 17. is briefly this. As whilst we have any being, we have it by vertue of that his concurrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we should cease to be; & so long as we live, we live by vertue of that his concurrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we could not live: so, as oft as we act and move a hand or a foot or a thought, we act and move by vertue of that his concurrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we could not act or move hand, foot, or thought. That is to say, we cannot actually exercise any of those natural powers God hath endowed us withal, without that generalis

* *concurfus causæ universalis* (as the Schoolmen call it) which hath such an influence upon all the motions of inferior subordinate agents and second causes; that if God be pleased at any time to withhold from them that concurrence, although the natural power remain, the same it was still, yet can they not exert or actually exercise that power to the producing of any effect. As when God with-held from the fire Dan. iii. his concurrence, it could not put forth that natural power it had of burning, so as to have any operation upon the bodies of the 3. young men, that were cast thereinto. If an ungracious son should be so wickedly disposed as to cut his own fathers throat, he could not take the knife into his hand, nor move his arme to do that foule deed, if God should withhold his concurrence thereunto, and not suffer him to exercise his natural power of reaching out his arme to cut. In which horrible and sinful act all the concurrence, imputable to God at the most is, but the affording (that is to say, * the not with-holding of that his * general

* Note the distinction of Melancthon. The will doth act, Deo sustentante, non adjuvante God sustaining the faculty, but not assisting the choice.

* Note his exposition of the word affording.

for, by not withholding, and the word general added to influx and the locomotive faculty, which is common to us with Beasts, as distinguished from the will, which is common to us with Angels.

influx.

influx into the loco-motive faculty of his creature, without which he could not exercise that faculty so far as to stretch out his hand to cut, which act so far forth only considered, and no farther, doubtless is no sin, for then every stretching out of the arm to cut any thing should be a sin, according to the old Logical axiom, *Quicquid convenit quatenus ipsum, convenit omni*. But the applying of such an act to an undue object, referring it to an undue end, performing it in an undue manner, or with undue circumstances, (by any of which obliquities it becometh a sin) proceedeth wholly and solely from the corrupt will of the inferiour agent, and not at all from God, which, as it layeth the whole guilt of the sin, or moral act upon the actor, so it clearly acquitteth God, (such his concurrence to the natural act or motion of his creature as aforesaid notwithstanding) from the least degree of any agency or efficiency therein.

8. He saith, That what he hath here declared concerning these two last points, as it is exactly agreeable to what his judgement then was, when the two Sermons, wherein the passages quoted by Mr. Hickman are found, were preached: so it is his present opinion still, which he hath therefore somewhat the longer insisted upon; not only for that it seemeth to be the consentient tenet of the best School-men, grounded upon discourse of reason, and the Authority of St. Augustin, and other of the anient Fathers, and no way (in his apprehension) derogatory to the holiness, goodness, wisdom, or majesty of God: But also because the due consideration of it might prove (if it were by some able hand distinctly, clearly, and intelligibly set down) a probable expedient toward the reconciling of some differences among Divines held at a greater distance then perhaps they needed

ded to have been, for want of a right understanding between the dissenting parties. For the Doctor professeth himself, (and he well hopeth he is in most things not much further from the truth for so doing,) as on the one side extreemly jealous of extreme opinions, till they have undergone a severe trial; so on the other side very inclinable to embrace middle and reconciling opinions, where there appeareth not pregnant evidence of reason to the contrary.

9. Lastly to conclude this whole businesse, so far as he apprehendeth himself concerned; he saith, he is not unwilling the world should know, that having from his younger years (as his Genius led him) addicted himself mostly to the study of the moral and practical part of Divinity; but especially having (for fear of approaching too neare to the Ark of Gods secret counsels) kept a loof off from meddling (more then needs must) with those more nice and intricate disputes concerning Gods eternal decrees, the cooperation of Gods free Grace, and mans free-will, &c. He contented himself for sundry years to follow on (as most others did) by a kinde of implicit credulity, in the Sublapsarian way, as the then most troden path; until having a just occasion, (A.D. 1628.) to make a little farther inquiry after the truth in those questions, upon due search he saw a necessity of receding from that way in some things: a more particular account whereof is given in a narrative lately printed with his consent, which if well considered, ought (he thinketh) in reason and charity to excuse him from the necessity of justifying every syllable or phrase that might slip from his tongue or pen, in any thing by him spo-

ken or written before that year, and whilst he was very little (or rather nothing at all) versed in the study of those Questions.

Now since I have proved undeniably, that the question was from the beginning (betwixt my adversaries and me) whether any kind of sins (plainly meaning whole sins, not the formal part of sin, which cannot possibly be the sin of which it is but the formal part) have a *positive being*; And since it is said by Dr. SANDERSON, that the *positive acts* above mentioned, [*murdering and ravishing of men, women,*] are (so in the *concrete*) horrid sins; nay in the plainest tearmes to be imagined, that a sin of *commission* doth consist of two things, an *act* and an *obliquity*; and since it is said by Mr. Hickman, that it belongs to the *universality of the first cause to produce* (not onely every positive, but every real being, and (not onely so, but also) the *positive modifications of beings*, (p. 95. It is apparent that Doctor SANDERSON is as much for my *cause*, and as much against Mr. Hickmans, as either my heart can wish, or my cause require. For though he conceiveth that the *act* may be considered, without considering the *object* about which it is conversant, (in which case it cannot possibly be considered as a *sin*,) yet he declares that the *Act* of sin cannot possibly exist without the *obliquity*, any more then the *obliquity* without the *Act*. And farther yet, he doth affirm (towards the end of his sixth paragraph) both that the *viciated Act* is the very sin; and that the *sin* which is the *viciated act*, is not only a real, but a *positive entity*. I have published this happy concurrence with me, not onely in his sense, but (according to his desire) in his own manner of expression.

A vindication
of Bp. WALL,
Bp. MORTON,
and Bp. BROWN-
RIG from Mr.
H.'s slander-
ous suggestion

§. 69. I now go on to discover his wilfull Calumny, not so much against me, as against Bp. HALL, Bp. MORTON, and Bp. BROWN RIG; whom though he knew to be Bishops of the Church of England, yet he reckons them with

them with the men of the *Kirk*, or *Consistory*, or their *Adherents* here in England, (whom I had charged with swearing the Scottish Covenant, and making God the Author of sin) who had done dishonours unto the Protestant name. p. 31, 32.] For if the Reader will consult my *Antocatapris*, chap. 2. p. 61, 62. he will see I onely spake against the *Papists* and *Presbyterians*, (in words at length, and by name,) and that upon no lesser motive or provocation, then their making God the Author of sin. So that now Mr. Hickman must either prove, that those excellent Prelates were *Presbyterians*, or *Papists*, or such at least of their adherents, as have been known to make God the Author of sin; Or if he cannot prove this, (as I know he cannot) he must make some amends for so foul a slander.

S. 70. The request he puts up to the *Episcopal Divines*, who close with such as he is, in the present contest, (p. 31.) renders him yet more criminall in two respects. First because there are none of the *Episcopal Divines*, who ever closed with the *Hickmanians*, in saying that sin, if it is positive, is either God's creature, or God himself; or that our English *Presbyterians* have any power to make *Priests*. (For this, and that, (he must confess) is the present subject of our contest) Next because he calls their Brethren, *Arminian Ardelio's*, by whom they must expect to be last devoured. By which he would intimate to his Readers, (if I am able to understand him) That we design the Doctrines they call *Arminian* as the condition of our Brethrens Communion with us: which as it hath ever been far from us, (we most joyfully communicating with all the Fathers and sons of the Church of England, how much soever in some points they may differ from us) so of all men living Mr. Hickman's party should least accuse us, whilst themselves are as guilty, as we are Innocent in this respect. For they are known to be the men, who fasten the character of *† sanctified* to their opinions, and have made them the test by which they admit, (or reject) their Betters, to a

The perfall animity and communion of all Episcopal Divines, for all their difference in judgement as to some controverted Doctrines.

* Quis tulere Gracchos de seditione querentes?
† See the Rd. D. GAUDEN his *Hiera De crua*, ch. 29. p. 384.

ny places of trust in the English Church. Witness all the partialities and inquisitions of the *Triers*. Whereas the men whom they call *Arminians* have never required any more then the subscription of the *Articles*, which are called by *Mr. Rogers*, our *English Creed*. And which, as they have not, in particular, defined all that is debated on either side, so they do not (like the late *Triers*) sift and winnow such persons as come before them; But together with truth, do provide for unity and peace too. In a word. Our Prelates and Prelatists, how much soever *Anti Calvinian*, do not cast out of their communion, any Calvinist that desires it, upon the account of his being a Calvinist. But the Calvinists in *Holland* are very well known to have made a schism; plainly dividing from the Remonstrants, and setting up schismatical *Congregations*. Now to communicate with such is a different thing, from our receiving to our communion such as differ in those points. Concerning that Schism, Master *HALES* his *LETTERS* have told us somewhat; And his Treatise of that sin hath told us more. And more then that I could give account of, if this were a season for such proximity.

Mr. Hickman's confession of his ignorance and incapacity to understand the points in controversy.

§ 71. He next proceeds to tell the world (without any colour of Coherence, or the least *Formula Introducendi*) That he hath spent more Time in reading Authors pro and con about these points, then ever he intended to do, &c. 32. And reason good. For he confesseth his gross Ignorance and Insufficiency, after all the reading of which he tells us. 'Tis strange he should meddle in the Doctrine of Gods Decrees, and the manner of the Spirits working Grace in the hearts of the Elect, since in the midst of all his meddling, he professeth them to be matters so very mysterious, and his understanding to be so dark, that he can scarce hope ever in the world to be freed from all scruples about them, p. 33. It seems he is not over-confident, that the Decrees of Election and Reprobation are Absolute; or that Grace in the Elect is irresistibly wrought; for all his railing at the

Sect. 72, 73. touching the Remnants of his Book, 203

the *Arminians*, and his partiall adhering to the *Calvinians*. Let him talk what he will of his holding this, or that Tenet; and let him render what reasons he thinks most *specious*; we will believe his own confession, that he is *Sceptical* and *Scrupulous*, and finds his understanding too dark to reach them.

§. 72. Again he confesseth his inward conviction of his own insufficiency to do the work of a Divine, whilst he saith of those Articles of the Christian faith [The Trinity of the persons, and the hypostatical union of the two Natures,] that he never thought himself able to vindicate those Mysteries from all the subtil Arguments and Niceties of unbelieving Sophisters. *ibid.*] 'Twould be a sad time for Christianity, if it had no better champions and propugnators then *UNBELIEVERS* are able to baffle, and put to silence, and so to shame. Yet this is the man, who by a schismaticall ordination takes upon him to be a Preacher, nay a Pastor of Christ's flock, (even denying our very Bishops to be of an order higher then he, much less such Priests as the Bishops have lawfully ordained,) who yet confesseth he is not able to defend the Flock from *Wolves*, or *Foxes*, no not the Articles of our Creed from the attempts of *unbelievers*.

His confessed insufficiency to maintain the chief Articles of the Creed.

§. 73. Nor may we think his two confessions are the effects of modesty or meekness. For (to secure himself from that suspicion) He first premiseth his opinion of the former points, That the greatest Scholars will never be able fully to satisfy their own, or other mens reasons about them, p. 52.] Hence it appears that Mr. Hickman may verily think himself one of the greatest Scholars in the world, (I do not say that he does) notwithstanding the confession which he hath made of his Disability. Nay it is probable that he does too; because he inferre (with a monstrous arrogance) the greatest Scholars are not able, from the sensible Non-ability which he discovereth in himself. As if Mr. Hickman's understanding were the measure of what may be understood, by the learnedest of mortals on this

Yet his conceitedness of his parts is not the less.

side heaven. If he is not past cure, and will but seek for a *Remedy*, let him read the *Full Accordance* betwixt Dr. *Sanderson* and Dr. *Hammond*, wherein he will find how those Doctors have fully satisfied themselves; And then he may learn from common fame, that they have fully satisfied others also.

His way to make a rope of sand, whereby to pull in the Puritanes.

* See (concerning Anti-christ) Bishop Montague's Appeal ch. 5. p. 140. and Examen. Hist. p. 253, 254.

* Ebrius sacrilegio qui respicit à vino, quod Austerum nescio quem.

His sinful way of defending Robbery by adding a manifold Aggravation.

§. 74. There is nothing worth notice in his next two Stories, besides his form of bringing them in. For having told us that he hopes by the free Grace of God to be acquitted at the Last day, he immediately adds (to introduce a new Section) That to this end he will relate two Historical passages. p. 34. And then to lengthen his Rope of Sand, he adds a saying of Doctor *Sanderson* concerning * *Anti-christ*, Another of *King James* against the *Arminians* in the Low-countries, (for they were all *Presbyterians*, and displeasing unto the King;) Another of Viscount *Falkland* against some Bishops (without a Name) and my Lord of *Strafford*; A fourth of Bishop *Carleton* against the *Puritans*, as *Disquieters of the Church about their conceived Discipline*. These are called by Master Hickman *The honest Puritanes*, (p. 41.) as if he consented to the Distinction which had been made by *King James*, betwixt the *Puritan Knaves*, and the *Knaves Puritanes*. If there were any such *Idle-sots as were seen to stagger in the streets*, they were as loathsome in my opinion, though not so dangerous to the publick, as that first sort of *Puritans* of which I spake. And yet that *Puritan* is a sot too, who being dry in respect of wine, is * *Drunk with sacrilege*. Which, as it minds me to refer him to what I have said on this subject to Mr. *Baxter*, so it affords me a fit Transition to the following subject of his Digression. For

§. 75. So far is this *Rhapsodist* from thinking it needfull to repent of his crying sin, or else from thinking that *Restitution* is any necessary part of a true *Repentance*; that he adds *Railing* to his *Robbery*, and *slander* to his *Railing*, and *Treason* too unto his *slander*. Which I shall shew in that Order, in which I find them committed, and brought to light too.

First,

First, whereas I had complained, and (Dr. Reynolds is my witness I did it justly, in so much that himself hath *joyned* with me in the complaint,) that I *suffered the loss of my best possession*, (not for any the least crime of which I had any way been guilty, but) *for being secretly suggested to be the Author of some Books, which (to this very day) I could never hear named*; and though I earnestly desired to hear my self accused, that I might know for what I suffered, and if not my Accuser at least my Accusation, and be heard speak for my self, yet Dr. Reynolds professed to me in private he could not obtain that justice for me; Mr Hickman expresseth this just complaint (which I am able to prove just, to any competent Judges who will but heare me,) by my throwing I know not what *fiery darts* not onely at him, but at the *far greater part of heads and Fellows of Colleges in Oxon*; at the *Visitors*, and at the *two Houses of Parliament* (p 44.) Now that his Readers may clearly see how great a violence he hath offered to *truth*, and *Candour*, and how he hath *blurred the two houses* with a most *scurrilous suggestion*, I shall furnish them very briefly with a perfect Narrative of the Case. I was permitted to appeare no more then *once* before the *Visitors*, when they onely entertained me with this one question, [Whether I could *submit* to their *Visitation*, or acknowledge they were my *rightful Visitors*? My Answer was not *Categorical*, either one way- or other. But as I really wanted, so I modestly besought them to give me time, wherein to consider that *weighty question*; that so my answer might be *rational*, which it could not be, if it were rash. For being then *newly* returned out of *France*, I had not studied the matter of right. And as I would not be *perjured* for fear of *Ruine*, so would I not rashly incur my ruine by such a *fear* of being perjured, as was not very well grounded. They did not deny what I desired, and that I thought was to yield it to me. But they met a little after, to passe a sentence of condemnation (by a most *absolute decree*) upon me and others; and proclaiming my

His Slandrous insinuation against the two Houses of Parliament, to save the credit of the Visitors in fining against their own Commission.

my banishment, before I was summoned to give my answer, (for which I concluded they gave me time) they used the violence of the *Souldiers*, to put their decrees into execution. Now is it likely that the two Houses would Authorize them to destroy me without a cause? not only unconvicted, but *unaccused*, and *unheard*? (for that they suspected me the Author of I know-not-what-books which were never named, I was privately informed by Dr. Reynolds, who was not able to tell me what Books they meant.) Could the two Houses Authorize them to break the Law of the Land in *Magna Charta*, and to act in contradiction to the *Petition of Rights*? I rather think that the *Visitors* did sin against the very rule, to which the two Houses had tied them up in their commission. A *Nicodemus* was able to ask, [doth our Law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doth? John 7: 51.] And as *Festus* said unto King *Agrippa*, It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the Accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him; so with greater force of reason (since the Romans then were *Heathens*, which we are not,) I may say to Mr. Hickman from *Magna Charta*, and the *Petition of rights*; It is not the manner of the English, in the two Houses of Parliament, to dispossesse any man, of whatsoever estate or condition, of his land, or Tenement, his freehold, or liberties or free Customs, without his being brought to answer by due process of Law, and by the Lawful judgement of his Peeres.] And this may serve as well for theirs, as for mine own vindication.

Acts 25.16.

See the New Discoverer discovered ch. 6. p. 131. 132.

His disparagement of the Visitors in his endeavours to assist them.

Next for the far greater part of Heads and Fellows of Colleges in Oxon, against whom he accuseth me to have thrown some darts, (ibid.) He knows I never made mention of them. And if he meanes that my case was also the case of all others who suffered with me, he wrongs the Visitors extremely, by concluding them worse then indeed they were. For they did not cast out the greatest part of Heads

Heads, and Fellows out of their rights, untill they had given their final answer. I hardly know any (besides *my self*) who were deprived of their places for being so circumspect onely and modest, as to desire a little respite before they answered, that so their answer might be unpassionate, and after a due deliberation. I know the sufferings of all the rest were illegally inflicted, as well as mine, (as may appear by the case of the *University*, which was sent in a letter to Mr. *Selden*, and of which I may give account towards the end of this subject.) but what I speak against the *Visitors* was in reference to the case, of which I had a peculiar knowledge.

Thirdly he playes upon himself by telling some stories of distraction and *Hypochondriacal conceits*, as if he were willing that his Readers should suspect me infected with his Disease; And talk as odly of me, as they do commonly of him. But he is strangely unfortunate in this adventure. For he discovers himself afresh to be a second hand-Historian, in citing an Author he never read. He would else have known (had he consulted *Laurentius*, as well as named him,) that there are * *three sorts of melancholy*, where of the first doth happen by the meer distemper of the Brain; The 2. by a consent of the whole body; the third is raised up from the *Hypochondres*, that is, from the entrails contained in them especially from the *Liver*, the *Spleen*, and the *Mesenterie*. The first is simply called *Melancholy*; the last with an addition of the Epithet *Hypochondriacal*. The first *exagitates* the patient without intermission, the last affords him some times of truce. The three instances produced do all belong unto the first, not at all unto the last, to which alone Mr. *Hickman* had the unskilfulness to apply them, p. 46. And *Laurentius* (besides) doth adde no less then fourteen, of which there is not so much

The work he makes with Hypochondriacal conceits.

* Melancholice differentias triplici discrimine assignant Authores: prima proprio cerebri vitio obtingit; secunda per consensum totius corporis cujus universa temperies totaque humor est melancholicus; ultima ex hypochondriis suscitatur. i. e. à visceribus in ipsis contentis, porissimè ab Epate, Liene & Mesenterio. &c. Vide Laurent. de Melancholia Differentiis cap. 4.

cos; ultima ex hypochondriis suscitatur. i. e. à visceribus in ipsis contentis, porissimè ab Epate, Liene & Mesenterio. &c. Vide Laurent. de Melancholia Differentiis cap. 4.

as one referred to *Flatus Hypochondriacus*, which by the Greeks is called *φυσικός*; but are widely different in two respects, to wit, in respect of the *Original seat*, and of the *manner* of the *delirium* which is produced. So that poor Mr. H. at once hath laid himself bare, and put a rod into my hand for his due correction. Did he think that *Hypochondria* were things residing in the brain? or was he as sick as the *Italian Foot-boy*, and fancied the brain was in the bowels? His own conceits was more likely to be *Hypochondriacal* than mine, when he reproached me with a distemper, from the very suspicion of which I was ever free; and with which if my Body had ever been affected in any measure, (as I blesse God for it, it never was,) Mr. Hickman should not have been so barbarous, as to have sported his Readers with my disease, which had been honest and helpless too, had it ever invaded my *Hypochondres*, as much as *Fame* hath affirmed it to have had dominion over his own. I never was so inhumane, as to upbraid my greatest enemy with any such badly disposition; and have rather afforded my utmost help. But since Mr. Hickman (unprovoked) could not abstain from objecting a sicknesse to me, and such a sicknesse as I have ever (by the blessing of God) been exempted from; it is his own fault onely (though my misfortune) that I am forced to expose him in this point also. And for the future I do beseech him, not to meddle in matters of which he hath not any knowledge; nor to have so little mercy upon himself, as to scourge his guilty self upon an innocent mans back; but rather to conceal his great infirmities, or onely reveal them to his Physician, and apply himself to the means of cure. I might (in favour and mercy to him) have prompted his Readers to believe, that it was but his *spleenative Conceit*, which made him say in his *Epistle* (wherewith he dedicates his collection) that the *Doctrines* printed before my birth, were the *meer chismara's* of my brain. For which prodigious Adventure he is not capable of excuse, unlesse his *flatulent Hypochondres* made him a kind of *Pythagorean*, so as to fancy a transmigration
of

of Calvin's soul into my body. I am sure *Pythagoras* is reported to have thought himself to be *Aethalides*, the son of *Mercurius*; and that *Aethalides* being dead, he became *Euphorbus*; and that *Euphorbus* being departed, he passed also into *Hermotimus*; and that *Hermotimus* dying, he lived in *Pyrrhus* the Fisherman; And after *Pyrrhus* his decease, he again survived in *Pythagoras*. Sure 'twere better for Mr. *Hickman* to think that my soul was once in Calvin, or *Zuinglius*, or Dr. *Twisse* then to call their writings the meer chimera's of my brain, or wilfully to deny what hath been read by thousands, and may be seen in those Writers by all Mankind who can but read them. The former (I say) were so much better then the later, by how much better it is, to be sick, then sinful. And so 'twere charity to imagine (if that were possible to be done) that this was one of Mr. *Hickman's* *Hypochondriacal conceits*.

§. 76. It may be taken for one at least, that he should charge me with *Impudence against the Supreme Authority of the Nation*. p. 45. For if he deals sincerely, as well as simply, he hence infer's the *Oxford Visitors* (Mr. *Cheyne*, and Mr. *Wilkinson*, and such like things,) to have had the *Supremacy*, in his opinion. They alone being the men, by whom I complain'd I had been injur'd; in their Transgressing the *Prescriptions* of those that sent them. And losers (by a Proverb) have still had liberty to complain. I did but modestly hope, Mr. *Hickman* would pay me my *Arrears*, when again and again he tells his Readers I am *impudent*; p. 45. and 47. so impudent I am as to own my Right; though not so simple, as to expect it. And it is strange that Mr. *Hickman* should thus revile me, for onely presuming to hope well of him, or for refusing to dissemble what was so visibly my due. So when the owner in the Parable sent for fruits of his Vineyard, the *Husbandmen* abused his severall Messengers, as well as sent them away empty. I will not say of Mr. *Hickman* that he is *impudent*, because his manners are none of mine, but I must

He adds railing to his robbery, and treasonably misplace the Supreme power of the nation.

Mat. 12. 25.

* Look back
on c. 1. S. 2.

The two Houses vindicated from his gross insinuation, & the Supreme Power asserted by 19 Arguments.
* See M. Prin his true and perfect Narrative. p. 45.

needs admire the strange nature of his modesty, when he denied a matter of * *Faith*, however attested by all mens eyes.

Sect. 77. If he means the two Houses by the *Supreme Authority of the Nation*, (as he seems to do, pag. 47.) he contradicts the fundamental *Laws* of the *Land*, the *Canons* of the *Church*, the *Oathes* of *Allegiance* and *Supremacy*, and implicitely censures all the *Members* of the *House of Commons* (by whom the *Visitors* were sent, in the year 1648.) as guilty of willful perjury, when they * *took those oathes before they sat, or could sit, as members in the House of Commons.* 1. The members of Parliament did even swear, in taking the *Oath of Supremacy*, [That the *Kings Highness* is the *only Supreme Governour* of this *Realm*, and of all other his *Dominions*, and *Countreys*, as well in all *Spiritual* and *Ecclesiasticall Things* or *Causis*, as *Temporal.*] 2. The King was ever acknowledged in the *Prayers* of the *Clergie* before their *Sermons*, to be the *Supreme Head and Governour*, in all *Causis*, and over all *Persons*, *Ecclesiasticall*, and *Civill*. Nor may we think that the *Clergie* were either taught or commanded to lye to God in their *Publick prayers*. Nay, 3. he was *uttrly* testified, and in *conscience* declared, as well by the *members* of *Parliament*, as by other subjects upon *oath*, to be not onely the *Supreme*, (which shews that *none* can be above him) but *Solus Supremus Moderator*, (as *Dr. Sander-son* observes) the *Sole* and *Onely* *Supreme Head and Governour*, which shews that *none* can be so besides him, or that *none* can be equal to him. 4. In the generall judgement of knowing men, and of *Dr. † Sander-son* in particular, The *Kings Supremacy* is imported by the stile of *Dread Sovereign*, and *Sovereign Lord*, and that of *Majesty*; expressions used by the two Houses of the late long *Parliament*, in their *humble Petitions* and *addresses* unto the King; (nor need I here tell my Reader, what an *humble Petition* is set to signifie) and as well in the most *solemn establishment of Laws*, as in *allions* and *forms* of *Jurisdiction*.

† Supremam hanc Potestatem, quam Majestatem, vel diuinitatem, &c. De obligat. conf. i. en. Praef. 7. p. 258. 260.

Jurisdiction. 5. *Magna Charta* was first granted (in effect by King John, and confirmed (with that Title) by Henry the third, a of his mere free will; and so the liberties of the Subject cannot with reason be presumed to lessen the King of his Supremacie. 6. Other Statutes which have the force of Acts of Parliament are known to be directed as private Writs, with a *Tesle Meipso*; And the common stile of most others is found to run in this strain, [*The King with the advice of the Lords at the humble Petition of the Commons, wills this, or that.*] So the form of passing Bills is still observed to be this, *Le Roy le veult, The King will have it.* And *sait fait comme il est desire,* Let it be done as it is desired; plainly speaking by way of Grant, to something sought or petitioned for. (From whence by some it hath been gathered, that the *Ragation of Laws* does rightly belong to the two Houses; but the Legislation unto the King; That their Act is *Preparative*, his onely *Assive*.) 7. That Supremacy of Power which the Law hath invested the King withall, is not onely over all particular persons, but also ^b over all states; which all the subjects of this Realm, and the Members of Parliament in particular, are bound by oath both to acknowledge, and to maintain. And which they grant to be his Due, when they desire him ^c to protect them in their priviledges, and call him alwayes in their Acts *Their onely Sovereign Lord, or their Royal Sovereign.* 8. The Kings Prerogative (as well as *Magna Charta*) is proved (by Judge Jenkins) to be a principall part of the common Law; and Royal Government a Law fundamental. Nay, 9. It is proved, (by the same most learned and pious Judge) ^e That the Supreme power even in time of Parliament, was declared by both Houses to belong unto the King. 10. The Kings Supremacy hath been proved by so many Arguments out of Bracton, (as may be seen in *Dudley Diggs*, *The Reasons of the University of Oxford*, *Judge Jenkins*, and the like,) that I shall onely translate some few short passages into English. *f The King* (saith he) *hath power and Jurisdiction*

a 9. Hen 3.
See Dr. Lag-
dair's Review
of the Cove-
nant. p. 88, &c.

b 1. Eliz. c. 1.

c ExaB. col. p.
5. & p. 738.

d Lex Terra.
p. 5 (bound
up with his
works.
e Ibid. p. 8.
7. Ed. 1. Stat.
at large, f. 42.

f Bracton. l. 4.
c. 24. Sect. 1.

tion over all who are within his Kingdome, and none but He.
 e *Ibid.* Sect. 5. e Every one is under the King, and he under God onely. He hath no Peer (or equal) with his Kingdome, much less is inferior unto his subjects. b God alone is his superiour, and to God alone is he accountable. In a word, i The things that concern Jurisdiction and Peace, or are annexed to peace and Justice, do belong to none but to the Crown, and the Kingly Dignity; nor can they be separated from the Crown, for as much as the Crown consisteth in them. 11. The Kings supremacy is evinced from the Nature of all his subjects Tenures, they holding their Lands of him in Fee. Which though it gives a perpetual Estate, yet is it not absolute but conditionall; as depending on the acknowledgement of superiority, and as being forfeitable upon the non-performance of some duties, on which supposition it still returns unto the King. For the breach of Fidelity is loss of Fee. In short, it is agreed among the most learned in the Law, 1, That the King alone hath such a property in all his Lands, as Lawyers are wont to call *Alaudinum*, because he doth hold in his own full Right, without any service, or payment of Rent, because from God onely. 2. That subjects of all Degrees do hold their Lands ut Fenda, in the nature of Fee, which implies Fealty to a Superiour. 12. The Oath of Allegiance hath the force of another Oath of Supremacy. For Legiancy is defined to be an obligation upon all subjects to take part with their Liege Lord against all men living, to aid and assist him with their bodies and minds, with their advise and power, not to lift up their arms against him, nor to support in any way those that oppose him. Now as no Liege Lord can acknowledge any Superiour, and though bound to some duties, is not bound under pain of Forfeiture, so subjects on the other side are *Homines Ligii*, all Liege-men, owing him Faith and Allegiance as their Superiour; Which Faith if they violate, He is enabled by the Law (as being the Fountain of Jurisdiction, saith Master Diggs,) to seiz upon their Goods and Lands, and to destroy their persons too. Whereas if He fail in the discharge of his

h *Ib.* l. 3. c. 7.
 l. 5. c. 3. sect. 31
 de Desalut.
 i *Ib.* l. 2. c. 24.
 sect. 1.

See M. Dudley
 Diggs of the
 unlawfulness
 of taking up
 Arms &c. p.
 80, 81.

k *Ibid.* p. 82.

l *Quatenus in*
Communem de
Concord. Pen-
derm. c. 4. n. 3.
apud eundem,

his duty, he is *not* subject to any Forfeiture by any Law of the Land I could ever hear of; and Mr. Diggs hath challenged all the world to name any. Doctor Sanderſon also affirmeth, That if a King who is Supreme should do the things that are proposed 1 Sam. 8. and Rule as a Tyrant, by no other Law then his own hearts lust, he would yet be *unaccountable* on this side Heaven, however liable to the wrath of the Sovereign Judge of all the World. For however such a Tyrant may *abuse* his power, yet the power is *His* which he abuseth; and *who shall say unto the King, what doſt thou?* Eccles. 8. 4. (a Text produced by the late King, of most blessed Memorie, against his own most unnatural and Blood Triers.) 13. There is an ancient Monument (saith Mr. Diggs, p. 83.) which shews the manner of holding a Parliament before the conquest. [The King is the head, the beginning, and the end of the Parliament, and so he hath not any equal in his Degree.] This I cite to anticipate Mr. Hickman's possible objection. 14. The King by Law hath just power, *to pass acts of Parliament by his great Seal*; to grant out Commissions of Oyer and Terminer for the holding of Assises; *to adjourn the Term* to whatsoever place he pleaseth; *to make Justices of Peace*, which wholly depends on his will and pleasure; *to pardon Delinquents and Malefactors*, (a privilege, by law, estated solely in the King,) *to choose his Officers*, to protect all persons, to coin money, to make leagues with forrein Princes, to dispose the Militia, to call and dissolve Parliaments, And to be (in one word) *Le dernier Recours de la Justice*. 15. In the thirty seventh Article of the Church of England, The King (or Queen) is declared to have the chief Power in this Realm of England, &c. *to whom the chief Government of all Estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil, in all Causes, doth appertain*. And this called the Prerogative which hath always been given to all godly Princes in holy Scriptures by God himself, that they shall rule all Estates, and all Degrees—Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the

m Etsi non
esset a iudice
vultu, nec
peccato care-
ret apud De-
um; esset ta-
men a vultu
Dei, nec
deberet a po-
pulo coerceri
diciq; pro-
pterea mere-
retur, abusus
quidem ille
potestate sua,
sed tamen
sua. De Leg.
Hum. Caus.
effic. Pral. 7.
p. 260.
n 33. H. 8. c.
21.
o 28. Ed. 1. c.
8.
p 27 H. 8. c.
24.
q 27. H. 8. c.
24.
Confessed al-
so Ex. Col. p.
270. 715. 902

Civil sword, the stubborn and evil Doers. 16. And accordingly in the *Canons* by law established in the Church, A *Supreme Power* is declared to be given by God in *Scripture* to the sacred order of *Kings*, which is there also declared to be of *Divine Right*. And that for any person or persons to set up, maintain, or avow, in any their said *Realms* respectively, under any pretence whatsoever, any Independent co-*active* power, either *Papal*, or *popular*, (whether directly, or indirectly) is to undermine their great *Royal* office, and cunningly to overthrow that most sacred ordinance, which God himself hath established; and so is treasonable against God, as well as against the *King*. (This I earnestly recommend to Mr. Hickman his consideration, and that which follows in the *Canon*, viz.) That for subjects to bear Arms against their *Kings*, offensive, or defensive, upon any pretence whatsoever, is at the least to resist the powers, which are ordained of God: And though they do not invade, but only resist; 17. Saint Paul tells them plainly, They shall receive to themselves damnation. The most excellent Recognition which was made by both Houses in the first year of King James, is so worthy to be written in Letters of Gold, and so needfull to be rivetted in the hearts and memories of the people, who desire to have a conscience void of offence towards God, and men, that I think I shall deserve many an honest man's thanks, (who hath either never known, or hath forgot what once he knew) by inserting some part upon this occasion.

1. Jac. c. 1.
p. Ed. 4. fol. 8.

"The King is our onely rightfull and lawfull Leige Lord
"and Sovereign, we do upon the knees of our heart ad-
"nize constant Faith, Loyalty, and Obedience to the
"King and his Royall Progeny, in this high Court of
"Parliament; where all the body of the Realm is either
"in Person, or by representation: we do acknowledge
"that the true and sincere Religion of the Church is con-
"tinued and established by the King. And do recognize, as
"we are bound by the law of God and man, the Realm
"of England, and the Imperiall Crown thereof doth be-
long

"long to him by inherent birthright, and lawfull and
 "undoubted succession, and submit our selves and our po-
 "sterities for ever, untill the last drop of blood be spent,
 "to his rule, and beseech the King to accept the same as
 "the first fruits of our Loyalty and Faith to his Majesty
 "and his posterity for ever; and for that this Act is not
 "compleat nor perfect without his Majesties assent, the
 "same is humbly desired.

"This proves (saith Judge *Jenkins*) 1. That the Hou-
 "ses are not above the King; 2. That Kings have not
 "their titles to the Crown by the two Houses, but 3. by
 "inherent birth-right, and 4. That there can be no
 "Statute without his expresse assent; and so 5. It de-
 "stroyes the Chimæra of the Kings virtuall being in the
 "Houses.

* See his
 works, p. 23;
 24.

18. The Kings Proclamations heretofore to severall
 purposes were of no less force then Acts of Parliament.
 And the ground of it was, that the * *supremacie of the*
Regal power is given by God. And however that Act was
 indeed repealed by the meek concession of King Edward
 the sixth, yet the Reason of the Repeal is recorded to
 have been this; *1 A willingness in the King to gratifie his*
people, upon trust that they would not abuse the same, but
rather be encouraged with more faithfulness and diligence to
serve his Highness. So when Charles the First passed a
 Bill for the continuance of the long Parliament indefinitely,
 it was upon their promise, *2 that the gracious favour of his*
Majesty expressed in that Bill should not encourage them to do
any thing, which otherwise had not been fit to be done. And
 so good is the Rule in the Civil Law, *Cessante causa, cessat*
Lex; That the Lords and Commons even of that very
 Parliament did declare it to hold good in Acts of Par-
 liament.

31. H. 8. c. 8.
 & 34. H. 8. c.
 23.
 * See the Pre-
 face to that
 Act 31. H. 8.

11. Ed. 6. c. 12

W. EXH. Coll.
 p. 203.

W. 1b. p. 876.

19. When 'twas declared by *24* the Judges and Ser-
 geants of Law, [that it cannot be said the King doth
 wrong] it was by a Periphrasis, A Declaration of his
 Supremacy. For the meaning of it must be, (say the grea-

1. Ed. 5. f. 2.

uct 3

test Lawyers) That what the King doth, in point of Jurisdiction, he doth by his Judges who are sworn to deal legally between the King and his people. So as the Judges may be questioned for violation of Law, but the King is *unaccountable*, and on his person or power no Reflection is to be made.

And by very many more, for which the Reader is intreated to see the works of Judge Jenkins.

§ 78. Thus I have given such an account of the proper subject of Supremacy, as my Notes of Observation suggest unto me at this time. I gather'd my Notes more especially (for my private use and information, that I might know what Party I ought to own, in these times of Trial and Temptation,) partly out of the Papers which passed betwixt the King, and both Houses of Parliament; partly from the writings of Mr. Prin, Mr. Diggs, Judge Jenkins, and Dr. Langbanc; partly out of the Book of Statutes, though I have not time to consult them much. Many more Arguments I could urge out of the works of Judge Jenkins, but that I find them *too many* to be transcribed in this Appendix; and withall I consider, that book is *cheap*, and *little*, and (I hope) *easily* to be had. which makes me choose to refer my Readers to his whole *Lex Terra*, from page 8. to page 63. I have been so convinced by all put together which hath been said, as I cannot but conclude with the most Learned and moderate Doctor Sanderson, That at least, amongst us here in England, there can be nothing more certain or conspicuous, (unless we will not use our eyes, but rather choose to be blind at noon, by stoutly winking against the Sun,) then that the power of these Three Kingdoms doth onely belong to his Serene and Supreme Royall Majesty. This is said by that great and judicious Casuist, in his stating the obligation and efficient cause of humane Lawes. After which, if Mr. Hickman shall yet contend, that the Oxford Visitors were commissioned by the Supreme Authority of the Nation, though by the two

y Apud nos Anglos saltem quid potest aut certius constare, aut liquidius, (nisi si qui in sole meridiano capere malint, quam uti oculis,) quam ad neminem hereticissimam Majestatem Regiam Supremam trium istorum Regnorum Potestatem pertinere? ubi super, pag. 260.

Houses only, (not only without, but against the pleasure of the King) I will only refer him to certain Notes on the Oathes of Supremacy and Allegiance, in a late-printed Book which is thus intitled. [The Resurrection of Loyalty and Obedience, out of the Grave of Rebellion]

§. 80. But I printed (saith Mr. Hickman) as if I had right to two Fellowships; and asks, how else he is but one of my receivers? p. 46.] To which I answer, 1. That for any thing I know, Mr. Hickman succeeded him that succeeded me. And my words of him were these, that for ought I know, he may be in possession of mine own fellowship, &c. Or 2. If he did not succeed my successor, but that his Robbery is immediate, not once removed; I will give him an Answer to chew upon out of the Digests. [When a number of men do join their strength to steal a piece of Timber, (or any thing else which is anothers,) which none of them singly could have carried away; Ulpian saith, that each of them severally, as well as all of them jointly, is liable to an action for the double value of the thing.] And so when the right of a Society is invaded by a Society, (which was our case in Magd. Colledge, when almost all were at once bereaved by men of violence,) all may require their right of all, and every man from every man. For every man by partnership is an Accessary to all that have done the wrong, as well as principall in part, and indefinitely; and so responsible to all who receive the wrong, or do require a reparation. I could prove to Mr. Hickman, that he is guilty of the Visitor's sin, by accepting the spoils of their injustice. But I am ready to pardon, though not to dissemble my being injur'd.

§. 81. I had but said by such a figure as is allowable in Scripture, [It seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Usurfructuaries] when taking my words by the wrong handle, he pretends that His is the usurfructuarius. p. 46.] But 1. he knows I there added, That my legitimate Successor they could not make him, which is a proof that what I spake, was of what they did, not ought

How Mr. H. became one of my uncommi-
oned Recei-
vers.

Digest. 47. 2.
21. Sect. 4. for
which see Dr.
Zach his Ca-
ses and Que-
stions, p. 92.

In what sense
he may be cal-
led my Recei-
ver and Usur-
fructuarius.

* Wild. 2.

to do ; And a *Falso ad Jus* no good Argument is to be drawn. The *Visitors* made him my *Receiver*, as they made their * *strength the law of justice* ; Or as *Lambert* made *Cromwell* the Kings *Receiver*. 'Tis easie for our man to be made an other man's *Receiver*, and yet (by a *Proverb*) to be as *bad as the thief* that made him. The *sons of violence* and *rapine* made one another what they pleased, as opportunity and power was in their hands. So it was said by *Doctor Heylin*, that *Mr. Hickman* had made a *Book* ; But he presently added, [As unhappy *Boyes* do make *Knives*, when in very deed they do but *steal* them.] 2. Had he been made my *Receiver* by my consent, he must have given me an *Account*, as the person to whom his *Receipts* were due. 3. He confesseth An *usufructuary* doth want the *Title*, and cannot pretend he hath *Jus ad Rem*. So that now in the same sense, in which he pretends to the *Usus-fructus*, he doth implicitly confess I am *proprietary in chief* ; and I may very well summon so *sawcy* an officer to a *Reckoning*. When *Doctor Heylin* said of *Mr. Chymel*, that he was the *Usufructuary* of the rich *Parsonage* of *Perworth*, the English of it was *usurper*, and nothing else. For 'tis a Rule (as I remember) in the *Civil Law*, *Potest proprietarius esse Mavii, Usus-fructus Titii, & tamen usus Sempromii*. And even where the *usus-fructus* is duly settled (as most *unduely* in *Mr. Hickman*,) it is but *jus in re*, by his confession. And *usus-fructus* is defined by *Jus Alienis Rebus utendi fruendi, salva rerum substantia*. So the *Propriety* is mine who have *jus ad rem*. The *Visitors* could not, by doing *wrong*, either take away my *Right*, or *confer* upon another what they could never take from me. To be out of possession is so far from being a prejudice to my *Right*, That *God's Anointed* himself hath been as long out of his ; whose *Right* hath yet been *alwayes greater* (at least by one *Title*) then any subject's.

How the *Assendy Presbyterians* became *Abettors of sacrilege*, and *perjurators with the Bible*,

§. 82. But *Mr. Hickman* is well satisfied that he wants nothing at all, but a *Right* and *Title* to his possession. pag. 46. And the taking that for a *small defect*, may very probably

bably be the reason why the *Assembly Annotators* on the *English Bible* did seem to think it no sin, to be God's and the Churches *Unusuaries*, in such a figurative sense as in which Mr. Hickman may be called mine. For 'tis observed by Dr. Gauden (and many others) that in * every place through the Bible, where the word and Spirit of God signally commands them to brand the sin of sacrilege with a black mark, as one of the Devils hindmost Herd, the Presbyterian Expositors do so slyly and slightly pass it over, as if they had neither seen nor smelt that foul beast; as if there were no gall in their pens, no Reproof in their mouths, no courage in their Hearts against this sin; they scarce ever touch it, never state it, make no perstrictive or invective stroke against it; which could not be (saith the Observer) their Ignorance, or inadvertency, but the cowardise, cunning, and Parasitism of the Times; in which they were content, for some Presbyterian ends, to connive at sacrilege in those good Lords and Masters, whose charity they hoped (yea Doctor Gauden professeth he heard of them profess they expected) would turn all that stream, which Bishops, Deans, and Chapters enjoyed, to drive the Presbyterian Mills, to keep up the honour of Ruling and teaching Elders. — These soft fingered Censors (saith the Reverend Doctor a little after) very gently touch that rough Satyr of sacrilege, where tis expressly put in the balance with Idolatry, and overweighs it, as more enormous. Thus farr that Learned and moderate man, whom perhaps the Annotators may charge with impudence (as Mr. Hickman does me) and that against the two Houses too, on whom they probably will bestow the Supreme Authority of the Nation; It being a Grace which Mr. Hickman was pleased to grant them.

§. 83. Whereas he saith that my being married doth evacuate and nullifie my Title to all Academical Injoyments, (pag. 46, 47.) first I must tell him that I was single, when I was cast out of my Fellowship (which was my Freehold)

* See his *Hierarchia* ch. 21. §. 3. p. 333. 334. and weigh the passage with the professions of these men.

Mr. Hickman's confounding possession and right, and making no scruple of many Robberies at once.

and some years after did so continue, even till after I was presented to the *Rectorie* of *Brington*, my injoyment of which he seems to *envie*, (*ibid.*) And so I hope he will acknowledge my *Arrears* are due to me till then; Nor can he with any Truth, that I ever pretended to any more.

2. I am not sure my being married can null my Title, untill Doctor *Oliver* and the true *Fellows* shall so declare it; and wise men have thought, that by their good leave I am *Fellow* still, till by a lawfull *Election* they put another into my place. For *Thomas Goodwin* (we know) is a most scandalous *usurper*, so as the *Rhapsodist* himself can be hardly worse. And so my *modus habendi* may still be *optimus*, as Mr. *Hickman's* is *pessimus* in the very worst sense too. For I have an Academical enjoyment by Right, Mr. *Hickman* onely by *usurpation*. I am warranted by *Ulpian* to say I have it, though many years together I have not held it. Nam & cum *Habere* dicimus qui *Rei Dominus* est, æque ac cum qui *Rem Tenet*. 3. And it was strange that Mr. *Hickman* could think me incapable of my own (at *Magdalen Colledge*) by my having injoyed a single *Parsonage*, whilst (at the very sametime) he thought himself capable of things which were none of his, even a *Fellowship* in the *Colledge*, a *Vicarage* of *Brackly*, and a *Parsonage* at *Saint Towles* too, and all by no other title, then what the wickedness of the Times could bestow upon him. So Mr. *Tombes* the Arch-*Anabaptist* could be qualified by the Times to be * *Parson* of *Rosse*, and *Vicar* of *Lempster*, and *Preacher* of *Bewdly*, and *Master* of the *Hospital* at *Ledbury*; All which he was somewhat fitter for, then Mr. *Hickman*, if but capable of something, by being lawfully ordained. Whereas Mr. *Hickman* having been onely made a *Minister*, (not a *Priest*, or a *Deacon*, as† *Doctor Heylin* doth well distinguish) and made a *Minister* no otherwise, then as the *Friar's Pork* was made *Pickerrill*, cannot be capable of the least, much less of two or three *Living*s. And perhaps in time he may say as much, if he will reade *Doctor Hammond* upon the *Ordinance* of
the

* Mr. *Baxter*
of *Infants*
Church Mem.
p. 202, 203.

† *Exam. Hist.*
part. 1. p. 158,
159.

the two Houses for the ordination of Ministers *Pro Tempore*, Printed at Oxford 1644. For which that Great Author was never yet accused of being *impudent*, though what he writ was against the two Houses.

S. 84. Because he know's I never said, *I was suspected by the Visitors to be the Author of a Libel*, (which words the man was resolved to use) he tells his Reader that my words might look like such an Affirmation. p. 47.] whereas before he confessed my words were no other, then that I was secretly suggested to be the Author of some books, which to this very day I could never hear nam'd. (p. 44.) were all things Libells which were written for the cause of the King and of the Church, or were any way displeasing to those mens Palates who came to Visit? Or is it lawfull to ruine men upon bare suspicion? Was this for the credit of the Visitors, or them that sent them? Be it so that I was suspected, (as any other man might be,) I was as innocent as the morning, in which I was told by Dr. Reynolds of such suspicion. And that he told me as a secret, not according to the vote of his guilty Brethren, who never charged me with ought, no not so much as a suspicion. Much less did they dare to let me know my Accuser, for fear I should prove him a false Accuser, and spoil the trade they then were driving. Much less yet would they indure that I should have the least tryall, (fair, or foul;) because they were conscious of the nothing, that they were able to say against me. Their dealing with me, in that affair, puts me in mind of what I read in an English book, * [There was nothing so common in those Times, as a charge without an Accuser, a sentence without a Judge, and a condemnation without a hearing.] But I was condemned without a charge too; And it seems by no Judge that will own the Judgment. For

S. 85. Mr. Hickman is fain to say, that I was turned out of my Fellowship, not by the Visitors, but by the Committee of Lords and Commons, for non-submission to the Authority of Parliament, in visiting the University. p. 47.]

His willful bitterness sadly reflecting upon the Visitors.

* See Mr. Howell's sober inspecions on the long Parliament. p. 136.

And as much on the Lords and Commons.

To which I answer, 1. That my Answer to the *Visitors* was judged rational and modest by Doctor *Reynolds*, who therefore told me it was impossible I should be banished only for that; but rather for being at least *suspected* to have written some Books; but *what* books they were, or *why* I was *suspected* the Author of them, he either could not, or would not tell me. 2. *Mr. Hickman* layes the whole fault on the *Lords* and *Commons*, which I ascribe unto the *Visitors*, transgressing the Commission by which they sate. For would the *Lords* and *Commons* undo an Orphan for being *modest*, and conscientiously desirous to gain some time, to the end he might not answer but upon due consideration? This would justifie *Philangus* in the book above mention'd, when he said **That many were outed their Free-holds, Liberty, and Livelyhoods, before any examination, much less conviction; and that the order of a Committee was commonly made to controule the fundamental Lawes of the Land.* I rather think that the *Visitors* did return a false answer, and so abused the *Lords* and *Commons*, then that persons of so much honour would be the authors of such a fact, as Doctor *Reynolds* (although a *Visitor*) so much abhorred, and never would give his consent unto. But *Mr. Hickman* doth acknowledge that the two Houses may do amiss; for he dares not undertake in all things to acquit them. p. 48.

* *Ubi supra.*

Worst of all up.
on the Kings in
excluding
whom, he be-
heads the Par-
liament.

* See his
works. p. 49.

† *Idibid.*

* COOKE,
their Oracle, in
his Chap. of
Parliam. fol. 1.
apud eundem.

§. 86. But why doth he call it the Authority of Parliament, which he confesseth at other Times to be no more then two Houses? A Parliament without a King (much more against him) is a contradiction in adjecto. Well said Judge *Jenkins*, [* The legs, Arms, and Trunk of the body, cannot be above the Head, nor have life without it.] So that supposing the King to be but one of the 3. States of which a Parliament doth consist, He is a part, and that the highest. But in truth (saith the † learned Judge) The King is none of the three estates, but * above them all. The three estates are the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons. And so *Mr. Hickman* is unexcusable in beheading

betraying the Parliament, by excluding the King from his Royal Birthright.

§ 87. Again Mr. Hickman proceeds to ask, [Is it "not Impudence to say, that the Visitors authorized by the two Houses, under the broad Seal of England, could not make me his legitimate successor? p. 47.] To which I answer, 1. that the Visitors were never authorized by the two Houses to condemn me without some little hearing, or to huddle up their sentence and Execution, without Accuser, or witness, or accusation, face to face. 2. The two Houses could only make an Ordinance, not an Act of Parliament, which is a Law) as the Houses themselves have oft confessed. And * Laws are the things which bind the people. Nay 3. If any Statute shall be made against Magna Charta, (and so against Bishops provided for by Magna Charta, and confirmed by thirty two Acts of Parliament; or against any man's right without a triall according to Law; It is by Law declared null. 42. Ed. 3. ch. 1. But it seems Mr. Hickman is like Oliver Cromwell, whose foul-mouth'd by-word was wont to be, * Magna Charta, Magna Farta. Nay 4. It is resolved in † Law Books, that if an Act of Parliament refer to, or confirm a thing which is nor, (as for a man to be a Judge or witness in his own case,) or a thing that is misrecited, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, there the common Law shall controll, and adjudge such an Act to be merely void. Now we who were of the Dispersion through the Avarice and Revenge of the cruel Visitors, did find those Visitors in very great part, at once our Judges, our Juries, our Executioners, and our Heirs. Had they dealt sincerely with us, and bid us plainly leave our Fellowships, because they had Sons, and Nephews, or other good friends to be cared for, (as the Fox was sincere, when he bid the Cock come down from the Tree, alledging this reason, that he was hungry,) I should not have used them as now I do, though I use them better then they did me. But their pretending to Reformation, and Justice too, did make their sin exceed-

How he and his Visitors have added against the two Houses and withall against the supreme Power of the Nation.

* Ibid. p. 195, 197.

† lb. p. 62.

* See M. Prins Perfect Narrative, p. 58. † Flouiden f. 388, 389. Cook's Reports. f. 118. Hobards Reports. p. 85, 86, 87. apud eundem. p. 34.

ing.

* p 35.

† p 37—§ 45.

* 1 Pet. 2. 31.

The case of
the University
of Oxford
A.D. 1648. &c
The sad Di-
lemma all its
members
were put to,
either to be
perjur'd, or
destroyed.

ing sinfull. 5. The *Broad Seal* which he speaks of is cal-
led by Judge *Jenkins*, a *Counterfeit Seal*. And the *Coun-*
terfeiting of that he † proves *High Treason*. Last of all I
will add, that we were taught in our *Catechism*, by our
common mother the *Church of England*, that we are
bound by God in the fifth Commandment, to honour and
obey (not the two Houses, but) the King, not the two
Houses and the King, but the King and his ministers. Saint
Peter accordingly commanding us to Submit our selves to
every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, instructs us to
do it to the King as * *Supreme*, and unto Governours as
sent by him. Now Were the *Visitors* really sent by him?
Or were they not flatly sent against Him? Whether so, or
so, Let it be judg'd by the *Case of the University*; the most
materiall part of which shall now become my next Se-
ction.

§. 88. The onely question which is by these men pro-
pos'd to every single person in the *University*, is, Whe-
ther we will submit to their *Visitation*, or to the power of
Parliament (as they call it) in this *Visitation*.

That without the Personall Consent of the King to this
Commission, (as far as it respects the *University* in General,
and us as members thereof) we cannot now submit to any
Visitation, without incurring the guilt of manifold per-
juries. In reference to our *University* oaths, we have
long since given an Account by way of Plea to these men:
That our particular *Locall*, or *Collegiate Statutes*, (which
define us particular *Visitors* in our particular *Colledges*)
bind us (under the same most evident perjury) to submit
to no other *Visitation*, but that which the Statutes of
each have defined, hath been also the Plea of the Heads
of our *Colledges*, in the name of their severall Societies.
And for this, and nothing but this, that is, (in plain words)
because they have (with all civility to the two Houses, and
to the persons sent by them) refused to incur that damning
sin of perjury, (which hath already helpt to bring such
heavy judgements upon this Nation) the Governours of
the

the University are displaced, and some imprison'd, and Master Reynolds a *Visit* or put into the office of Vice-chancellor, and into the *D. anary* of *(Christ Church)* two places of the greatest dignity, and power) one of the greatest profit in the *University*. And in like manner the Heads of the *Colledges*, and the *Prebendaries* of *Christ-church* have many of them already fallen under the same punishments, (and the rest expect their turns) and severall of the *Visitors* also are put into their places. And now the slaughter hastens to the door of every of the ancientest, or youngest Student, Fellow, Scholar, Commoner, or other member of the whole *University*, and the speed is so great, the pursuit so vehement, that four whole *Colledges* have been in one day summoned to appear before them, without any delay, to give positive *Answer* to this one Question. *Whether they will submit, or no.* By this 'tis apparent to us, that as the state of things now stands, we have an easie, though unhappy choice propos'd to us, *viz.* Whether we will prefer the preservation of our Estates, or of our Souls by admitting perjury or ruine. (And in the making of the choice God hath given the whole University such an uniform constancy, and contempt of the world, that we hear not of above three men that have considered their profit so much, as to yield this submission) And that it may be also apparent to all others, that this is the choice, I shall give you the plain words of our Oaths, by which we are withheld from submitting, that the Honourable Houses may judge, if they please, whether it be probable that conscience hath by us been hypocritically pretended to destroy our selves, as it hath sometimes been made use of by others for their visible advantages. This I shall set down first as far as our obligation is founded in our Oathes to the University, and then to our severall Colledges.

The Oath of the University to every man is this. *Tu jurabis te observaturum omnia Statuta, Libertates, Privilegia, et Consuetudines istius universitatis. Thou shalt swear to observe all the Statutes, Liberties, Priviledges, and*

customs of this University. The Scholar answers, *Iure, I swear,* and this he renews, and repeats as often as he takes any degree in the University. From hence we conclude, that for any man wilfully to betray any one of the *Privileges*, or *Liberties* (as well as to break the *Statutes* or *customs* of the *University*) can never be excused from the guilt and charge of down-right *Perjury*; for which we must be banished the *University*, if ever we be called to account for it by any just power. And that one of our *Privileges* is, that we be visited by none but the *King*, or those that are sent by Him, as we are verily perswaded, so have we never heard of any other title, or pretension of any (which is thought even by our enemies to have any shew of Ground in our Charters, or Customs against our Plea) save onely that of the *Archbishop of Canterbury*, the *Metropolitan*; to which our Answer is so clear, and punctuall, (*viz.* that in the vacancy of the *Arch-bishops* See, all power that can be thought to belong to him, must needs be acknowledged to devolve to the *King* the fountain of his power, and so the *Arch-bishop* having been long dead, this power of Visiting us (if any such belong to the *Arch-bishop*) must now needs be onely in the *King*) that we profess never to have heard of any word of satisfaction that hath been offered to this enforcement of our Plea, but are rather told that the Commission for this Visitation coming under the name of our *Sovereign Lord Charles, &c.* is a Commission issued out by the *King*; which as it seems to us an acknowledgement of the truth of all our pretensions; so is it the imposing upon us the belief of that which we know to be otherwise, having certain knowledge that the *King* never consented to the issuing of this Commission, and so having no excuse of ignorance, in case we should yield submission to that Visitation (as proceeding from him) which is acknowledged by all to involve us in *Perjury*, if it come not from him. To this we may add one obligation more, that as 'tis one of the *Universities Privileges* to be exempt (without al
con-

controversie as long as the *Arch-bishops* See is vacant) from all power but that of the King, so 'tis one of the *Kings Priviledges* and *preeminencies* to have this full, and (at this time) sole power over us. And then that branch of the Oath of Supremacy that obligeth all Subjects in these expresse words, [*to assist, and defend to our power all Priviledges, and Preeminencies, and Authorities granted, and belonging to the Kings Majesty, or annexed to the Imperiall Crown of this Kingdome*] doth certainly bind us to defend this, as far as it is in our power to do it.

For the obligations of *Colledge Statutes* which name us particular Visitors, and exclude all others from that employment, I shall shorten your trouble, and yet not fail in giving you, and all men a perfect satisfaction, by setting down a few plain words out of some of them. In the *Statutes of New Coll. Magdalen Coll. Corpus Christi, and St. John's* (in each of these without any considerable alteration) these are the words; *Statuimus, ordinamus, & volumus, ut liceat Dno Episcopo Winton: Dioc: qui pro tempore fuerit, & nulli alii, nec aliis, &c. per se, vel suum Commissarium (specialem, quem duxerit deputandum (praterquam per Cancellarium Universitatis, seu ejus Commissarium generalem, seu procuratores Univers. Oxon. &c. ac praterquam Custodem, aut aliquam personam nostri Collegii, aut alios quoscunque in Universitate per unam quindenam anno proximo cum Visitationem precedentem Studentes, &c. per quos, aut ipsorum aliquem hac volumus quomodolibet exerceri) ad Collegii hujus visitationem liberè accedere, & Custodem ac alios singulos socios, &c. nostri Collegii in Sacellum ejusdem convocare.*

From whence these few things are distinctly concluded by the *Statutes* of those *Colledges*. 1. That the *Bishop of Winchester* by himself, or some body deputed by him is the onely lawfull Visitor of those *Colledges*; and all other person or persons in direct words (*nec alii nec aliis, & praterea nemini*) are excluded by the *Statutes*. 2. That it is not lawfull for the *Bishop* himself to depute any of those

G g 2 persons

persons which are there excepted, viz. the *Chancellor* or *Vice-chancellor*, or *Prossours* of the *University*, the *Warden* or *President*, or any person of the said *Colledges*, or any *Student* in the *University*, that hath been commorant there fifteen dayes in the year preceding the *Visitation*; by which exception all these men, which have lately been the onely actors in this business (having now resided ('tis to be supposed studied) here for some time, and now one nam'd, and by them repated to be *Vice chancellor*, others to be *Governours* of particular *Colledges*) are made utterly incapable of that employment. I shall not need to mention any more, it being clear that these men are not deputed by that *Bishop*, and as clear, that if they were deputed by him, they are not qualified according to the *Statutes*, but expressly excluded by them. Now what is thus ordained by those *Statutes*, every member admitted into those *Colledges*, is by Oath obliged to observe, and not onely involved in perjury if he do not, but where other penalties are not named (as in this matter there are not) is liable to the pain of perjury, that is, deprivation of all benefits of his *Colledge*; which is now become the punishment of none but those who will observe them.

Besides these Oathes which particularly and directly look to the grand matter of the *Visitation*, There be many other branches of our Oathes *Academicali*, and *Collegiate*, which are most nearly concerned in the present transactions. The *Statutes* of the *University*, to the observing of which our oaths distinctly bind us, prescribe the manner of *Election* of *Prossours*, (of calling and meeting in *Convocations*, &c.) And therefore whensoever *Prossours* have been removed by the KING, the *University Statutes* have taken place in appointing the *Successours*; and those (as the *Vice-chancellor* also) are obliged to take Oaths, for the discharge of their places according to *statute*. But all is now done directly contrary to all this. And therefore herein no sworn member of the *University* can think fit, without professing despight to Conscience or reputation, to joyn with them. And so in particular *Colledges*, the

Statutes are punctuall, that after the departure or a motion of any *Governour*, the *Fellows* must proceed within such a time to the election of a new, and he and none but he shall be reputed *Warden*, *President*, &c. who shall be chosen by a major part of the *Electours*. And then he that is chosen must take severall *Oaths* particularly to govern according to *Statute*, before any of the *muniments* of the *Colledge* may be delivered up to him, or before he enter upon the Government, to act any thing in it. And this is established by severall positive statutes, to the observing of which, all members of *Colledges* are precisely sworn. And it is evident and acknowledged that no man can be made *Dean* or *Prebendary* of *Christs Church* (nor ever was since the foundation of the *Church*) but by the *KINGS* personal consent, and nomination under the *Privy Seal*, and *Broad Seal*, by which he is installed; And to him that is thus posselt of that *Deanary*, every Student of that *Church* is by plain words of the *Oath* of his admission, bound to perform due obedience &c. All which being now most clearly violated by not onely *Sequestring*, but removing the former, and putting in new *Governours* by force, without *Election*, or taking of *Oaths* to the *Colledges*, it follows that no sworn member of any *Colledge* can acknowledge any such *Governours* without wilfull un-executable *Perjury*. The onely thing that hath yet been offer'd to us to answer the Force, and urgency of all this Plea (and at the presence of which, all mention of our *Oaths* must vanish presently) is the pretended *Sovereign power* of the two *Houses* to make and abolish *Laws* and *Obligations*; which having interposed here, is consequently said to quit us of all these engagements, which formerly lay upon us. But this is so far from removing our *scruples*, that it is it self a *scruple* much more hard to us to digest, then the former. For by our having taken the *Oath of Supremacy*, we have acknowledged that to be onely in the *KING*; and by our education in this Kingdome, have been brought up in a firm belief (grounded on the known *Laws* and *Customes* there-

thereof) that the power of enacting, and repealing of Laws belongs not to the *two Houses exclusively*, but to the KING, *with the consent of the two Houses*; and we do now profess, never to have heard any thing to the contrary, before these times: nor since these times, sufficient to alter our judgements in this particular. And therefore whatsoever question be made of this truth by other men, yet we, whose hearts assure us, that we make no question of it (and consequently acknowledge, that we do not yet conceive our selves to be freed from any one branch of any of these *Oaths*) cannot imagine what colour it is possible for the Tempter to put upon this required submission, by which to persuade us, that it might be reconcileable with a good Conscience now, or with any degree of excuse to God or men, or of quiet and tranquillity within our own breasts at the hour of death, in case we should, on such terms as these, submit to this *Visitation*. And as I think I might safely appeal to any Divine in the world as to a *Confessor*, or *Confessor* for the stating of this *Question*, *Whether it were lawfull for us to submit, supposing our many Oathes confessedly bound us to the contrary, and that we are verily persuaded, that these Oathes are in full force upon us, and as confident that the two Houses could not dispence with them, nor take off the obligingness of them*; So would I likewise appeal to any man living that ever pretended to assert either the *Liberty of Conscience*, or propriety of goods, *Whether we ought in this case to be turn'd out of our free hold, to the utter undoing of so great a multitude for no other crime but this of not submitting, when that is nothing else but the following the dictates of our Consciences informed and regulated by the known Laws of the Land*. Having given you this short view of our *State*, which (as 'tis told us assuredly by the *Visitors*) is suddenly to bring a perfect *visitation* on this *University*, I cannot but think it my duty to the publick (which is now so disabled from meeting in a body, that it cannot make any formall address to you) to lay this representation before you, and to de-

fire

fire by your assistance it may yet be resumed into consideration, Whether it will be for the honour of *Christian Religion*, or of the *Protestant Profession*, that our bare *demurring* or refusing to submit our selves to the grossest and most unquestion'd *perjuries*, should be voted by your Committee to be *an high contempt of Authority of Parliament*, and such punishments assign'd thereto, which if inflicted impartially, must necessarily leave no one scholar of what quality soever in this University (which is of age to have taken Oathes of admission to the *University*, or to any particular *Colledge*) which shall not appear to all men avowedly and confessedly *perjur'd* and lyable to all the shame and penalty, that by Law belongs to that crime, whensoever any man shall be willing to prosecute it against him. We hope this representation may produce some other counsels; if not, we shall most chearfully perish in our integrity.

To conclude. 1. That as many *Earls* and *Barons* as could stand about the Kings Throne, at his Coronation, did lay their hands on the *Crown* on his Royal Head, professing to spend their blood to maintain it to Him and his lawfull Heirs. 2. That those Lords were cast out of their House by the *Commons*, as they had joyned with the *Commons* to cast out the King; 3. That the Bishops were acknowledged to be one of the *Three States*, even by those very Houses which cast them out; 4. That Both the *houses*, without the King, had but a *disputable Authority*, even with some of their own *Minions*; 5. That the *Oxford Visitation*, was null and void; Doctor *Haylin* hath proved to Master *Fuller* in his *Examen Historicum*, pag. 203. 251. 264. 265. &c.

§. 89. Having now dismissed those weighty subjects, in which it concerns every person to be sufficiently instructed, I am arriv'd at that part of the *Filcher's* Volume, wherein he comes to the Question, concerning the *positive Entity of sin*. Of which whatsoever the man hath said, (whether out of Mr. *Baylow*, or Doctor *Baron*,) I have consi-

*A transigent to
the discovery
of his no-
in Logick.*

considered at large in the 6. Chapters of my Book, to which I have added this long Appendix. Yet because there are still some things remaining, which though not to the purpose, may yet be usefully discovered, I will discover them as fully as shall be needfull, and in as few words as can be shew'd.

His insultation
added to hide
or bear up his
ignorance.

90. I had said then an Accident is not the subject of an Accident, And that some Accidents are not separable from their subjects of Inhesion, as Risibility from a man. Then which there are not two greater Truths, either more ordinarily known, or more generally granted amongst Logicians. But so profound was the Ignorance of Mr. Hickman, or so implacable his Rancour, and so incomparable his boldness, that he summon'd all those who had any respect for Mag. Coll. to blush at my Ignorance in those particulars, which commonly Freshmen are wont to know, (pag. 51.) If here he spoke against his conscience (which is the likeliest of the two) I wonder how he durst do it, unless he hoped that no Scholars would read his Book. But if it was his mere ignorance, which is not so likely, though it is possible, he then was destitute of skill even in Logick, which he last came from, as well as in Divinity, at which he is not yet arrived. And so it is hard for me to judge, whether the sinner or the Sciolist hath the greater share in him. For mark the Judgement of Aristotle, as well as that of the Complutenfes, and all the Thomists.

Concerning the
subject of an
Accident.
Collegium
Empl. in Aris-
tot. Dialect.
Disp. 12. de
substan. quest. 5
p. 419. 420.

Hæc est expressa Doctrina Aristotelis. (4 Metaphys. Text. 14.) Accidenti non est accidens, nisi quia Ambobus idem accidunt. Estque receptissima inter Thomistas. Pro quâ videri possunt *Cartan.* 2. p. q. 77. art. 2. A *Soto* in 4. dist. 10. quest. 2. art. 2. *Maf. Sanch.* l. 5. quest. 11. *Bergom.* in Concordantiis D. *Thoma.* dub. 10. & alii.

Fundamentum est, quia omne Accidens definitur per proprium & immediatum subjectum cui inhaeret. Sed semper definitur per substantiam. ut ex Aristotele patet. Ergo semper substantia pertinet ad proprium & immediatum subjectum Accidentis.

Con-

Confirmatur primò: quia quilibet forma, seu actus immediatè attingit propriam materiam, seu potentiam, ut patet inductione: sed in propria materia, seu potentia accidentium semper includitur substantia, ergò semper accidentia immediatè attingunt substantiam. Probatur Minor: quia accidens dat propriæ materiæ esse secundum quid, ergò requirit, & supponit in illâ esse simpliciter.

Confirmatur secundò: quia idè in sententiâ D. Thomæ materia prima non est integrum & immediatum subiectum quantitatis, aut alterius accidentis (& idem est de formis materialibus) quia non habet propriam substantiam: sed nullum accidens habet propriam substantiam, ut patet; ergò nullum accidens potest esse subiectum integrum & immediatum alterius. Yet in a flat contradiction to all this *Authority and Reason* too, Master Hickman tells us that an Accident may be the immediate subject of Inhabitation to an Accident. (p. 31.) As if he had never so much as tasted of *Aristotles* Well, or hardly dipped into a system. For even thence he might have learned, that 'tis the propriety of substantia Quarto modo, to be the subject of Accidents.

§. 91. Nay as if he had studied to talk exactly like an *Ideot*, he presently adds that *only substance can be the ultimate subject of an Accident* (ibid.) whereas on the contrary it is held by all the world to be *subiectum ultimum*, not *ultimatum*, which an Accident may be by my good leave. So that either he was ignorant, how *ultimum* differs from *ultimatum*; or else he conceived that *substance* signifies an Accident; or else he was wholly of my opinion, even whilst he so much rail'd against it. When I said that an Accident is not *subiectum Accidentis*, I meant *ultimum*, (as all the world hath ever meant) not *ultimatum*, (as Master Hickman;) but mention'd neither, because 'twas needless. And so Master Hickman hath no excuse for disgracing himself in this publick manner. Of one hundred Authors, I will convince him but

Of *subiectum ultimum*, or *ultimatum*,

with one, whom he pretends to admire, but (I am confident) never read.

Crakenthorp
de Accidente
p. 33.

Subjectum ultimum cui accidentia omnia inhaerent, quodque accidentia sustentat, est vel substantia illa quae est summum genus, vel aliqua species, aut individuum illius. Differentiae quidem substantiales, etiam & unum accidens potest esse alterius subjectum, sed ut *Logici* vocant, ultimum. (therefore Mr. Hickman is no Logician) Nunquam autem sunt accidentia aut esse possunt ultima accidentium subjecta, &c.

* Hurtadus de
Mendoza
Phys. Disp. 6.
sub. 2.
Greg. de Val.
lent. 2. dist. 12.
q. 2. art. 1.
Marsilius 4. q.
9. art. 2. ibid.

Nay there are who are of opinion, (and *men of renown) that Accidents is neither subjectum quod, nor quo; not ultimum, nor ultimum. That Quantity is no way receptive of Qualities, sed in materia esse unam potentiam ad quantitatem, aliam vero distinctam ad qualitatem; in qua potentia, & non in quantitate, Capreolus subjoinct qualitates, saith Hurtadus; who professeth he is driven to this opinion.

Of an Inseparable
Accident.

§. 92. To his denial that *Risibility* is an *Inseparable Accident*, (which if a Freshman should deny, he would be hift out-of the Schools) I shall not need say any more then this, That 'tis a quality and so an Accident; that 'tis Accidens proprium, and so 'tis accidens; That 'tis proprium quarto modo, and so inseparable. For omni, soli, semper & convertibiliter subjecto convenit. Master Hickman denies it to be an Accident Inseparable, because forsooth 'tis a propriety. As if he should say, it is not, because it is, and cannot possibly be otherwise. The cause of his miscarriage must needs be this, that he know's not the difference betwixt a *pradicabile* and a *pradicament*. Because Accidens and Proprium do make two *pradicables*, he thinks that that which is proprium, (as *Risibility*) cannot therefore be Accidens; forgetting that accidens is divided into proprium, & commune, and so does make a twofold *pradicabile*. Now let the Visitors consider what Reformation they have made, when a titular Fellow of a Colledge and a titular Master of Arts is found not fit

to be a tolerable Pupil, whilst he stands in need of such Logick Lectures. Is not Cicero a name, because it is a proper name? Or is not Mr. Hickman so much as a man, because he is not a learned man? no nor an animal, (by his reasoning) because not *Animal irrationale*. The blackness of a Crow he will grant to be an *Inseparable accident*, but not the Crow's crocication; because the later is not less, but more inseparable than the former. I will not say, *blush*, but pity him all yee, that have any respect for *Magdalen Colledge*.

§. 93. He goes to prove that an *Accident* may be the subject of *Inhabition* to an *Accident*, because *fides* is either in *Intellectu* or in *voluntate*. (p. 51.) And thus he takes it for granted that these are accidents, which are known by all Scholars to be *substantial faculties*. Aristotle calls the *Intellect* a part of the soul. A part I say, not as if it had quantity, but *secundum rationem*, as he explains his own words. Πῦρ ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον τῆς ψυχῆς, & γινώσκων τε ἢ ψυχῇ καὶ φρονῶν, ὅτε χωρεῖσθ' ὄντων, εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωρεῖσθ' κατὰ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτικόν τιν' ἔχει διαφανέον, καὶ πῶς πότε γίνεσθαι το νοεῖν.

Ochamus, Gregorius Ariminensis, Gabriel Biel, Thomas Garbinus, Bonaventura, Parisiensis, & complures alii, (inquit * Berigardus,) dicunt anima facultates esse ipsummet ejus essentiam, quæ prout variis in organis obit varia munera, ipsa quoque diversis facultatum appellationibus nuncupatur.

Ostendi, inquit Hurtadus, Gratiam imitari Conceptus Naturæ, ac propterea esse in *substantia anima*. *Fides* est in *Intellectu*, id est, in *Animâ*, ad efficiendos actus intelligendi: sub quo conceptu *Anima* est *Intellectus*. This comes home to Mr. Hickman's Instance. Nay Hurtadus is of opinion, that *no vital faculty is accidental*. Sed esse adæquate idem vel cum animâ, si est spiritualis, vel cum toto composito, si materialis. Ita Greg. Arimin. Henr. Gandavensis, Gab. Biel, & universa *Nominum* schola quibulcum consentiunt * non pauci.

Of the substantial faculties of the Soul.

Aristot. φῖλ ψυχῆς. cap. 2. mibip 1416

By whom they are held to be its very essence. * Berigardus. Circulo quinto de anima facult. sua potentia.

† Hurtadus de Mendez de Anima Dissert. 4. Sect. 4.

* Pat. Conimbricenses 2. de Anima c. 3. q. 4. artic. 1. Durandus 2. dist. 3. quest. 5.

† August. lib.
de sp. & ani-
ma c. 2. & 3.
* Tom. 9. Tr.
15. in Joh.
apud Hart. u-
bi supra.

† Bernardus
in serm. 11.
supra cantica
apud eund.
Stabilis reg.
Philos. Tit. 16
de Regulis
subjectis & ac-
cidentis.

** Hort. de
Mend. ubi su-
pra.

Of his grant-
ing what he
denyes whilst
he denyes it,
and giving up
the whole
cause,

Saint † *Austin* saith, that those *Faculties* are the *Soul* it self as existing in several parts of the body. And again, *Anima est intellectus, Anima est memoria, & Anima est voluntas*. And again, * *Intellectus non est aliquid aliud quam Anima; sed aliquid anima est Intellectus, quomodo non aliquid aliud quam caro est oculus, sed aliquid carnis est oculus, &c.*

† In animâ *Tria* intueor, *Rationem, Memoriam, & Voluntatem, & hac Tria tandem esse animam.*

Nec dissentit *Scotus* cum suâ scholâ, quem adducit *Par. Valentia* pro eadem sententiâ. (inquit *Hurtadus*.)

Videtur ea sententiâ, quod *facultates animæ* sint secundum *Rem ipsa substantia Animæ*, alterâ longè probabilior.

'Tis true that some *Confused* men are of another mind, but they * confess that their opinion cannot easily be proved and (as I said before) they are * *confused*. However, for their sakes, (though 'tis likely *Mr. Hickman* doth not know with whom he err's) I hold our Malefactor the more excusable.

§. 94. But he is utterly unexcusable, when he saith that *sin* is not acknowledged by any to be *Complexum Quid*, except by *Complexum*, we mean *Complexum ex genere & Differentiâ*. p. 53.] For first that 'tis *complexum quid*, is so acknowledged by all, (by Doctor *Sanderson* in particular who is himself a great many) that 'till I heard of one *Mr. Hickman*, I heard of no man, that e're deny'd it. Next he affirms what he denies, by saying it is *complexum ex genere & differentiâ*; more than which, he could not possibly have said for my advantage. For first *Mr. Hickman* is but *Animal rationale*, if we grant him the most that he can desire. And what is *Animal Rationale*, but one *genus & differentia*? Next he clearly here confesseth the positive entity of *sin*; (though 'twas more then he knew, until I told him,) For every good Definition must be *ex genere & Differentiâ*. And every thing must be considered as under some species when so defined. And 'twill be

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A
P O S T S C R I P T
Touching some late Dealings
O F
Master Baxter.

POSTSCRIPT

Teaching some late Drawings

Malster Baxter.



A POSTSCRIPT

*Touching Mr. Baxter, condemned out of his
own Works, and proved excellently
scandalous in Life and Doctrin.*

§ 1. **H**AVING concluded with Mr. Hickman, I should gladly have ended my Readers Trouble, but that I finde Mr. Baxter hath dealt with Me, and my Writings, as the *Synagogue of the Libertines* once dealt with Stephen, and his Oration; when having nothing to Answer in the Defense of their Rebellion, or for their Murder of Gods Anointed which ^a Stephen had laid unto their charge, they were so ^b cut to the heart, (as S. Luke tells us the story) that they gnashed upon him with their Teeth. But finding him still to use the Liberty of his Tongue, they were transported with greater Fury; and so impatient of his words, that ^c that they stopped their ears, and ran upon him with open mouth: and (with violent hands) disputing him out of the Citie, they flung their arguments at his head; Arguments as hard as the hardest ^d Stones, that He might not fail of a Confutation.

§ 2. That Mr. Baxter is neer of kin unto the Synagogue of the Libertines, I have ^e evinced out of his writings in my *New Discoverer Discover'd*. Where I have shewed in what degree he hath strengthened the hands of Evil Doers, and encouraged the people in all the Villanies to be named; even by striving to perswade them (with all the Artifice he could use) that if a man be once Regenerate, Sanctified, or Godly, it is not Murder, or Adultery, or Drunkenness, or Incest, or Idolatry, or Perjury, or the denying of Christ himself, that can make

A a a

him

*The Synagogue
of the Libertines*

a Acts 6.9.

b Acts 7. 54.

c Verse 57.

d Verse 58.

*Fully applied to
Mr. Baxter.*

*e see the New
Discoverer Discover'd.
Ch. 3. Sect. 1. p. 61, 62,
63, 64. where
Mr. Baxters
words and pages
are set at large.*

him otherwise then a *sanctified* and *Godly* man. Now Mr. Baxter (it seems) resolving not to Answer my Book, and yet not able to let it alone, hath rather chosen (once or twice) to *gnash upon me with his teeth*, and to *throw be was cut unto the heart*, and to *fling some stones* (*Railing and Calumny*) at my *Head*, than to be thought by his Disciples to have *offended*, or so little *stomachful* as to *Repent*.

His railing on
K. James and
Bp. Bancroft.
Metropolitan is
derived from
his and others.
And is used by
Athenicus [Lib.
18.] for an In-
centiary, a
Boute-lew, a
fester of things
into combustion.

§ 3. For first in his Pamphlet of *Self-denial*, (a Pamphlet properly so called) he saith [a Rogers, a Stubb, a Pierce,] not for any other end (that I am able to conceive) then to give himself *Ease* by a little vent. To express a sharp Writer *et cetera*, by [a Rogers, a Stubb, a Pierce] can amount to no more then the bare *showing of his Teeth*, when besides his *own Lip*, there is nothing *Bitten*. From this he could not abstain in his very *Dedicatory Epistle*, (p. 11.) Nor waded he farther into his *Preface* then p. 17. when another sharp pang did thus inspire him. [If Fits-Simon, and other Jesuites, and Br. Bancroft, and Dr. Peter Heylin, Mr. Thomas Pierce, and other such among us are to be believed, what an abominable odious sort of people are they (the Puritans) and especially the Presbyterians, who are (the greatest part of them) intolerable; hypocritical, bloody men.] Now to what purpose was all this, (not so much against Me, whom he ranked with Bishop Bancroft, as against that excellent Archbishop, whom he ranked with the Jesuites) but to discover to all the world *whereabouts his shoe wring'd him?* Archbishop Bancroft was a most wise, and a most pious Metropolitan; whose learned Books have been rayld at but never answered. Certainly He, and Dr. Heylin are as eminent for the Truth of their several Narratives, as any humane Historians that ever writ. I have vindicated the Former, beyond the power of a Baxter to contradict me. The Later hath vindicated Himself in his *Certamen Epistolare*; by which Mr. Baxter was too much baffled, to think of making a Reply.

Fitz

Fitz-Simons was a Jesuite, with whom Mr. Baxter doth too much censure. Nor doth he answer one word to my 5 Allegations. Concerning the Puritans I spent a whole Chapter, (not a Line of which hath ever been answered by Mr. Baxter) wherein I shewed they were as Odious to King James, and Br. Andrews, Dr. Sanderson, and the like, as to Arch-Bp. Bancroft, or Mr. Pierce. And whatsoever he saith of Me, for speaking severely of the Puritans, doth plainly reflect upon the King, and upon all the greatest Persons, both for piety and learning, Archbishops and Bishops, and Reverend Judges of the Land, whose pungent Characters of the Puritans I fairly^h cited.

New Discov.
Discov. ch. 1. p.
98, 99.

Ibid. from p.
103. v. p. 17.

§ 4. But suppose Br. Bancroft, and Dr. Heylin, and Mr. Pierce are three Jesuites, (or as little deserving to be believed, yet Dr. Sanderson is confessed by Mr. Baxter himself, to be both a Moderate and learned Protestant. And He hath so preached against the Puritans (as well from the Presse, as from the Pulpit, that I cannot think of any person (unlesse King James, or Br. Andrews,) who hath branded that Faction with deeper marks. Not only in his Preface to the Second Edition of his Sermons, where he placeth us in the middle betwixt the two extremes, Papists and Puritans and shew's how the Puritans have extremely promoted the Popish Interests, nay how^h Libertinism itself had overspread the whole Face of the Land, by the means of Fiery Turbulent Presbyterians; But in the latest of all his writings, (set out indeed by Dr. Hammond, yet with his own special liking and Approbation,) He sharply speaks of some books against the Liturgy and Ceremonies, by giving them the Name of Puritanical Pamphlets with a juster Epithete than which he could not easily stigmatize them: And the most Learned King James (in his Meditations on the Lords Prayer) doth piously give a special caveat, that we do not make God the Author of sin, as certain^h Puritans are wont to do. Of this

On Br Andrews
and Dr. Sanderson
their Justice to the
Puritans.

See that Preface
of Dr. Sanderson,
Sect. 17,
and 18.

See the Reverend Dr. Hammond his pious
Dissertation,
Sec. 8. l. ult.

k Cavendum
ne cum Puritanis
quibusdam
Deum faciamus
Autorem peccati.
vid. epist.
Deo. Dav. Tillem.
pref. Moris. sunt
in Canon. Synod
his Dicit.

his Majesty was minded by that Acute and Learned Frenchman *Daniel Tilenus* in his excellent Epistle to that wise King, after their happy valediction to the Calvinian Doctrines. Those I hope were no Jesuites Fellows, and may deserve to be Believed, if they affirmed of the Puritans (which Mr. Baxter happily confesseth to have been mostly Presbyterians,) that they were Hypocritical and Bloody men. Only here Mr. Baxter must be taught to distinguish of Presbyterians. For with them that are Moderate I have ever had communion and very affectionate commerce, (as many of them can witness for me) But I am ready to consent to what I find said by Dr. Sanderson, [Such is the Obstinacy and Madnes of the Rigid, Scotized, through-paced Presbyterians, that it is vain to think of doing any good upon them by Arguments, till it shall please God to make them of more humble and Teachable Spirits.] These are pungent but very True, yea very Necessary expressions. They could not else have proceeded from that Exemplary Divine, whom hardly any hath ever excelled (if we behold him in his latest and ripest years) for Piety, Meekness, and Moderation. Had Baxter railed at Me alone for my impartiality to the Puritans, I might have passed it over in peace and silence. But since tis apparent he wreaks his malice upon the Reverend Dr. Sanderson and the Right Reverend B^y. Andrews, and all the other great persons whose words I used, (striking really at Them, although through Me, as *Darius* (in *Herodotus*) was bid to run at *Patizitbam* through *Gobrias sides*) I could not in Conscience let him escape without some usefull Animadversions.

I See the last page of the most learned Dr. Sandersons most incomparable preface.

in *Deum* & *de* *imperio* *et* *libertate* *Herodoti* *in* *Thalia* *c* *78* *p* *194*.

His Confession of his own wickedness again confessed by himself, though but in p. vi.

§ 5. He adds in the Margin of the same page, [That I had answered his Expectation, and from his own Confession, (not knowing him myself) had drawn his picture, that he is proud, lazy, false, an Hypocrite, unjust, &c.] But why for this am I called *Bolsec*, in the words next after, since I was only his Echo, and did but resound his own

Confessions? Not his Auricular confessions, (for he had made none to me,) but his *Confessions* even in print, and in words at length. Mr. Owen had framed a charge against him, that he was proud, selfish, and Hypocritical; Mr. Baxter sub dio (in open Court) pleaded Guilty to the indictment. It was not certainly my Fault, that I cited his Pages as well as Words, that all his favourers might find I had never wrong'd him. Nor could I possibly know him better, then by an abundance of his Own both words and works. Of which how faithfull an accompt I have given the Reader, I leave to be judged of by them, who will compare my citations, as well as read them. Never should I have taxt him either with pride, selfishness and Hypocrisie; but when he had owned all three, I had nothing to do to contradict him. I could never have thought him lazy, (whom I found a Polypragmatick) nor so faulty in the discharge of his pastoral Office as he professed himself to be, if he had not avowed it in very plain English, both in his sheet against the Quakers, and in his *Saints everlasting Rest*. From both I cited his words and pages. And lastly for his injustice, in usurping the Right of Mr. Dance, I never so much as beard of it, untill he told me. Nor was it without his own intreaty, that I demonstrated to him his great Injustice. Let his Followers but consider my whole Chapter of Sequestrations, and I shall hope they will be wary how they are led by his example. Nay in his Postscript to his *True Catholick*, he makes an open Confession of one part of his Confession, though not of All. He saith He is aware of Hypocrisie within him. p. 315. And Hypocrisy (as I take it) must needs denominate an Hypocrite, after the measure that Hypocrisie doth dwell within him.

§ 6. But he saith, he may have my own Consent to tell the world, that there is no truth in me. *ibid.*] See the desperate wickedness of this Pretender to Reformation, without so much as any colour of Common Honesty. For

His prodigious falsifying of Common Prayers.

a Postscript. at the end of his True Catholick when, p. 315.

when, and where did I consent that he should tell the world so gross a *Falshood*? And yet he saith, *he doth perceive he may have my consent to rayl and slander.* But how doth he perceive it? Is it by any thing he hath read in all my writings? Or by any kinde of Message which I had sent him? No, he contents himself to say, [*It is my ordinary Confession in the Book of Common prayer, ibid.*] Does this Professor believe there is a God, or a Devil? A Heaven, or a Hell? Or (believing all four) does he conclude he is *regenerate*, and cannot cease to be such by any Sin to be imagined? Were it not for *This* or *That* he could not wilfully publish so leud a *Fiction*. For first, in all the *Common prayer* there are not any such words. Next, I might use the *Common prayer*, and yet not *All*. Thirdly, the words that are likest to it, are expressly taken out of *S. John*, and are only *Hypoibetical*. If we say that we have no sin we deceive our selves, and there is no Truth in us. (1 John 1. 8. Inſomuch that Mr. Baxter is just as bad as that Fellow, (of whom King James doth somewhere speak in his *Basilicon Doron*) who sought to prove out of the *Psalmist*, *There is no God*, because it is said by the Prophet David, *The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.* Nay fourthly, we are only commanded to use some One of those many Sentences in the Beginning of the Liturgy; which a man may do for many years, without so much as once repeating what Mr. Baxter doth seem to allude unto. And tis more then he knows, if ever I once us'd it in all my Life. But fifthly, let us suppose there were indeed such a *Confession* categorically made in the *Common prayer*. Mr. Baxter is old enough to have known (what Mr. Hooker and others might have taught him, having not read it in *S. Jerome*, a *Latine Father*;) That the Priest, in publick prayer, is the Mouth of the people unto God; as he is, in publick preaching, Gods Mouth unto the people. And so *Confession* is to be made in such General Terms, as may well become the Congregation.

To which as the Priest doth address himself with a [*Dearly beloved Brethren*] so doth he beseech them (in the Conclusion) to keep him Company in the Devotion, saying after him what he speaks, with a pure heart, and humble voice. But it seems Mr. Baxter cares not what he ^b foams out, although it be his own shame, if he ^b *John 13.* may ease himself for a time by aspersing the person with whom he deals.

§ 7. Having confessed again in print his printed Confession of his Hypocrisie, (p. 315.) He yet professeth he is so far from proclaiming himself an Hypocrite, that he will imitate Job in holding fast his integrity. p. 318.] 1. It seems he either understands not the rule of Conjugates, and believes he hath the privilege to keep his Hypocrisie, without the danger of being an Hypocrite; or else when he came to p. 318. he forgot what he had said, p. 315. or else he thinks, that to publish his Sins in print, is nothing neer so much as to proclaim them; or else he is desperate, and careless, what becomes of his reputation; or else he thinks it no Disrepute, to print such shameful Self-Contradictions. 2. After publick Convictions of his Pride and Selfishness, Hypocrisie and Impatience, (for he somewhere also confesseth he is of a peevish Disposition, as I have somewhere shewed in my *New Discover'd Discover'd*;) He talks of imitating Job in holding fast his Integrity. Mr. Dance his Living cannot be called his Integrity, which yet alone is the Thing that he hath ever held fast since first he held it. As for Loyalty, and Obedience, Professants, and Principles, Duties, and Covenants, Those are things he hath playd with at Fast and Loose. Which I proceed to make apparent by these following Degrees.

§ 8. First he hath printed a Confession. [*That our Rebellion prov'd our Constitution was King, Lords, and Commons, which we were Sworn, and Sworn, and Sworn again to be faithful to, and to defend.*] These are all his own words in his Preface directed to the Army, 1659.

His perjury and
ed out of his
own words.
See his holy
Communion
Pref. p. 9.

Next

III. p. 10.

Next he hath printed a Confession, That after several changes of Government, [we had a Protector governing according to an Instrument, made by God knows who. After this we had a Protector governing to the humble petition and Advice, and sworn to both.]

III. p. 9. and 10.

Thirdly, he printed a Confession, that his Protectors came not in till after these four changes, (which I pray the Reader to observe, that thou mayest see in the Conclusion how the Hocus of Kiderminster hath juggled with God, and his own Conscience, and how his Juggling is brought to Light by his own Discovery.)

1. The King withdrawing, (mark his words) the Lords and Commons ruled alone. 2. Next this, we had the minor part of the House of Commons in the exercise of the Sovereign power, -Regality and a House of Lords being cast off. 3. Next this we had nothing visible but a General and an Army. 4. Next this, we had All the whole Constitution and Liberties of the Common-wealth at once subverted: Certain men being called by the NAME of a Parliament, and the Sovereign power pretended to be given them, and exercised by them, that never were chosen by the people, but by we know not whom. Such a fall (he confesseth) as never King was guilty of since Parliaments were known. 5. & 6. There came a Protector, and a Protector, of whom I noted his Confession in my second Observation.

His playing at fast and loose with his Integrity.

Having promised these Confessions, which prove the Titular Protectors to have been the greatest of all USURPERS and so the guiltiest Malefactors in all the Kingdom; Let us consider Mr. Baxter in the bolding fast of his Integrity of which he boasteth. Let us observe how he defended, and was faithfull to the King, Lords and Commons, to which he was Sworn, and Sworn, and Sworn again, by his Confession. Alluding I suppose to those three Oathes; that of Allegiance, that of Supremacy, that of the Scottish and English Covenants. Wherein He Swore to be faithfull and obedient to his Majesties Per-

person and posterity, to assert and defend them with the utmost of his power, that is to say, with Life and Fortune. He swore the two first with one hand upon the Bible, the third with hands lifted up to the most big God. After which I cannot tell whether he enter'd into the Engagement to be true and Faithfull to that which followed without the King and house of Lords; but that he did as bad or worse, I shall prove out of his writtings by what now follows.

6. 10. First he dedicates a book to Protector Richard, wherein he plays the Parasitaster in a most loathsome manner. The style in which he directs his Flattery, is To his Highness Richard Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland. After which he begins to cogg with the man in these words. *a These papers are Ambitious of Accompanying those against popery into your Highness presence, for the tender of their service. --- I observe the Nation generally rejoiceth in your peaceable entrance upon the Government. --- Many are persuaded you have been strangelly kept from participating in any of our late bloody contentions, that God might make you an Healer of our Breaches, and imploy you in that Temple-work, which David himself might not be honoured with. --- This would be the way to lift you highest in the esteem and love of all your People, and make them see that you are appointed by God to be an Healer and Restorer, and to glory in you, and to blesse God for you as the instrument of our chiefest good. --- My earnest prayers for your Highnesse shall be, --- that you may rule us as one that is Ruled by God. That you may alwayes remember you are Christs, and your Peoples, and not your own. Your zeal for God will kindle in your Subjects a zeal for you. c Parliaments, Ministers will heartily pray for you, and praise the Lord for his mercies by you, and Teach all the people to love, honour and obey you. I crave your Highness favourable acceptance of the tendered service of a Faithfull Subjett to your Highness ---* Richard Baxter.

His time serving and sawing upon his Sovereign Richard.

a Five Disput. of Church Gov. and worship Epist. Dedication.

b Mark how this suits with the Assemblies Confess. of faith that all things whatsoever are ordained by God.

c Compare this with his Confession, that was no Parliament, which yet had a better pretence in then Richard,

His rejoicing in
our late miseries
Or.
d Key for C.
tholick Epist.
De poy totam.

e Note the
Presbyterian
agreement
with the Pope
in excommu-
nicating Kings
K. Charles
might be
fought against,
but Mr. Richard
must not.

f Note his
charging upon
God all the
Villanies of
the times.

His Flattering
mentions of
old Oliver, as
severely care-
full of Christs
c. u. e.

g Ded. e. epist.
or pref. before
his Holy Com-
munion lib. 6

In another Epistle to the same Richard, to whom he dedicates another book, he fawns and wags the tail, and catches at favour by these expressions. *You have your government, and we our lives, because the Papists are not strong enough. Pope Pins V. in his Bull against our Queen Elizabeth, saith, we will and command that the Subjects take up Armes against that Hereticall and Excommunicated Queen. Whether such e Opinions as these should by us be uncontradicted, or by you be suffered to be taught your Subjects, is easie to discern. --- We desire you that you would not advance us to temporal honours, or dignities, or power, nor make us Lord Bishops, nor to abound with the Riches of this World: these things agree not with our calling. --- Give not leave to every Seducer to do his worst to damn mens Souls, when you will not tolerate every Traitor to draw your Armies or People into Rebellion. If you ask who it is that presumeth thus to be your Monitor, It is one that Rejoiceth in the present happiness of England, and earnestly wisheth that it were but as well with the rest of the world: and that honoureth all the providences of God by which we have been brought to what we are, and he is one that concurring in the common hopes of greater blessings yet to these Nations under your Government, was encouraged to do what you dayly allow your preachers to do, and to concur with the Rest in the Tenders (and some performance) of his service. --- That God will make you a bealer and preserver of his Churches here at home, and a successfull helper to his Churches abroad, is the Earnest prayers of your Highness faithfull Subject Richard Baxter.*

After this in a Third Epistle, directed to the Army, He calls the powers that were last laid by (meaning either Richard, or the Corrupt minority of the Garbled House, but I rather suppose the Former) *The best governours in all the world that have the supremacy, whom to resist or depose is forbidden to Subjects on pain of Damnation. In what respect he affirmeth those powers the best, he*

explains by^h Wisdom and holyness conjunct. And of the same he saith,^h shall the best of Governours, the greatest of mercies seem intollerable? O how happy would the best of the Nations under heaven be, if they had the Rulers that our Ingratitude hath cast off! Again he tells them, his book^h was written, whilst the Lord Protector, prudently, pi-^h usly, faithfully, to his immortall honour, did exercise the Government. Nay (speaking, I am sure, either of Richard or the Ramp, but I think of Richard) he saith^h be is bound to submit to the present Government, as set over us by God, and to obey, for conscience and to behave himself as a loyall Subject towards them. Nay his Reason for this is yet more monstrous; first partially to Richard, he saith^m A Full and Free Parliament hath owned it, and so there is notoriously the Consent of the People, which is the Evidence that some Princes had to justify the best Titles.] Next maliciously to the King, his only rightfull Sovereign Lord, he saith, [That they who plead Inheritance and Law must fetch the Original from Consent.] Lastly that nothing might be wanting to speak him a Time-server in grain, He said to Richard concerning Oliver (the bloodiest Tyrant in all the World) That the Serious endeavours of his Renowned Father for the Protestants of Savoy had won him more esteem in the hearts of many that fear the Lord, then all his Victories in themselves considered.] To which he added [We pray that you may INHERIT a tender Care of the Cause of Christ] plainly implying the Tyrant Oliver to have been Tenderly careful of the Cause of Christ, and so becoming by such Cajolrie a most eminent partaker in all his villanies. Yet this is the man that stands neer Eternity, (as he boasteth of himself and therefore unfaithfull Man-pleasing would be to him a double crime.

§. 11. Having promised his fearfull dabbling with the Titularie Protectors, whom he confessed to have Governed according to an instrument made by God known who, and according to the humble petition and advice

His being necessary so the most parricidal act, the murder of Gods Anointed.

¶ See the preface to the Essay for the good Old Cause.
1 Tim. 5. 22.
Revel 18. 4.

(made by all the world knows whom, to wit a most illegall and Criminall sort of Traytors, nicknamed a Parliament;) And with that having compared (though not so fully as I intend) his malicious *disowning* the Lords Anointed, whom he had *sworn and sworn and sworn again* to be faithful unto and to defend, (against all such usurpers as *Oliver* & *Alle-seller*, and *Richard* were known to be) I shall now observe in how many respects, Mr. Baxter comes to be *partaker* of *other mens sins*, besides the hideous and frightful nature of his Own. I mean the sins of both the *nominal Protectors*, and of that sort of men who had set them up. To which end it will be usefull, briefly to reckon the severall wayes, whereby a man may be *Accessory*, when another is *Principal* in a transgression.

The seven wayes of partaking in other mens sins:

1. By *Consent* and *Approbation*, so *Saul* was guilty of *Stephens* death Act. 8. 1. So the *Gnasticks* were guilty of sins committed by other men, because they *had pleasure* in those that did them. Rom. 1. 32.

2. By *Counsel* and *advise*, so *Achitophel* was guilty of *Abisalons* Incest and Rebellion, 2. Sam. 16. 23. So also *Caiphas* had a hand in the blood of *Christ*, Joh. 11. 49.

3. By *Appointment* and *Command*, so *Pharoah* and *Herod* are said to have slain the little children they never toucht. Exod. 1. and Matth. 2. So *David* is said to have slain *Uriah* the *Hittite*, though with the *band*, as well as the *Sword* of the *Children of Ammon*. 2. Sam. 12. 9.

4. By *Commending*, *Defending*, or *Excusing* the *Fall* or the *Malefactor*. *W's be to you* that call *evill Good*, that put *darkness* for *light*, and *bitter* for *sweet*, Esa. 5. 20. *W's be to them* that *sowe pillows* to all *Armeboles*, and *make Kerchiefs* upon the *head* of every *stature* to *hunt* souls. Ezek. 13. 18.

Such were Mr. Baxters *Principals* *Oliver* and *Richard*.

5. By any kind of participation of any illgotten Goods, whether gotten by *Rapine*, or kept by *fraud*, and unjust Title. Of this saith the *Psalmist*, when thou saw'st a Thief

Thief thou consentedst with him, and hast been partaker with Adulterers. Psal. 50. 18. Thy Princes are Rebellious and Companions of Thieves; every one loveth gifts and followeth after Rewards. Isa. 1. 23.

6. By too much Lenity and Connivence, which harden's a sinner by Impunity. And therefore *Abaz* was threatned, for the unjust Mercy he shew'd to *Benbadad*, with a Sentence of Death without Mercy; Because thou hast let go out of thy hand a Man whom I appointed to utter destruction, therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people. 1. Kings 20. 42. This was the sin that brake *Eli's* Neck. 1. Sam. 3. 13. and 4. 18. The Magistrate is made to be Gods Revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. And he ought not to bear the sword in vain. Rom. 13. 4.

7. By unseasonable silence and Neglect of the Christian duty of reprobation. For this is a sin against those precepts, Levit. 19. 17. Isa. 58. 1. Ezek. 3. 17. and 33. 7.

Now by how many of these wayes Mr. Baxter hath been Accessarie to the Murder of One King, and to the exclusion of another, and to the debauching the peoples souls by his scandalous writings and example, I leave to be pronounced by the Intelligent Readers. Who, that they may judge the more exactly, shall do well to compare his signal Confessions above recited, both with his flattering and blessing the Old and Young *Cromwell*, And with his other Confessions which now ensue.

§. 12. He confesseth he was moved to engage himself in the Parliament Warr (Holy Common-wealth; p. 456.) And yet 2. That the Disorders which on both sides were unexcusable, were no just cause to cast the Nation into a Warr. (p. 474.) Nay, 3. That he would have ingaged as he did, (which was against his natural King and Leige Lord) if he had known the Parliament (he means the 2. Houses) had been for beginners, and in most fault. p. 480. Nay 4. that the warr was not so pro-

He being an incendiary in the Warr, and incouraging many thousands to rebel proved out of his confessions.

cure

Though here he confesseth he was a Col-
blower and in-
courage
thousands to
Rebell, yet he
dares not re-
pse, p. 486.
Mark the
tenderneſſe of
his Conſcience
firſt he fought
againſt his
King, & then
conſidered if
lawfully.
Note that by
one of the 3.
eſtates he muſt
mean the King
or the Biſhops

His Denying
the ſupremacy
of the King, which
yet he allowed
the very Crom-
wells, yet ſurely
he is proved by
his Confeſſions
to be a Rebell.
y Pref. p. 23.

care a change of the conſtitution, to take down Royalty and
the houſe of Lords, but clean contrary, p. 482. (why then
did he ſawn upon both the Cromwells?) 5. That all of
them did ruſh too eagerly into the heat of Diviſions and
warr, and none of them did ſo much as they ſhould have
done to prevent it. And that himſelf, in particular did
ſpeak much to blow the coals, for which he ſaith he daily
begs forgiveness of the Lord. (p. 485.) Nay 6. That he
encouraged many thousands to engage againſt the Kings
Army: And is under a ſelf-ſuſpicion whether that
engagement was lawfull, or not, yea that he will con-
tinue this ſelf-ſuſpicion, (p. 486.) Nay 7. he confeſ-
ſeth what he is, by ſolemnly making this Declaration,
That if any of us can prove he was guilty of hurt to the per-
ſon of the King, or deſtruction of the Kings power, or
changing the Fundamental Conſtitution of the Common-
wealth, taking down the houſe of Lords without conſent of
all three States, that had a part in the Sovereignty, &c.
He will never gainſay, as if we call him a moſt perfidious
Rebell, and tell him he is guilty of farre greater ſin than
Murder, Whoredom, Drunkenneſſe, or ſuch like. Or if we
can ſolidly confute his grounds, he will thank us, and con-
feſs his ſin to all the World. p. 490. Here then I chal-
lenge him to make good his promiſe. For I have
proved him as guilty, as any Rebell can be imagin'd, in
divers parts of this Poſtſcript. And his grounds I have
conſuted in my Appendix for Mr. Hickman §. 78, 79.
If he thinks not ſolidly, let him answer it if he is able.

§. 13. What his chief Ground is upon which he goes
(whileſt he ſpeaks of the King as of a Rebell to the two
Houſes) I eaſily gather from theſe words, which I finde in
his Preface to the ſame book. To this queſtion [did
not you reſiſt the King?] His answer is Verbatim, thus
1. Prove that the King was the higheſt power in the time of
diviſion, and that he had power to make that war which he
made, and I will offer my head to Juſtice as a Rebell.]
He here implicitey confeſſeth, the King was once the
higheſt

biggest power and implies he lost it by the Divisions. But that he never could loose it, and that demonstrably he had it, I have made it most evident in the *Appendix* of this book, which concerns Mr. Baxter as much as Mr. Hickman, at least as far as I have proved the *Supremacy of the King* (§ 78.) which both the *Houses* of that *Parliament*, did swear to acknowledg and to assert. However, if his *Supremacy* had been a *Disputable* thing, yet whilst the most learned of the Land, both *Judges* and *Divines* did assert it in books which were never answered, Mr. Baxter should have staid for the decision of that dispute, before he resisted that power, for the resisting of which (for ought he knew) he might be damned, *Rom. 13. 4.* Besides when he knew 'twas no sin to abstain from fighting against the King, and that fighting against him was a damning sin, (if it was any) in the judgment of such persons as *Bp. Hall, Bp. Morton, Bp. Davenant, Bp. Brownrigg, D. Sanderson, D. Oldsworth,* & thousands more, he should have taken the safest course, and rather have strained at a Gnat, then have swallowed a Camel. In a word, That the warr was begun by the two *Houses*, and only followed by the King in his most *Necessary Defence*, hath been proved too often to be excusably denied. And that our Law doth declare it to be *high Treason*, to
 " seize the Kings Ports, Forts, Magazine of war,
 " to remove Counsellors by Arms, to Levy Warr, to
 " alter the Law, to counterfeit the broad Seal, to ad-
 " here to any state within the Kingdom but the Kings
 " Majesty, to imprison the King until he agree to cer-
 " tain Demands. Unanswerably proved by the most ex-
 cellent Judge *Jenkins*, from page 37. as far as page 77.
 That the power of the *Militia* and of making war is by
 Law in the King, yea that *All Authority and Jurisdiction*
Spiritual and Temporal is derived from the King, there-
 fore none from the *Houses*, The same Judge hath evinced
 p. 20. and 8. and 13. I exhort Mr. Baxter to read the
 works of that Learned person, and either to baffle all
 that

that Law, and to confute that mighty Lawyer, or else to declare he hath been worse then either a Drunkard, or an Adulterer, and offer his head as a Rebel, according to his present promise. I would not exhort him to the later, but that I think it the way to obtain his pardon

His being a
Troyer to the
House which he
had set above
the King, by set-
ting Richard to
have them when
they disowned
him.

And for own-
ing Cromwells
Justice for a full
and free parli-
ment.

§. 14. Whilst he saith that his Protector was set over us by God, and owned also by a full and free Parliament (ibid. p. 484. lin. 2.) he does not only falsifie against a known matter of fact, (All the considerable persons in the Land having been utterly against him) but he grossly gives the lye to the Secluded Members, (whom he had called the first sort of the best Governours in the Land,) and to both the Houses of that very Parliament with whom he engaged against the King. In stead of proving this at large (which is not fit for this Postscript) I will refer him to the perusal of Mr. Pryns True & perfect Narrative. And to The True State of the Secluded Members Case, in Vindication of themselves. From thence he may see how he hath Trespas'd against them. Besides that a Parliament cannot be full, without the King (who is the Head) and House of Lords (who are the shoulders) never was any full Body made up of leggs with an Addition of some other Inferiour Members. But Squire Cromwell was not the King, nor was the pack of Mechanicks an House of Lords, nor is it less then high Treason, to set up either with those pretentions, yet this was done by Mr. Baxter; let him deny it if he is able. Again a Parliament cannot be Free, unless the Commons are chosen by all the people who are qualified by law to give their suffrage. Whereas no loyal Man was allowed by Cromwell to give a voice at those Elections; and no honest Man could safely do it. For besides the danger of provoking a proud Usurper, Squire Cromwell had no more right to send out Writs for an Election of Parliament Men, then any Porter or Scavenger in all the Kingdom, Nay he had less, rather than more, by being Son to so guilty and foul a Tyrant. Richards issuing

out

out of writs was a most *Treafurable Faët*; And could that make a Parliament *full or free*, for which the maker by Law might be hang'd at *Tiburn*? Let Mr. Baxter now consider in how many respects he is obnoxious; both to the wrath of God, for all his *Perjuries* and *Time-serving*; to the wrath of God's Anointed, (whose *Restaurazion* is not impossible, though somewhat remote from the eye of flesh) for all his *Treasons*, and * *slanders*; To the wrath of the two *Houses* (before they were Garbled by the Army and Oliver Cromwell) by setting up, to their destruction, a pack of flattering *Cromwellians*, and affording them the name of a *Full and Free Parliament*. Lord! to what times are we reserved, when such a Creature may pass for a *godly brother*, and be entrusted with peoples souls?

atives of the Nation, and its whole security (*Holy Com. wealth, page 480. section 19.*)

* Note his ungodly Resolution to take that for granted, which was visibly false, (viz. that the King would have ruin'd the Representation)

§. 16. Whilst he saith [*The old Constitution was King, Lords, and Commons, which we were sworn, and sworn, and sworn again to be faithful to, and to defend, Praef. p. 9.* he either implies there was since a new Constitution, and then he must shew by whose Authority it was made, or else he must confess he spake and acted against his conscience, when he *claw'd* the *Cromwells* and their Abettors, as hath been shewd. And he must name by what power he could be absolved from his *three oaths*, or else acknowledge to all the world, he is a *perjur'd, perjur'd, perjur'd person*. For where was his *Faithfulness* to the King, (to which he was sworn, and sworn, and sworn,) when he confesseth he encouraged so many thousands to fight against him? and when he acknowledged Mr. Cromwell to be his *Sovereign*; And set over him by God too, who did but suffer and permit (that is, not hinder,) the Prince of Darkness to set him over us. (Is Mr. Baxter qualified for the Priesthood, being not able to distinguish betwixt *Permission* and *approbation*, *sufferance* and *appointment*, or betwixt Gods patience, and the Activity of Satan?) How again did he defend the *Lords*

He is evinced out of his mouth to have been perjur'd over and over,

his charge a-
gainst the
Lords and
Commons,
and his setting
aside the King
more then the
houses ever
did.

and Commons of the Long Parliament (in conjunction with the King, or divided from him,) when he asserted *Cromwells* Juncto to be a full and free Parliament? yet he knowes what it was, which he was sworn to defend.

§. 17. Whilst he saith [*The King withdrawing, the Lords and Commons ruled alone, ibid,*] he first gives the lye to the Lords and Commons; who in their *Addresses and Declarations* did own the King to be their *Sovereign*, and called themselves his *humble subjects*, (Mr. Baxter himself could say no more to Mr. *Cromwel*) They protested against the *thought* of ever changing the Government, or lessening his *Majesties* just Prerogative, but their Intention was to make him the *greatest Prince in Christendome*; They confessed that *without* him they might not Rule, and therefore used *His Name* to give countenance to their Actions. I could write a volume on this occasion, were it not fitter to referre unto severall volumes already written. Let Mr. Baxter write less till he hath read more, and let him read the writings of the most learned Doctor Hammond, both against the Ordinance of the Lords and Commons for abolishing the Liturgie, and against taking up of Arms under colour of Religion against the lawfull Magistrats. Let him read Judge Jenkins against Master Prin's first writings, and let him read the latter writings of Mr. Prin against himself; Let him read Mr. Diggs, and Doctor Langbane, The Regal Apologie, the excellent observations upon *Aristotles Politiques*, and many more such books, then do occur to my memory whilst I am writing. Next in saying the King withdrew, he doth unreasonably imply the King's withdrawing from the Government; why else doth he add, *the Lords and Commons ruled alone*? which, as it is a most senseless and a most traitterous insinuation, so it seems to be the Reason why the man makes so ill use of *Grotius*, whom he doth either not understand, (as indeed Mr. Baxter is a very small Latinist, and not a small, but rather no Greeke,) or wilfully mistake, and most unpardonably misapply. As the Hereticks

ticks have ever abused Scripture, not onely beside, but against its meaning.

§. 18. Whilst he adds of the *Lords and Commons*, [*That though they ruled alone, They attempted not the change of the species of Government, ibid.*] first he implies a contradiction; for he confessed the *Constitution to have been King, Lords and Commons*, which species of Government must needs be changed, if the two later do Rule alone or without the Former. Does Mr. Baxter think there is a *Monarchy* without a *Monarch*? Or, that the *two Houses* can make a *Monarchy* without a single person to Form and Head them? Or that it is no contradiction, to Rule alone, and not alone? Or does he mean that the *Lords and Commons* did onely intend to depose the *King*, and set up some other (*Richard or Oliver,*) in his stead, that so the species of Government might still remain? Or does he not know what species signifies? One of these five things must needs be the reason of his miscarriage; But which of the five, let him determine.

His most Notable contradiction about the Houses ruling without the King.

§. 19. Whereas I had shew'd him his guilt, and folly, in accusing (not onely *Grotius*, but) in general Terms our *Episcopal Divines*, and in particular Doctor Taylor, nay Bishop Pierce, and Bishop Wren, whereof not one (for ought he knowes) is of *Grotius* his mind; He now so juggles with his Readers, as to alleviate the matter in two points, and grossely to falsifie in a third, 1. He saith he did intimate, what he knows he expressed in broadest wise. 2. He saith he did intimate they were addicted to Popery, when he cannot but know he had call'd them *Papists*. 3. He saith he onely spake this of *Grotius*, and all that are of his mind, when he knowes he spake it of a multitude, whose minds he knows not. Nay I told him (what he confesseth) That the Prelatists are not agreeable to *Grotius*, in that for which he was most suspected; to wit, his thinking that the Bull of Pius Quintus may (for peace) be subscribed in commodious sense. Yet could not *Grotius* have turned *Papist*, for all those Reasons which I rendered

His new Miscarriage against Grotius and the Episcopal Divines

dred in my *Defense of Grotius*, to which Master Baxter doth here turn Tail, Neither acknowledging his *guilt*, (of which I am sure he is convinced) nor making a shew that he is *Innocent*, unless he thinks it sufficient to *beat the Question*. To my great Number of Arguments, he hath not so much as brought *one answer*; to my great number of Answers (against his old Arguments) he hath not given so much as the *least Reply*; And lastly for his *Forgeries or Falsifications* of the Text, or his *false translating* the words of *Grotius*, (whether weakly or wilfully let others judge) the man is left destitute of all *Apologie or Excuse*.

He is proved to be a Jesuite by as good Logick as he useth.

* See my Appendix to New Disc. Disc. 5. p. 170. & 174.

§. 20. But because he *relents onely by halves*, and continues *stomachfull* in affirming, that (if we are not quite given up to Popery) we are too much inclined, and *addicted to it*; I will a little be pleasant with him, and prove *himself* to be a *papist* (yea a *Jesuite* if he will,) by adding now a *fiftieth Argument* (to the number of fourteen which I had plyed him with before; whereof *not one* is answered by him,) which at least *ad hominem* will prove to be of sufficient force. He that espouseth and puts in practice the *Jesuites Doctrine of Probability*, must needs be a *Jesuite* (and so a *Papist*) by Mr. Baxter's way of Argumentation; But Mr. Baxter hath done the *former*, for ought I am able to apprehend) and therefore he cannot but be the *later*, by his own way of Argumentation. The *Jesuits Doctrine of Probability* is most briefly expressed in these four Rules. I will set them down in my *Antibours* own words.

The Jesuites Doctrine of Probability. chez les provinciaux. p. 73:74.

1. Lors qu'il y a différentes opinions probables sur quelque point, Toutes les deux opinions sont également seures en conscience. Quamcumque duarum viarum primò diversarum homines inierint, rectà tendunt ad superos. *Escobar. Theol. moral. Tom. 1. in p. 1. cap. 3.*

2. Il est permis de choisir l'opinion la moins probable & la moins seure.

3. Une opinion est probable, lors qu'elle est appuyée d'une

d'une raison ou d'une autorité considerable & il n'est pas necessaire, que ces deux conditions soient jointes ensemble, l'une ou l'autre suffisant. (Note that the former they call an *Intrinsicall*, the later an *extrinsicall* probability.)

4. Selon le sentiment general des Casuists, une opinion est probable, & peut estre communement suivie sans crainte, lors qu'elle est soutenue par quatre Auteurs graves. Mais plusieurs enseignent que l'Autorité d'un seul suffit.

Now if Mr. Baxter did not believe, That an opinion is probable, when 'tis supported by a Reason without Authority, or by an Authority without a Reason; And that he may with a good conscience choose to follow which he pleaseth of two opinions, or both by turns, or (if he please) the less probable of the two; what could move him to publish so many contradictory Doctrines, as I have shew'd out of his writings? Or how could he hope for any pardon for so many contradictory actions, as I have cited out of his Life, and publick practice? I will leave him to be examin'd by my *New Discoverer* Discover'd, by severall things in this *Postscript*, compared with the Rules above recited. If he shall say he was not guided by the Jesuites Doctrine, he will be found to be by so much the more Incapable of Excuse. For the more wilful a sinner is, he cannot choose but be the worse. And how extravagantly he argues that I am Popishly affected, because I have evidently proved that *Grains* never turn'd Papist, Let him read (and blush) in my *Appendix* directed to him. §. 4. p. 167, 168.

I am sure some of his Brethren are more like *Papists* then any *Grains*, or any English Prelatist within my knowledge. For *Thomas Goodwin* anointed a sick Gentlewoman with oyle. And in the Church at *Arnhem* (where Mr. *Archer* himself was a kind of Pastor) Anointing the sick with oyle was a standing ordinance for the Church members. And upon the propounding with what oyle the anction was to be made, oyle of olives was resolved to be the

Popery com-
mon to *Idem*.
Goodwin with
some noted
Presbyterians

* See his An-
tapologia, p.
29.

* See Dr. Ro-
ger Drake's let-
ter to M. Love
p. 7.

Mr. Baxter's
Puritanism as
well in life as
Doctrine.

His additio-
nal Falshood,

fittest for that use. All this is said by one of the Brother-
hood, * Mr. Edwards; who also tels us of a Gentleman in
that Church, (president Lawrence is thought to have been
the man.) who propounded (saith my Author) that singing
of Hymns was an ordinance, which is, that any person of
the congregation, exercising his own gifts, should sing an
Hymn in the Congregation, the rest being silent. But it was
more like Popery, that * Doctor Drake should desire Mr.
Love to pray for him, (not whilst on earth, but) when in
heaven. And when Mr. Jackson (the Presbyterian Mini-
ster) had confessed a thing from which he afterwards re-
coil'd, (affirming it was true, but refusing to swear it as a
witness, the Lord Pres.—(as they call'd him) said o-
penly in the Court,—well, Jesuites and Priests, they say, you
are none, but you are their Brethren [pag. 52. Loves Trial.]
Nor do I really think that Mr. Baxter is a Jesuite, though
I have proved him to be such, according to the Logick in
which he deals. I also proved he was an * Heathen, by an
Argument *ad hominem* beyond exception; of which, 'tis
well he is so cunning as not to make the least mention.

§. 21. He concludes his postscript (as I shall mine) with
the odious part of the puritanism of his Life, of which (he
saith) he hears little from me, but his own confessions, and
his possessing a sequestration, (for he was loath to call it
another mans Living,) concerning which, he answers nothing,
(not any one word to all my Chapter) but onely saith he
might answer, if the love of Mr. Dance restrained him, &c.
p. 329] In which parcell of Expressions there are obler-
vable particulars, to which I shall return these following
things.

1. Though I insisted pretty largely on many points of
his practical Puritanism, as all will say who will but read
my *New Discoverer Discover'd*, (and therefore this is one
of his many falshoods,) yet now I hope in this *Postscript*
he will find a supply of my former mercifull defect, at which
he must not be angry, because he hath made it thus need-
full for me.

2. The first and worst Puritanes (at least in Christendome) were the Followers of *Marens*, that monstrous Heretick. And Mr. Baxter (as neer as any) hath written after that Copy. Those Antient Hereticks made Accompt they were so pure and 'perfect, and under such an Incapacity to fall from Grace and Gods favour, that they might live in any course of the greatest sin; without the least fear, because without the least danger of being damn'd. † For by the Benefit of Redemption they had a priviledge of Impunity for all their sins, which was not indulged to other Mortals; And in the midst of all their villanies they were protected with such an Helmet, as they had read of in Homers Iliads, And by that (as by a skreen) they were made invisable to the Judge. Now whether Mr. Baxter doth hope to hide himself from God; (as Pallas in * Homer from the discovery of Mars, or as Gyges went invisable by the priviledge of his Ring,) or is carried away by the vehement strength of his opinion, That being once godly he must be always unavoidably, and though God cannot but see, yet can he not punish his impieties with pains eternal; whether he stick to his famous Doctrine, That a man must be a † greater sinner then David was in his Murder and Adultery, Peter in his perjury and denial of Christ, Lot in his Drunkenness and Incest, and Solomon in his Idolatry, before he can be said to be notoriously ungodly; sure I am I have evinced, he is as scandalous in his life, as in his Doctrine; Because I have proved the Kings Supremacie, and that in respect of the two Houses, even of that very Parliament under which Mr Baxter doth seek for shelter. And having proved him to have been a * perfidious Rebell (Reader 'tis his own expression) by having proved the very thing upon which he confesseth he must be such, and gives the world † leave to say, He is worse then a Murderer, an Adul-

ter, in his Holy Common wealhb. pag. 490. lin. 9, 10. † He hath promis'd never to gainsay it, on the hypothesis spoken of.

The original of Puritanism among Professors of Christianity.

* Τηλεις ἐ-
αυσις ἀναρ-
ρδοτες γυν-
αιδεσιν πιδ-
διδδσσαν.—

† — Διδ εἰ-
λυθίως πύ-
τυ πιδασιν
μυθία ἐς
μαθιδί οἱδον
ἐχοντες διδ-
ος ἡ ἀπολύ-
τητων ἀρε-
τήτων ἐ ἀρε-
τας ἰνιδον τοῖ
κεντῇ. &c.

Iren adversf.
Hær. l. i. c. 9.
p. 72.

* Homer. Il. 5.
Τλω Όμει-
αν κωλύν
ἀδλως οἱδ-
δους, οἱδ-
τῷ ἀρετῶν
ἐκοντῶν τῷ
κεντῶν. Irenæ-
us ubi supra.

† See the pa-
ges exactly
cited with the
words, in my
new Diss. Dis-
c. 3. sect. 1. p.
61, 62, 63.
&c.

* See his Con-

Our English
Puritans ca-
racterized by
Salmasius, one
of the lea-
nedest of the
Beyond-sea
Protestants.

* Defens.
Reg. c. 10.

† How neerly
this toucheth
Mr. Baxter,
see the whole
third Chapter
of my *New*
Disc. Disc.
Mr. Baxter de-
clared by
God's Anoin-
ted to be a
seditious and
schismatical
person.

terer,, a Drunkard, and the like, (still I speak his own words,) I think I need not add more concerning his *Puritanism of Life*.

Before I leave this subject, (which yet I will never leave finally, whilst Mr Baxter shall be so daring as to continue a publick Advocate for the worst of *Hypocrites*, whose Rebellions, Murders, Schism, Sacrilege, have evinced them to be such by many an *ocular demonstration*,) I will add the character which *Salmasius* hath given of our *Puritans*, who yet was a friend and Patron to them, untill he was converted by seeing their *usage* of the King.

* Belli isti sane *Puritani* sub Regno *Elizabetha* prodire
“ e Tenebris *ORCI*, & Ecclesiam inde turbare primum
“ coeperunt. — persuadent sibi, se posse cujuscunque sce-
“ leris esse Affines, & tamen sanctitatem in medio sceleris
“ *Actu* retinere. (In English thus) Those goodly *Puri-*
“ *taines* did first come forth from the dark pit of Hell un-
“ der the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth*, And thence began
“ to disturb the Church. — † They persuade themselves,
“ that (being once sanctified) they may ingage in any
“ villany, and yet, in the very act, retain their sanctity.

3. It were *Puritanism* enough, if he had onely invaded his Neighbours goods, and Intitled Gods service to his Impiety. If he shall say he is established by any Ordinance of the two Houses, (which without the King cannot possibly be a legal and Rightfull Parliament) I shall first refer him for satisfaction to my whole Chapter upon the subject, (against which he hath not offered one word of Answer.) Next I shall tell him that the two Houses were bound to keep *Magna Charta*, and not to break it; And so they were told by his Sacred Majesty, in his Printed Proclamation against the oppression of the Clergy by the Insurrection of Faction and Schismaticall persons into their cures, &c. wherein he said 1. That by the great Charter of England, no Ecclesiastical Possession may be sequestred but by the Ordinary. 2. That what ever was pretended, men of learning and piety were dispossessed for their Loyalty, 3. That

he

Se^ct. 21, 22. touching some of his late dealings. 25

he straitly charged and commanded all his * Subjects, as well Ecclesiastical as Temporal, not to presume to intermeddle in that affair, — notwithstanding any sequestration, or pretended orders, or ordinances, or other command whatsoever, of one or * both Houses of * Parliament. 4. That if any should presume to transgress this command, he did hereby declare them to infringe the good old Law of the Land, and to assist * a Rebellion against himself. Let Mr. Baxter mark that, and read the whole Proclamation, to be seen in *Bibliotheca Regia* 9. 3. p. 324.

4. By saying he could say I know-not-what-of Master Dance, if love did not restrain him, he does maliciously imply that Mr. Dance is as scandalous as himself, or at least somewhat near it. Whether a drunkard, or a swearer, he leaves the Reader to suppose. There is no worse slandering an Innocent man, than by such a *Paralypsis* as here is used. Was it not enough, for Mr. Baxter to seize on his neighbours goods, but he must slur his good name too? 'Twas ill done of *Antinous*, to eat *Ulysses* his meat, and to beat him too into the bargain,

* Quære, whether M. Baxter was not the Kings subject, as much as *Cromwell*?

* Quære, whether the King, and his learned Judges with him, did not know his Right, as well as Mr. Baxter. His double injury to Master Dance,

ὅ, ὅρῳν. ἰλῶν βάλῃ δαξιδὸν ἄμων,
Πρυμνοτάδον κτ' νῦτον.

Homer: *Odyss.*
17.

But Mr. Baxter ought to chew upon *Ulysses* his Answer thereupon, and if he can digest it, 'twill do him good.

Ἄλλ' ἔτι πῶς πῶς γὰρ θεοὶ καὶ ἑλπίς ἐσίν,
Ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι πρὸς γὰρ μοιο τέλει θανάτοιο κίχελι.

§. 22. I should here have concluded with Mr. Baxter, but that in casting back my eye upon his p. 299. I find him railing at others, somewhat more then at my self. He saith that commonly the whole Kennels of swearers and drunkards, and scorners at godliness (so he ever calls hypocrisy) and such like, were continued in the communion of the Prela-

His unparal-
lel'd bitter-
ness against
Episcopacy
and our
Church seven
wayes rebu-
ked.

* He means
(oy that
word) the
constant sons
of the Church
of England.

* Key for Ca-
tholicks page
416.

† Note,
that in the 42
of Edw. 3. the
first chapter
doth enact,
that if any
statute be made
to the contrary,
it shall be hol-
den for null.
And see Judge
Fenk. p. 62.

* Consult Bi-
bliotheca Re-
gia for it, sect.
3. p. 328.

† See his Ma-
jesties Conces-
sions at the Isle
of Wight. ib. p.
357.

* See Doctor
Gauden's His-
tory of the
21. p. 334.

ticall Church; to which he adds (page 300.) *The scandalous Rabble are eager for prelacy, and their mode of Government and worship.* To which I answer 7. things. 1. what he saith is but *gratis dictum*; as *proofless*, as it is false; and yet no falser of the *Prelatical*, then *true* of the *Presbyterian* party. 2. If it were true, (as it is not) it would hold an objection against our Saviour, for admitting *Judas* to his Sacrament, as *Publicans* and *Sinners* to his converse. 3. Neither *drunkenness*, nor *swearing*, nor *murder*, nor *adultery*, (if Mr Baxter himself may be believed) is so bad as *Rebellion*. And he may fitly consider, what men are admitted to his *Communion*. 4. That his way of Government and worship hath been followed by *swearers*, and *perjur'd* persons, yea *incestuous* and *murderous*, and *parricidal*, I have proved undeniably in my *Discoverer* *Discovered*. 5. He forgets the foul fact with which he had charged the *Presbyterian Assembly of Divines*, when he said, '[That The Assembly had put down Prelacy, for which a Convocation had formed an oath to be imposed on all Ministers but a little before.]' Nothing can put down the right of that, which is of divine Institution. No † not a full and free Parliament, much less the two Houses without the King; much less the Assembly against the King. O wonder of wickedness! what a company of *inferiour* and *obnoxious* Ministers put down the Order of their *Superiours*? It was treason for them to sit, after his Majesties * *Proclamation*, [Inhibiting the Assembly of Divines and others, summoned to Westminster by an ordinance of both houses of Parliament, what a dismal character the King did fasten upon that Ordinance, and upon the Divines then Assembled, as men of no Reputation or Learning, and Preachers of Rebellion, &c. I wish that all men would read by having recourse to the Proclamation. 6. He passeth by the sin of *Sacrilege*, (which the † King proved to reign in the Presbyterians, and so he falls, with his Assembly men, under the lash of Dr Gauden. [As * if they were *Chap-lains*, at once serving the Lord, their *Bellies*, and the Times,

"Times, as partaking of the Table of the Lord, and the
 "Table of Devils; They rather cherish than crush this
 "Cockatrice; fearing to seem but luke-warm Reformers,
 "if they damped some of their good Masters zeal, by
 "justly damning this darling and damnable sin of Sacrilege;
 "which puts on the form not onely of godliness and Refor-
 "mation, but of thrift and good husbandry, to save the
 "publick purse the necessary expenses of a Civil warr;
 "which in some mens desires, as I believe it had never
 "been begun, but onely to destroy the Government of the
 "Church, and confiscate those Revenues, so (all things
 "computed) I no less believe that the secular purse hath
 "had but a dear pennyworth of those Church-Lands, at
 "so vast a charge as hath attended the warr, first commen-
 "ced by Presbytery against Episcopacy.] 7. All the prime of
 the Nobility, Gentry and Clergy, the King himself, and his
 Ancestors, all former Parliaments, and Magna Charta, are
 very eager for Prelacy. Are these a scandalous rabble
 with Mr. Baxter? No, the Rabble was such, by which
 Prelacy was decried, though the Gates of Hell shall not
 finally prevail against it.

I will add no more of those men (the sons of violence
 and Rapine) then what was said by Ulysses concerning
 the ill natur'd Antinous, who took possession of his house,
 laid siege unto his wife, forbid him to enter his own
 doors, added Railing to Robbery, and Blows to Railing,

Hom. Odyss.
 17.

Τὰ ὕβρεος τὴ βίη τὰ σὺν ἡπείρῳ βεβήκοι ἐν.

4. 23. Christian Reader, I am sensible of being tedi-
 ous by my prolixity. And therefore will end with an
 Account of my vindicative Justice to Master Baxter,
 however some of his Fautors may call it cruel.

The Conclu-
 sion.

As Mr. Baxter is a man, I truly love him, though I spare
 him not at all as a Malefactor. 'Tis plain I love him, be-
 cause I labour for his conversion: For I could wish him no
 greater punishment, then to be still what he is. But to

Dd's spare

* Ecclef. 8.
11.

spare the *Malefactor*, were a twofold Cruelty; as well to himself, as his weaker brethren. It were a cruelty to himself, because as long as he prospers, he will not mend. It were a cruelty to his Brethren, who live indulgently in sin by his Example. To make him Contemptible unto such, as do bless themselves in their Rebellions, through the Authority they ascribe to his books and Practice, I take it to be as good (I mean as *charitable*) a work, as I can set my Heart or my Hand unto. For he confessed he blew'd the coals of all our National Combustions; And those I may call the Devil's bonfires. It was the very worst thing in *Jeroboam* himself, that he made Israel to sin. It is for this very Reason, that the Devil himself is called *Satan*. And so Mr. Baxter hath been avowedly an Epidemical Disease to his native Countie; For, he professeth to have encouraged many thousands to engage their force against their Sovereign. And that (in the judgement of * *Salmasius* himself) was to have the highest hand in the blackest murder of the best King. Now the fewer Admirers this man shall have, (by the blessing of God upon my endeavours,) the fewer mens sins he will be answerable for. And let him kick whilst he will, my charity bids me consult his cure. No sinner can be more scandalous, than a sinner in Print. That Mr. Baxter hath been such, in a greater measure than *Paras*, (whose Book was burnt by the Hangman at the command of King James, and again (at the appointment of the whole Oxford University,) I have evinced in my former and later papers upon the subject. Saint Paul himself thought it a duty, to shame such Sinners for their Amendment; And by him I was persuaded to think it mine. When a man hath taken pains to let me know that he is blind, I hold it a duty to make him see, or at least to make him see that he sees just nothing; for fear he run against the wall, and break his forehead.

* Ad quorum actum, & ultra, in hoc Dramate desultando, filii gultientes Presbyteriani spectati sunt, Quinque autem illi merito Regis Occisi crimine notari magis debuerunt, quam qui viam ad eum occidendum munierant? Illi sunt, qui nefariam illum securim cervicibus ejus inflixerunt, non alii. Salmasius. De fens. Reg. c. 10. † Prævidit eas quas nunc Britannia sentit, Calamitates inde orituras. Gys. vot. pro pace. p. 49. * 2 Thes. 3. 14.

head.

head, or from a precipice, and break his neck. There is nothing so dangerous as for a *Buſard* to be Bold, upon a fanſifull presumption of being quick fighted.

I very well know that *Maſter Baxter*, if he is not converted, will be imbuſter'd againſt me by, what I ſay. But I leave it to the *Prudentialiſts* to be deterr'd with ſuch *Mormo's*, who dare be lazie and afraid to ſerve their God, and their Generation; And even cenſure their Brethren Who dare not fear to ſerve both. Beſides, I am armed by ſtrat of *Seneca*, *Quoſdam eſſe Talet, ne pulchrius ſit ab His vituperari, quam laudari*. And when I conſider that *Mr. Baxter* hath lick'd up the ſpittle of the *Cromwells*, and preached them up unto the ſkies, thereby becoming a partaker of their very worſt ſins, whiſt he hath rail'd (on the contrary) as well at the *King* as at the *Bishops*, and at all that is really *Great* or *Sacred*; I think it my *Happineſs* and my *Glory*, not to have my Name flurr'd with his commendations.

FINIS.

*The Typographical Errata the candid Reader will be
pleased either to pardon or to Correct.*

In Pref. p. 2. l. 5. in marg. r. Bortheus. p. 7. l. 22. for good, r. God.
p. 14. l. ult. r. needst.

Pag. 3. l. 18. r. Injustitia. p. 4. l. 6. in marg. after cap. r. 28. p. 5. l. 13.
in marg. after, pag. r. 20, 21. p. 7. l. 5. r. appetitum. lb. l. 26. r. be. p. 11. l.
1. in marg. after promise, r. of. p. 13. l. ult. in marg. r. and. p. 22. l. 23. af-
ter so. r. be. lb. p. 9. after will r. not. p. 26. l. 26. after conceive r. it. ibid. l.
ult. in marg. r. consequens. p. 27. l. 35. after is. r. so. p. 37. l. 24. dele and.
p. 40. l. 22. r. forbidding. ibid. l. 34. in marg. r. vetat. p. 44. l. ult. in marg. af-
ter 12. r. 4. p. 45. (l. ult. in marg. after 3024. r. chap. 9. p. 47. l. 30. after
hating r. God. p. 49. l. 3. in marg. after sol. r. 2. p. 54. l. ult. r. c. 6. p. 56.
l. 1. in marg. after of. r. the. ibid. l. 2. in marg. after. l. r. 3. lb. l. 73. in marg.
r. c. 24. p. 57. l. 22. r. thing. p. 76. l. 1. in marg. r. p. 127. p. 77. l. 4. in marg.
r. verbis. ib. l. ult. in marg. r. p. 671. p. 78. l. 34. in marg. r. aliam. lb. l. 3. r.
of. p. 8. l. 5. r. 2. diff. p. 83. l. 30. after original r. fin. p. 84. l. 1. after an r.
evil. p. 85. l. 19. r. uno. p. 88. l. 4. in marg. r. anam. p. 90. l. 7. r. Catarchesin.
p. 104. l. penult. r. p. 150. p. 106. l. 18. r. in. p. 137. l. 18. after of, r. which. p.
144. l. 21. r. syllilline. p. 145. l. ult. in marg. r. stealths. p. 146. col. 2. l. 30. d.
ad i. o. lineas, & id genus reliqua. p. 149. col. 2. l. 31. r. q. 9. p. 153. l. 8. r.
endeavour. p. 159. l. 7. r. so. p. 178. l. 4. r. fuch. p. 203. l. 29. r. p. 32.

Errata in the Postscript to Mr. Baxter.

Pag. 2. l. 4. in marg. r. *μικρα* [C]. lb. l. 11. in marg. r. Boutefeu. p. 4.
l. 29. r. Patizitha. p. 5. l. 14. for and r. or. p. 8. l. 4. for. r. by. lb. l. 8. for the
r. thee. p. 9. l. 21. in marg. after that. r. that. p. 10. l. 15. r. Traitor. p. 15.
l. 30. after Demands, r. is.

